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ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXTS.

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ON THE

ORIGIN AND HISTORY

OF

THE PEOPLE OF INDIA,

THEIR RELIGION AND INSTITUTIONS,

COLLECTED, TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED,

BY

J. MUIR, D.C.L., LL.D., PH.D.

VOLUME THIRD.

THE VEDAS: OPINIONS OF THEIR AUTHORS AND OF LATER INDIAN WRITERS ON THEIR ORIGIN, INSPIRATION, AND AUTHORITY.

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Ārtheपsavaḥ ṛishayo devatāś chhandobhir abhyadhāvan |
Anukramaṇikā.

"Rishis, seeking to obtain the various objects of their desire, hastened to the deities with metrical compositions."

(See p. 211 of this volume.)

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PREFACE

The object which I have had in view in the series of of treatises which this volume forms a part, has been to investigate critically the most important points in the civil and religious history of the Hindus. Having shown in the First Volume that the mythical and legendary accounts given in the Purāṇas, etc., regarding the origin of the caste system which has long prevailed in India, are mutually contradictory and insufficient to establish the early existence of the popular belief regarding the distinct creation of four separate tribes, as an original and essential article of the Brahmanical creed; and having endeavoured to prove, in the Second Volume, by a variety of arguments, drawn chiefly from comparative philology and from the contents of the Rigveda, that the Hindus are descended from a branch of the Indo-European stock, which dwelt originally along with the other cognate races in Central Asia, and subsequently migrated into Northern Hindustan, where the Brahmanical religion and institutions were developed and matured;—I now come, in this Third Volume, to consider more particularly the history of the Vedas, regarded as the sacred Scriptures of the Hindus, and the inspired source from which their religious and philosophical systems (though,

to a great extent, founded also on reasoning and speculation) profess to be mainly derived; or with which, at least, they all claim to be in harmony.

When I speak, however, of the history of the Veda, I am reminded that I am employing a term which will suggest to the philosophical reader the idea of a minute and systematic account of the various opinions which the Indians have held in regard to their sacred books from the commencement, through all the successive stages of their theological development, down to the present time. To do anything like this, however, would be a task demanding an extent of research far exceeding any to which I can pretend. At some future time, indeed, we may hope that a history of the theological and speculative ideas of the Indians, which shall treat this branch also of the subject, may be written by some competent scholar. My own design is much more modest. I only attempt to show what are the opinions on the subject of the Veda, which have been entertained by certain distinct sets of writers whom I may broadly divide into three classes—(1) the mythological, (2) the scholastic, and (3) the Vedic.

The first, or mythological class, embraces the writers of the different Purāṇas and Itihāsas, and partially those of the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads, who, like the compilers of the Purāṇas, frequently combine the mythological with the theosophic element.

The second, or scholastic class, includes the authors of the different philosophical schools, or Darśanas, with their scholiasts and expositors, and the commentators

on the Vedas. The whole of these writers belong to the class of systematic or philosophical theologians; but as their speculative principles differ, it is the object of each particular school to explain and establish the origin and authority of the Vedas on grounds conformable to its own fundamental dogmas, as well as to expound the doctrines of the sacred books in such a way as to harmonize with its own special tenets.

The third class of writers, whose opinions in regard to the Vedas I have attempted to exhibit, is composed (1) of the rishis themselves, the authors of the Vedic hymns, and (2) of the authors of the Upanishads, which, though works of a much more recent date, and for the most part of a different character from the hymns, are yet regarded by later Indian writers as forming, equally with the latter, a part of the Veda. As the authors of the hymns, the earliest of them at least, lived in an age of simple conceptions and of spontaneous and childlike devotion, we shall find that, though some of them appear, in conformity with the spirit of their times, to have regarded their compositions as in a certain degree the result of divine inspiration, their primitive and elementary ideas on this subject form a strong contrast to the artificial and systematic definitions of the later scholastic writers. And even the authors of the Upanishads, though they, in a more distinct manner, claim a superhuman authority for their own productions, are very far from recognizing the rigid classification which, at a subsequent period, divided the Vedic writings from all other religious works, by a broad line of demarcation.

It may conduce to the convenience of the reader, if I furnish here a brief survey of the opinions of the three classes of writers above described, in regard to the Vedas, as these opinions are shown in the passages which are collected in the present volume.

The first chapter (pp. 1–217) contains texts exhibiting the opinions on the origin, division, inspiration, and authority of the Vedas, which have been held by Indian authors shortly before, or subsequent to, the collection of the Vedic hymns, and consequently embraces the views of the first two of the classes of writers above specified, viz. (1) the mythological and (2) the scholastic. In the first Section (pp. 3–10), I adduce texts from the Purusha Sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the Chhāndogya Upanishad, the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, and the Institutes of Manu, which variously represent the Vedas (*a*) as springing from the mystical sacrifice of Purusha; (*b*) as resting on (or inhering in) Śkambha; (*c*) as cut or scraped off from him, as being his hair, and his mouth; (*d*) as springing from Indra; (*e*) as produced from time; (*f*) as produced from Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya; (*g*) as springing from Prajāpati, and the waters; (*h*) as being the breathing of the Great Being; (*i*) as being dug by the gods out of the mind-ocean; (*j*) as being the hair of Prajāpati's beard, and (*k*) as being the offspring of Vāch.

In page 287 of the Appendix a further verse of the Atharva-veda is cited, in which the Vedas are declared to have sprung from the leavings of the sacrifice (*uchchhishṭa*).

In the second Section (pp. 10–14) are quoted passages from the Vishṇu, Bhāgavata, and Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇas, which represent the four Vedas as having issued from the mouth of Brahmā at the creation; several from the Harivaṁśa, which speak of the Vedas as created by Brahmā, or as produced from the Gāyatrī; another from the Mahābhārata, which describes them as created by Vishṇu, or as having Sarasvatī for their mother; with one from Manu, which declares the Vedas, along with certain other objects, to be the second manifestation of the Sattva-guṇa, or pure principle, while Brahmā is one of its first manifestations.

The third Section (pp. 14–18) contains passages from the Brāhmaṇas, the Vishṇu Purāṇa, and the Mahābhārata, in which the Vedas are celebrated as comprehending all beings, as being the soul of metres, hymns, breaths, and gods, as imperishable, as the source of form, motion, and heat, of the names, forms, and functions of all creatures, as infinite in extent, as infinite in their essence (*brahma*), though limited in their forms as Rich, Yajush, and Sāman verses, as eternal, and as forming the essence of Vishṇu.

The fourth Section (pp. 18–36) contains passages from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu, in which the great benefits resulting from the study of the Vedas, and the dignity, power, authority, and efficacy of these works are celebrated; together with two other texts from the latter author and the Vishṇu Purāṇa, in which a certain impurity is predicated of the Sāma-veda (compare the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, as quoted in p. 12, where the four

Vedas are described as respectively partaking differently of the character of the three Guṇas, or Qualities); and some others from the Vāyu, Padma, Matsya, and Brahma-vaivartta Purāṇas, and the Mahābhārata, and Rāmāyaṇa, which derogate greatly from the consideration of the Vedas, by claiming for the Purāṇas and Itihāsas an equality with, if not a superiority to, the older scriptures. A passage is next quoted from the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, in which the Vedas and their appendages are designated as the "inferior science," in contrast to the "superior science," the knowledge of Soul; and is followed by others from the Bhagavad Gītā, the Chhāndogya Upanishad and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, in which the ceremonial and polytheistic portions of the Veda are depreciated in comparison with the knowledge of the supreme Spirit.

The fifth Section (pp. 36–49) describes the division of the Vedas in the third or Dvāpara age, by Vedavyāsa and his four pupils, according to texts of the Vishṇu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purāṇas; and then adduces a different account, asserting their division in the second or Tretā age, by the King Purūravas, according to another passage of the same Bhāgavata Purāṇa, and a text of the Mahābhārata (though the latter is silent regarding Purūravas).

Section vi. (pp. 49–57) contains passages from the Vishṇu and Vāyu Purāṇas and the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, regarding the schism between the adherents of the Yajurveda, as represented by the different schools of Vaiśampāyana and Yājnavalkya, and quotes certain remarks of

Prof. Weber on the same subject, and on the relation of the Rig and Sāma Vedas to each other, together with some other texts, adduced and illustrated by that scholar, on the hostility of the Ātharvaṇas towards the other Vedas, and of the Chandogas towards the Rig-veda.

Section vii. (pp. 57–70) contains extracts from the works of Sāyaṇa and Mādhava, the commentators on the Rig and Taittirīya Yajur Vedas, in which they both define the characteristics of the Veda, and state certain arguments in support of its authority. Sāyaṇa (pp. 58–66), after noticing the objections urged against his views by persons of a different school, and defining the Veda as a work consisting of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa, asserts that it is not derived from any personal, or at least not from any human, author (compare the further extract from him in p. 105); and rests its authority on its own declarations, on its self-proving power, on the Smṛiti (*i.e.* non-vedic writings of eminent saints), and on common notoriety. He then encounters some other objections raised against the Veda on the score of its containing passages which are unintelligible, dubious, absurd, contradictory, or superfluous. Mādhava (pp. 66–70) defines the Veda as the work which alone reveals the supernatural means of attaining future felicity; explains that males only, belonging to the three superior castes, are competent to study its contents; and asserts that, inasmuch as it is eternal, it is a primary and infallible authority. This eternity of the Veda, however, he appears to interpret as not being absolute, but as dating from the first creation, when it was produced from Brahmā,

though, as he is free from defects, the Veda, as his work, is self-proved.

Section viii. (pp. 70–108) contains the views of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, the (alleged) authors of the Mīmānsā and Brahma (or Vedānta) Sūtras on the eternity of the Veda. Jaimini asserts that sound, or words, are eternal, that the connection between words and the objects they represent also, is not arbitrary or conventional, but eternal, and that consequently the Vedas convey unerring information in regard to unseen objects. This view he defends against the Naiyāyikas, answering their other objections, and insisting that the names, derived from those of certain sages, by which particular parts of the Vedas are designated, do not prove those sages to have been their authors, but merely the teachers who studied and handed them down; while none of the names occurring in the Veda are those of temporal beings, but all denote some objects which have existed eternally. Two quotations in support of the supernatural origin of the Veda are next introduced from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara (a condensed account of the Mīmānsā system) and from the Vedārtha-prakāśa (the commentary on the Taittirīya Yajur-veda). The arguments in both passages (pp. 86–89) are to the same effect, and contain nothing that has not been already in substance anticipated in preceding summaries of the Mīmānsā doctrine. In reference to their argument that no author of the Veda is remembered, I have noticed here that the supposition which an objector might urge, that the rishis, the acknowledged utterers of the hymns,

might also have been their authors, is guarded against by the tenet, elsewhere maintained by Indian writers, that the rishis were merely seers of the pre-existing sacred texts. Some of the opinions quoted from the Sūtras of Jaimini are further enforced in a passage from the summary of the Mīmānsā doctrine, which I have quoted from the Sarva-darśana-sangraha. The writer first notices the Naiyāyika objections to the Mīmānsaka tenet that the Veda had no personal author, viz. (1) that any tradition to this effect must have been interrupted at the past dissolution of the universe; (2) that it would be impossible to prove that no one had ever recollected any such author; (3) that the sentences of the Veda have the same character as all other sentences; (4) that the inference,—drawn from the present mode of transmitting the Vedas from teacher to pupil,—that the same mode of transmission must have gone on from eternity, breaks down by being equally applicable to any other book; (5) that the Veda is in fact ascribed to a personal author in a passage of the book itself; (6) that sound is not eternal, and that when we recognize letters as the same we have heard before, this does not prove their identity or eternity, but is merely a recognition of them as belonging to the same species as other letters we have heard before; (7) that though Parameśvara (God) is naturally incorporeal, he may have assumed a body in order to reveal the Veda, etc. The writer then states the Mīmānsaka answers to these arguments thus: What does this alleged 'production by a personal author' (*paurusheyatva*) mean? The Veda, if supposed to be so pro-

duced, cannot derive its authority (*a*) from inference (or reasoning), as fallible books employ the same process. Nor will it suffice to say (*b*) that it derives its authority from its truth: for the Veda is defined to be a book which proves that which can be proved in no other way. And even if Parameśvara (God) were to assume a body, he would not, in that state of limitation, have any access to supernatural knowledge. Further, the fact that different śākhās or recensions of the Vedas are called after the names of particular sages, proves no more than that these recensions were studied by those sages, and affords no ground for questioning the eternity of the Vedas,—an eternity which is proved by the fact of our recognizing letters when we meet with them. These letters are the very identical letters we had heard before, for there is no evidence to show either that letters of the same sort (G's, for instance,) are numerically different from each other, or that they are generic terms, denoting a species. The apparent differences which are observable in the same letter, result merely from the particular characteristics of the persons who utter it, and do not affect its identity. This is followed by further reasoning in support of the same general view; and the writer then arrives at the conclusion, which he seems to himself to have triumphantly established, that the Veda is underived and authoritative.

The question of the effect produced on the Vedas by the dissolutions of the world is noticed in some extracts from Patanjali's Mahābhāshya and its commentators, which have been adduced by Prof. Goldstücker

in the Preface to his Mānava-kalpa Sūtra, and which I have partly reprinted in pp. 95 ff. It is admitted by Patanjali, that, though the sense of the Vedas is permanent, the order of their letters has not always remained the same, and that this difference is exhibited in the different recensions of the Kāṭhakas and other schools. Patanjali himself does not say what is the cause of this alteration in the order of the letters; but his commentator, Kaiyyaṭa, states that the order was disturbed during the great mundane dissolutions, etc., and had to be restored (though with variations) by the eminent science of the rishis. Kullūka, the commentator on Manu (see p. 6), maintains that the Veda was preserved in the memory of Brahmā during the period of dissolution; and promulgated again at the beginning of the Kalpa, but whether in an altered form, or not, he does not tell us. The latter point is also left unsolved in S'ankara's commentary on Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 30, which I quote in the Appendix, pp. 300 ff. Pages 93 ff. contain some remarks (by way of parenthesis) on the question whether or not the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā admits the existence of a Deity.

In the extract given in pp. 98–105 from his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras,[1] S'ankara, who follows the author of those Sūtras, and Jaimini, in basing the authority of the Vedas on the eternity of sound, finds it necessary to meet an objection that, as the gods mentioned in the Veda had confessedly an origin in time, the

[1] My attention was originally drawn to this passage by a treatise, then unpublished, by the Rev. Prof. Banerjea, formerly of Bishop's College, Calcutta.

words which designate those gods cannot be eternal, but must have originated co-evally with the created objects which they denote, since eternal words could not have an eternal connection with non-eternal objects. This difficulty he tries to overcome (ignoring the ground taken by Jaimini, that the Veda contains no references to non-eternal objects) by asserting that the eternal connection of words is not with individual objects, but with the species to which these objects belong, and that Indra and the other gods are proved by the Veda to belong to species. S'ankara then goes on to assert, on the authority of Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 28, fortified by various texts from the Vedas and the Smṛitis, that the gods and the world generally are produced (though not in the sense of evolution out of a material cause) from the word of the Vedas (see pp. 6 and 16) in the form of *sphoṭa*. This last term will be explained below. This subject above referred to, of the eternal connection of the words of the Veda with the objects they represent, is further pursued in a passage which I have quoted in the Appendix, p. 300, where an answer is given to the objection that the objects denoted by the words of the Veda cannot be eternal, as a total destruction of everything takes place (not, indeed, at the intermediate, but) at the great mundane dissolutions. The solution given is that, by the favour of the supreme Lord, the inferior lords Brahmā, etc., retain a recollection of the previous mundane conditions; and that in each successive creation everything is produced exactly the same as it had previously been. I then proceed in p. 105 to adduce a passage from Sāyaṇa, the

commentator on the Rig-veda, who refers to another of the Brahma Sūtras, i. 1, 3 (quoted in p. 106), declaring that Brahma was the source of the Veda, which Śankara interprets as containing a proof of the omniscience of Brahma. Sāyaṇa understands this text as establishing the superhuman origin of the Veda, though not its eternity in the proper sense, it being only meant, according to him (as well as to Mādhava; see p. xi.), that the Veda is eternal in the same sense as the æther is eternal, *i.e.* during the period between each creation and dissolution of the universe.

In opposition to the tenets of the Mīmānsakas, who hold the eternity (or the eternal self-existence) of the Veda, and to the dogmas of the Vedānta, as just expounded, Gotama, the author of the Nyāya aphorisms, denies (Section ix. pp. 108–118) the eternity of sound; and after vindicating the Veda from the charges of falsehood, self-contradiction, and tautology, deduces its authority from the authority of the wise, or competent, person or persons who were its authors, as proved by the efficacy of such of the Vedic prescriptions as relate to mundane matters, and can be tested by experience. It does not distinctly result from Gotama's aphorism that God is the competent person whom he regards as the maker of the Veda. If he did not refer to God, he must have regarded the rishis as its authors. The authors of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras, and of the Tarka Sangraha, as well as the writer of the Kusumānjali, however, clearly refer the Veda to Īśvara (God) as its framer (pp. 118–133). Udayana, the author of the latter

work (pp. 128–133), controverts the opinion that the existence of the Veda from eternity can be proved by a continuous tradition, as such a tradition must, he says, have been interrupted at the dissolution of the world, which preceded the existing creation. He, therefore (as explained by his commentator), infers an eternal (and omniscient author of the Veda; asserting that the Veda is *paurusheya*, or derived from a personal author; that many of its own texts establish this; and that the appellations given to its particular śākhās or recensions, are derived from the names of those sages whose persons were assumed by Īśvara, when he uttered them at the creation. In pp. 125 ff. I have quoted one of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras, with some passages from the commentator, to show the conceptions the writers entertained of the nature of the supernatural knowledge, or intuition, of the rishis.

Kapila, the author of the Sānkhya Aphorisms (pp. 133–138), agrees with the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika aphorists in denying the eternity of the Veda, but, in conformity with his own principles, differs from Gotama and Kaṉāda in denying its derivation from a personal (*i.e.* here, a divine) author, because there was no person (*i.e.* as his commentator explains, no God) to make it. Vishṉu, the chief of the liberated beings, though omniscient, could not, he argues, have made the Veda, owing to his impassiveness, and no other person could have done so from want of omniscience. And even if the Veda have been uttered by the primeval Purusha, it cannot be called his work, as it was breathed forth by him unconsciously. Kapila agrees

with Jaimini in ascribing a self-demonstrating power to the Veda, and differs from the Vaiśeshikas in not deriving its authority from correct knowledge possessed by a conscious utterer. He proceeds to controvert the existence of such a thing as *sphoṭa* (a modification of sound which is assumed by the Mīmānsakas, and described as single, indivisible, distinct from individual letters, existing in the form of words, and constituting a whole), and to deny the eternity of sound.

In the tenth Section (pp. 138–179) I shew (*a*) by quotations from the aphorisms of the Vedānta and their commentator (pp. 140–145), that the author and expounder of the Uttara Mīmāṁsā (the Vedānta) frequently differ from Jaimini the author of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā in the interpretation of the same texts of the Upanishads. A similar diversity is next (*b*) proved at greater length (pp. 145-173), by quotations from the aphorisms and commentaries of the Vedānta and the Sānkhya, to characterize the expositions proposed by the adherents of those two systems respectively. One quotation is given in pp. 175 ff. to shew (*c*) that the same is true in regard to the followers of the Vaiśeshika philosophy, who distinctly reject the Vedāntic explanations; and last of all (*d*) I have made some extracts (pp. 177 ff.) from the Bhakti Sūtras of Śāṇḍilya to exhibit the wide divergence of that writer from the orthodox views of the Vedānta regarding the sense of the Vedas. In pp. 173–175 I quote some remarks of Dr. E. Roer, and Prof. Max Müller, regarding the doctrines of the Upanishads, and their relations to the different philosophical schools.

In the facts brought forward in this section we find another illustration (1) of the tendency common to all dogmatic theologians to interpret in strict conformity with their own opinions the unsystematic and not always consistent texts of an earlier age which have been handed down by tradition as sacred and infallible, and to represent them as containing, or as necessarily implying, fixed and consistent systems of doctrine; as well as (2) of the diversity of view which so generally prevails in regard to the sense of such texts among writers of different schools, who adduce them with equal positiveness of assertion as establishing tenets and principles which are mutually contradictory or inconsistent.

In the eleventh Section (pp. 179–207) some passages are adduced from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, and from Kullūka's commentary on Manu, to show that a distinct line of demarcation is drawn by the scholastic writers between the Vedas on the one hand, and all other classes of Indian scriptures, embraced under the designation of Smṛiti (including the Darśanas, the Institutes of Manu, the Purāṇas, and Itihāsas, etc.), on the other, the first being regarded as independent and infallible guides, while the others are (in theory) held to be authoritative only in so far as they are founded on, and coincide with, the Veda. The practical effect of this distinction is, however, much lessened by the fact that the ancient sages, the authors of the Smṛitis, such of them, I mean, as, like Manu, are recognized as orthodox, are looked upon by Mādhava and Śankara as having had access to Vedic texts now no longer extant, as having held communion with the gods,

and as having enjoyed a clearness of intuition into divine mysteries which is denied to later mortals (pp. 181–185). Sankara, however (as shewn in pp. 184–192), does not regard all the ancients as having possessed this infallible insight into truth, but exerts all his ingenuity to explain away the claims (though clearly sanctioned by an Upanishad) of Kapila, who was not orthodox according to his Vedāntic standard, to rank as an authority. In his depreciation of Kapila, however, S'ankara is opposed to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (p. 192). I then proceed to observe (pp. 194–196) that although in ancient times the authors of the different philosophical systems (*Dars'anas*) no doubt put forward their respective opinions as true, in opposition to all the antagonistic systems, yet in modern times the superior orthodoxy of the Vedānta appears to be generally recognized; while the authors of the other systems are regarded, *e.g.* by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, as, amid all their diversities, having in view, as their ultimate scope, the support of the Vedāntic theory. The same view, in substance, is taken by Vijnāna Bhikshu, the commentator on the Sānkhya Sūtras, who (pp. 196–203) maintains that Kapila's system, though atheistic, is not irreconcilable with the Vedānta and other theistic schools, as its denial of an Īs'vara (God) is only practical, or regulative, and merely enforced in order to withdraw men from the too earnest contemplation of an eternal and perfect Deity, which would impede their study of the distinction between matter and spirit. To teach men this discrimination, as the great means of attaining final liberation, is one of the two main objects, and strong

points, of the Sānkhya philosophy, and here it is authoritative; while its atheism is admitted to be its weak side, and on this subject it has no authority. Vijnāna Bhikshu goes on to say that it is even supposable that theistic systems, in order to prevent sinners from attaining knowledge, may lay down doctrines partially opposed to the Vedas; and that though in these portions they are erroneous, they will still possess authority in the portions conformable to the Sruti and Smṛiti. He then quotes a passage from the Padma Purāṇa, in which the god Śiva tells his consort Pārvatī that the Vaiśeshika, the Nyāya, the Sānkhya, the Purva-mīmānsā Darśanas, and the Vedāntic theory of illusion, are all systems infected by the dark (or *tāmasa*) principle, and consequently more or less unauthoritative. All orthodox (*āstika*) theories, however, are, as Vijnāna Bhikshu considers, authoritative, and free from error on their own special subject. And as respects the discrepancy between the Sānkhya and the Vedānta, regarding the unity of Soul, he concludes that the former is not devoid of authority, as the apparent diversity of souls is acknowledged by the Vedānta, and the discriminative knowledge which the Sānkhya teaches is an instrument of liberation to the embodied soul; and thus the two varying doctrines, if regarded as, the one practical (or regulative), and the other real (or transcendental), will not be contradictory. At the close of Section eleventh (pp. 204–207) it is shewn that the distinction drawn by the Indian commentators between the superhuman Veda and its human appendages, the Kalpa Sūtras, etc., as well as the Smṛitis, is not borne out by

certain texts which I had previously cited. The Bṛihad Āraṉyaka and Muṉḍaka Upanishads (pp. 8, 31) seem to place all the different sorts of S'āstras or scriptures (including the four Vedas) in one and the same class, the former speaking of them all promiscuously as being the breathing of Brahma, while the latter describes them all (except the Upanishads) as being parts of the "inferior science," in opposition to the "superior science," or knowledge of Brahma. In the same spirit as the Muṉḍaka, the Chhāndogya Upanishad also (quoted in p. 32 f.) includes the four Vedas in the same list with a variety of miscellaneous S'āstras (which Nārada has studied without getting beyond the confines of exoteric knowledge), and never intimates (unless it be by placing them at the head of the list) that the former can claim any superiority over the other works with which they are associated. As, however, S'ankara could not, in consistency with the current scholastic theory regarding the wide difference between the Vedas and all other S'āstras, admit that the latter could have had a common origin with the former, he endeavours in his comment on the passage of the Bṛihad Āraṉyaka Upanishad to which I have adverted, to shew that the other works, which are there said to have been breathed out by the great Being along with the Vedas, were in reality portions of the Brāhmaṉas. This explanation can scarcely apply to all the works enumerated, and its force is weakened by the tenor of the other passages from the Muṉḍaka and Chhāndogya Upanishads, while any such distinction is repudiated in the statements of the Itihāsas and Purāṉas quoted in pp. 27–30 and 105.

In the twelfth Section (pp. 207–217) the arguments in support of the Veda, adduced in the philosophical systems, and by the various commentators, as above summarised, are recapitulated, and some remarks are made on these reasonings. My observations are intended to shew that the arguments in question are inconclusive, or assume the points to be established; that the rishis are proved by the contents of the hymns to have been their real authors; and that numerous events which have occurred in time, are undoubtedly mentioned in the Vedas. This as we have seen (above, p. xvi.) is admitted by S'ankara.

The Second Chapter (pp. 217–286) exhibits the opinions of the rishis in regard to the origin of the Vedic hymns. Its object is to shew in detail that, though some at least of the rishis appear to have imagined themselves to be inspired by the gods in the expression of their religious emotions and ideas, they at the same time regarded the hymns as their own compositions, or as (presumably) the compositions of their forefathers, distinguishing between them as new and old, and describing their own authorship in terms which could only have been dictated by a consciousness of its reality. The first, second, and third Sections (pp. 218–244) contain a collection of passages from the Rig-veda in which a distinction is drawn (1) between the rishis as ancient and modern, and (2) between the hymns as older and more recent; and in which (3) the rishis describe themselves as the makers, fabricators, or generators of the hymns; with some additional texts in which such authorship appears

to be implied, though it is not expressed. Section fourth (pp. 245–283) contains a variety of passages from the same Veda, in which (1) a superhuman character or supernatural faculties are ascribed to the earlier rishis; and (2) the idea is expressed that the praises and ceremonies of the rishis were suggested and directed by the gods in general, or, in particular, by the goddess of speech, or by some other or others of the different deities of the Vedic pantheon. To illustrate, and render more intelligible and probable, the opinions which I have ascribed to the old Indian rishis regarding their own inspiration, I have quoted in the same Section (pp. 267 - 273) a number of passages from Hesiod and Homer to shew that the early Greek bards entertained a similar belief. I then advert (pp. 273 - 274) to the remarkable divergence between the later religious histories of Greece and of India. I next enquire briefly (in pp. 274 - 275) in what way we can reconcile the apparently conflicting ideas of the rishis on the subject of the hymns, considered, on the one hand, as their own productions, and, on the other, as inspired by the gods. Then follow (pp. 275 - 279) some further texts from the Rig-veda, in which a mystical, magical, or supernatural efficacy is ascribed to the hymns. These are succeeded (pp. 279-283) by a few quotations from the same Veda, in which the authors complain of their own ignorance; and by a reference to the contrast between these humble confessions and the proud pretensions set up by later theologians in behalf of the Veda, and its capability of imparting universal knowledge. The ideas of the rishis regarding their own inspiration differ widely from the conceptions

of later theorists; for while the former looked upon the gods, who were confessedly mere created beings, as the sources of supernal illumination, the latter either regard the Veda as eternal, or refer it to the eternal Brahma, or Īśvara, as its author. The fifth and last Section (pp. 283-286) adduces some texts from the Śvetāśvatara, Muṇḍaka and Chhāndogya Upanishads, which show the opinions of the writers regarding the inspiration, of their predecessors; and refers to the similar claims set up on their own behalf by the writers of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, as shewn in the passages quoted in pp. 27-30.

With all its imperfections this volume may perhaps possess a certain interest, not only for the student of Indian history, but also for the divine and the philosopher, as furnishing a few documents to illustrate the course of theological opinion in a sphere far removed from the ordinary observation of the European student, —a course which, quite independently of the merits of the different tenets involved in the enquiry, will, I think, be found to present a remarkable parallel in various respects to that which is traceable in the history of those religious systems with which we are most familiar. In both cases we find that a primitive age of ardent emotion, of simple faith, and of unarticulated beliefs, was succeeded by a period of criticism and speculation, when the floating materials handed down by preceding generations were compared, classified, reconciled, developed into their consequences, and elaborated into a variety of scholastic systems.

In the Preface to the first edition I stated as follows: "In regard to the texts quoted from the Ṛig-veda, I

have derived the same sort of assistance from the French version of M. Langlois, which has been acknowledged in the Preface to the Second Volume, p. vi. I am also indebted for some of the Vedic texts to Boehtlingk and Roth's Lexicon."

A comparison of the former edition with the present will shew that considerable alterations and additions have been made in the latter. The texts which formerly stood in the Appendix have now been transferred to their proper places in the body of the work; and various other passages have been transposed. The principal additions will be found in the first four sections, in the ninth (pp. 115-127), tenth (which is altogether new), eleventh (pp. 185 ff.), and in the Appendix.

I am indebted to various learned friends for assistance in different parts of the work, which I have acknowledged in the notes. My thanks are especially due to Professors Goldstücker and Cowell for various important corrections which they have suggested in my translations of passages of a scholastic and philosophical character, quoted either in the body of the volume or in the Appendix,—corrections which are incorporated in the text,—as well as for some further remarks and suggestions which will be found in the notes or Appendix. I am also under obligations to Professor Aufrecht for some emendations of my renderings in the early part of the work, as well as for his explanations of many of the texts of the Rig-veda cited in the Second Chapter.

EDINBURGH, J. MUIR.
November, 1868.

CONTENTS.

ERRATA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page 24, line 11. For Brahmā read Brahmă.
„ 45, „ 15. For *Yayush* read *Yajush.*
„ 53, „ 8. For theologicans read theologians.
„ 62, „ 2 from foot: For its author read their authors.
„ 85, „ 4 „ Before *Prajāpatir* insert xi. 243.
„ 95, „ 2 „ For *dhvanitvam* read *dhvanitam.*
„ 96, „ 16. The same correction.
„ 101, „ 22. For Vanap. read S'āntip.
„ 149, „ 6. For *śabdādīkshiter* read *śabdād īkshiter*
„ 159, „ 16. For *chaindri-* read *cha indri-.*
„ 159, „ 31. For *paratvou-* read *paratvo-.*
„ 160, „ 18. For *punar-utpattir* read *punar-anutpattir.*
„ 213, „ 16. For p. 120 read p. 118.
„ 221, „ 24. For vi. 21, 1 read vi. 21,
„ 224, „ 7 from foot. Omit *dhishaṇā.*
„ 261, „ 12. For vi. 62, 3 read vi. 26,

ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXTS.

VOLUME THIRD.

CHAPTER I.

OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORIGIN, DIVISION, INSPIRATION, AND AUTHORITY OF THE VEDAS, HELD BY INDIAN AUTHORS SHORTLY BEFORE, OR SUBSEQUENT TO, THE COLLECTION OF THE HYMNS OF THE RIG-VEDA.

In the preceding volumes of this work[1] I have furnished a general account of the ancient Indian writings, which are comprehended under the designation of Veda or S'ruti. These works, which, as we have seen, constitute the earliest literature of the Hindus, are broadly divisible into two classes: (1) The Mantras or hymns, in which the praises of the gods are celebrated and their blessing is invoked; (2) the Brāhmaṇas, which embrace (*a*) the liturgical institutes in which the ceremonial application of these hymns is declared, the various rites of sacrifice are prescribed, and the origin and hidden import of the different forms are explained, and (*b*) the Āraṇyakas,[2] and Upanishads (called also Vedāntas, *i.e.* concluding portions of the Vedas), which in part possess the same character as some of the earlier portions of the Brāhmaṇas, and are in part theological treatises in which the spiritual aspirations which

[1] See Vol. I. pp. 2 ff. and Vol. II. pp. 169 ff. See also Professor Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature.

[2] For more precise information see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit: pp. 313 ff. from which it will be perceived that only some of the Āraṇyakas form part of the Brāhmaṇas, and that two of the Upanishads are included in a Sanhitā.

were gradually developed in the minds of the more devout of the Indian sages are preserved. It is, therefore, clear that the hymns constitute the original and, in some respects, the most essential portion of the Veda; that the Brāhmaṇas arose out of the hymns, and are subservient to their employment for the purposes of worship; while the Upanishads give expression to ideas of a speculative and mystical character which, though to some extent discoverable in the hymns and in the older portion of the Brāhmaṇas, are much further matured, and assume a more exclusive importance, in these later treatises.

I content myself here with referring the reader who desires to obtain a fuller idea of the nature of the hymns, and of the mythology which they embody, to the late Professor H. H. Wilson's translation of the earlier portion of the Rig-veda, to his prefaces to the several volumes, to Professor Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, and to two papers of my own in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, entitled Contributions to a knowledge of the Cosmogony and Mythology of the Rig-veda. In the fourth volume of this work I return to the latter branch of the subject, and compare the conceptions which the rishis entertained of the different objects of their worship, with those representations of the deities who bore the same names, which occur in Indian writings of a later date, whether mythological or theological.

The task to which I propose in the meantime to devote myself, is to supply some account of the opinions entertained by Hindu writers, ancient and modern, in regard to the origin and authority of the Vedas. With this view I have collected from some of the later hymns, from the Indian writings of the middle and later Vedic era (the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads) as well as from the books, whether popular or scientific, of the post-vedic period (the Purāṇas, the Itihāsas, the Institutes of Manu, the aphorisms of the Darśanas, or systems of philosophy, and their commentators, and the commentaries on the Vedas) such passages as I have discovered which have reference to these subjects, and propose to compare the opinions there set forth with the ideas entertained on some of these points by the writers of the more ancient hymns, as deducible from numerous passages in their own compositions.

The mythical accounts which are given of the origin of the Vedas

are mutually conflicting. In some passages they are said to have been created by Prajāpati from fire, air, and the sun, or by some other process. In other texts they are said to have been produced by Brahmā from his different mouths, or by the intervention of the Gāyatrī, or to have sprung from the goddess Sarasvatī, or to have otherwise arisen. I proceed to adduce these several passages.

SECT. I.—*Origin of the Vedas according to the Purusha-sūkta, the Atharva-veda, the Brāhmaṇas, Upanishads, and Institutes of Manu.*

Purusha-sūkta.—In the ninth verse of this hymn (Rig-veda, x. 90, already quoted in Vol. I. pp. 8 and 9) the three Vedas are said to have been produced from the mystical victim Purusha: *Tasmād yajnāt sarva-hutaḥ ṛichaḥ sāmāni jajnire | chhandāṁsi jajnire tasmād yajus tasmād ajāyata* | "From that universal sacrifice sprang the ṛich and sāman verses: the metres sprang from it: from it the yajush arose."[3]

This is the only passage in the hymns of the Rig-veda in which the creation of the Vedas is described.

In the Atharva-veda the following texts refer to that subject:

x. 7, 14. *Yattra ṛishayaḥ prathamajāḥ ṛichaḥ sāma yajur mahī | ekarshir yasminn ārpitaḥ Skambhaṁ tam brūhi katamaḥ svid eva saḥ* | . . . . 20. *Yasmād ṛicho apātakshan yajur yasmād apākashan | sāmāni yasya lomāni atharvāngiraso mukham | Skambham tam brūhi katamaḥ svid eva saḥ* |

"Declare who that Skambha (supporting-principle) is in whom the primeval rishis, the ṛich, sāman, and yajush, the earth, and the one rishi, are sustained. . . . . 20. Declare who is that Skambha from whom they cut off the ṛich verses, from whom they scraped off the yajush, of whom the sāman verses are the hairs, and the verses of Atharvan and Angiras the mouth."

[3] The word *veda*, in whatever sense we are to understand it, occurs in R.V. viii. 19, 5: *Yaḥ samidhā yaḥ āhutī yo vedena dadāśa martyo agnaye | yo namasā svadhvaraḥ* | 6. *Tasya id arvanto raṁhayante āśavas tasya dyumnitamaṁ yaśaḥ | na tam aṁho deva-kṛitaṁ kutaś chana na martya-kṛitam naśat* | "The horses of that mortal who, devoted to sacrifice, does homage to Agni with fuel, with an oblation, with ritual knowledge (?), with reverence,—(6) speed forward impetuously; and his renown is most glorious. No calamity, caused either by god or by man, can assail him from any quarter."

xiii. 4, 38. *Sa vai ṛigbhyo ajāyata tasmād ṛicho ajāyanta* |

"He (apparently Indra, see verse 44) sprang from the ṛich verses: the ṛich verses sprang from him."

xix. 54, 3. *Kālād ṛichaḥ samabhavan yajuḥ kālād ajāyata* |

"From Time the ṛich verses sprang: the yajush sprang from Time."[4]

The following texts from the same Veda may also be introduced here:

iv. 35, 6. *Yasmāt pakvād amṛitaṁ sambabhūva yo gāyatryāḥ adhipatir babhūva | yasmin vedāḥ nihitāḥ viśvarūpās tenaudanenāti tarāmi mṛityum* |

"I overpass death by means of that oblation (*odana*), from which, when cooked, ambrosia (*amṛita*) was produced, which became the lord of the Gāyatrī, and in which the omniform Vedas are comprehended."

vii. 54, 1. *Ṛichaṁ sāma yajāmahe yābhyāṁ karmāṇi kurvate | ete sadasi rājato yajnaṁ deveshu yachhataḥ* | 2. *Ṛichaṁ sāma yad aprāksham havir ojo yajur balam | esha mā tasmād mā hiṁsīd vedaḥ pṛishṭaḥ śachīpate* |

"We worship the Ṛich and the Sāman, wherewith men celebrate religious rites, which shine in the assembly, and convey sacrifices to the gods. 2. Inasmuch as I have asked the Ṛich and the Sāman for butter and for vigour, and the Yajush for strength,—let not the Veda, so asked, destroy me, o lord of strength (Indra)."

The next passage is from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 8, 1 ff.:

Prajāpatir vai idam agre āsīd ekaḥ eva | so 'kāmayata syām prajāyeya iti | So 'śrāmyat sa tapo 'tapyata | tasmāch chrāntāt tepānāt trayo lokāḥ asṛijyanta pṛithivy antarikshaṁ dyauḥ | sa imāṁs trīṇ lokān abhitatāpa | tebhyas taptebhyas trīṇi jyotīṁshy ajāyanta agnir yo 'yam pavate sūryaḥ | sa imāni trīṇi jyotīṁshy abhitatāpa | tebhyas taptebhyas trayo vedāḥ ajāyanta agner ṛigvedo vāyor yajurvedaḥ sūryāt sāmavedaḥ | sa imāṁs trīn vedān abhitatāpa | tebhyas taptebhyas trīṇi śukrāṇy ajāyanta bhūr ity ṛigvedād bhuvaḥ iti yajurvedāt svar iti sāmavedāt | Tad ṛigvedenaiva hotram akurvata yajurvedena ādhvaryavaṁ sāmavedena udgītham | yad eva trayyai vidyāyai śukraṁ tena brahmatvam uchchakrāma.

"Prajāpati was formerly this universe [*i.e.* the sole existence], one only. He desired, 'may I become, may I be propagated.' He toiled

[4] See my translation of the entire hymn in the Journal of the Roy. As. Soc. for 1865, p. 381. The Vishṇu Purāṇa, i. 2, 13, says: *Tad eva sarvam evaitad vyaktāvyakta-svarūpavat | tathā purusha-rūpeṇa kāla-rūpeṇa cha sthitam* | "This (Brahma) is all this universe, existing both as the perceptible and the imperceptible; existing also in the forms of Purusha and of Kāla (Time)."

in devotion, he performed austerity. From him, when he had so toiled, and performed austerity, three worlds were created,—earth, air, and sky. He infused warmth into these three worlds. From them, thus heated, three lights were produced,—Agni (fire), this which purifies (*i.e.* Pavana, or Vāyu, the wind),[5] and Sūrya (the sun). He infused heat into these three lights. From them so heated the three Vedas were produced,—the Rig-veda from Agni (fire), the Yajur-veda from Vāyu (wind), and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya (the sun). He infused warmth into these three Vedas. From them so heated three luminous essences were produced,—bhūḥ from the Rig-veda, bhuvaḥ from the Yajur-veda, and svar from the Sāma-veda. Hence, with the Rig-veda they performed the function of the hotṛi; with the Yajur-veda, the office of the adhvaryu; with the Sāma-veda, the duty of the udgātṛi; while the function of the brahman arose through the luminous essence of the triple science [*i.e.* the three Vedas combined]."

Chhāndogya Upanishad.—A similar passage (already quoted in Volume Second, p. 200) occurs in the Chhāndogya Upanishad (p. 288 of Dr. Röer's ed.):

Prajāpatir lokān abhyatapat | teshām̐ tapyamānānām̐ rasān prābṛihad agnim pṛithivyāḥ vāyum antarikshād ādityam̐ divaḥ | sa etās tisro devatāḥ abhyatapat | tāsām̐ tapyamānānām̐ rasān prābṛihad agner ṛicho vāyor yajūm̐shi sāma ādityāt | sa etām̐ trayīm̐ vidyām abhyatapat | tasyās tapyamānāyāḥ rasān prābṛihad bhūr iti ṛigbhyo bhuvar iti yajurbhyaḥ svar iti sāmabhyaḥ |

"Prajāpati infused warmth into the worlds, and from them so heated he drew forth their essences, viz. Agni (fire) from the earth, Vāyu (wind) from the air, and Sūrya (the sun) from the sky. He infused warmth into these three deities, and from them so heated he drew forth their essences,—from Agni the ṛich verses, from Vāyu the yajush verses, and from Sūrya the sāman verses. He then infused heat into this triple science, and from it so heated he drew forth its essences,—from ṛich verses the syllable bhūḥ, from yajush verses bhuvaḥ, and from sāman verses svar."[6]

[5] See S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 1, 2, 19: . . . *ayam eva sa Vāyur yo 'yam pavate* . . . "This is that Vāyu, he who purifies."

[6] Passages to the same effect occur also in the Aitareya (v. 32–34) and Kaushītakī Brāhmaṇas. That in the former will be found in Dr. Haug's translation of the

Manu.—The same origin is assigned to the three Vedas in the following verses from the account of the creation in Manu, i. 21–23, where the idea is no doubt borrowed from the Brāhmaṇas:

Sarveshāṁ tu sa nāmāni karmāṇi cha pṛithak pṛithak | Veda-śabdebhya evādau pṛithak saṁsthāś cha nirmame | Karmātmanāṁ cha devānāṁ so 'sṛijat prāniṇām prabhuḥ | sādhyānāṁ cha gaṇaṁ sūkshmaṁ yajnaṁ chaiva sanātanam | Agni-vāyu-ravibhyas tu trayam brahma sanātanam | dudoha yajna-siddhyartham ṛig-yajuḥ-sāma-lakshaṇam |

"He [Brahmā] in the beginning fashioned from the words of the Veda[7] the several names, functions, and separate conditions of all [creatures]. That Lord also created the subtile host of active and living deities, and of Sādhyas, and eternal sacrifice. And in order to the performance of sacrifice, he drew forth from Agni, from Vāyu, and from Sūrya, the triple eternal Veda, distinguished as Rich, Yajush, and Sāman."

Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, the commentator, annotates thus on this passage:

Sanātanaṁ nityam | vedāpaurusheyatva-paksho Manor abhimataḥ | pūrva-kalpe ye vedās te eva Paramātma-mūrtter Brahmaṇaḥ sarvajnasya smṛity-ārūḍhāḥ | tān eva kalpādāv agni-vāyu-ravibhyaḥ āchakarsha | śrautaś cha ayam artho na śankanīyaḥ | tathācha śrutiḥ | "agner ṛigvedo vāyor yajurvedaḥ ādityāt sāmavedaḥ" iti |

"The word *sanātana* means 'eternally pre-existing.' The doctrine of the superhuman origin of the Vedas is maintained by Manu. The same Vedas which [existed] in the previous mundane era (Kalpa) were preserved in the memory of the omniscient Brahmā, who was one with the supreme Spirit. It was those same Vedas that, in the beginning of the [present] Kalpa, he drew forth from Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya: and this dogma, which is founded upon the Veda, is not to be questioned, for the Veda says, 'the Rig-veda comes from Agni, the Yajur-veda from Vāyu, and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya.'"

Another commentator on Manu, Medhātithi, explains this passage in a more rationalistic fashion, "by remarking that the Rig-veda opens with a hymn to fire, and the Yajur-veda with one in which air is mentioned."—Colebr. Misc. Ess. i. p. 11, note.

Brāhmaṇa; and the one in the latter is rendered into German by Weber in his Ind. Stud. ii. 303 ff.

[7] Kullūka explains this to mean, "Having understood them from the words of the Veda" (*Veda-śabdebhyaḥ eva avagamya*).

To the verses from Manu (i. 21–23) just cited, the following from the second book may be added, partly for the purpose of completing the parallel with the passages previously adduced from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Chhāndogya Upanishad:

Manu, ii. 76 ff. *Akāraṁ chāpy ukāraṁ cha makāraṁ cha Prajāpatiḥ | Veda-trayād niraduhad bhūr bhuvaḥ svar itīti cha | 77. Tribhyaḥ eva tu vedebhyaḥ pādam pādam adūduhat | "tad" ity ṛicho 'syāḥ sāvitryāḥ parameshṭhī prajāpatiḥ | . . . . 81. Oṁkāra-pūrvikās tisro mahāvyāhṛitayo 'vyayāḥ | Tripadā chaiva gāyatrī vijneyaṁ Brahmaṇo mukham.*

76. "Prajāpati also milked out of the three Vedas the letters *a*, *u*, and *m*, together with the words *bhūḥ*, *bhuvaḥ*, and *svar*. 77. The same supreme Prajāpati also milked from each of the three Vedas one of the [three] portions of the text called *sāvitrī* [or *gāyatrī*], beginning with the word *tat*.[8] . . . . 81. The three great imperishable particles (*bhūḥ*, *bhuvaḥ*, *svar*) preceded by *om*, and the *gāyatrī* of three lines, are to be regarded as the mouth of Brahmā."

The next passage, from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 1, 1, 8, first speaks generally of Prajāpati creating the three Vedas, and then afterwards, with some inconsistency, describes their production from the waters:[9]

So 'yam purushaḥ Prajāpatir akāmayata "bhūyān syām prajāyeya" iti | so 'śrāmyat sa tapo 'tapyata | sa śrāntas tepāno brahma eva prathamam asṛijata trayīm eva vidyām | sā eva asmai pratishṭhā 'bhavat | tasmād āhur "brahma asya sarvasya pratishṭhā" iti | tasmād anūchya pratitishṭhati | pratishṭhā hy eshā yad brahma | tasyām pratishṭhāyām pratishṭhito 'tapyata | 9. So 'po 'sṛijata vāchaḥ eva lokāt | vāg eva asya sā 'sṛijyata | sā idaṁ sarvam āpnod yad idaṁ kincha | yad āpnot tasmād āpaḥ | yad avṛiṇot tasmād vāḥ | 10. So 'kāmayata "ābhyo 'dbhyo 'dhi prajāyeya" iti | so 'nayā trayyā vidyayā saha apaḥ prāviśat | tataḥ āṇḍaṁ samavarttata | tad abhyamṛiśat | "astv" ity "astu bhūyo 'stv" ity eva tad abravīt | tato brahma eva prathamam asṛijyata trayy eva vidyā | tasmād āhur "brahma asya sarvasya prathamajam" iti | api hi tasmāt purushād brahma eva pūrvam asṛijyata tad asya tad mukham eva asṛijyata | tasmād anūchānam āhur "agni-kalpaḥ" iti | mukhaṁ hy etad agner yad brahma |

[8] This text, Rig-veda, iii. 62, 10, will be quoted in the sequel.

[9] This passage with the preceding context is given in the Fourth Volume of this work, pp. 18 f.

"This Male, Prajāpati, desired, 'May I multiply, may I be propagated.' He toiled in devotion; he practised austere-fervour. Having done so he first of all created sacred knowledge, the triple Vedic science. This became a basis for him. Wherefore men say, 'sacred knowledge is the basis of this universe.' Hence after studying the Veda a man has a standing ground; for sacred knowledge is his foundation. Resting on this basis he (Prajāpati) practised austere-fervour. 9. He created the waters from Vāch (speech), as their world. Vāch was his: she was created. She pervaded all this whatever exists. As she pervaded (*āpnot*), waters were called 'āpaḥ.' As she covered (*avṛiṇot*) all, water was called 'vār.' 10. He desired, 'May I be propagated from these waters.' Along with this triple Vedic science he entered the waters. Thence sprang an egg. He gave it an impulse; and said, 'Let there be, let there be, let there be again.' Thence was first created sacred knowledge, the triple Vedic science. Wherefore men say, 'Sacred knowledge is the first-born thing in this universe. Moreover, it was sacred knowledge which was created from that Male in front, wherefore it was created as his mouth. Hence they say of a man learned in the Veda, 'He is like Agni; for sacred knowledge is Agni's mouth.'"

The next passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 3, 10, 1, briefly states that the Vedas were created after Soma:

Prajāpatiḥ Somaṁ rājānam asṛijata | taṁ trayo vedāḥ anv asṛijyanta |

"Prajāpati created king Soma. After him the three Vedas were created."

The same Brāhmaṇa in other places, as iii. 3, 2, 1, speaks of the Veda as derived from Prajāpati (*Prājāpatyo vedaḥ*).

S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa.—According to the following passage of the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 5, 4, 10 (=Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, p. 455 of Röer's ed. and p. 179 of trans.) the Vedas, as well as other S'āstras, are the breath of Brahma:

Sa yathā ārdredhāgner abhyāhitāt pṛithag dhūmāḥ viniścharanti evaṁ vai are 'sya mahato bhūtasya niśvasitam etad yad ṛigvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo 'tharvāngirasaḥ itihāsaḥ purāṇaṁ vidyā upanishadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇy anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni asyaiva etāni sarvāṇi niśvasitāni |

"As from a fire made of moist wood various modifications of smoke proceed, so is the breathing of this great Being the Rig-veda, the

Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Atharvāngirases, the Itihāsas, Purāṇas, science, the Upanishads, verses (*ślokas*), aphorisms, comments of different kinds—all these are his breathings."

It is curious that in this passage the Vedas appear to be classed in the same category with various other works, such as the Sūtras, from some at least of which (as we shall see further on), they are broadly distinguished by later writers, who regard the former (including the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads) as of superhuman origin, and infallible correctness, while this character is expressly denied to the latter, which are represented as *paurusheya*, or merely human compositions, possessed of no independent authority.

In the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad (pp. 50–53 of Dr. Röer's ed.) Prajāpati [identified with Death, or the Devourer] is said to have produced *Vāch* (speech), and through her, together with soul, to have created all things, including the Vedas:

Sa tayā vāchā tena ātmanā idaṁ sarvam asṛijata yad idaṁ kincha ṛicho yajūṁshi sāmāni chhandāṁsi yajnān prajāḥ paśūn |

"By that speech and that soul he created all things whatsoever, ṛich, yajush, and sāman texts, metres, sacrifices, creatures, and animals."

And in Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 4, 3, 12 (p. 290 of the same Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad) it is said:

Trayo vedāḥ ete eva | *vāg eva ṛig-vedo mano yajur-vedaḥ prāṇaḥ sāma-vedaḥ* |

"The three Vedas are [identifiable with] these three things [speech, mind, and breath]. Speech is the Rig-veda, mind the Yajur-veda, and breath the Sāma-veda."

The following text, from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 52, gives a singular account of the production of the Vedas:

"Samudre tvā sadane sādayāmi" iti | *Mano vai samudraḥ* | *manaso vai samudrād vāchā 'bhryā devās trayīṁ vidyāṁ nirakhanan* | *tad esha śloko 'bhyuktaḥ "ye (yat?) samudrād nirakhanan devās tīkshṇābhir abhribhiḥ* | *sudevo adya tad vidyād yatra nirvapaṇaṁ dadhur" iti* | *manaḥ samudro vāk tīkshṇā 'bhris trayī vidyā nirvapaṇam* | *etad esha śloko 'bhyuktaḥ* | *manasi tāṁ sādayati* |

"'I settle thee in the ocean as thy seat.'[10] Mind is the ocean.

[10] I am indebted to Professor Aufrecht for the following explanation of this formula, which is taken from the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xiii. 53. The words are addressed to a

From the mind-ocean with speech for a shovel the gods dug out the triple Vedic science. Hence this verse has been uttered: 'May the brilliant deity to-day know where they placed that offering which the gods dug out with sharp shovels.' Mind is the ocean; speech is the sharp shovel; the triple Vedic science is the offering. In reference to this the verse has been uttered. He settles it in Mind."

The next passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 39, 1, speaks of the Veda as being "the hair of Prajāpati's beard" (*Prajāpater vai etāni śmaśrūṇi yad vedaḥ*). The process of its germination is left to the imagination of the reader.

In another text of the same Brāhmaṇa, Vāch (speech) is called the mother of the Vedas:

ii. 8, 8, 5. *Vāg aksharam prathamajā ṛitasya vedānām mātā amṛitasya nābhiḥ | sā no jushāṇā upa yajnam āgād avantī devī suhavā me astu | yām ṛishayo mantra-kṛito manīshiṇaḥ anvaichhan devās tapasā śrameṇa |*

"Vāch (speech) is an imperishable thing, and the first-born of the ceremonial, the mother of the Vedas, and the centre-point of immortality. Delighting in us, she came to the sacrifice. May the protecting goddess be ready to listen to my invocation,—she whom the wise rishis, the composers of hymns, the gods, sought by austere-fervour, and by laborious devotion."

Sect. II.—*Origin of the Vedas according to the Vishṇu, Bhāgavata, and Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇas, the Harivaṁśa, the Mahābhārata; eternity of the Veda; miscellaneous statements regarding it.*

In the Vishṇu and Bhāgavata Purāṇas we find a quite different tradition regarding the origin of the Vedas, which in these works are said to have been created by the four-faced Brahmā from his several mouths. Thus the Vishṇu Purāṇa says, i. 5, 48 ff.:

Gāyatraṁ cha ṛichaś chaiva trivṛit-sāma-rathantaram | Agnishṭomaṁ cha yajnānāṁ nirmame prathamād mukhāt | yajūṁshi traishṭubhaṁ chhandaḥ stomaṁ panchadaśaṁ tathā | Vṛihat sāma tathokthyaṁ cha dakshiṇād asṛijad mukhāt | sāmāni jagatī-chhandaḥ stomaṁ saptadaśaṁ

brick at the time when the hearth (*chityā*) for the reception of the sacred fires is being constructed. As the bricks are severally called *apasyā* (properly 'efficacious,' but erroneously derived from *ap*) they are addressed as if placed in various parts of water

tathā | vairūpam atirātraṁ cha paśchimād asṛijad mukhāt | ekaviṁśam atharvāṇam āptoryāmāṇam eva cha | Anushṭubhaṁ sa vairājam uttarād asṛijad mukhāt |

"From his eastern mouth Brahmā formed the gāyatra, the ṛich verses, the trivṛit, the sāma-rathantara, and of sacrifices, the agnishṭoma. From his southern mouth he created the yajush verses, the trishṭubh metre, the panchadaśa-stoma, the vṛihat-sāman, and the ukthya. From his western mouth he formed the sāman verses, the jagatī metre, the saptadaśa-stoma, the vairūpa, and the atirātra. From his northern mouth he framed the ekavinśa, the atharvan, the āptoryāman, with the anushṭubh and virāj metres."[11]

In like manner it is said but with variations, in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iii. 12, 34, and 37 ff.:

Kadāchid dhyāyataḥ srashṭur vedāḥ āsaṁś chaturmukhāt | kathaṁ srakshyāmy ahaṁ lokān samavetān yathā purā | . . . . Ṛig-yajuḥ-sāmā-tharvākhyān vedān pūrvādibhir mukhaiḥ | śastram ijyāṁ stuti-stomam prāyaśchittaṁ vyadhāt kramāt |

"Once the Vedas sprang from the four-faced creator, as he was meditating 'how shall I create the aggregate worlds as before?' . . . . He formed from his eastern and other mouths the Vedas called ṛich, yajush, sāman, and atharvan, together with praise, sacrifice, hymns, and expiation."

And in verse 45 it is stated that the ushṇih metre issued from his hairs, the gāyatrī from his skin, the trishṭubh from his flesh, the anushṭubh from his tendons, the jagatī from his bones (*Tasyoshṇig āsīl lomebhyo gāyātrī cha tvacho vibhoḥ | trishṭup māṁsāt snuto 'nushṭup jagaty asthnaḥ Prajāpateḥ*).

The Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa says on the same subject, 102, 1:

Tasmād aṇḍād vibhinnāt tu Brahmaṇo 'vyakta-janmanaḥ | ṛicho babhūvaḥ prathamam prathamād vadanād mune | 2. *Javā-pushpa-nibhāḥ sadyas tejo-rūpānta-saṁhatāḥ | pṛithak pṛithag vibhinnāś cha rajo-rūpa-vahās tataḥ |* 3. *Yajūṁshi dakshiṇād vaktrād aniruddhāni kānchanam | yādṛig-varṇaṁ tathā-varṇāny asaṁhati-dharāṇi cha |* 4. *Paśchimaṁ yad vibhor vaktram Brahmaṇaḥ parameshṭhinaḥ | āvirbhūtāni sāmāni tataś chhandāṁsi tāny atha |* 5. *Ātharvaṇam aśeshaṁ cha bhṛingāñjana-chaya-prabham | ghorāghora-svarūpaṁ tad ābhichārika-śāntikam |* 6. *Uttarāt pra-*

[11] See Wilson's Transl. vol. i. p. 84.

kaṭībhūtaṁ vadanāt tasya vedhasaḥ | sukha-sattva-tamaḥ-prāyaṁ saumyā-saumya-svarūpavat | 7. Ṛicho rajo-guṇāḥ sattvaṁ yajushāṁ cha guṇo mune | tamo-guṇāni sāmāni tamaḥ-sattvam atharvasu |

1. "From the eastern mouth of Brahmā, who sprang by an imperceptible birth from that divided egg (Manu, i. 9, 12), there suddenly issued first of all the ṛich verses, (2) resembling China roses, brilliant in appearance, internally united, though separated from each other, and characterized by the quality of passion (*rajas*). 3. From his southern mouth came, unrestrained, the yajush verses of the colour of gold, and disunited. 4. From the western mouth of the supreme Brahmā appeared the sāman verses and the metres. 5 and 6. From the northern mouth of Vedhas (Brahmā) was manifested the entire Ātharvaṇa of the colour of black bees and collyrium, having a character at once terrible and not terrible,[12] capable of neutralizing the arts of enchanters, pleasant, characterized by the qualities both of purity and darkness, and both beautiful and the contrary. 7. The verses of the ṛich are distinguished by the quality of passion (*rajas*), those of the yajush by purity (*sattva*), those of the sāman by darkness (*tamas*), and those of the atharvan by both darkness and purity."

Harivaṁśa.—In the first section of the Harivaṁśa, verse 47, the creation of the Vedas by Brahmā is thus briefly alluded to:

Ṛicho yajūṁshi sāmāni nirmame yajna-siddhaye | sādhyās tair ayajan devān ity evam anuśuśruma |

"In order to the accomplishment of sacrifice, he formed the ṛich, yajush, and sāman verses: with these the S'ādhyas worshipped the gods, as we have heard."

The following is the account of the same event given in another part of the same work; Harivaṁśa, verse 11,516:

Tato 'sṛijad vai tripadāṁ gāyatrīṁ veda-mātaram | Akaroch chaiva chaturo vedān gāyatri-sambhavān |

After framing the world, Brahmā "next created the gāyatrī of three lines, mother of the Vedas, and also the four Vedas which sprang from the gāyatrī."[13]

[12] *Ghorāghora* is the correct MS. reading, as I learn from Dr. Hall, and not *yāvaddhora*, as given in Professor Banerjea's printed text.

[13] The same words *gāyatrīṁ veda-mātaram* also occur in the M.Bh. Vanaparvan, verse 13,432; and the same title is applied to Vāch in the Taitt. Br. as quoted above, p 10.

A little further on we find this expanded into the following piece of mysticism, verse 11,665 ff.:

Samāhita-manā Brahmā moksha-prāptena hetunā | chandra-maṇḍala-saṁsthānāj jyotis-tejo mahat tadā | Praviśya hṛidayaṁ kshipraṁ gāyatryāḥ nayanāntare | Garbhasya sambhavo yaś cha chaturdhā purushātmakaḥ | Brahma-tejomayo 'vyaktaḥ śāśvato 'tha dhruvo 'vyayaḥ | na chendriya-guṇair yukto yuktas tejo-guṇena cha | chandrāṁśu-vimala-prakhyo bhrājishṇur varṇa-saṁsthitaḥ | Netrābhyāṁ janayad devaḥ ṛig-vedaṁ yajushā saha | sāmavedaṁ cha jihvāgrād atharvāṇaṁ cha mūrddhatah | Jāta-mātrās tu te vedāh kshetraṁ vindanti tattvataḥ | Tena vedatvam āpannā yasmād vindanti tat padam | Te sṛijanti tadā vedāḥ brahma pūrvaṁ sanātanam | Purushaṁ divya-rūpābhaṁ svaiḥ svair bhāvair mano-bhavaiḥ |

"For the emancipation of the world, Brahmā, sunk in contemplation, issuing in a luminous form from the region of the moon, penetrated into the heart of Gāyatrī, entering between her eyes. From her there was then produced a quadruple being in the form of a Male, lustrous as Brahmā, undefined, eternal, undecaying, devoid of bodily senses or qualities, distinguished by the attribute of brilliancy, pure as the rays of the moon, radiant, and embodied in letters. The god fashioned the Rig-veda, with the Yajush from his eyes, the Sāma-veda from the tip of his tongue, and the Atharvan from his head. These Vedas, as soon as they are born, find a body (*kshetra*). Hence they obtain their character of Vedas, because they find (*vindanti*) that abode. These Vedas then create the pre-existent eternal brahma (sacred science), a Male of celestial form, with their own mind-born qualities."

I extract another passage on the same subject from a later section of the same work, verses 12,425 ff. When the Supreme Being was intent on creating the universe, Hiraṇyagarbha, or Prajāpati, issued from his mouth, and was desired to divide himself,—a process which he was in great doubt how he should effect. The text then proceeds:

Iti chintayatas tasya "om" ity evotthitaḥ svaraḥ | sa bhūmāv antarīkshe cha nāke cha kṛitavān svanam | Taṁ chaivābhyasatas tasya manaḥ-sāra-mayam punaḥ | hṛidayād deva-devasya vashaṭkāraḥ samutthitaḥ | bhūmy-antarīksha-nākānām bhūyaḥ svarātmakāḥ parāḥ | mahāsmṛitimayāḥ puṇyāḥ mahāvyāhṛitayo 'bhavan | chhandasām pravarā devī chaturviṁśā-ksharā 'bhavat | Tat-padaṁ saṁsmaran divyam sāvitrīm akarot prabhuḥ |

ṛik-sāmātharva-yajushaś chaturo bhagavān prabhuḥ | chakāra nikhilān vedān brahma-yuktena karmaṇā |

"While he was thus reflecting, the sound "om" issued from him, and resounded through the earth, air, and sky. While the god of gods was again and again repeating this, the essence of mind, the vashaṭkāra proceeded from his heart. Next, the sacred and transcendent vyāhṛitis, (bhūḥ, bhuvaḥ, svar), formed of the great smṛiti, in the form of sound, were produced from earth, air, and sky. Then appeared the goddess, the most excellent of metres, with twenty-four syllables [the gāyatrī]. Reflecting on the divine text [beginning with] "tat," the Lord formed the sāvitrī. He then produced all the Vedas, the Ṛich, Sāman, Atharvan, and Yajush, with their prayers and rites." (See also the passage from the Bhāg. Pur. xii. 6, 37 ff., which will be quoted in a following section.)

Mahābhārata.—The Mahābhārata in one passage speaks of Sarasvatī and the Vedas as being both created by Achyuta (Vishṇu) from his mind (Bhīshma-parvan, verse 3019: *Sarasvatīm cha vedāṁś cha manasaḥ sasṛije 'chyutaḥ*). In another place, S'ānti-parvan, verse 12,920, Sarasvatī is said, in conformity with the texts quoted above, pp. 10 and 12, from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, the Vana-parvan, and the Harivaṁśa, to be the mother of the Vedas:

Vedānām mātaraṁ paśya mat-sthām devīṁ Sarasvatīm |

"Behold Sarasvatī, mother of the Vedas, abiding in me."

Manu.—According to the verses in Manu, xii. 49, 50, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 41, the Vedas, with the other beings and objects named along with them, constitute the second manifestation of the sattva guṇa, or pure principle; while Brahmā is placed in a higher rank, as one of the first manifestations of the same principle. The word Veda in this passage is explained by Kullūka of those "embodied deities, celebrated in the Itihāsas, who preside over the Vedas" (*Vedābhimāninyaś cha devatāḥ vigrahavatyaḥ itihāsa-prasiddāḥ*).

SECT. III.—*Passages of the Brāhmaṇas and other works in which the Vedas are spoken of as being the sources of all things, and as infinite and eternal.*

The first text of this sort which I shall cite is from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, x. 4, 2, 21:

Atha sarvāṇi bhūtāni paryaikshat | sa trayyām eva vidyāyāṁ sarvāṇi bhūtāny apaśyat | attra hi sarveshāṁ chhandasāṁ ātmā sarveshāṁ stomānāṁ sarveshām prāṇānāṁ sarveshāṁ devānām | etad vai asti | etad hy amṛitam | yad hy amṛitam tad hy asti | etad u tad yad martyam | 22. *Sa aikshata Prajāpatiḥ "trayyāṁ vāva vidyāyāṁ sarvāṇi bhūtāni | hanta trayīm eva vidyām ātmānam abhisaṁskaravai" iti |* 23. *Sa ṛicho vyauhat | dvādaśa bṛihatī-sahasrāṇy etāvatyo ha ṛicho yāḥ Prajāpati-sṛishṭās tās triṁśattame vyūhe panktishv atishṭhanta | tāḥ yat triṁśattame vyūhe 'tishṭhanta tasmāt triṁśad māsasya rātrayaḥ | atha yat panktishu tasmāt pānktaḥ Prajāpatiḥ | tāḥ ashṭāśataṁ śatāni panktayo 'bhavan |*

21. "Then he looked around upon all beings. He beheld all beings in this triple Vedic science. For in it is the soul of all metres, of all hymns of praise, of all breaths, of all the gods. This, indeed, exists.[14] It is an undying thing. For that which is undying (really) exists. This is that which is mortal.[15] Prajāpati reflected, 'All beings are comprehended in the triple Vedic science: come let me dispose myself in the shape of the triple Vedic science.[16] He arranged the verses of the Rig-veda. Twelve thousand Bṛihatīs, and as many Ṛich-verses which were created by Prajāpati, stood in rows in the thirtieth class. Since they stood in the thirtieth class there are thirty nights in the month. Since they stood in rows (*pankti*) Prajāpati is called Pānkta. They formed eighteen hundreds of rows."

The next text, from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 12, 9, 1, speaks of the three Vedas as being respectively the sources of form, motion, and heat, or brilliancy:

Ṛigbhyo jātām sarvaśo mūrttim āhuḥ sarvā gatir yājushī haiva śaśvat | sarvaṁ tejaḥ sāma-rūpyaṁ ha śaśvat |

"They say that form universally proceeds from ṛich verses; that motion is always connected with the yajush, and that all heat has the nature of the sāman."

We have already seen, p. 6, that Manu (i. 21) speaks of the names,

[14] "Always exists" (*sarvadā vidyate*).—Comm.

[15] On this the commentator remarks: *Yach cha martyam maraṇa-dharmakam manushyādi tad apy etat trayī-bhūtam eva | ato martiyāmṛitātmakaṁ sarvaṁ jagad attrāntarbhūtam |* "And that which is mortal, subject to death, the human race, etc., is also one with the triple Vedic science. Hence the latter includes all the world both mortal and immortal."

[16] I owe this interpretation of this clause to Prof. Aufrecht.

functions, and conditions of all things as fashioned from the words of the Veda. It is similarly said in the Vishṇu Purāṇa, i. 5, 58:

Nāma rūpaṁ cha bhūtānāṁ kṛityānāṁ cha pravarttanaṁ | Veda-śabdebhya evādau devādīnāṁ chakāra saḥ | ṛishīṇāṁ nāmadheyāni yathā veda-śrutāni vai | yathā-niyoga-yogyāni sarveshām api so 'karot |

"In the beginning he created from the words of the Veda the names, forms, and functions of the gods and other beings. He also assigned the names of all the rishis as indicated in the Vedas, and as appropriate to their respective offices."

The same idea is repeated in the Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan, 8533:

Ṛishayas tapasā vedān adhyaishanta divāniśam | An-ādi-nidhanā vidyā vāg utsṛishṭā Svayambhuvā | ādau vedamayī divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravṛittayaḥ | ṛishīṇām nāmadheyāni yāś cha vedeshu sṛishṭayaḥ | nānā-rūpaṁ cha bhūtānām karmaṇāṁ cha pravarttayan (pravarttanam?) | veda-śabdebhya evādau nirmimīte sa īśvaraḥ |

"Through austere-fervour (*tapas*) the rishis studied the Vedas, both day and night. In the beginning knowledge (*vidyā*)[17] without beginning or end, divine speech, formed of the Vedas, was sent forth by Svayambhū (= Brahmā, the self-existent): from her all activities are derived. It is from the words of the Veda that the lord in the beginning frames the names of the rishis, the creations which (exist) in the Vedas, the various forms of beings, and the activity manifested in works."

The Mangalācharaṇa, or prayer prefixed to their commentaries on the Rik Sanhitā and Taittirīya Sanhitā, by both Sāyaṇa and Mādhava, is as follows:

Yasya niśśvasitaṁ vedāḥ yo vedebhyo 'khilaṁ jagat | nirmame tam ahaṁ vande vidyā-tīrtham maheśvaram |

"I reverence Maheśvara the hallowed abode of sacred knowledge, of whom the Vedas are the breathings, and who from the Vedas formed the whole universe."

The following passage from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 10, 11, 3, asserts that the Vedas are infinite in extent:

Bharadvājo ha tribhir āyurbhir brahmacharyyam uvāsa | taṁ ha jīrṇiṁ

[17] In quoting this line in a passage of his Vedārtha-prakāśa, or commentary on the Taittirīya Sanhitā, which I shall adduce further on, Mādhava Āchāryya gives the reading *nityā*, 'eternal,' instead of *vidyā*, 'knowledge.' It is possible that the line may be taken from some other book.

sthaviraṁ śayānam Indraḥ upavrajya uvācha | "*Bharadvāja yat te chaturtham āyur dadyāṁ kim etena kuryyāḥ*" *iti* | "*brahmacharyyam eva enena chareyam*" *iti ha uvācha* | 4. *Taṁ ha trīn giri-rūpān avijnātān iva darśayānchakāra* | *teshāṁ ha ekaikasmād mushṭim ādade* | *sa ha uvācha* "*Bharadvāja*" *ity āmantrya* | "*vedāḥ vai ete* | *anantāḥ vai vedāḥ* | *etad vai etais tribhir āyurbhir anvavochathāḥ* | *atha te itarad ananūktam eva* | *ehi imaṁ viddhi* | *ayaṁ vai sarva-vidyā*" *iti* | 5. *Tasmai ha etam agnim sāvitram uvācha* | *taṁ sa viditvā amṛito bhūtvā svargaṁ lokam iyāya ādityasya sāyujyam* | *amṛito ha eva bhūtvā svargaṁ lokam ety ādityasya sāyujyaṁ yaḥ evaṁ veda* | *eshā u eva trayī vidyā* | 6. *Yāvantaṁ ha vai trayyā vidyayā lokaṁ jayati tāvantam lokaṁ jayati yaḥ evaṁ veda* |

"Bharadvāja lived through three lives[18] in the state of a religious student (*brahmacharyya*). Indra approached him when he was lying old and decrepit, and said to him: 'Bharadvāja, if I give thee a fourth life, how wilt thou employ it?' 'I will lead the life of a religious student,' he replied. 4. He (Indra) showed him three mountain-like objects, as it were unknown. From each of them he took a handful: and, calling to him, 'Bharadvāja,' said, 'These are the Vedas. The Vedas are infinite. This is what thou hast studied during these three lives. Now there is another thing which thou hast not studied, come and learn it. This is the universal science.' 5. He declared to him this Agni Sāvitra. Having known it he (Bharadvāja) became immortal, and ascended to the heavenly world, to union with the sun. He who knows this ascends to heaven, to union with the sun. This is the triple Vedic science. He who knows this conquers a world as great as he would gain by the triple Vedic science."

Another text from the Taittirīya Sanhitā, vii. 3, 1, 4, puts the matter somewhat differently:

Atha brahmā (*brahma-vādino*?) *vadanti parimitāḥ vai ṛichaḥ parimitāni sāmāni parimitāni yajūṁshi atha tasya eva anto nāsti yad brahma* |

"The expounders of sacred science say, 'Ṛich verses are limited, sāman verses are limited, yajush verses are limited; but there is no end of sacred knowledge."

Vishṇu Purāṇa.—At the end of Section 6 of the third book of the

18 This does not appear to mean, three lives in three different births, but a life of thrice the usual length, or already twice renewed.

Vishṇu Purāṇa we have the following assertion of the eternity of the Veda:

Iti śākhāḥ prasankhyātāḥ śākhā-bhedās tathaiva cha | karttāraś chaiva śākhānām bheda-hetus tathoditah | sarva-manvantareshv eva śākhā-bhedāḥ samāḥ smritāḥ | Prājāpatyā śrutir nityā tad-vikalpās tv ime dvija |

"Thus the S'ākhās, their divisions, their authors, and the cause of the division have been declared. In all the manvantaras the divisions of the S'ākhās are recorded to be the same. The śruti (Veda) derived from Prajāpati (Brahmā) is eternal: these, o Brāhman, are only its modifications."

In another passage of the same book, Vishṇu is identified with the Vedas: Vishṇu Purāṇa, iii. 3, 19 ff.:

Sa riñ-mayaḥ sa sāmamayaḥ sa chātmā sa yajurmayaḥ | ṛig-yajuḥ-sāma-sārātmā sa evātmā śarīriṇām | sa bhidyate vedamayaḥ sa vedaṁ karoti bhedair bahubhiḥ saśākham | śākhā-praṇetā sa samasta-śākhāḥ jnāna-svarūpo bhagavān anantaḥ |

"He is composed of the Rich, of the Sāman, of the Yajush; he is the soul. Consisting of the essence of the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman, he is the soul of embodied spirits. Formed of the Veda, he is divided; he forms the Veda and its branches (*śākhās*) into many divisions. Framer of the S'ākhās, he is also their entirety, the infinite lord, whose essence is knowledge."

SECT. IV.—*Passages from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa and Manu, eulogistic of the Veda, with some statements of a different tenor from Manu and other writers.*

The following panegyric on Vedic study is taken from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 6, 1:

Pancha eva mahāyajnāḥ , tāny eva mahāsattrāṇi bhūta-yajno manushya-yajnaḥ pitṛi-yajno deva-yajno brahma-yajnaḥ iti | 2. *Ahar ahar bhūtebhyo baliṁ haret | tathā etam bhūta-yajnaṁ samāpnoti | ahar ahar dadyād ā uda-pātrāt tathā etam manushya-yajnaṁ samāpnoti | ahar ahaḥ svadhākuryād ā uda-pātrāt tathā etaṁ pitṛi-yajnaṁ samāpnoti | ahar ahaḥ svāhākuryād ā kāshṭhāt tathā etaṁ deva-yajnaṁ samāpnoti* | 3. *Atha brahma-yajnaḥ | svādhyāyo vai brahma-yajnaḥ | tasya vai etasya brahma-*

yajnasya vāg eva juhūr manaḥ upabhṛich chakshur dhruvā medhā sruvaḥ satyam avabhṛithaḥ svargo lokaḥ udayanam | yāvantaṁ ha vai imām pṛithivīṁ vittena pūrṇāṁ dadaṁ lokaṁ jayati tris tāvantaṁ jayati bhūyāṁsaṁ cha akshayyaṁ yaḥ evaṁ vidvān ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyaḥ | 4. *Paya-āhutayo ha vai etāḥ devānāṁ yad ṛichaḥ | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān ṛicho 'har ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte paya-āhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tarpayati | te enaṁ tṛiptās tarpayanti yoga-kshemeṇa prāṇena retasā sarvātmanā sarvābhiḥ puṇyābhiḥ sampadbhiḥ | ghṛita-kulyāḥ madhu-kulyāḥ pitṛīn svadhā abhivahanti |* 5. *Ājyāhutayo ha vai etāḥ devānāṁ yad yajūṁshi | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān yajūṁshy ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte ājyāhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tarpayati te enam tṛiptās tarpayanti yoga-kshemeṇa ityādi |* 6. *Somāhutayo ha vai etāḥ devānāṁ yat sāmāni | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān sāmāny ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte somāhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tarpayati ityādi |* 7. *Meda-āhutayo ha vai etāḥ devānāṁ yad atharvāngirasaḥ | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān atharvāngiraso 'har ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte meda-āhutibhir eva tad devāṁs tarpayati ityādi |* 8. *Madhv-āhutayo ha vai etāḥ devānāṁ yad anuśāsanāni vidyā vākovākyam itihāsa-purāṇaṁ gāthāḥ nārāśaṁsyaḥ | sa yaḥ evaṁ vidvān ityādi |* 9. *Tasya vai etasya brahma-yajnasya chatvāro vashaṭkārāḥ yad vāto vāti yad vidyotate yat stanayati yad avasphūrjati | tasmād evaṁ vidvān vāte vāti vidyotamāne stanayaty avasphūrjaty adhīyīta eva vashaṭkārāṇām achhaṁbaṭkārāya | ati ha vai punar mṛityum muchyate gachhati Brahmaṇaḥ sātmatām | sa ched api prabalam iva na śaknuyād apy ekaṁ deva-padam adhīyīta eva tathā bhūtebhyo na hīyate |* xi. 5, 7, 1: *Atha ataḥ svādhyāya-praśaṁsā | priye svādhyāya-pravachane bhavataḥ | yukta-manāḥ bhavaty aparādhīno 'har ahar arthān sādhayate sukhaṁ svapiti parama-chikitsakaḥ ātmano bhavati | indriya-saṁyamaś cha ekārāmatā cha prajnā-vṛiddhir yaśo loka-paktiḥ | prajnā varddhamānā chaturo dharmān brāhmaṇam abhinishpādayati brāhmaṇyam pratirūpa-charyyāṁ yaśo loka-paktim | lokaḥ pachyamānaś chaturbhir dharmair brāhmaṇam bhunakty archayā cha dānena cha ajyeyatayā cha abadhyatayā cha |* 2. *Ye ha vai ke cha śramāḥ ime dyāvā-pṛithivī antareṇa svādhyāyo ha eva teshām paramatā kāshṭhā yaḥ evam vidvān svādhyāyam adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyaḥ |* 3. *Yad yad ha vai ayaṁ chhandasaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte tena tena ha eva asya yajna-kratunā ishṭam bhavati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān svādhyāyam adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyaḥ |* 4. *Yadi ha vai apy abhyaktaḥ alankṛitaḥ suhitaḥ sukhe śayane śayānaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte ā ha*

eva sa nakhāgrebhyas tapyate yaḥ evaṁ vidvān svādhyāyam adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyaḥ | 5. *Madhu ha vai ṛicho ghṛitaṁ ha sāmāny amṛitaṁ yajūṁshi | yad ha vai ayaṁ vākovākyam adhīte kshīraudana-māṁsaudanau ha eva tau* | 6. *Madhunā ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān ṛicho 'har ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enaṁ tṛiptās tarpayanti sarvaiḥ kāmaiḥ sarvair bhogaiḥ* | 7. *Ghṛitena ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān sāmāny ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enaṁ tṛiptāḥ ityādi* | 8. *Amṛitena ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evam vidvān yajūṁshy ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enaṁ tṛiptāḥ ityādi* | 9. *Kshīraudana-māṁsaudanābhyāṁ ha vai esha devāṁs tarpayati yaḥ evaṁ vidvān vākovākyam itihāsa-purāṇam ity ahar ahaḥ svādhyāyam adhīte | te enaṁ tṛiptāḥ ityādi* | 10. *Yanti vai āpaḥ | ety ādityaḥ | eti chandramāḥ | yanti nakshattrāṇi | yathā ha vai na iyur na kuryur evaṁ ha eva tad ahar brāhmaṇo bhavati yad ahaḥ svādhyāyaṁ na adhīte | tasmāt svādhyāyo 'dhetavyaḥ | tasmād apy ṛichaṁ vā yajur vā sāma vā gāthāṁ vā kuṁvyāṁ vā abhivyāhared vratasya avyavachhedāya* |

"There are only five great sacrifices, which are the great ceremonies, viz., the offering to living creatures,[19] the offering to men, the offering to the fathers, the offering to the gods, and the Veda-offering (*brahma-yajna*). 2. Let an oblation be daily presented to living creatures. Thus the offering to them is fulfilled. Let (hospitality) be daily bestowed even down to the bowl of water. Thus is the offering to men fulfilled. Let the oblation to the fathers be daily presented,[20] down to the bowl of water with the svadhā formula. Thus is the offering to the fathers fulfilled. Let the oblation to the gods be daily presented as far as the faggot of wood. Thus is the offering to the gods fulfilled. 3. Next is the Veda-offering. This means private study[21] (of the sacred books). In this Veda-sacrifice speech is the juhū, the soul the upabhṛit, the eye the dhruvā, intelligence the sruva,[22] truth the ablution, and paradise

[19] This sacrifice, as I learn from Prof. Aufrecht, consists in scattering grain for the benefit of birds, etc. See Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, *s.v. bali*. In regard to the other sacrifices see Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. pp. 150, 153, 182 ff., 203 ff.

[20] In explanation of this Professor Aufrecht refers to Kātyāyana's S'rauta Sūtras, iv. 1, 10, and Manu, iii. 210, 214, 218.

[21] *Svādhyāyaḥ sva-śākhādhyanam* | "Reading of the Veda in one's own śākhā."—Comm.

[22] These words denote sacrificial spoons or ladles of different kinds of wood. See the drawings of them in Prof. Müller's article on the funeral rites of the Brāhmans, Journ. of the Germ. Or. Soc. vol. ix. pp. lxxviii. and lxxx.

the conclusion. He who, knowing this, daily studies the Veda, conquers an undecaying world more than thrice as great as that which he acquires who bestows this whole earth filled with riches. Wherefore the Veda should be studied. 4. Verses of the Rig-veda are milk-oblations to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with milk-oblations; and they being satisfied, satisfy him with property, with breath, with generative power, with complete bodily soundness, with all excellent blessings. Streams of butter, streams of honey flow as svadhā-oblations to the fathers. 5. Yajush-verses are offerings of butter to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with offerings of butter; and they, being satisfied, satisfy him, etc. (as in the preceding paragraph). 6. Sāman-verses are soma-libations to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with soma-libations; and they being satisfied, satisfy him, etc. (as above). 7. Verses of Atharvan and Angiras (*atharvāngirasaḥ*[23]) are oblations of fat to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these verses, satisfies the gods with oblations of fat; and they etc. (as above). 8. Prescriptive and scientific treatises, dialogues, traditions, tales, verses, and eulogistic texts are oblations of honey to the gods. He who, knowing this, daily reads these, satisfies the gods with oblations of honey; and they etc. (as above). 9. Of this Veda-sacrifice there are four Vashaṭkāras, when the wind blows, when it lightens, when it thunders, when it crashes; wherefore when it blows, lightens, thunders, or crashes, let the man, who knows this, read, in order that these Vashaṭkāras may not be interrupted.[24] He who does so is freed from dying a second time, and attains to an union with Brahma. Even if he cannot read vigorously, let him read one text relating to the gods. Thus he is not deprived of his living creatures."

xi. 5, 7, 1: "Now comes an encomium upon Vedic study. Study and teaching are loved. He (who practises them) becomes composed in mind. Independent of others, he daily attains his objects, sleeps pleasantly, becomes his own best physician. Control of his senses, concentration of mind, increase of intelligence, renown, capacity to educate mankind [are the results of study]. Increasing intelligence secures for

[23] The Atharva Sanhitā is so called.

[24] See Böthlingk and Roth's Lexicon, *s.v. chhambaṭ*.

the Brāhman the four attributes of saintliness, suitable conduct, renown, and capacity for educating mankind. When so educated, men guarantee to the Brāhman the enjoyment of the four prerogatives which are his due, reverence, the receipt of gifts, freedom from oppression, and from death by violence. 2. Of all the modes of exertion, which are known between heaven and earth, study of the Veda occupies the highest rank, (in the case of him) who, knowing this, studies it. Wherefore this study is to be practised. 3. On every occasion when a man studies the Vedic hymns he (in fact) performs a complete ceremonial of sacrifice, *i.e.* whosoever, knowing this, so studies. Wherefore this study, etc., etc. 4. And even when a man, perfumed with unguents, adorned with jewels, satiated with food, and reposing on a comfortable couch, studies the Veda he (has all the merit of one who) performs penance (felt) to the very tips of his nails:[25] (such is the case with him) who, knowing this, studies. Wherefore etc. 5. Rig-veda-verses are honey, Sāma-verses butter, yajus-verses nectar (*amṛita*). When a man reads dialogues (*vākovākya*) [and legends], these two sorts of composition are respectively oblations of cooked milk and cooked flesh. 6. He who, knowing this, daily reads Rig-veda-verses, satisfies the gods with honey; and they, when satisfied, satisfy him with all objects of desire, and with all enjoyments. 7. He who, knowing this, daily reads Sāma-verses, satisfies the gods with butter; and they, when satisfied, etc. (as before). 8. He who, knowing this, daily reads Yajus-verses, satisfies the gods with nectar; and they, etc. (as before). 9. He who, knowing this, daily studies dialogues and the different classes of ancient stories, satisfies the gods with milk- and flesh-oblations; and they, etc. (as before). 10. The waters move. The sun moves. The moon moves. The constellations move. The Brāhman who on any day does not study the Veda, is on that day like what these moving bodies would be if the ceased to move or act. Wherefore such study is to be practised. Let

[25] This sentence is differently rendered by Professor Weber, Ind. Stud. x. p. 112, as follows: "He burns (with sacred fire) to the very tips of his nails." In a later page of the same Essay we are told that according to the doctrine of a teacher called Nāka Maudgalya as stated in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, the study and teaching of the Veda are the real *tapas* (*svādhyāya-pravachane eva tad hi tapaḥ*). In the text of the Āraṇyaka itself, vii. 8, it is declared that study and teaching should always accompany such spiritual or ritual acts as *ṛitam*, *satyam*, *tapas*, *dama*, *śama*, the *agnihotra* sacrifice, etc. See Indische Studien, ii. 214, and x. 113.

a man therefore present as his offering a verse of the Rig-veda, or the Sāman, or the Yajush, or a Gāthā, or a Kuṁvyā, in order that the course of his observances may not be interrupted."

Manu employs the following honorific expressions in reference to the Vedas (xii. 94 ff.):

Pitṛi-deva-manushyāṇāṁ vedaś chakshuḥ sanātanam | aśakyaṁ chāprameyaṁ cha veda-śāstram iti sthitiḥ | Yā veda-vāhyāḥ smṛitayo yāś cha kāścha kudṛishṭayaḥ |[26] *sarvās tā nishphalāḥ pretya tamo-nishṭhāḥ hi tāḥ smṛitaḥ | Utpadyante chyavante cha yāny ato 'nyāni kānichit | Tāny arvāk-kālikatayā*[27] *nishphalāny anṛitāni cha | Chāturvarṇyaṁ trayo lokāś chatvāraś chāśramāḥ pṛithak | Bhūtam bhavad bhavishyaṁ cha sarvaṁ vedāt prasiddhyati | śabdaḥ sparśaś cha rūpaṁ cha raso gandhaś cha panchamaḥ | vedād eva prasiddhyanti prasūti-guṇa-karmataḥ | Bibhartti*[28] *sarva-bhūtāni veda-śāstraṁ sanātanam | Tasmād etat param manye yaj jantor asya sādhanam | Saināpatyaṁ cha rājyaṁ cha daṇḍa-netṛitvam eva cha | sarva-lokādhipatyaṁ cha veda-śāstra-vid arhati | Yathā jāta-balo vahnir dahaty ārdrān api drumān | tathā dahati veda-jnaḥ karma-jaṁ dosham ātmanaḥ | veda-śāstrārtha-tattva-jno yatra tatrāśrame vasan | ihaiva loke tishṭhan sa brahmabhūyāya kalpate |*

"The Veda is the eternal eye of the fathers, of gods, and of men; it is beyond human power and comprehension; this is a certain conclusion. Whatever traditions are apart from the Veda, and all heretical views, are fruitless in the next world, for they are declared to be founded on darkness. All other [books] external to the Veda, which arise and pass away, are worthless and false from their recentness of date. The system of the four castes, the three worlds, the four states of life, all that has been, now is, or shall be, is made manifest by the

[26] *Drishṭārtha-vākyāni "chaitya-vandanāt svargo bhavati" ity ādīni yāni cha asat-tarka-mūlāni devatā-'pūrvādi-nirākaraṇātmakāni veda-viruddhāni chārvāka-darśananani* | "That is, deductions from experience of the visible world; such doctrines as that 'heaven is attained by obeisance to a chaitya,' and similar Chārvāka tenets founded on false reasonings, contradicting the existence of the gods, and the efficacy of religious rites, and contrary to the Vedas."—Kullūka.

[27] *Idānīntanatvāt* | "From their modernness."—Kullūka.

[28] "*Havir agnau hūyate | so 'gnir ādityam upasarpati | tat sūryo raśmibhir varshati | tenānnam bhavati | atha iha bhūtānām utpatti-sthitiś cheti havir jāyate" iti brāhmaṇam* | "'The oblation is cast into the fire; fire reaches the sun; the sun causes rain by his rays; thence food is produced; thus the oblation becomes the cause of the generation and maintenance of creatures on this earth;' so says a Brāhmaṇa."—Kullūka.

Veda. The objects of touch and taste, sound, form, and odour, as the fifth, are made known by the Veda, together with their products, quatilies, and the character of their action. The eternal Veda supports all beings: hence I regard it as the principal instrument of well-being to this creature, man. Command of armies, royal authority, the administration of criminal justice, and the sovereignty of all worlds, he alone deserves who knows the Veda. As fire, when it has acquired force, burns up even green trees, so he who knows the Veda consumes the taint of his soul which has been contracted from works. He who comprehends the essential meaning of the Veda, in whatever order of life he may be, is prepared for absorption into Brahmā, even while abiding in this lower world."

The following are some further miscellaneous passages of the same tenor, scattered throughout the Institutes (Manu, ii. 10 ff.):

S'rutis tu vedo vijneyo dharma-śāstram tu vai smṛitiḥ | te sarvārtheshv amīmāṁsye tābhyāṁ dharmo hi nirbabhau | 11. *Yo 'vamanyeta te mūle hetu-śāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ | sa sādhubhir vahishkāryyo nāstiko veda-nindakaḥ* | . . . . 13. *Dharmaṁ jijnāsamānānām pramāṇam paramaṁ śrutiḥ* |

"By śruti is meant the Veda, and by smṛiti the institutes of law: the contents of these are not to be questioned by reason, since from them [a knowledge of] duty has shone forth. The Brāhman who, relying on rationalistic treatises,[29] shall contemn these two primary sources of knowledge, must be excommunicated by the virtuous as a sceptic and reviler of the Vedas. . . . . 13. To those who are seeking a knowledge of duty, the śruti is the supreme authority."

In the following passage, the necessity of a knowledge of Brahma is asserted, though the practice of ritual observances is also inculcated (vi. 82 ff.):

Dhyānikaṁ sarvam evaitad yad etad abhiśabditam | na hy anadhyātmavit kaśchit kriyā-phalam upāśnute | adhiyajnam brahma japed ādhidaivikam eva cha | ādhyatmikaṁ cha satataṁ vedāntābhihitaṁ cha yat | Idaṁ śaraṇam ajnānām idam eva vijānatām | idam anvichchhatāṁ svargam idam ānantyam ichchhatām |

[29] This, however, must be read in conjunction with the precept in xii. 106, which declares: *ārshaṁ dharmopadeśaṁ cha veda-śāstrāvirodhinā | yas tarkenānusandhatte sa dharmaṁ veda nāparaḥ* | "He, and he only is acquainted with duty, who investigates the injunctions of the rishis, and the precepts of the smṛiti, by reasonings which do not contradict the Veda."

"All this which has been now declared is dependant on devout meditation: no one who is ignorant of the supreme Spirit can reap the fruit of ceremonial acts. Let a man repeat texts relating to sacrifice, texts relating to deities, texts relating to the supreme Spirit, and whatever is declared in the concluding portions of the Veda (the Upanishads). This [Veda] is the refuge of the ignorant, as well as of the understanding; it is the refuge of those who are seeking after paradise, as well as of those who are desiring infinity."

The following text breathes a moral spirit, by representing purity of life as essential to the reception of benefit from religious observances (ii. 97):

Vedās tyāgaś cha yajnāś cha niyamāś cha tapāṁsi cha | na vipra-dushṭa-bhāvasya siddhiṁ gachhanti karchichit |

"The Vedas, almsgiving, sacrifices, observances, austerities, are ineffectual to a man of depraved disposition."

The doctrine which may be drawn from the following lines does not seem so favourable to morality (xi. 261 ff.):

Hatvā lokān apīmāṁs trīn aśnann api yatastataḥ | Ṛigvedaṁ dhārayan vipro nainaḥ prāpnoti kinchana | Ṛiksaṁhitāṁ trir abhyasya yajushāṁ va samāhitaḥ | sāmnāṁ vā sa-rahasyānāṁ sarva-pāpaiḥ pramuchyate | yathā mahā-hradam prāpya kshiptam loshṭaṁ vinaśyati | tathā duścharitaṁ sarvaṁ vede trivṛiti majjati |

"A Brāhman who should destroy these three worlds, and eat food received from any quarter whatever, would incur no guilt if he retained in his memory the Rig-veda. Repeating thrice with intent mind the Sanhitā of the Rik, or the Yajush, or the Sāman, with the Upanishads, he is freed from all his sins. Just as a clod thrown into a great lake is dissolved when it touches the water, so does all sin sink in the triple Veda."

Considering the sacredness ascribed in the preceding passages to all the Vedas, the characteristics assigned to three of them in the passage quoted above (p. 12) from the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, as well as the epithet applied to the Sāma-veda in the second of the following verses are certainly remarkable; (Manu, iv. 123 ff.):

Sāma-dhvanāv ṛig-yajushī nādhīyīta kadāchana | vedasyādhītya vā 'py antam āraṇyakam adhītya cha | Ṛigvedo deva-daivatyo yajurvedas tu mānushaḥ | Sāmavedaḥ smṛitaḥ pitryas tasmāt tasyāśuchir dhvaniḥ |

"Let no one read the Rich or the Yajush while the Sāman is sounding in his ears, or after he has read the conclusion of the Veda (*i.e.* the Upanishads) or an Āraṇyaka. The Rig-veda has the gods for its deities; the Yajur-veda has men for its objects; the Sāma-veda has the pitṛis for its divinities, wherefore its sound is impure."

The scholiast Kullūka, however, will not allow that the sound of the Sāma-veda can be really "impure." "It has," he says, "only a semblance of impurity" (*tasmāt tasya aśuchir iva dhvaniḥ | na tv aśuchir eva*). In this remark he evinces the tendency, incident to so many systematic theologians, to ignore all those features of the sacred text on which they are commenting which are at variance with their theories regarding its absolute perfection. As it was the opinion of his age that the Veda was eternal and divine, it was, he considered, impossible that impurity or any species of defect could be predicated of any of its parts; and every expression, even of the highest authorities, which contradicted this opinion, had to be explained away. I am not in a position to state how this notion of impurity came to be attached to the Sāma-veda. The passage perhaps proceeded from the adherents of some particular Vedic school adverse to the Sāma-veda; but its substance being found recorded in some earlier work, it was deemed of sufficient authority to find a place in the miscellaneous collection of precepts,—gathered no doubt from different quarters, and perhaps not always strictly consistent with each other,—which make up the Mānava-dharma-śāstra.

Vishṇu Purāṇa.—The following passage from the Vishṇu Purāṇa, at the close, ascribes the same character of impurity to the Sāma-veda, though on different grounds, Vish. Pur. ii. 11, 5:

Yā tu śaktiḥ parā Vishṇor ṛig-yajuḥ-sāma-sanjnitā | saishā trayī tapaty aṁho jagataś cha hinasti yat | saiva Vishṇuḥ sthitaḥ sthityāṁ jagataḥ pālanodyataḥ | ṛig-yajuḥ-sāma-bhūto 'ntaḥ savitur dvija tishṭhati | māsi māsi ravir yo yas tatra tatra hi sā parā | trayīmayī Vishṇu-śaktir avasthānaṁ karoti vai | Ṛichas tapanti pūrvāhne madhyāhne 'tha yajūṁshy atha | vṛihadrathantarādīni sāmāny ahnaḥ kshaye ravau | angam eshā trayī Vishṇor ṛig-yajuḥ-sāma-sanjnitā | Vishṇu-śaktir avasthānam māsāditye karoti sā | na kevalaṁ ravau śaktir vaishṇavī sā trayīmayī | Brahmā 'tha Purusho Rudras trayam etat trayīmayam | sargādāv ṛiṅmayo Brahmā sthitau Vishṇur yajurmayaḥ | Rudraḥ sāmamayo 'ntāya tasmāt tasyāśuchir dhvaniḥ |

"The supreme energy of Vishṇu, called the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman—this triad burns up sin and all things injurious to the world. During the continuance of the world, this triad exists as Vishṇu, who is occupied in the preservation of the universe, and who in the form of the Rich, Yajush, and Sāman, abides within the sun. That supreme energy of Vishṇu, consisting of the triple Veda, dwells in the particular form of the sun, which presides over each month. The Rich verses shine in the morning sun, the Yajush verses in the meridian beams, and the Vṛihad-rathantara and other Sāma verses in his declining rays. This triple Veda is the body of Vishṇu, and this his energy abides in the monthly sun. But not only does this energy of Vishṇu, formed of the triple Veda, reside in the sun: Brahmā, Purusha (Vishṇu), and Rudra also constitute a triad formed of the triple Veda. Acting in creation, Brahmā is formed of the Rig-veda; presiding over the continuance of the universe, Vishṇu is composed of the Yajur-veda; and for the destruction of the worlds, Rudra is made up of the Sāma-veda; hence the sound of this Veda is impure."

Vāyu Purāṇa.—Other passages also may be found in works which are far from being reputed as heretical, in which the Vedas, or particular parts of them, are not spoken of with the same degree of respect as they are by Manu. Thus the Vāyu Purāṇa gives precedence to the Purāṇas over the Vedas in the order of creation (i. 56[30]):

Prathamaṁ sarva-śāstrāṇāṁ Purāṇaṁ Brahmaṇā smṛitam | anantaraṁ cha vaktrebhyo vedās tasya vinissṛitāḥ |

"First of all the Śāstras, the Purāṇa was uttered by Brahmā. Subsequently the Vedas issued from his mouths."

Similarly the Padma Purāṇa says:

Purāṇam sarva-śāstrāṇām prathamam Brahmaṇā smṛitam | tri-varga-sādhanam puṇyaṁ śata-koṭi-pravistaram | nirdagdheshu cha lokeshu vāji-rūpeṇa Keśavaḥ | Brahmaṇas tu samādeśād vedān ahṛitavān asau | angāni chaturo vedān purāṇa-nyāya-vistarā[n?] | mīmāṁsā[ṁ?] dharma-śāstraṁ cha parigṛihyātha sāmpratam | matsya-rūpeṇa cha punaḥ kalpādāv udakāntare | aśesham etat kathitam ityādi |[31]

"The Purāṇa, which is an instrument for effecting the three objects

[30] Page 48 of Prof. Aufrecht's Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in the Bodleian Library at Oxford.

[31] See the same Catalogue p. 12, col. i.

of life, which is pure, and extends to the length of a hundred crores of verses, was the first of all the S'āstras which Brahmā uttered. When the worlds had been burnt up, Keśava (Kṛishṇa), in the form of a horse, and obeying Brahmā's command, rescued the Vedas. Having taken them with their appendages, the Purāṇas, the Nyāya, the Mīmānsā, and the Institutes of Law, he now at the beginning of the Kalpa promulgated them all again in the form of a Fish from the midst of the waters."

In the Matsya Purāṇa, iii. 2 ff., not only is priority of creation claimed for the Purāṇas, but also the qualities of eternity and identity with sound, which are generally predicated of the Vedas alone:

Rūpaṁ dadhāra[32] *prathamam amarāṇam Pitāmahaḥ | āvirbhūtās tato vedāḥ sāngopānga-pada-kramāḥ* | 3. *Purāṇaṁ sarva-śāstrāṇām prathamam Brahmaṇā smṛitam | nityaṁ śabdamayam puṇyam śata-koṭi-pravistaram* | 4. *Anantaraṁ cha vaktrebhyo vedās tasya vinissṛitāḥ | mīmāṁsā nyāya-vidyā cha pramāṇāshṭaka-saṁyutā* | 5. *Vedābhyāsa-ratasyāsya prajā-kāmasya mānasāḥ | manasā pūrva-sṛishṭāḥ vai jātāḥ ye tena mānasāḥ* |

2. "Pitāmaha (Brahmā), first of all the immortals, took shape: then the Vedas with their Angas and Upāngas (appendages and minor appendages), and the various modes of their textual arrangement, were manifested. 3. The Purāṇa, eternal, formed of sound, pure, extending to the length of a hundred crores of verses, was the first of the S'āstras which Brahmā uttered: and afterwards the Vedas, issued from his mouth; and also the Mīmānsā and the Nyāya with its eightfold system of proofs. 5. From him (Brahmā), who was devoted to the study of the Vedas, and desirous of offspring, sprang mind-born sons, so called because they were at first created by his mind."

The Vāyu Purāṇa says further on in the same section from which I have already quoted:[33]

Yo vidyāch chaturo vedān sāngopanishado dvijaḥ | na chet purāṇaṁ saṁvidyād naiva sa syād vichakshaṇaḥ | Itihāsa-purāṇābhyāṁ vedān samupavṛiṁhayet | vibhety alpa-śrutād vedo mām ayaṁ praharishyati |

[32] This quotation is made from the Taylor MS. No. 1918 of the India Office Library. The Guikowar MS. No. 3032 of the same collection, reads here *tapas chachāra*, "practised austerity," instead of *rūpaṁ dadhāra*, "took shape," and has besides a number of other various readings in these few lines.

[33] See p. 50 of Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue.

"He who knows the four Vedas, with their supplements and Upanishads is not really learned, unless he know also the Purāṇas. Let a man, therefore, complete the Vedas by adding the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. The Veda is afraid of a man of little learning, lest he should treat it injuriously."

The first of these verses is repeated in the Mahābhārata, Ādiparvan verse 645, with a variation in the first half of the second line *na chākhyānam idam vidyāt*, "unless he know also this narrative" (*i.e.* the Mahābhārata). The second of the verses of the Vāyu Purāṇa also is to be found in the same book of the Mahābhārata verse 260, and is followed by these lines:

261. *Kārshṇam vedam imam vidvān śrāvayitvā 'nnam aśnute* | . . . .
264. *Ekataś chaturo vedān Bhāratam chaitad ekataḥ* | *purā kila suraiḥ sarvaiḥ sametya tulayā dhṛitam* | *chaturbhyaḥ sa-rahasyebhyo vedebhyo hy adhikam yadā* | *tadā-prabhṛiti loke 'smin mahābhāratam uchyate* |

"The man who knows this Veda relating to Kṛishṇa (the Mahābhārata), and repeats it to others, obtains food. . . . . 264. All the collected gods formerly weighed in a balance the four Vedas which they placed in the one scale, and this Bhārata which they put into the other. When the latter was found to exceed (in weight) the four Vedas with the Upanishads, it was thenceforward called in this world the Mahābhārata."

Here there is a play upon the word Bhārata, as in part identical with *bhāra*, "weight."

The following verses of the same Ādiparvan and many others are also eulogistic of the great epic poem:

2298. *Idam hi vedaiḥ sammitam pavitram api chottamam* | *śrāvyāṇām uttamam chedam purāṇam ṛishi-samstutam* |

"This (Mahābhārata) is on an equality with the Veda, pure, most excellent, the best of all works that are to be recited, ancient, and praised by rishis."

2314. *Vijneyaḥ sa cha vedānām pārago Bhāratam paṭhan* |

The reader of the Bhārata is to be regarded as having gone through the Vedas."

The benefits derivable from a perusal of the same poem are also set forth in the Svargārohaṇika-parvan, verses 200 ff.

In the same way the Rāmāyaṇa, i. 1, 94, speaks of itself, as "this

pure and holy narrative, which is on an equality with the Vedas" (*idam pavitram ākhyānam puṇyaṁ vedaiś cha sammitam*).

And in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, ii. 8, 28, it is said: *Prāha bhāgavataṁ nāma purāṇam brahma-sammitam | Brahmaṇe Bhagavat-proktam Brahma-kalpe upāgate |*

"(Brahmarāta) declared the Purāṇa called the Bhāgavata, which stands on an equality with the Veda (*brahma*), and was declared by Bhagavat to Brahmā when the Brahma-kalpa had arrived."

Brahma-vaivartta Purāṇa.—The Brahma-vaivartta Purāṇa asserts in a most audacious manner its own superiority to the Veda (i. 48 ff.):

Bhavagan yat tvayā pṛishṭaṁ jnātaṁ sarvam abhīpsitam | sāra-bhūtaṁ purāṇeshu Brahma-vaivarttam uttamam | Purāṇopapurāṇānāṁ vedānām bhrama-bhanjanaṁ |

"That about which, venerable sage, you have inquired, and which you desire, is all known to me, the essence of the Purāṇas, the pre-eminent Brahma-vaivartta, which refutes the errors of the Purāṇas and Upapurāṇas, and of the Vedas." (Professor Aufrecht's Cat. p. 21.)

In the following passage also, from the commencement of the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, the Vedic hymns (though a divine origin would no doubt be allowed to them[34]) are at all events depreciated, by being classed among other works as part of the inferior science, in contrast to the Brahma-vidyā or knowledge of Brahma, the highest of all knowledge, which is expressly ascribed to Brahmā as its author:

1. *Brahmā devānām prathamaḥ sambabhūva viśvasya karttā bhuvanasya goptā | sa brahma-vidyāṁ sarva-vidyā-pratishṭhām Atharvāya jyeshṭha-putrāya prāha | 2. Atharvaṇe yāṁ pravadeta Brahmā Atharvā tāṁ purovāchāṅgire brahma-vidyām | sa Bhāradvājāya Satyavāhāya prāha Bhāradvājo 'ngirase parāvarām | 3. S'aunako ha vai Mahāśālo 'ngirasaṁ*

[34] In fact the following verses (4 and 6) occur in the second chapter of the same Mund. Up.: *Agnir mūrddhā chakshushī chandra-sūryyau diśaḥ śrotre vāg vivṛitāś cha vedāḥ | vāyuḥ prāṇo hṛidayaṁ viśvam asya padbhyāṁ pṛithivī hy esha sarva-bhūtāntarātmā | . . . . 6. Tasmād ṛichaḥ sāma yajūṁshi dīkshā yajnāś cha sarve kratavo dakshiṇās cha | saṁvatsaraṁ cha yajamānaś cha lokāḥ somo yatra pavate yatra sūryaḥ |* "Agni is his [Brahma's] head, the sun and moon are his eyes, the four points of the compass are his ears, the uttered Vedas are his voice, the wind is his breath, the universe is his heart, the earth issued from his feet: he is the inner soul of all creatures. . . . . 6. From him came the Rich verses, the Sāman verses, the Yajush verses, initiatory rites, all oblations, sacrifices, and gifts, the year, the sacrificer, and the worlds where the moon and sun purify."

vidhivad upapannaḥ prapachchha | kasmin nu bhagavo vijnāte sarvam idaṁ vijnātam bhavatīti | 4. Tasmai sa hovācha | dve vidye veditavye iti ha sma yad brahma-vido vadanti parā chaivāparā cha | 5. Tatrāparā "ṛigvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo 'tharvavedaḥ śikshā kalpo vyākaraṇaṁ niruktaṁ chhando jyotisham" iti | atha parā yayā tad aksharam adhigamyate |

"Brahmā was produced the first among the gods, maker of the universe, preserver of the world. He revealed to his eldest son Atharva, the science of Brahma, the basis of all knowledge. 2. Atharvan of old declared to Angis this science, which Brahmā had unfolded to him; and Angis, in turn, explained it to Satyavāha, descendant of Bharadvāja, who delivered this traditional lore, in succession, to Angiras. 3. Mahāśāla S'aunaka, approaching Angiras with the proper formalities, inquired, 'What is that, o venerable sage, through the knowledge of which all this [universe] becomes known?' 4. [Angiras] answered, 'Two sciences are to be known—this is what the sages versed in sacred knowledge declare—the superior and the inferior. 5. The inferior [consists of] the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Atharva-veda, accentuation, ritual, grammar, commentary, prosody, and astronomy. The superior science is that by which the imperishable is apprehended.[35]

I adduce some further passages which depreciate the ceremonial, or exoteric parts of the Vedas, in comparison with the esoteric knowledge of Brahma.

My attention was drawn to the following passage of the Bhagavad Gītā, ii. 42 ff., by its quotation in the Rev. Professor K. M. Banerjea's Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy:

Yām imām pushpitām vācham pravadanty avipaśchitaḥ | veda-vāda-ratāḥ pārtha nānyad astīti vādinaḥ | kāmātmānaḥ svarga-parāḥ janma-karma-phala-pradām | kriyā-viśesha-bahulām bhogaiśvarya-gatim prati | bhogaiśvarya-prasaktānām tayā 'pahṛita-chetasām | vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ samādhau na vidhīyate | traiguṇya-vishayāḥ vedāḥ nistraiguṇyo bhavār-

[35] Compare the Mahābhārata, Ādip. verse 258, which speaks of the Āraṇyakas as superior to (the other parts of) the Vedas, and amṛita as the best of medicines (*āraṇyakaṁ cha vedebhyaś chaushadhibhyo 'mṛitaṁ yathā*). Similarly the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, x. 3, 5, 12 (quoted in Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit., p. 315, note), speaks of the Upanishads as being the essence of the Yajush: *Tasya vai etasya yajusho rasaḥ eva upanishat |*

juna | . . . . *yāvān arthaḥ udapāne sarvataḥ samplutodake* | *tāvān sarveshu vedeshu brāhmaṇasya vijānataḥ* |

"A flowery doctrine, promising the reward of works performed in this embodied state, prescribing numerous ceremonies, with a view to future gratification and glory, is preached by unlearned men, devoted to the injunctions of the Veda, assertors of its exclusive importance, lovers of enjoyment, and seekers after paradise. The restless minds of the men who, through this flowery doctrine, have become bereft of wisdom, and are ardent in the pursuit of future gratification and glory, are not applied to contemplation. The Vedas have for their objects the three qualities (*sattva, rajas, tamas*, or 'goodness,' 'passion,' and 'darkness'); but be thou, Arjuna, free from these three qualities . . . . As great as is the use of a well which is surrounded on every side by overflowing waters, so great [and no greater] is the use of the Vedas to a Brāhman endowed with true knowledge."

Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 1, 1, p. 473 (Colebrooke's Essays, i. 12):

"*Adhīhi bhagavaḥ*" *iti ha upasasāda Sanatkumāram Nāradaḥ* | *tam ha uvācha* "*yad vettha tena mā upasīda tatas te ūrddhvam vakshyāmi*" *iti* | 2. *Sa ha uvācha* "*ṛigvedam bhagavo 'dhyemi yajurvedam sāmavedam ātharvaṇam chaturtham itihāsa-purāṇam panchamam vedānām vedam pitryam rāśim daivam nidhim vākovākyam ekāyanam deva-vidyām brahma-vidyām bhūta-vidyām kshatra-vidyām nakshatra-vidyām sarpa-deva-jana-vidyām etad bhagavo 'dhyemi* | 3. *So 'ham bhagavo mantra-vid evāsmi na ātma-vit* | *śrutam hy eva me bhagavaddṛiśebhyaś 'tarati śokam ātma-vid' iti so 'ham bhagavaḥ śochāmi tam mā bhagavān śokasya pāram tārayatv*" *iti* | *tam ha uvācha* "*yad vai kincha etad adhyagīshṭhāḥ nāma evaitat* | 4. *Nāma vai ṛigvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedaḥ ātharvaṇaś chaturthaḥ itihāsa-purāṇaḥ panchamo vedānām vedaḥ pitryo rāśir daivo nidhir vākovākyam ekāyanam deva-vidyā brahma-vidyā bhūta-vidyā kshatra-vidyā nakshatra-vidyā sarpa-deva-jana-vidyā nāma evaitad nāma upāsva*" *iti* | 5. "*Sa yo nāma brahma ity upāste yāvad nāmno gatam tatra asya yathā kāmachāro bhavati yo nāma brahma ity upāste*" | "*asti bhagavo nāmno bhūyaḥ*" *iti* | "*nāmno vāva bhūyo 'sti*" *iti* | "*tan me bhagavān bravītv*" *iti* |

1. "Nārada approached Sanatkumāra, saying, 'Instruct me, venerable sage.' He received for answer, 'Approach me with [*i.e.* tell me] that which thou knowest; and I will declare to thee whatever more is to be learnt.' 2. Nārada replied, 'I am instructed, venerable sage, in the

Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvaṇa, [which is] the fourth, the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, [which are] the fifth Veda of the Vedas, the rites of the pitṛis, arithmetic, the knowledge of portents, and of great periods, the art of reasoning,[36] ethics, the science of the gods, the knowledge of Scripture, demonology, the science of war, the knowledge of the stars, the sciences of serpents and deities; this is what I have studied. 3. I, venerable man, know only the hymns (*mantras*); while I am ignorant of soul. But I have heard from reverend sages like thyself that 'the man who is acquainted with soul overpasses grief.' Now I, venerable man, am afflicted; but do thou transport me over my grief.' Sanatkumāra answered, 'That which thou hast studied is nothing but name. 4. The Rig-veda is name; and so are the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Ātharvaṇa, which is the fourth, and the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, the fifth Veda of the Vedas, etc. [all the other branches of knowledge are here enumerated just as above],—all these are but name: worship name. 5. He who worships name (with the persuasion that it is) Brahma, ranges as it were at will over all which that name comprehends;—such is the prerogative of him who worships name (with the persuasion that it is) Brahma.' 'Is there anything, venerable man,' asked Nārada, 'which is more than name?' 'There is,' he replied, 'something which is more than name.' 'Tell it to me,' rejoined Nārada."

(S'ankara interprets the words *panchamaṁ vedānāṁ vedam* differently from what I have done. He separates the words *vedānāṁ vedam* from *panchamaṁ* and makes them to mean "the means of knowing the Vedas," *i.e.* grammar. See, however, the Bhāg. Pur. i. 4, 20, below, p. 42, and iii. 12, 39, to be quoted further on.

S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xiv. 7, 1, 22 (= Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, iv. 3, 22, p. 792 ff., p. 228–9 of Dr. Röer's English): *Atra pitā apitā bhavati mātā amātā lokāḥ alokāḥ devāḥ adevāḥ vedāḥ avedāḥ yajnāḥ ayajnāḥ | atra steno 'steno bhavati bhrūṇa-hā abhrūṇa-hā paulkaso 'paulkasaś chāṇḍālo 'chāṇḍālaḥ śramaṇo 'śramaṇas tāpaso 'tāpaso nanvāgatam puṇyena ananvāgatam pāpena*[37] *tīrṇo hi tadā sarvān śokān hṛidayasya bhavati* |

[36] *Vākovākyam* = *tarka-śāstram* — Sāyaṇa. The word is elsewhere explained as meaning "dialogues" (*ukti-pratyukti-rūpam prakaraṇam*—Comm. on S' P. Br. xi. 5, 6, 8). The sense of some of the terms in this list of sciences is obscure; but exactness is not of any great importance to the general drift of the passage.

[37] I give here the reading of the Br. Ār. Up. The S'. P. Br. in Professor Weber's

"In that [condition of profound slumber, *sushupti*,] a father is no father, a mother is no mother, the worlds are no worlds, the gods are no gods, and the Vedas are no Vedas, sacrifices are no sacrifices. In that condition a thief is no thief, a murderer of embryos is no murderer of embryos, a Paulkasa no Paulkasa, a Chāṇḍāla no Chāṇḍāla, a S'ramaṇa no S'ramaṇa, a devotee no devotee; the saint has then no relation, either of advantage or disadvantage, to merit or to sin; for he then crosses over all griefs of the heart."

(I quote from the commentary on the Br. Âr. Up. S'ankara's explanation of the unusual words *nanvāgata* and *ananvāgata*: *Nanvāgataṁ na anvāgatam ananvāgatam asambaddham ity etat puṇyena śāstra-vihitena karmaṇā tathā pāpena vihitākaraṇa-pratishiddha-kriyā-lakshaṇena* | "*Nanvāgata*=*na* (not) *anvāgata*, and *ananvāgata*=*asambaddha*, unconnected. This condition is unconnected either with merit, *i.e.* action enjoined by the śāstra, or with sin, *i.e.* action defined as the neglect of what is enjoined, or the doing of what is forbidden."

To the same effect the great sage Nārada is made to speak in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iv. 29, 42 ff.:

Prajāpati-patiḥ sākshād bhagavān Giriśo Manuḥ | *Dakshādayaḥ prajādhyakshāḥ naishṭhikāḥ Sanakādayaḥ* | *Marīchir Atry-angirasau Pulastyaḥ Pulahaḥ Kratuḥ* | *Bhṛigur Vaśishṭhaḥ ity ete mad-antāḥ brahmavādinaḥ* | *adyāpi vāchaspatayas tapo-vidyā-samādhibhiḥ* | *paśyanto 'py na paśyanti paśyantam Parameśvaram* | *śabda-brahmaṇi dushpāre charantaḥ uruvistare* | *mantra-liṅgair vyavachchhinnam bhajanto na viduḥ param* | *yadā yasyānugṛihṇāti bhagavān ātma-bhāvitaḥ* | *sa jahāti matiṁ loke vede cha parinishṭhitāṁ* | *tasmāt karmasu varhishmann ajnānād artha-kāśishu* | *mā 'rtha-dṛishṭiṁ kṛithāḥ śrotra-sparśishv aspṛishta-vastushu* | *sva-lokaṁ na vidus te vai yatra devo Janārdanaḥ* | *āhur dhūmradhiyo vedaṁ sa-karmakam a-tad-vidaḥ* | *āstīrya darbhaiḥ prāg-agraiḥ kārtsnyena kshiti-maṇḍalam* | *stabdho vṛihad-vadhād mānī karma nāvaishi yat param* | *tat karma Hari-toshaṁ yat sā vidyā tan-matir yayā* |

"Brahmā himself, the divine Giriśa (S'iva), Manu, Daksha and the other Prajāpatis, Sanaka and other devotees, Marīchi, Atri, Angiras, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Bhṛigu, Vaśishṭha—all these expounders of sacred knowledge, and masters of speech, including myself (Nārada) as

text gives *ananvāgataḥ puṇyena ananvāgataḥ pāpena.* And yet the commentary alludes to the word *ananvāgata* being in the neuter.

the last, though seeing, are yet, to this day, unable, by austerity, by science, by contemplation, to see Parameśvara (the supreme God), who sees all things. Wandering in the vast field of the verbal brahma (the Veda), which is difficult to traverse, men do not recognise the Supreme, while they worship him as he is circumscribed by the attributes specified in the hymns (*mantras*). When the Divine Being regards any man with favour, that man, sunk in the contemplation of soul, abandons all thoughts which are set upon the world and the Veda. Cease, therefore, Varhishmat, through ignorance, to look upon works which merely seem to promote the chief good, as if they truly effected that object, (works) which only touch the ear, but do not touch the reality. The misty-minded men, who, ignorant of the Veda, declare that works are its object, do not know [his] own world, where the divine Janārdana abides. Thou who, obstinate man that thou art, strewest the whole earth with sacrificial grass, with its ends turned to the east, and art proud of thy numerous immolations,—thou knowest not what is the highest work of all. That by which Hari (Vishṇu) is pleased, is work; that by which the thoughts are fixed on him, is science."

I copy the comment on a part of this passage, viz. on verses 45 and 46: *S'abda-brahmaṇi vede urur vistāro yasya arthato 'pi pāra-śūnye tasmin varttamānāḥ mantrāṇām lingair vajra-hastatvādi-guṇa-yukta-vividha-devatā-'bhidhāna-sāmarthyaiḥ parichchhinnam eva Indrādi-rūpam taṭ-tat-karmāgraheṇa bhajantaḥ param Parameśvaraṁ na viduḥ | Tarhy anyaḥ ko nāma | karmādy-āgrahaṁ hitvā parameśvaram eva bhajed ity ata āha "yadā yam anugṛihṇāti" | anugrahe hetuḥ | ātmani bhāvitaḥ san sa tadā loke loka-vyavahāre vede cha karma-mārge parinishṭhitām matiṁ tyajati* |

"Men, conversant with the verbal brahma, the Veda, of which the extent is vast, and which, in fact, is boundless, worshipping Parameśvara [the supreme God] under the form of Indra, etc., circumscribed by the marks specified in the hymns, *i.e.* limited to various particular energies denominated deities, who are characterised by such attributes as 'wielder of the thunderbolt,' etc.; worshipping Him, I say, thus, with an addiction to particular rites, men do not know the supreme God. What other [god], then, [is there]? He therefore, in the words, 'When he regards any one with favour,' etc., says, let a man, abandoning all addiction to works, etc., worship the supreme God alone. The reason for this favour [is supplied in the following words]:

'Sunk in the contemplation of soul, he then relinquishes his regard directed to the business of the world and to the Veda, *i.e.* to the method of works.'"

The following passage from the Kaṭha Upanishad (ii. 23) is of a somewhat similar tendency (p. 107 of Roër's ed. and p. 106 of Eng. trans.):

Nāyam ātmā pravachanena labhyo na medhayā na bahunā śrutena | *yam evaisha vṛinute tena labhyas tasyaisha ātmā vṛinute tanūṁ svām* |

"This Soul is not to be attained by instruction, nor by understanding, nor by much scripture. He is attainable by him whom he chooses. The Soul chooses that man's body as his own abode."

The scholiast interprets thus the first part of this text:

Yadyapi durvijneyo 'yam ātmā tathāpy upāyena suvijneyaḥ eva ity āha nāyam ātmā pravachanena aneka-veda-svīkaraṇena labhyo jneyo nāpi medhayā granthārtha-dhāraṇā-śaktyā na bahunā śrutena kevalena | *kena tarhi labhyaḥ ity uchyate* |

"Although this soul is difficult to know, still it may easily be known by the use of proper means. This is what [the author] proceeds to say. This soul is not to be attained, known, by instruction, by the acknowledgement of many Vedas; nor by understanding, by the power of recollecting the contents of books; nor by much scripture alone. By what, then, is it to be attained? This he declares."

It is not necessary to follow the scholiast into the Vedantic explanation of the rest of the passage.[38]

The preceding passages, emanating from two different classes of writers, both distinguished by the spirituality of their aspirations, manifest a depreciation, more or less distinct and emphatic, of the polytheism of the Vedic hymns, as obstructive rather than promotive, of divine knowledge, and express disregard, if not contempt, of the ceremonies founded on that polytheism, and performed with a view to the enjoyments of paradise.

SECT. V.—*Division of the Vedas, according to the Vishṇu, Vāyu, and Bhāgavata Purāṇas, and the Mahābhārata.*

Some of the Purāṇas, as we have seen above, represent the four Vedas as having issued from Brahmā's different mouths. If they had

[38] See Prof. Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. 1st ed. p. 320, and p. 109.

each a separate origin of this kind, it would seem that they must have had from the time of their production a distinct existence also. And yet it is elsewhere said that there was originally but one Veda, which was subsequently divided into four portions.

Thus the Vishṇu Purāṇa gives the following account of the division of the Veda, described as having been originally but one, into four parts, iii. 2, 18:

Kṛite yuge paraṁ jnānam Kapilādi-svarūpa-dhṛik | dadāti sarva-bhūtānāṁ sarva-bhūta-hite rataḥ | chakravartti-svarūpeṇa tretāyām api sa prabhuḥ | Dushṭānāṁ nigrahaṁ kurvan paripāti jagattrayam | Vedam ekaṁ chatur-bhedaṁ kṛitvā śākhā-śatair vibhuḥ | karoti bahulam bhūyo Vedavyāsa-svarūpa-dhṛik | vedāṁs tu dvāpare vyasya, etc.

"In the Kṛita age, Vishṇu, devoted to the welfare of all creatures, assumes the form of Kapila and others to confer upon them the highest knowledge. In the Tretā age the Supreme Lord, in the form of a universal potentate, represses the violence of the wicked, and protects the three worlds. Assuming the form of Vedavyāsa, the all-pervading Being repeatedly divides the single Veda into four parts, and multiplies it by distributing it into hundreds of śākhās. Having thus divided the Vedas in the Dvāpara age," etc.[39]

This is repeated more at length in the following section (Vish. Pur. iii. 3, 4 ff.):

Veda-drumasya Maitreya śākhā-bhedaiḥ sahasraśaḥ | na śakyo vistaro vaktuṁ sankshepeṇa śriṇushva tam | Dvāpare dvāpare Vishṇur Vyāsa-rūpī mahāmune | Vedam ekam sa bahudhā kurute jagato hitaḥ | vīryaṁ tejo balaṁ chālpam manushyāṇām avekshya vai | hitāya sarva-bhūtānāṁ veda-bhedān karoti saḥ | yayā sa kurute tanvā vedam ekaṁ pṛithak prabhuḥ | Vedavyāsābhidhānā tu sā mūrttir Madhuvidvishaḥ | . . . . Ashṭā-viṁśati-kṛitvo vai vedāḥ vyastāḥ maharshibhiḥ | Vaivasvate 'ntare tasmin dvāpareshu punaḥ punaḥ |

"It is not possible, Maitreya, to describe in detail the tree of the Vedas with its thousand branches (*śākhās*); but listen to a summary. A friend to the world, Vishṇu, in the form of Vyāsa, divides the single Veda into many parts. He does so for the good of all creatures, because he perceives the vigour, energy, and strength of men to have become

[39] Compare on this subject portions of the passage of the Mahābhārata quoted in the First Volume of this work, pp. 144–146.

decreased. Vedavyāsa, in whose person he performs this division, is an impersonation of the enemy of Madhu (Vishṇu). . . . . Eight-and-twenty times in the Dvāpara ages of this Vaivasvata Manvantara[40] have the Vedas been divided by great sages." These sages are then enumerated, and Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana[41] is the twenty-eighth.

The subject is resumed at the beginning of the next section (Vish. Pur. iii. 4, 1 ff.):

Ādyo vedaś chatushpādaḥ śata-sāhasra-sammitaḥ | Tato daśa-guṇaḥ kṛitsno yajno 'yaṁ sarva-kāmadhuk | Tato 'tra mat-suto Vyāso 'shṭāviṁśatitame 'ntare | vedam ekam chatushpādaṁ chaturdhā vyabhajat prabhuḥ | yathā tu tena vai vyastāḥ Vedavyāsena dhīmatā | Vedās tathā samastais tair vyastāḥ Vyāsais tathā mayā | tad anenaiva vedānāṁ śākhābhedān dvijottama | chaturyugeshu rachitān samasteshv avadhāraya | Kṛishṇa-dvaipāyanaṁ Vyāsam viddhi Nārāyaṇam prabhum | ko 'nyo hi bhuvi Maitreya Mahābhārata-kṛid bhavet | Tena vyastāḥ yathā Vedāḥ mat-putreṇa mahātmanā | Dvāpare hy atra Maitreya tad me śṛiṇu yathārthataḥ | Brahmaṇā chodito Vyāso vedān vyastum prachakrame | Atha śishyān sa jagrāha chaturo veda-pāra-gān | Ṛigveda-śrāvakam Pailaṁ jagrāha sa mahāmuniḥ | Vaiśampāyana-nāmānaṁ Yajurvedasya chāgrahīt | Jaiminiṁ Sāma-vedasya tathaivātharvaveda-vit | Sumantus tasya śishyo 'bhūd Vedavyāsasya dhīmataḥ | Romaharshaṇa-nāmānam mahābuddhim mahāmunim | Sūtaṁ jagrāha śishyaṁ sa itihāsa-purāṇayoḥ |

"The original Veda, consisting of four quarters, contained a hundred thousand verses. From it arose the entire system of sacrifice, tenfold (compared with the present) and yielding all the objects of desire. Subsequently, in the twenty-eighth manvantara my son, [Parāśara is the speaker] the mighty Vyāsa, divided into four parts the Veda which was one, with four quarters. In the same way as the Vedas were divided

[40] For an account of the Manvantaras, see the First Part of this work, pp. 39, 43 ff.

[41] Lassen (Ind. Ant. 2nd ed. i. 777, note) remarks: "Vyāsa signifies arrangement, and this signification had still retained its place in the recollection of the ancient recorders of the legend, who have formed from his name an irregular perfect, viz. *vivyāsa*." Lassen refers to two passages of the Mahābhārata in which the name is explained, viz. (i. 2417), *Vivyāsa vedān yasmāt sa tasmād Vyāsaḥ iti smṛitaḥ* | "He is called Vyāsa because he divided the Veda." And (i. 4236) *Yo vyasya vedāṁś chaturas tapasā bhagavān ṛishiḥ | loke vyāsatvaṁ āpede kārshṇyat kṛishṇatvam eva cha* | "The divine sage (Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa) who, through fervid devotion, divided the four Vedas, and so obtained in the world the title of Vyāsa, and from his blackness, the name of Kṛishṇa."

by the wise Vyāsa, so had they been divided by all the [preceding] Vyāsas, including myself. And know that the śākhā divisions [formed] by him [were the same as those] formed in all the periods of four yugas. Learn, too, that Kṛishṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa was the lord Nārāyaṇa; for who else on earth could have composed the Mahābhārata? Hear now correctly how the Vedas were divided by him, my great son, in this Dvāpara age. When, commanded by Brahmā, Vyāsa undertook to divide the Vedas, he took four disciples who had read through those books. The great muni took Paila as teacher of the Rich, Vaiśampāyana of the Yajush, and Jaimini of the Sāman, while Sumantu, skilled in the Atharva-veda, was also his disciple. He took, too, as his pupil for the Itihāsas and Purāṇas the great and intelligent muni, Sūta, called Romaharshaṇa."[42]

Vāyu Purāṇa.—In the same way, and partly in the same words, the Vāyu Purāṇa (section lx.) represents the Vedas to have been divided in the Dvāpara age. It first describes how this was done by Manu in the Svāyambhuva, or first manvantara, and then recounts how Vyāsa performed the same task in the existing seventh, or Vaivasvata manvantara; and, no doubt, also in the Dvāpara age, though this is not expressly stated in regard to Vyāsa.

The following is an extract from this passage (as given in Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue of the Bodleian Sanskrit MSS. p. 54):

Dvāpare tu purāvṛitte Manoḥ svāyambhuve 'ntare | Brahmā Manum uvāchedam vedam̃ vyasya mahāmate | Parivṛittam̃ yugam̃ tāta svalpa-vīryāḥ dvijātayaḥ | saṁvṛittāḥ yuga-doshena sarvam̃ chaiva yathākramam | bhrashṭa-mānam̃ yuga-vaśād alpa-śishṭam̃ hi dṛiśyate | Daśa-sāhasra-bhāgena hy avaśishṭam kṛitād idam | vīryam̃ tejo balam̃ chālpam̃ sarvam̃ chaiva praṇaśyati | vede vedāḥ hi kāryyāḥ syur mā bhūd veda-vināśanam̃ | vede nāśam anuprāpte yajno nāśam̃ gamishyati | yajne nashṭe deva-nāśas

[42] Mahīdhara on the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā (Weber's ed. p. 1) says, in regard to the division of the Vedas: *Tatrādau Brahma-paramparayā praptam̃ Vedam̃ Vedavyāso manda-matīn manushyān vichintya tat-kṛipayā chaturdhā vyasya Ṛig-yajuḥ-sāmātharvākhyām̃ś chaturo vedān Paila-Vaiśampāyana-Jaimini-Sumantubhyaḥ kramād upadideśa te cha sva-śishebhyaḥ | Evam paramparayā sahasra-śākho Vedo jātaḥ |* "Vedavyāsa, having regard to men of dull understanding, in kindness to them, divided into four parts the Veda which had been originally handed down by tradition from Brahmā, and taught the four Vedas, called Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan, in order, to Paila, Vaiśampāyana, Jaimini, and Sumantu; and they again to their disciples. In this way, by tradition, the Veda of a thousand śākhās was produced."

tataḥ sarvam praṇaśyati | Ādyo vedaś chatush-pādo śata-sāhasra-sammitaḥ | Punar daśa-guṇaḥ kritsno yajno vai sarva-kāma-dhuk | Evam uktas tathety uktvā Manur loka-hite rataḥ | vedam ekam chatush-pādaṁ chaturdhā vyabhajat prabhuḥ | Brahmaṇo vachanāt tāta lokānāṁ hita-kāmyayā | tad aham varttamānena yushmākam veda-kalpanam | manvantareṇa vakshyāmi vyatītānām prakalpanam | pratyakshena parokshaṁ vai tad nibodhata sattamāḥ | Asmin yuge krito Vyāsaḥ Pārāśaryaḥ parantapaḥ | "Dvaipāyanaḥ" iti khyāto Vishṇor aṁśah prakīrttitaḥ | Brahmaṇā choditaḥ so 'smin vedaṁ vyastum prachakrame | Atha śishyān sa jagrāha chaturo veda-kāraṇāt | Jaiminiṁ cha Sumantuṁ cha Vaiśampāyanam eva cha | Pailaṁ teshāṁ chaturthaṁ tu panchamaṁ Lomaharshaṇam |

"In the former Dvāpara of the Svāyambhuva manvantara, Brahmā said to Manu, 'Divide the Veda, o sage. The age is changed; through its baneful influence the Brāhmans have become feeble, and from the same cause the measure of everything has gradually declined, so that little is seen remaining. A part (of the Veda) consisting of only these ten thousand (verses) is now left to us from the Kṛita age; vigour, fire, and energy are diminished; and everything is on the road to destruction. A plurality of Vedas must be made out of the one Veda, lest the Veda be destroyed. The destruction of the Veda would involve the destruction of sacrifice; that again would occasion the annihilation of the gods, and then everything would go to ruin. The primeval Veda consisted of four quarters and extended to one hundred thousand verses, while sacrifice was tenfold, and yielded every object of desire.' Being thus addressed, Manu, the lord, devoted to the good of the world, replied, 'Be it so,' and in conformity with the command of Brahmā, divided the one Veda, which consisted of four quarters, into four parts.[43] I shall, therefore, narrate to you the division of the Veda in the existing manvantara; from which visible division you, virtuous sages, can understand those invisible arrangements of the same kind which were made in past manvantaras. In this Yuga, the victorious son of Parāśara, who is called Dvaipāyana, and is celebrated as a portion of Vishṇu, has been made the Vyāsa. In this Yuga, he, being commanded by Brahmā, began to divide the Vedas. For this purpose he took four pupils, Jaimini, Sumantu, Vaiśampāyana,

[43] The Mahābhārata, S'āntip. verse 13,678, says the Vedas were divided in the Svāyambhuva manvantara by Apāntaratamas, son of Sarasvatī (*Tena bhinnās tadā vedā manoḥ svāyambhuvo 'ntare*).

and Paila, and, as a fifth, Lomaharshana" [for the Purāṇas and Itihāsas, etc.]

Bhāgavata Purāṇa.—It is in its third book, where the different manvantaras are described, that the Vishṇu Purāṇa gives an account of the division of the Vedas. In the book of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa where the manvantaras are enumerated, there is no corresponding allusion to the division of the Vedas; but a passage to the same effect occurs in the fourth section of the first book, verses 14 ff.:

Dvāpare samanuprāpte tṛitīya-yuga-paryaye | *jātaḥ Parāśarād yogī Vāsavyāṁ kalayā Hareḥ* | 15. *Sa kadāchit Sarasvatyāḥ upaspṛiśya jalaṁ śuchi* | *viviktaḥ ekaḥ āsīnaḥ udite ravi-maṇḍale* | 16. *Parāvara-jnaḥ sa ṛishiḥ kālenāvyakta-raṁhasā* | *yuga-dharma-vyatikaram prāptam bhuvi yuge yuge* | 17. *Bhautikānāṁ cha bhāvānāṁ śakti-hrāsaṁ cha tat-kṛitam* | *aśraddhadhānān nissatvān durmedhān hrasitāyushaḥ* | 18. *Durbhagāṁs janān vīkshya munir divyena chakshushā* | *sarva-varṇāśramāṇāṁ yad dadhyau hitam amogha-dṛik* | 19. *Chāturhotraṁ karma śuddham prajānāṁ vīkshya vaidikam* | *vyadadhād yajna-santatyai vedam ekaṁ chatur-vidham* | 20. *Ṛig-yajuḥ-sāmātharvākhyāḥ vedāś chatvāra uddhṛitāḥ* | *itihāsa-purāṇaṁ cha panchamo veda uchyate* | 21. *Tattrarg-veda-dharaḥ Pailaḥ sāmago Jaiminiḥ kaviḥ* | *Vaiśampāyana evaiko nishṇāto yajushām uta* | 22. *Atharvāngirasām āsīt Sumantur dāruṇo muniḥ* | *itihāsa-purāṇānām pitā me Romaharshaṇaḥ* | 23. *Te ete ṛishayo vedaṁ svaṁ svaṁ vyasyann anekadhā* | *śishyaiḥ praśishyais tach-chhishyair vedās te śākhino 'bhavan* | 24. *Te eva vedāḥ durmedhair dhāryante purushair yathā* | *evaṁ chakāra bhagavān Vyāsaḥ kṛipaṇa-vatsalaḥ* | 25. *Strī-śūdra-dvijabandhūnāṁ trayī na śruti-gocharā* | *karma-śreyasi mūḍhānāṁ śreyaḥ eva bhaved iha* | *iti Bhāratam ākhyānaṁ kṛipayā muninā kṛitam* |

14. "When the Dvāpara age had arrived, during the revolution of that third yuga, the Yogin (Vyāsa) was born, a portion of Hari, as the son of Parāśara and Vāsavyā. 15. As on one occasion he was sitting solitary at sunrise, after touching the pure waters of the Sarasvatī, (16) this rishi, who knew the past and the future, perceiving, with the eye of divine intelligence, that disorder had in each yuga been introduced into the duties proper to each, through the action of time, whose march is imperceptible, (17) that the strength of beings formed of the elements had in consequence declined, that men were destitute of faith, vigour, and intelligence, that their lives were shortened, (18) and that they

were miserable,—reflected with unerring insight on the means of benefitting the several castes and orders. 19. Discerning that the pure Vedic ceremonies ought to be performed for men by the agency of four classes of priests, he divided the one Veda into four parts, with a view to the performance of sacrifice. 20. Four Vedas, called the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan, were drawn forth from it; while the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are called the fifth Veda. 21. Of these the Rich was held by Paila, the sage Jaimini chanted the Sāman, Vaiśampāyana alone was versed in the Yajush, (22) the dreadful muni Sumantu in the verses of Atharvan and Angiras, and my father Romaharshaṇa in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. 23. Each of these rishis arranged his own Veda in many ways; and by the successive generations of their disciples the Vedas were separated into branches (*śākhās*). 24. The venerable Vyāsa, kind to the wretched, acted thus in order that the Vedas might be recollected by men of enfeebled understanding. 25. And as women, S'ūdras, and the inferior members of the twice-born classes were unfitted for hearing the Veda, and were infatuated in desiring the blessings arising from ceremonies, the muni, with a view to their felicity, in his kindness composed the narrative called the Mahābhārata."

But notwithstanding the magnitude of the great legendary and theological repertory which he had thus compiled, Vyāsa, we are told, was dissatisfied with his own contributions to sacred science until he had produced the Bhāgavata Purāṇa consecrated to the glory of Bhagavat (Kṛishṇa).[44] The completion of this design is thus narrated, Bhāg. Pur. i. 7, 6:

Anarthopaśamaṁ sākshād bhakti-yogam Adhokshaje | lokasyājānato vidvāṁś chakre Sātvata-saṁhitām | 7. Yasyāṁ vai śrūyamāṇāyāṁ Kṛishṇe parama-pūrushe | bhaktir udpatyate puṁsaḥ śoka-moha-bhayāpahā | 8. Sa saṁhitām Bhāgavatīṁ kṛitvā 'nukramya chātmajam | S'ukam adhyāpayāmāsa nivṛitti-niratam muniḥ |

"Knowing that devotion to Adhokshaja (Kṛishṇa) was the evident means of putting an end to the folly of the world, which was ignorant of this, he composed the Sātvata-Sanhitā (the Bhāgavata). 7. When a man listens to this work, devotion to Kṛishṇa, the supreme Purusha, arises in his mind, and frees him from grief, delusion, and fear. Having

[44] See Wilson's Vishṇu Purāṇa, Preface, p. xlvi.

completed and arranged this Sanhitā, the muni taught it to his son S'uka, who was indisposed to the pursuit of secular objects."

Towards the close of this Purāṇa also, in the sixth section of the twelfth book (verses 37 ff.), there is to be found what Professor Wilson (Vish. Pur. Pref.) calls "a rather awkwardly introduced description of the arrangement of the Vedas and Purāṇas by Vyāsa."

The passage (as given in the Bombay lithographed edition) is as follows:

Sūta uvācha | *samāhitātmano brahman Brahmaṇaḥ parameshṭhinaḥ* | *hṛid-ākāśād abhūd nādo vṛitti-rodhād vibhāvyate* | *yad-upāsanayā brahman yogino malam ātmanaḥ* | *dravya-kriyā-kārakākhyam dhūtvā yānty apanurbhavam* | *Tato 'bhūt trivṛid omkāro yo 'vyakta-prabhavaḥ svarāṭ* | *yat tal lingam Bhagavato Brahmaṇaḥ paramātmanaḥ* | *sṛiṇoti yaḥ imam sphoṭam supta-śrotre cha śūnya-dṛik* | *yena vāg vyajyate yasya vyaktir ākāśe ātmanaḥ* | *svadhāmno brahmaṇaḥ sākshād vāchakaḥ paramātmanaḥ* | *sa-sarva-mantropanishad-veda-vījam sanātanam* | *tasya hy āsams trayo varṇāḥ a-kārādyāḥ Bhṛigūdvaha* | *dhāryante yais trayo bhāvāḥ guṇāḥ nāmārtha-vṛittayaḥ* | *tato 'kshara-samāmnāyam asṛijad bhagavān ajaḥ* | *Antassthoshma-svara-sparśa-hrasva-dīrghādi-lakshaṇam* | *tenāsau chaturo vedāms chaturbhir vadanair vibhuḥ* | *sa-vyāhṛitikān somkārāmś chātur-hotra-vivakshayā* | *putrān adhyāpayat tāms tu brahmarshīn brahma-kovidān* | *te tu dharmopadeshṭāraḥ sva-putrebhyaḥ samādiśan* | *te paramparayā prāptās tat-tach-chhishyair dhṛita-vrataiḥ* | *chaturyugeshv atha vyastāḥ dvāparādau maharshibhiḥ* | *kshīṇāyushaḥ kshīṇā-sattvān durmedhān vīkshya kālataḥ* | *vedān brahmarshayo vyasyan hṛidisthāchyuta-noditāḥ* | *Asminn apy antare brahman bhagavān loka-bhāvanaḥ* | *brahmeśādyair lokapālair yāchito dharma-guptage* | *Parāśarāt Satyavatyām amśāmśa-kalayā vibhuḥ* | *avatīrṇo mahābhāga vedam chakre chaturvidham* | *ṛig-atharva-yajuḥ-sāmnām rāśīn uddhṛitya vargaśaḥ* | *chatasraḥ samhitās chakre mantrair maṇigaṇāḥ iva* | *tāsām sa chaturaḥ śishyān upāhūya mahāmatiḥ* | *Ekaikām samhitām brahman ekaikasmai dadau vibhuḥ* | *Pailāya samhitām ādyām bahvṛichākhyām uvācha ha* | *Vaiśampāyana-sanjnāya nigadākhyam yajur-gaṇam* | *sāmnām Jaiminaye prāha tathā chhandoga-samhitām* | *Atharvāngirasīm nāma sva-śishāya Sumantave* |

"Sūta speaks: 'From the æther of the supreme Brahma's heart, when he was plunged in meditation, there issued a sound, which is

perceived [by the devout] when they close their organs of sense. By adoring this sound, devotees destroy the soul's threefold taint, extrinsic, inherent, and superhuman,[45] and become exempt from future birth. From this sound sprang the *oṁkāra*, composed of three elements, self-resplendent, of imperceptible origin, that which is the emblem of the divine Brahma, the supreme spirit. He it is who hears this sound (*sphoṭa*), when the ears are insensible and the vision inactive,—(this *sphoṭa* or *oṁkāra*) through which speech is revealed, and which is manifested in the æther, from the Soul.[46] This [*oṁkāra*] is the sensible exponent of Brahma, the self-sustained, the supreme spirit; and it is the eternal seed of the Vedas, including all the Mantras and Upanishads. In this [*oṁkāra*] there were, o descendant of Bhṛigu, three letters, A and the rest, by which the three conditions, the [three] qualities, the [three] names, the [three] significations, the [three] states[47] are maintained. From these [three letters] the divine and unborn being created the traditional system of the letters of the alphabet, distinguished as inner (*y*, *r*, *l*, *v*), *ushmas* (*ś*, *sh*, *s*, *h*), vowels, long and short, and consonants. With this [alphabet] the omnipresent Being, desiring to reveal the functions of the four classes of priests, [created] from his four mouths the four Vedas with the three sacred syllables (*vyāhṛitis*) and the *oṁkāra*.[48] These he taught to his sons, the brahmarshis, skilled in sacred lore; and these teachers of duty, in turn declared them to their sons. The Vedas were thus received by each succeeding generation of devout pupils from their

[45] *Dravya-kriyā-kāraka*, which the scholiast interprets as answering to *adhibhūta*, *adhyātma*, and *adhidaiva*. See the explanation of these terms in Wilson's Sānkhya-kārikā, pp. 2 and 9.

[46] I quote the scholiast's explanation of this obscure verse: *Ko'sau paramātmā tam āha 'sṛiṇoti' iti | imam sphoṭam avyaktam oṁkāram | nanu jīvaḥ evo taṁ sṛiṇotu | na ity āha | supta-śrotre karṇa-pidhānādinā avṛittike'pi śrotre sati | jīvas tu karaṇādīnatvād na tadā śrotā | tad-upalabdhis tu ṭasya paramātma-dvārikā eva iti bhāvaḥ | Īśvaras tu naivam | yataḥ śūnya-dṛik śūnye'pi indriya-varge dṛik jnānaṁ yasya | tathā hi supto yadā śabdaṁ śrutvā prabuddhyate na tadā jīvaḥ śrotā līnendriyatvāt | ato yas tadā śabdaṁ śrutvā jīvam prabodhayati sa yathā paramātmā eva tadvat | ko'sāv oṁkāras taṁ viśinashṭi sārdhena yena vāg bṛihatī vyajyate yasya cha hṛidayākāśe ātmanaḥ sakāśād vyaktir abhivyaktiḥ.* The word *sphoṭa* will be explained below, in a future section.

[47] These the scholiast explains thus: *Guṇāḥ sattvādayaḥ | nāmāni ṛig-yajuḥ-sāmāni | arthāḥ bhūr-bhuvaḥ-svar-lokāḥ | vṛittayo jāgrad-ādyāḥ |*

[48] If I have translated this correctly, the *oṁkāra* is both the source of the alphabet, and the alphabet of the *oṁkāra!*

predecessors, and in each of the systems of four yugas were divided by great sages at the beginning of the Dvāpara.[49] The Brahmarshis, impelled by Achyuta, who resided in their hearts, divided the Vedas, because they perceived that men had declined in age, in power, and in understanding. In this manvantara also,[50] the divine and omnipresent Being, the author of the universe, being supplicated by Brahmā, Īśa (S'iva), and the other guardians of the world, to maintain righteousness, became partially incarnate as the son of Parāśara and Satyavatī, and divided the Veda into four parts. Selecting aggregates of Rich, Atharvan, Yajush, and Sāman verses, and arranging them in sections (*vargas*), he formed four *sanhitās* (collections) of the hymns, as gems [of the same description are gathered together in separate heaps]. Having summoned four disciples, the wise lord gave to each of them one of these sanhitās. To Paila he declared the first sanhitā, called that of the Bahvṛichas; to Vaiśampāyana the assemblage of Yayush verses, called Nigada; to Jaimini the Chhandoga collection of Sāman verses; and to his pupil, Sumantu, the Atharvāngirasī."

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa, however, is not consistent in the account which it gives of the division of the Vedas. In a passage already quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 158, it speaks of that division as having been the work of the monarch Purūravas, and as having taken place in the beginning of the Tretā age. From the importance of this text I will extract it here again at greater length.

The celestial nymph Urvaśī, the Purāṇa tells us, had been doomed, in consequence of a curse, to take up her abode upon earth. She there

[49] *Dvāparādau* can only mean the "beginning of the Dvāpara;" but the scholiast undertakes by the following process of reasoning to show that it means the *end* of that yuga: *Dvāparādau dvāparam ādir yasya tad-antyāṁś'a-lakshaṇasya kālasya | tasmin dvāparānte veda-vibhāga-prasiddheḥ S'antanu-sama-kāla-Vyāsāvatāra-prasiddheś cha | vyastā vibhaktāḥ* | "Dvāparādau means the period of which the dvāpara was the beginning, *i.e.* the time distinguished as the concluding portion of that yuga; since it is notorious that the Vedas were divided at the end of the Dvāpara, and that the incarnation of Vyāsa was contemporaneous with S'antanu. *Vyastāḥ*=*vibhaktāḥ*, divided."

[50] From this it appears that hitherto the account had not referred to the present manvantara. The scholiast remarks: *Evaṁ sāmānyato veda-vibhāga-kramam uktvā vaivasvata-manvantare vis'eshato nirūpayitum āha* | "Having thus [in the preceding verses] generally described the manner in which the Vedas are divided, [the author] now states [as follows], with the view of determining particularly [what was done] in the Vaivasvata manvantara."

fell in love with King Purūravas, the report of whose manly beauty had touched her heart, even before she had been banished from paradise. After spending many happy days in the society of her lover, she forsook him in consequence of his having infringed one of the conditions of their cohabitation, and Purūravas was in consequence rendered very miserable. He at length, however, obtained a renewal of their intercourse, and she finally recommended him to worship the Gandharvas, who would then re-unite him with her indissolubly.

The Purāṇa then proceeds (ix. 14, 43 ff.):

Tasya saṁstuvatas tushṭāḥ agnisthālīṁ dadur nṛipa | Urvaśīm manyamānas tāṁ so 'budhyata charan vane | Sthālīṁ nyasya vane gatvā gṛihān ādhyāyato niśi | Tretāyāṁ sampravṛittāyām manasi trayy avarttata | Sthālī-sthānaṁ gato 'śvatthaṁ śamī-garbhaṁ vilakshya saḥ | Tena dve araṇī kṛitvā Urvaśī-loka-kāmyayā | Urvaśīm mantrato dhyāyann adharāraṇim uttarām | Ātmānam ubhayor madhye yat tat prajananaṁ prabhuḥ | Tasya nirmathanāj jāto jātavedāḥ vibhāvasuḥ | Trayyā cha vidyayā rājnā putratve kalpitas trivṛit | Tenāyajata yajneśaṁ bhagavantam adhokshajam | Urvaśī-lokam anvichhan sarva-devamayaṁ Harim | Ekaḥ eva purā vedaḥ praṇavaḥ sarva-vāṅmayaḥ | Devo nārāyaṇo nānyaḥ eko 'gnir varṇaḥ eva cha | Purūravasa evāsīt trayī tretā-mukhe nṛipa | Agninā prajayā rājā lokaṁ gāndharvam eyivān |

"The Gandharvas, gratified by his praises, gave him a platter containing fire. This he [at first] supposed to be Urvaśī, but became aware [of his mistake], as he wandered in the wood. Having placed the platter in the forest, Purūravas went home; and as he was meditating in the night, after the Tretā age had commenced, the triple Veda appeared before his mind.[51] Returning to the spot where he had placed the platter, he beheld an *aśvattha* tree springing out of a *śamī* tree, and formed from it two pieces of wood. Longing to attain the world where Urvaśī dwelt, he imagined to himself, according to the sacred text, Urvaśī as the lower and himself as the upper piece of wood, and the place of generation as situated between the two.[52] Agni was produced from its

[51] *Karma-bodhakam veda-trayaṁ prādurabhūt* | "The three Vedas, expounders of rites, were manifested to him," as the scholiast explains."

[52] Allusion is here made to a part of the ceremonial for kindling a particular sacrificial fire; one of the formulas employed at which, as given in the Vāj. Sanhitā, 5, 2, is, "thou art Urvaśī" (*Urvaśy asi*), and another, "thou art Purūravas" (*Purūravāḥ*

friction, and, according to the threefold science [Veda], was under his triple form, adopted by the king as his son. With this fire, seeking to attain the heaven of Urvaśī, he worshipped the divine Hari, the lord of sacrifice, Adhokshaja, formed of the substance of all the gods. There was formerly but one Veda, the sacred monosyllable *om*, the essence of all speech; one god, Nārāyaṇa; one Agni, and [one] caste. From Purūravas came the triple Veda in the beginning of the Tretā age. Through Agni, his son, the king attained the heaven of the Gandharvas."[53]

On the close of this passage the commentator remarks:

Nanv anādir veda-traya-bodhito brāhmaṇādīnām Indrādy-aneka-deva-yajanena svarga-prāpti-hetuḥ karma-mārgaḥ kathaṁ sādir iva varṇyate | Tatrāha "eka eva" iti dvābhyām | Purā kṛita-yuge sarva-vāṅmayaḥ sarvāsāṁ vāchāṁ vīja-bhūtaḥ praṇavaḥ eka eva vedaḥ | Devaś cha Nārāyaṇaḥ eka eva | Agniś cha eka eva laukikaḥ | Varṇaś cha eka eva haṁso nāma | Veda-trayī tu Purūravasaḥ sakāśād āsīt . . . . Ayam bhāvaḥ | kṛita-yuge sattva-pradhānāḥ prāyaśaḥ sarve 'pi dhyāna-nishṭhāḥ | rajaḥ-pradhāne tu Tretā-yuge vedādi-vibhāgena karma-mārgaḥ prakaṭo babhūva ity arthaḥ |

"How is it that the eternal method of works, which is pointed out by the three Vedas, and through which Brāhmans and others, by worshipping Indra and many other gods, attain to paradise, is spoken of [in the preceding verses] as if it had a beginning in time? He [the author of the Purāṇa] answers this in these two verses. Formerly, *i.e.* in the Kṛita age, there was only one Veda, the sacred monosyllable *om*, the essence of all words, *i.e.* that which is the seed of all words; and there was only one god, Nārāyaṇa; only one fire, that for common uses; and

asi), the former denoting the lower (*adhararaṇi*), and the latter the upper, piece of wood (*uttararaṇi*), by the friction of which the fire was to be produced. See Weber's Indische Studien, i. 197, and note; Roth's Illustrations of the Nirukta, p. 154; the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, iii. 4, 1, 22, and Kātyāyana's S'rauta Sūtras, v. 1, 28 ff. The commentator on the Vājanasaneyi Sanhitā explains the formula *Urvaśy asi* thus: *Yathā Urvaśī Purūravo-nṛipasya bhogāya adhastāt śete tadvat tvam adho 'vasthitā 'si* | "As Urvaśī lies under King Purūravas for sexual connection, so thou art placed underneath."

[53] This story is also told in a prose passage in the Vish. Pur. iv. 6. It is there stated that Purūravas divided fire, which was originally one, in a threefold manner (*Eko 'gnir ādāv abhavad Ailena tu atra manvantare traitā pravarttitā*). No mention, however, is there made of his having divided the Vedas, or partitioned society into castes.

only one caste, the Hansa. But the triple Veda came from Purūravas. . . . . The meaning is this: in the Kṛita age the quality of goodness predominated in men, who were almost all absorbed in meditation. But in the Tretā age, when passion (*rajas*) prevailed, the method of works was manifested by the division of the Vedas."[54]

This last quoted passage of the Bhāgavata gives, as I have intimated, a different account of the division of the Vedas from that contained in the other two texts previously adduced from the same work, and in the citations from the Vishṇu and Vāyu Purāṇas. The one set of passages speak of the Veda as having been divided by Vyāsa into four parts in the Dvāpara age; while the text last cited speaks of the triple Veda as having originated with Purūravas in the Tretā age; and evidently belonged to a different tradition from the former three. The legend which speaks of three Vedas may possibly have a somewhat more ancient source than that which speaks of four, as it was not till a later date that the Atharva asserted its right to be ranked with the three others as a fourth Veda. The former tradition, however, would appear to have had its origin partly in etymological considerations. The word Tretā, though designating the second Yuga, means a triad, and seems to have been suggested to the writer's mind by the triple fire mentioned in the legend.

Mahābhārata.—The following passage from the Mahābhārata, S'āntiparvan (verses 13,088 ff.), agrees partially in tenor with the last passage from the Bhāgavata, but is silent regarding Purūravas:

Idaṁ kṛita-yugaṁ nāma kālaḥ śreshṭhaḥ pravarttitaḥ | Ahiṁsyāḥ yajna-paśavo yuge 'smin na tad anyathā | Chatushpāt sakalo dharmo bhavishyaty atra vai surāḥ | Tatas Tretā-yugaṁ nāma trayī yatra bhavishyati | Prokshitāḥ yajna-paśavo badhaṁ prāpsyanti vai makhe[55] *| Yatra*

[54] This legend is borrowed from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 5, 1, 1 ff. (pp. 855–858 Weber's ed.), where the motive for its introduction is to describe the process by which fire was generated by Purūravas in obedience to the command of the Gandharvas, as the means of his admission into their paradise. See Professor Müller's translation of this story in the Oxford Essays for 1856, pp. 62, 63, or the reprint in his Chips from a German Workshop; and the First Volume of this work, p. 226. The legend is founded on the 95th hymn of the tenth book of the Rig-veda.

[55] Manu (i. 85, 86) differs from this passage of the Mahābhārata in making the Dvāpara the age of sacrifice: *Anye kṛitayuge dharmās Tretāyāṁ Dvāpare pare | Anye kaliyuge nṛīnāṁ yuga-hrāsānurūpataḥ | Tapaḥ paraṁ Kṛitayuge Tretāyāṁ jnānam uchyate | Dvāpare yajnam evāhur dānam ekaṁ kalau yuge |* "Different duties are practised by men in the Kṛita age, and different duties in the Tretā, Dvāpara, and

pādaś chaturtho vai dharmasya na bhavishyati | Tato vai dvāparaṁ nāma miśraḥ kālo bhavishyati |

"This present Kṛita age is the best of all the yugas; in it it will be unlawful to slay any animals for sacrifice; in this age righteousness shall consist of all its four portions and be entire. Then shall follow the Tretā age, in which the triple Veda shall come into existence, and animals fit for sacrifice shall be slaughtered as oblations. In that age the fourth part of righteousness shall be wanting. Next shall succeed the Dvāpara, a mixed period."

The M. Bh. (S'āntip. 13,475) relates that two Asuras, who beheld Brahmā creating the Vedas, suddenly snatched them up and ran off. Brahmā laments their loss, exclaiming:

Vedo me paramāṁ chakshur vedo me paramam balam | . . . . Vedān ṛite hi kiṁ kuryāṁ lokānāṁ sṛishṭim uttamām |

"The Veda is my principal eye; the Veda is my principal strength. . . . . What shall I do without the Vedas, the most excellent creation in the universe?" They were, however, recovered and restored to Brahmā (verses 13,506 ff.).

Vishṇu Purāṇa.—The following verse, Vish. Pur. iii. 2, 12, refers to the periodical disappearance of the Vedas:

Chaturyugānte vedānāṁ jāyate kali-viplavaḥ | pravarttayanti tān etya bhuvi saptarshayo divaḥ |

"At the end of the four ages (*yugas*) the disappearance of the Vedas, incident to the Kali, takes place. The seven rishis come from heaven to earth, and again give them currency." (Compare M. Bh. S'āntip. verse 7660, which will be quoted further on.)

SECT. VI.—*Accounts in the Vishṇu and Vāyu Purāṇas of the schisms between the adherents of the Yajur-veda, Vaiśampāyana and Yājnavalkya; hostility of the Ātharvaṇas towards the other Vedas; and of the Chhandogas towards the Ṛig-veda.*

The Vishṇu Purāṇa, iii. 5, 2 ff., gives the following legend regarding

Kali ages, in proportion to the decline in those yugas. Devotion is said to be supreme in the Kṛita, knowledge in the Tretā, sacrifice in the Dvāpara, and liberality alone in the Kali." See also Mahābhārata, S'āntiparvan, verse 8505, which agrees with Manu. See also the First Volume of this work, pp. 39 ff.

the way in which the Yajur-veda came to be divided into two schools, the black and the white:

Yājnavalkyas tu tasyābhūd Brahmarāta-suto dvija | S'ishyaḥ parama-dharma-jno guru-vritti-paraḥ sadā | Rishir yo 'dya mahāmeruṁ samāje nāgamishyati | Tasya vai sapta-rātraṁ tu brahma-hatyā bhavishyati | Pūrvam eva muni-gaṇaiḥ samayo 'bhūt krito dvija | Vaiśampāyana ekas tu taṁ vyatikrāntavāṁs tadā | S'vaśrīyam bālakaṁ so 'tha padā sprishṭam aghātayat | S'ishyān āha sa "bhoḥ śishyāḥ brahma-hatyāpahaṁ vratam | Charadhvam mat-krite sarve na vichāryyam idam tathā" | Athāha Yājnavalkyas taṁ "kim ebhir bhagavan dvijaiḥ | Kleśitair alpatejobhir charishye 'ham idaṁ vratam" | Tataḥ kruddho guruḥ prāha Yājnavalkyam mahāmatiḥ | "Muchyatāṁ yat tvayā 'dhītam matto viprāvamanyaka | Nistejaso vadasy etān yas tvam brāhmaṇa-pungavān | Tena śishyeṇa nārtho 'sti mamājnā-bhanga-kāriṇā" | Yājnavalkyas tataḥ prāha bhaktau tat te mayoditam | Mamāpy alaṁ tvayā 'dhītaṁ yad mayā tad idaṁ dvija | Ity uktvā rudhirāktāni sarūpāṇi yajūṁshi saḥ | Chhardayitvā dadau tasmai yayau cha svechhayā muniḥ | yajūṁshy atha visrishṭāni Yājnavalkyena vai dvija | Jagrihus tittirībhūtvā Taittirīyās tu te tataḥ | Brahma-hatyā-vratam chīrṇam guruṇā choditais tu yaiḥ | Charakādhvaryavas te tu charaṇād munisattamāḥ | Yājnavalkyo 'tha Maitreya prāṇāyāma-parāyaṇaḥ | tushṭāva prayataḥ sūryam yajūṁshy abhilashaṁs tataḥ | . . . . Ity evamādibhis tena stūyamanaḥ stavaiḥ raviḥ | vāji-rūpa-dharaḥ prāha "vriyatām" iti "vānchhitam" | Yājnavalkyas tadā prāha praṇipatya divākaram | yajūṁshi tāni me dehi yāni santi na me gurau | Evam ukto dadau tasmai yajūṁshi bhagavān raviḥ | ayātayāma-sanjnāni yāni vetti na tad-guruḥ | Yajūṁshi yair adhītāni tāni viprair dvijottama | vājinas te samākhyātāḥ sūryo 'śvaḥ so 'bhavad yataḥ |

"Yājnavalkya, son of Brahmarāta, was his [Vaiśampāyana's] disciple, eminently versed in duty, and always attentive to his teacher. An agreement had formerly been made by the Munis that any one of their number who should fail to attend at an assembly on Mount Meru on a certain day should incur the guilt of Brahmanicide during a period of seven nights. Vaiśampāyana was the only person who infringed this agreement, and he in consequence occasioned the death of his sister's child by touching it with his foot. He then desired all his disciples to perform on his behalf an expiation which should take away his guilt, and forbade any hesitation. Yājnavalkya then said to him,

'Reverend sir, what is the necessity for these faint and feeble Brahmins? I will perform the expiation.' The wise teacher, incensed, replied to Yājnavalkya, 'Contemner of Brāhmans, give up all that thou hast learnt from me; I have no need of a disobedient disciple, who, like thee, stigmatizes these eminent Brāhmans as feeble.' Yājnavalkya rejoined, 'It was from devotion [to thee] that I said what I did; but I, too, have done with thee: here is all that I have learnt from thee.' Having spoken, he vomited forth the identical Yajush texts tainted with blood, and giving them to his master, he departed at his will. [The other pupils] having then become transformed into partridges (*tittiri*), picked up the Yajush texts, which were given up by Yājnavalkya, and were thence called Taittirīyas. And those who by their teacher's command had performed the expiation for Brahmanicide, were from this performance (*charaṇa*) called Charakādhvaryus. Yājnavalkya then, who was habituated to the exercise of suppressing his breath, devoutly hymned the sun, desiring to obtain Yajush texts.... [I pass over the hymn.] Thus celebrated with these and other praises, the sun assumed the form of a horse, and said, 'Ask whatever boon thou desirest.' Yājnavalkya then, bowing down before the lord of day, replied, 'Give me such Yajush texts as my teacher does not possess.' Thus supplicated, the sun gave him the Yajush texts called Ayātayāma, which were not known to his master. Those by whom these texts were studied were called Vājins, because the sun (when he gave them) assumed the shape of a horse (*vājin*)."

I quote also the parallel text from the Vāyu Purāṇa, as it exhibits some slight variations from the preceding (Aufr. Cat. p. 55):

Kāryam āsīd ṛishīṇāṁ cha kinchid brāhmaṇa-sattamāḥ | Meru-pṛishṭhaṁ samāsādya tais tadā "'stv" iti mantritam | Yo no 'tra saptarātreṇa nāgachhed dvija-sattamāḥ | sa kuryād brahma-badhyāṁ vai samayo naḥ prakīrttitaḥ | Tatas te sa-gaṇāḥ sarve Vaiśampāyana-varjitāḥ | Prayayuḥ saptarātreṇa yatra sandhiḥ kṛito 'bhavat | Brāhmaṇānāṁ tu vachanād brahma-badhyāṁ chakāra saḥ | S'ishyān atha samānīya sa Vaiśampāyano 'bravīt | "Brahma-badhyāṁ charadhvaṁ vai mat-kṛite dvijaḥ-sattamāḥ | sarve yūyaṁ samāgamya brūta me tad-hitaṁ vachaḥ" | Yājnavalkyaḥ uvācha | Aham eva charishyāmi tishṭhantu munayas tv ime | bālaṁ chotthāpayishyāmi tapasā svena bhāvitaḥ | Evam uktas tataḥ kruddho Yājnavalkyam athābravīt | uvācha "yat tvayā 'dhītaṁ sarvam praty-

arpayasva me" | *Evam uktaḥ sarūpāṇi yajūṁshi pradadau guroḥ* | *rudhireṇa tathā 'ktāni chharditvā brahma-vittamaḥ* | *Tataḥ sa dhyānam āsthāya sūryam ārādhayad dvijaḥ* | *"sūrya brahma yad uchchhinnaṁ khaṁ gatvā pratitishṭhati"* | *Tato yāni gatāny ūrddhaṁ yajūṁshy āditya-maṇḍalam* | *Tāni tasmai dadau tushṭaḥ sūryo vai Brāhmarātaye* | *Aśva-rūpaś cha mārttaṇḍo Yājnavalkyāya dhīmate* | *Yajūṁshy adhīyate yāni brāhmaṇāḥ yena kenachit* (*yāni kānichit*?) | *aśva-rūpāṇi* (*-rūpeṇa*?) *dattāni tatas te Vājino 'bhavan*[56] | *brahma-hatyā tu yaiś chīrṇā charaṇāt charakāḥ smṛitāḥ* | *Vaiśampāyana-śishyās te charakāḥ samudāhṛitāḥ* |

"The rishis having a certain occasion, met on the summit of Mount Meru, when, after consultation, they resolved and agreed together that any one of their number who should fail to attend there for seven nights should become involved in the guilt of brahmanicide. They all in consequence resorted to the appointed place for seven nights along with their attendants. Vaiśampāyana alone was absent, and he, according to the word of the Brāhmans, committed brahmanicide. He then assembled his disciples, and desired them to perform, on his behalf, an expiation for his offence, and to meet and tell him what was salutary for the purpose. Yājnavalkya then said, 'I myself will perform the penance; let all these munis refrain: inspired by my own austere-fervour I shall raise up the boy (whom thou hast slain).' Incensed at this speech of Yājnavalkya [Vaiśampāyana] said to him, 'Restore all that thou hast learned (from me).' Thus addressed, the sage, deeply versed in sacred lore, vomited forth the identical Yajush texts stained with blood, and delivered them to his teacher. Plunged in meditation, the Brāhman (Yājnavalkya) then adored the sun, saying, 'Sun, every sacred text which disappears [from the earth] goes to the sky, and there abides.' The sun, gratified, and [appearing] in the form of a horse, bestowed on Yājnavalkya, son of Brahmarāta, all the Yajush texts which had ascended to the solar region. As all the Yajush texts which these Brāhmans study were given by him in the form of a horse, they in consequence became Vājins. And the disciples of Vaiśampāyana, by whom the expiatory rite was accomplished, were called *Charakas*, from its accomplishment (*charaṇa*)."[57]

[56] I am indebted to Dr. Hall for communicating to me the various readings of this verse in the India Office Library MSS., but some parts of it seem to be corrupt.

[57] In a note to p. 461 (4to. ed.) of his Translation of the Vishṇu Purāṇa, Prof. Wilson

It is sufficiently evident from the preceding legend that the adherents of the two different divisions of the Yajurveda (the Taittirīya or black, and the Vājasaneyi or white), must in ancient times have regarded each other with feelings of the greatest hostility—feelings akin to those with which the followers of the rival deities, Vishṇu and S'iva, look upon each other in modern days. On this subject I translate a passage from Professor Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 84:

"Whilst the theologicans of the Ṛich are called Bahvṛichas, and those of the Sāman Chhandogas, the old name for the divines of the Yajush is Adhvaryu: and these ancient appellations are to be found in the Sanhitā of the Black Yajush (the Taittirīya), and in the Brāhmaṇa of the White Yajush (the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa). The latter work applies the term Adhvaryus to its own adherents, whilst their opponents are denominated Charakādhvaryus, and are the objects of censure. This hostility is also exhibited in a passage of the Sanhitā of the White Yajush, where the Charakāchārya, as one of the human sacrifices to be offered at the Purushamedha, is devoted to Dushkṛita or Sin." [58]

In his Indische Studien (iii. 454) Professor Weber specifies the following passages in the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa as those in which the Charakas, or Charakādhvaryus are censured, viz. iii. 8, 2, 24; iv. 1, 2, 19; iv. 2, 3, 15; iv. 2, 4, 1; vi. 2, 2, 1, 10; viii. 1, 3, 7; viii. 7, 1, 14, 24. Of these I quote one specimen (iv. 1, 2, 19):

mentions the following legend illustrative of the effects of this schism. "The Vāyu and Matsya relate, rather obscurely, a dispute between Janamejaya and Vais'ampāyana, in consequence of the former's patronage of the Brāhmans of the Vājasaneyi branch of the Yajur-veda, in opposition to the latter, who was the author of the Black or original Yajush. Janamejaya twice performed the As'vamedha according to the Vājasaneyi ritual, and established the Trisarvī, or use of certain texts by As'maka and others, by the Brāhmans of Anga, and by those of the middle country. He perished, however, in consequence, being cursed by Vais'ampāyana. Before their disagreement Vais'ampāyana related the Mahābhārata to Janamejaya."

[58] Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xxx. 18 (p. 846 of Weber's ed.): *Dushkṛitāya charakāchāryyam* | (*charakāṇām gurum*—Scholiast). Prof. Müller also says (Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 350), "This name Charaka is used in one of the Khilas (the passage just quoted) of the Vājasaneyi Sanhitā as a term of reproach. In the 30th Adhyāya a list of people is given who are to be sacrificed at the Purushamedha, and among them we find the Charakāchārya as the proper victim to be offered to Dushkṛita or Sin. This passage, together with similar hostile expressions in the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, were evidently dictated by a feeling of animosity against the ancient schools of the Adhvaryus, whose sacred texts we possess in the Taittirīya-veda, and from whom Yājnavalkya seceded in order to become himself the founder of the new Charaṇas of the Vājasaneyins."

Tāḥ u ha Charakāḥ nānā eva mantrābhyām juhvati "prāṇodānau vai asya etau | nānā-vīryau prāṇodānau kurmaḥ" iti vadantaḥ | Tad u tathā na kuryāt | mohayanti ha te yajamānasya prāṇodānau | api id vai enam tūshṇīm juhuyāt |

"These the Charakas offer respectively with two mantras, saying thus: 'These are his two breathings,' and 'we thus make these two breathings endowed with their respective powers.' But let no one adopt this procedure, for they confound the breathings of the worshipper. Wherefore let this libation be offered in silence."

But these sectarian jealousies were not confined to the different schools of the Yajur-veda; the adherents of the Atharva-veda seem to have evinced a similar spirit of hostility towards the followers of the other Vedas. On this subject Professor Weber remarks as follows in his Indische Studien, i. 296: "A good deal of animosity is generally displayed in most of the writings connected with the Atharvan towards the other three Vedas; but the strongest expression is given to this feeling in the first of the Atharva Pariśishṭas (Chambers Coll. No. 112)."

He then proceeds to quote the following passage from that work:

Bahvṛicho hanti vai rāshṭram adhvaryur nāśayet sutān | Chhandogo dhanam nāśayet tasmād Ātharvaṇo guruḥ | Ajnānād vā pramādād vā yasya syād bahvṛicho guruḥ | deśa-rāshṭra-purāmātya-nāśas tasya na saṁśayaḥ | yadi vā 'dhvaryavam rājā niyunakti purohitam | śastreṇa badhyate kshipram parikshīṇārtha-vāhanaḥ | yathaiva pangur adhvānam apakshī chāṇḍa-bhojanam (chāṇḍa-jo nabhaḥ?)[59] *| evam chhandoga-guruṇā rājā vṛiddhim na gachhati | purodhā jalado yasya maudo vā syāt kathanchana | abdād daśabhyo māsebhyo rāshṭra-bhraṁśam sa gachhati |*

"A Bahvṛicha (Rig-veda priest) will destroy a kingdom; an Adhvaryu (Yajur-veda priest) will destroy offspring; and a Chhandoga (Sāma-veda priest) will destroy wealth;—hence an Ātharvaṇa priest is the [proper] spiritual adviser. (The king) who, through ignorance or mistake, takes a Bahvṛicha priest for his guide will, without doubt, lose his country, kingdom, cities, and ministers. Or if a king appoints an Adhvaryu priest to be his domestic chaplain, he forfeits his wealth and his chariots, and is speedily slain by the sword. As a lame man makes no progress on a road, and an egg-born creature which is without wings

[59] For the ingenious conjectural emendation in brackets, I am indebted to Professor Aufrecht. I adopt it in my translation.

cannot soar into the sky, so no king prospers who has a Chhandoga for his teacher. He who has a Jalada or a Mauda for his priest, loses his kingdom after a year or ten months."

"Thus," continues Professor Weber, "the author of the Pariśishṭa attacks the adherents of certain S'ākhās of the Atharva-veda itself, for such are the Jaladas and the Maudas, and admits only a Bhārgava, a Paippalāda, or a S'aunaka to be a properly qualified teacher. He further declares that the Atharva-veda is intended only for the highest order of priest, the brahman, not for the three other inferior sorts."

The following passage is then quoted:

Atharvā sṛijate ghoram adbhutaṁ śamayet tathā | atharvā rakshate yajnam yajnasya patir Angirāḥ | Divyāntariksha-bhaumānām utpātānām anekadhā | śamayitā brahma-veda-jnas tāsmād dakshiṇato Bhṛiguḥ | Brahmā śamayed nādhvaryur na chhandogo na bahvṛichaḥ | rakshāṁsi rakshati brahmā brahmā tasmād atharva-vit |

"The Atharva priest creates horrors, and he also allays alarming occurrences; he protects the sacrifice, of which Angiras is the lord. He who is skilled in the Brahma-veda (the Atharva) can allay manifold portents, celestial, aërial, and terrestial; wherefore the Bhṛigu [is to be placed] on the right hand. It is the brahman, and not the adhvaryu, the chhandoga, or the bahvṛicha, who can allay [portents]; the brahman wards off Rakshases, wherefore the brahman is he who knows the Atharvan."

I subjoin another extract from Professor Weber's Indische Studien, i. 63 ff., which illustrates the relation of the Sāma-veda to the Rig-veda,[60] as well as the mutual hostility of the different schools: "To understand the relation of the Sāma-veda to the Rig-veda, we have only to form to ourselves a clear and distinct idea of the manner in which these hymns in general arose, how they were then carried to a distance by those tribes which emigrated onward, and how they were by them regarded as sacred, whilst in their original home, they were either—as living in the immediate consciousness of the people—subjected to modifications corresponding to the lapse of time, or made way for new hymns by which they were pushed aside, and so became forgotten. It is a foreign country which first surrounds familiar things with a sacred charm; emigrants continue to occupy their ancient men-

[60] See the Second Volume of this work, pp. 202 f.

tal position, preserving what is old with painful exactness, while at home life opens out for itself new paths. New emigrants follow those who had first left their home, and unite with those who are already settlers in a new country. And now the old and the new hymns and usages are fused into one mass, and are faithfully, but uncritically, learned and imbibed by travelling pupils from different masters;—several stories in the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka are especially instructive on this point, see Ind. Stud. p. 83;—so that a varied intermixture arises. Others again, more learned, then strive to introduce arrangement, to bring together what is homogeneous, to separate what is distinct; and in this way theological intolerance springs up; without which the rigid formation of a text or a canon is impossible. The influence of courts on this process is not to be overlooked; as, for example, in the case of Janaka, King of Videha, who in Yājnavalkya had found his Homer. Anything approaching to a clear insight into the reciprocal relations of the different schools will in vain be sought either from the Purāṇas or the Charaṇavyūha, and can only be attained by comparing the teachers named in the different Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras, partly with each other and partly with the text of Pāṇini and the gaṇapāṭha and commentary connected therewith (for the correction of which a thorough examination of Patanjali would offer the only sufficient guarantee). For the rest, the relation between the S.V. and the R.V. is in a certain degree analogous to that between the White and the Black Yajush; and, as in the Brāhmaṇa of the former (the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa), we often find those teachers who are the representatives of the latter, mentioned with contempt, it cannot surprise us, if in the Brāhmaṇa of the Sāma-veda, the Paingins and Kaushītakins are similarly treated."

It is sufficiently manifest from the preceding passages of the Purāṇas concerning the division and different S'ākhās of the Vedas, that the traditions which they embody contain no information in regard to the composition of the hymns, and nothing tangible or authentic regarding the manner in which they were preserved, collected, or arranged. In fact, I have not adduced these passages for the purpose of elucidating those points, but to show the legendary character of the narratives, and their discrepancies in matters of detail. For an account of the S'ākhās of the Vedas, the ancient schools of the Brāhmans, and other matters of a similar nature, I must refer to the excellent work of Professor Müller,

the "History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature," pp. 119–132 and 364–388 and elsewhere.

SECT. VII.—*Reasonings of the Commentators on the Vedas, in support of the authority of the Vedas.*

I proceed now to adduce some extracts from the works of the more systematic authors who have treated of the origin and authority of the Vedas, I mean the commentators on these books themselves, and the authors and expositors of the aphorisms of several of the schools of Hindu philosophy.[61] Whatever we may think of the premises from which these writers set out, or of the conclusions at which they arrive,

[61] Although the authors of the different schools of Hindu philosophy (as we shall see) expressly defend (on grounds which vary according to the principles of the several systems) the authority of the Vedas, they do not consider themselves as at all bound to assert that the different portions of those works are all of equal value: nor do they treat their sacred scriptures as the exclusive sources out of which their own theology or philosophy are to be evolved. On the relation of Indian thinkers generally to the Vedas, I quote some remarks from an article of my own in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1862, pp. 310 f.: "It is evident from some of the hymns of the Veda (see Müller's Hist. of Anc. Sansk. Lit. p. 556 ff.) that theological speculation has been practised in India from a very early period. . . . . As, therefore, the religious or mythological systems of India became developed, it was to be expected that they should exhibit numerous variations springing out of the particular genius of different writers; and more especially that, whenever the speculative element predominated in any author, he should give utterance to ideas on the origin of the world, and the nature and action of the Deity or deities, more or less opposed to those commonly received. In the stage here supposed, a fixed and authoritative system of belief or institutions had not yet been constructed, but was only in process of construction, and therefore considerable liberty of individual thought, expression, and action would be allowed; as is, indeed, also shown by the existence of different schools of Brāhmans, not merely attached to one or other of the particular Vedas, but even restricting their allegiance to some particular recension of one of the Vedas. Even after the Brahmanical system had been more firmly established, and its details more minutely prescribed, it is clear that the same strictness was not extended to speculation, but that if a Brāhman was only an observer of the established ceremonial, and an assertor of the privileges of his own order, he might entertain and even profess almost any philosophical opinion which he pleased (Colebrooke, Misc. Ess. i. 379; Müller, Anc. Sansk. Lit. 79). In this way the tradition of free thought was preserved, and speculative principles of every character continued to be maintained and taught without hindrance or scandal. Meanwhile the authority of the Vedas had come to be generally regarded as paramount and divine, but so long as this authority was nominally acknowledged, independent thinkers were permitted to propound a variety of speculative principles, at variance with their general tenor, though perhaps not inconsistent with some isolated

we cannot fail to be struck with the contrast which their speculations exhibit to the loose and mystical ideas of the Purāṇas and Upanishads, or to admire the acuteness of their reasoning, the logical precision with which their arguments are presented, and the occasional liveliness and ingenuity of their illustrations.

I.—The first passage which I shall adduce is from Sāyaṇa's introduction to his commentary on the Rig-veda, the Vedārthaprakāśa, pp. 3 ff. (Sāyaṇa, as we have seen in the Second Volume of this work, p. 172, lived in the 14th century, A.D.):

Nanu Vedaḥ eva tāvad nāsti | kutas tad-avāntara-viśeshaḥ ṛigvedaḥ | Tathā hi | ko 'yaṁ vedo nāma | na hi tatra lakshaṇaṁ pramāṇaṁ vā 'sti | nacha tad-ubhaya-vyatirekeṇa kinchid vastu prasidhyati | Lakshaṇa-pramāṇābhyāṁ hi vastu-siddhir iti nyāya-vidām matam | "Pratyakshānumānāgameshu pramāṇa-viśesheshv antimo Vedaḥ iti tallakshaṇam" iti chet | na | Manv-ādi-smṛitishv ativyāpteḥ | Samaya-balena samyak parokshānubhava-sādhanam ity etasya āgama-lakshaṇasya tāsv api sadbhāvāt | "apaurusheyatve sati iti viśeshaṇād adoshaḥ" iti chet | na | Vedasyāpi parameśvara-nirmitatvena paurusheyatvāt | "S'arīra-dhāri-jīva-nirmitatvābhāvād apaurusheyatvam" iti chet | [na] | "Sahasra-śīrshā purushaḥ" ityādi-śrutibhir īśvarasyāpi śarīritvāt | "Karma-phala-rūpa-śarīra-dhāri-jīva-nirmitatvābhāva-mātreṇa apaurusheyatvaṁ vivakshitam" iti chet | na | Jīva-viśeshair Agni-Vāyv-Ādityair vedānām utpāditatvāt | "Ṛigvedaḥ eva Agner ajāyata Yajurvedo Vāyoḥ Sāmavedaḥ Ādityād" iti śruter īśvarasya agny-ādi-prerakatvena nirmātṛitvaṁ drashṭavyam | "mantra-brāhmaṇātmakaḥ śabda-rāśir vedaḥ" iti chet | na | Īdṛiśo mantraḥ | īdṛiśam brāhmaṇam ity anayor adyāpi anirṇītatvāt | Tasmād nāsti kinchid vedasya lakshaṇam | Nāpi tat-sadbhāve pramāṇaṁ paśyāmaḥ | "'Ṛigvedaṁ bhagavo 'dhyemi Yajurvedaṁ Sāmavedam Ātharvaṇam chaturtham' ityādi vākyaṁ pramāṇaṁ" iti chet | na | tasyāpi vākyasya vedāntaḥpātitvena ātmāśrayatva-prasangāt | Na khalu nipuṇo 'pi sva-skandham ārodhuṁ prabhaved iti | "'Vedaḥ eva dvijātīnāṁ niḥśreyasa-karaḥ paraḥ' iti ādi smṛiti-vākyaṁ pramāṇam" iti chet | na | tasyāpy ukta-śruti-mūlatvena nirākṛitatvāt | pratyakshādikaṁ śankitum apy ayo-

portions of their contents. It was only when the authority of the sacred books was not merely tacitly set aside or undermined, but openly discarded and denied, and the institutions founded on them were abandoned and assailed by the Buddhists, that the orthodox party took the alarm."

gyam | *Veda-vishayā loka-prasiddhiḥ sārvajanīnā 'pi "nīlaṁ nabhaḥ" ityādi-vad bhrāntā* | *Tasmāl lakshaṇa-pramāṇa-rahitasya vedasya sadbhāvo na angīkarttuṁ śakyate iti pūrva-pakshaḥ* |

Atra uchyate | *mantra-brāhmaṇātmakaṁ tāvad adushṭaṁ lakshaṇam* | *ata eva Āpastambo yajna-paribhāshāyām evāha "mantra-brāhmaṇayor veda-nāmadheyam" iti* | *tayos tu rūpam uparishṭhād nirṇeshyate* | *apaurusheya-vākyatvam iti idam api yādriśam asmābhir vivakshitaṁ tādriśam uttaratra spashṭībhavishyati* | *pramāṇāny api yathoktāni śruti-smṛiti-loka-prasiddhi-rūpāṇi veda-sadbhāve drashṭavyāni* | *Yathā ghaṭa-paṭādi-dravyāṇām sva-prakāśatvābhāve 'pi sūrya-chandrādīnāṁ sva-prakāśatvam avirudham tathā manushyādīnāṁ sva-skandhārohāsambhave 'py akuṇṭhita-śakter vedasya itara-vastu-pratipādakatva-vat sva-pratipādakatvam apy astu* | *Ata eva sampradāya-vido 'kuṇṭhitāṁ śaktim vedasya darśayanti "chodanā hi bhūtam bhavishyantaṁ sūkshmaṁ vyavahitaṁ viprakṛishṭam ity evanjātīyam artham śaknoty avagamayitum" iti* | *Tathā sati veda-mūlāyāḥ smṛites tad-ubhaya-mūlāyāḥ loka-prasiddheś cha prāmāṇyaṁ durvāram* | *Tasmāl lakshaṇa-pramāṇa-siddho vedo na kenāpi chārvākādinā 'poḍhuṁ śakyate iti sthitam* |

Nanv astu nāma Vedākhyaḥ kaśchit padārthaḥ | *tathāpi nāsau vyākhyānam arhati apramāṇatvena anupayuktatvāt* | *Na hi Vedaḥ pramāṇaṁ tal-lakshaṇasya tatra duḥsampādatvāt* | *tathā hi "samyag anubhava-sādhanaṁ pramāṇam" iti kechil lakshaṇam āhuḥ* | *apare tu "anadhigatārtha-gantṛi pramāṇam" ity āchakshate* | *na chaitad ubhayam vede sambhavati* | *mantra-brāhmaṇātmako hi vedaḥ* | *tatra mantrāḥ kechid abodhakāḥ* | "*amyak sā te Indra ṛishṭir*" (R.V. i. 169, 3) *ity eko mantraḥ* | "*Yādṛiśmin dhāyi tam apasyayā vidad*" (R.V. v. 44, 8) *ity anyaḥ* | "*S'ṛiṇyā iva jarbharī turpharītū*" (R.V. x. 106, 6) *ity aparaḥ* | "*Āpānta-manyus tṛipala-prabharmā*" (R.V. x. 89, 5) *ity-ādayaḥ udāhāryāḥ* | *na hy etair mantraiḥ kaśchid apy artho 'vabudhyate* | *eteshv anubhavo eva yadā nāsti tadā tat-samyaktvaṁ tadīya-sādhanatvaṁ cha dūrāpetam* | "*Adhaḥ svid āsīd*" (R.V. x. 129, 5) *iti mantrasya bodhakatve 'pi "sthāṇur vā purusho vā" ityādi-vākya-vat sandigdhārtha-bodhakatvād nāsti prāmāṇyam* | "*Oshadhe trāyasva enam*" (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) *iti mantro darbha-vishayaḥ* | "*Svadhite mā enaṁ hiṁsīr*" (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) *iti kshura-vishayaḥ* | "*Sṛiṇota grāvāṇaḥ*" *iti pāshāṇa-vishayaḥ* | *Eteshv achetanānāṁ darbha-kshura-pāshāṇānāṁ chetana-vat sambodhanaṁ śrūyate* | *tato "dvau chandramasāv" iti vākya-vad viparītārtha-bodhakatvād aprāmāṇ-*

yam | *"Ekaḥ eva Rudro na dvitīyo 'vatasthe"* | *"sahasrāṇi sahasraśo ye Rudrāḥ adhi bhūmyām"*[62] *ity anayos tu mantrayor "yāvajjīvam aham maunī" ity vākya-vad vyāghāta-bodhakatvād aprāmāṇyam* | *"Āpaḥ undantu"* (Taitt. Sanh. i. 2, 1, 1) *iti mantro yajamānasya kshaura-kāle jalena śiraśaḥ kledanam brūte* | *"S'ubhike śiraḥ āroha śobhayantī mukham mama" iti mantro vivāha-kāle mangalācharaṇārtham pushpa-nirmitāyāḥ śubhikāyāḥ vara-badhvoḥ śirasy avasthānam brūte* | *tayoś cha mantrayor loka-prasiddhārthānuvāditvād anadhigatārtha-gantṛitvaṁ nāsti* | *tasmād mantra-bhāgo na pramāṇam* |

Atra uchyate | *"Amyag"-ādi-mantrāṇām artho Yāskena nirukta-granthe 'vabodhitaḥ* | *tat-parichaya-rahitānām anavabodho na mantrāṇāṁ dosham āvahati* | *Ata eva atra loka-nyāyam udāharanti "na esha sthāṇor aparādho yad enam andho na paśyati* | *purushāparādho sambhavati" iti* | *"Adhaḥ svid āsīd" iti mantraś cha na sandeha-prabodhanāya pravṛittaḥ kiṁtarhi jagat-kāraṇasya para-vastuno 'tigambhīratvaṁ niśchetum eva pravṛittaḥ* | *tad-artham eva hi guru-śāstra-sampradāya-rahitair durbodhyatvam "adhaḥ svid" ity anayā vacho-bhangyā upanyasyati* | *Sa eva abhiprāyaḥ uparitaneshu "ko addhā veda"* (R.V. x. 129, 6) *ity ādi-mantreshu spashṭīkṛitaḥ* | *"Oshadhy"-ādi mantreshv api chetanāḥ eva tat-tād-abhimāni-devatās tena tena nāmnā sambodhyante* | *tāś cha devatāḥ bhagavatā Bādarāyaṇena "abhimāni-vyapadeśas tu" iti sūtre sūtritāḥ* | *Ekasyāpi Rudrasya sva-mahimnā sahasra-mūrtti-svīkārād nāsti parasparaṁ vyāghātaḥ* | *Jalādi-dravyeṇa śiraḥ-kledanāder loka-siddhatve 'pi tad-abhimāni-devatānugrahasya aprasiddhatvāt tad-vishayatvena ajnātārtha-jnāpakatvam* | *tato lakshaṇa-sadbhāvād asti mantra-bhāgasya prāmāṇyam* |

"But, some will say, there is no such thing as a Veda; how, then, can there be a Rig-veda, forming a particular part of it? For what is this Veda? It has no characteristic sign or evidence; and without these two conditions, nothing can be proved to exist. For logicians hold that 'a thing is established by characteristic signs and by proof.' If you answer that 'of the three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and scripture, the Veda is the last, and that this is its sign;' then the objectors rejoin that this is not true, for this sign extends too far, and includes also Manu's and the other Smṛitis; since there exists in them

[62] The Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xvi. 53, has, *asankhyātā sahasrāṇi ye Rudrāḥ adhi bhūmyām* |

also this characteristic of Scripture, viz. that in virtue of common consent it is a perfect instrument for the discovery of what is invisible.' If you proceed, 'the Veda is faultless, in consequence of its characteristic that it has no person (*purusha*) for its author;'[63] they again reply, 'Not so; for as the Veda likewise was formed by Parameśvara (God), it had a person (*purusha*) for its author.' If you rejoin, 'It had no person (*purusha*) for its author, for it was not made by any embodied living being;' [they refuse[64] to admit this] on the ground that, according to such Vedic texts as 'Purusha has a thousand heads,' it is clear that Īśvara (God) also has a body. If you urge that *apaurusheyatva* ('the having had no personal author') means that it was not composed by a living being endowed with a body which was the result of works; —the opponent denies this also, inasmuch as the Vedas were created by particular living beings—Agni (fire), Vāyu (wind), and Āditya (the sun); for from the text 'the Rig-veda sprang from Agni, the Yajur-veda from Vāyu, and the Sāma-veda from Sūrya,' etc., it will be seen that Īśvara was the maker, by inciting Agni and the others. If you next say that the Veda is a collection of words in the form of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas, the objectors rejoin, 'Not so, for it has never yet been defined that a Mantra is so and so, and a Brāhmaṇa so and so.' There exists, therefore, no characteristic mark of a Veda. Nor do we see any proof that a Veda exists. If you say that the text, 'I peruse, reverend sir, the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, and the Ātharvaṇa as the fourth,' is a proof, the antagonist answers, 'No, for as that text is part of the Veda, the latter would be open to the objection of depending upon itself; for no one, be he ever so clever, can mount upon his own shoulders.' If you again urge that such texts of the Smṛiti as this, 'It is the Veda alone which is the source of blessedness to twice-born men, and transcendent,' are proofs, the objector rejoins,' 'Not so; since these too must be rejected, as being founded on the same Veda.' The

[63] Or, the meaning of this may be, "If you urge that, as the Veda has no personal author, there is—in consequence of this peculiar characteristic—no flaw (in the proposed definition), etc."

[64] I have translated this, as if it there had been (which there is not) a negative particle *na* in the printed text, after the *iti chet*, as this seems to me to be necessary to the sense. I understand from Prof. Müller that the negative particle is found in some of the MSS. [I am, however, informed by Prof. Goldstücker that *na* is often omitted, though understood, after *iti chet*.]

evidence of the senses and other ordinary sources of knowledge ought not even to be doubted.[65] And common report in reference to the Veda, though universal, is erroneous, like such phrases as 'the blue sky,' etc. Wherefore, as the Veda is destitute of characteristic sign and proof, its existence cannot be admitted. Such is the first side of the question.

"To this we reply: The definition of the Veda, as a work composed of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa, is unobjectionable. Hence Āpastamba says in the Yajnaparibhāshā, 'the name of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa is Veda.' The nature of these two things will be settled hereafter.[66] The sense we attach to the expression 'consisting of sentences which had no personal author' will also be declared further on. Let the proofs which have been specified of the existence of the Veda, viz. the Veda (itself), the Smṛiti, and common notoriety, be duly weighed. Although jars, cloth, and other such [dark] objects have no inherent property of making themselves visible, it is no absurdity to speak of the sun, moon, and other luminous bodies, as shining by their own light. Just in the same way, though it is impossible for men or any other beings to mount on their own shoulders, let the Veda through the keenness of its power be held to have the power of proving itself, as it has of proving other things.[67] Hence traditionists set forth this penetrating force of the Veda; thus, 'Scripture is able to make known the past, the future, the minute, the distant, the remote.' Such being the case, the authority of the Smṛiti, which is based on the Veda, and that of common notoriety, which is based on both, is irresistible. Wherefore it stands fast that the Veda, which is

[65] The drift of this sentence does not seem to me clear. From what immediately follows it would rather appear that the evidence of the senses may be doubted. Can the passage be corrupt?

[66] See the First Volume of this work, pp. 2 ff. and the Second Volume, p. 172.

[67] The same thing had been said before by S'ankāra Achāryya (who lived at the end of the 8th or beginning of the 9th century, A.D. See Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. 332), in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras, ii. 1, 1: *Vedasya hi nirapekshaṁ svārthe prāmāṇyam̐ raver iva rūpa-vishaye | purusha-vachasām̐ tu mūlāntarāpekshaṁ svārthe prāmāṇyam̐ vaktṛi-smṛiti-vyavahitam̐ cha iti viprakarshaḥ* | "For the Veda has an independent authority in respect of its own sense, as the sun has of manifesting forms. The words of men on the other hand, have, as regards their own sense, an authority which is dependent upon another source [the Veda], and which is separated [from the authority of the Veda] by the fact of its author being remembered. Herein consists the distinction [between the two kinds of authority]."

established by characteristic sign, and by proof, cannot be overturned by the Chārvākas or any other opponents.

"But let it be admitted that there is a thing called a Veda. Still, the opponents say, it does not deserve explanation, being unsuited for it, since it does not constitute proof. The Veda, they urge, is no proof, as it is difficult to show that it has any sign of that character. Now, some define proof as the instrument of perfect apprehension; others say, it is that which arrives at what was not before ascertained. But neither of these definitions can be reasonably applied to the Veda. For the Veda consists of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa. Of these mantras some convey no meaning. Thus one is *amyak sā te Indra ṛishtir*, etc.; another is *yādṛiśmin*, etc.; a third is *śṛinyā iva*, etc. The texts *āpāntu-manyuḥ*,[68] etc., and others may be adduced as further examples. Now no meaning whatever is to be perceived through these mantras; and when they do not even convey an idea at all, much less can they convey a perfect idea, or be instruments of apprehension. Even if the mantra *adhaḥ svid āsīd upari svid āsīd*, 'was it below or above?' (R.V. x. 129, 5) convey a meaning, still, like such sayings as 'either a post or a man,' it conveys a dubious meaning, and so possesses no authority. The mantra, 'deliver him, o plant,' has for its subject grass. Another, 'do not hurt him, axe,' has for its subject an axe (*kshura*). A third, 'hear, stones,' has for its subject stones. In these cases, grass, an axe, and stones, though insensible objects, are addressed in the Veda as if they were intelligent. Hence these passages have no authority, because, like the saying, 'two moons,' their import is absurd. So also the two texts, 'there is one Rudra; no second has existed,' and 'the thousand Rudras who are over the earth,' involving, as they do, a mutual contradiction (just as if one were to say, 'I have been silent all my life'), cannot be authoritative. The mantra *āpaḥ undantu* expresses the wetting of the sacrificer's head with water at the time of tonsure; while the text '*śubhike*,' etc. ('garland, mount on my head and decorate my face') expresses the placing of a garland formed of flowers on the heads of the bridegroom and bride, by way of blessing, at the time of marriage. Now, as these two last texts merely repeat a matter of

[68] See Nirukta, v. 12, and vi. 15, and Roth's Illustrations. It is not necessary for my purpose to inquire whether the charge of intelligibility brought against these different texts is just or not.

common notoriety, they cannot be said to attain to what was not before ascertained. Wherefore the Mantra portion of the Veda is destitute of authority.

"To this we reply, the meaning of these texts, '*amyak*,' and the others, has been explained by Yāska in the Nirukta.[69] The fact that they are not understood by persons ignorant of that explanation, does not prove any defect in the mantras. It is customary to quote here the popular maxim, 'it is not the fault of the post that the blind man does not see it; the reasonable thing to say is that it is the man's fault.' The mantra '*adhaḥ svid*,' etc. ('was it above or below?') (R.V. x. 129, 5) is not intended to convey doubt, but rather to signify the extreme profundity of the supreme Essence, the cause of the world. With this view the author intimates by this turn of expression the difficulty which persons who are not versed in the deep Scriptures have, in comprehending such subjects. The same intention is manifested in the following mantras *ko addhā veda*, etc. (R.V. x. 129, 6) ('who knows?' etc.) In the texts *oshadhe*, etc. ('o herb,' etc.), the deities who preside over these various objects are addressed by these several names. These deities are referred to by the venerable Bādarāyaṇa in the aphorism *abhimāni-vyapadeśaḥ*. As Rudra, though only one, assumes by his power a thousand forms, there is no contradiction between the different texts which relate to him. And though the moistening, etc., of the head by water, etc., is a matter of common notoriety, yet as the goodwill of the deities who preside over these objects is not generally known, the texts in question, by having this for their subject, are declaratory of what is unknown. Hence the Mantra portion of the Veda, being shown to have a characteristic mark, is authoritative."

Sāyaṇa then, in p. 11 of his Preface, proceeds to extend his argument to the Brāhmaṇas. These are divisible into two parts, Precepts (*vidhi*), and Explanatory remarks (*arthavāda*). Precepts again are either (*a*) incitements to perform some act in which a man has not yet engaged (*apravṛitta-pravarttanam*), such as are contained in the ceremonial sections (*Karma-kāṇḍa*); or (*b*) revelations of something previously unknown (*ajnāta-jnāpanam*), such as are found in the portions which treat of sacred knowledge or the supreme spirit (*Brahma-kāṇḍa*). Both these parts

[69] See the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1866, pp. 323, 329, 334, and 337.

are objected to as unauthoritative. The former is said (1) to enjoin things afterwards declared to be improper; and (2) to prescribe in some texts things which are prohibited in others. Thus in the Aitareya, Taittirīya, and other Brāhmaṇas, many injunctions given in other places are controverted in such phrases as, "This or that must not be regarded;" "This must not be done in that way" (*tat tad na ādrityam* | *tat tathā na kāryyam*).[70] And again prescriptions are given which are mutually contradictory. Another objection is that no result, such as the attainment of paradise, is perceived to follow the celebration of a jyotishṭoma or other sacrifice; whilst satisfaction never fails to be experienced immediately after eating (*jyotishṭomādishv apy anushṭhānānantaram eva cha svargādi-phalaṁ na upalabhyate* | *na hi bhojanānantaraṁ tripter anupalambho 'sti* |). The answer given to the earlier of these objections is that the discrepant injunctions and prohibitions are respectively applicable to people belonging to different S'ākhās or Vedic schools; just as things forbidden to a man in one state of life (*āśrama*) are permitted to one who is in another. It is thus the difference of persons which gives rise to the apparent opposition between the precepts (*tathā jarttilādi-vidhir attra nindyamāno 'pi kvachit śākhāntare bhaved iti chet* | *bhavatu nāma* | *prāmāṇyam api tach-chhākhādhyāyinam prati bhavishyati* | *yathā gṛihasthāśrame nishiddham api parānna-bhojanaṁ āśramāntareshu prāmāṇikaṁ tad-vat* | *anena nyāyena sarvattra paraspara-viruddhau vidhi-nishedhau purusha-bhedena vyavasthāpanīyau yathā mantreshu pāṭha-bhedaḥ* |). In the same way, it is remarked, the different S'ākhās adopt different readings in the mantras. As regards the objection raised to the authoritativeness of the revelations of things hitherto unknown, which are made in the Brahma-kāṇḍa, that they are mutually contradictory—as when the Aitareyins say, *Ātmā vai idam ekaḥ eva agre āsīt*, "This was in the beginning soul only;" whilst the Taittirīyakas on the other hand affirm, *asad vai idam agre āsīt*, "This was in the beginning non-existent;"—the answer is given that it is determined by a particular aphorism (which is quoted)[71] that in the latter passage the word *asat* does not mean absolute vacuity or nothingness, but merely an

[70] Compare the quotation given above, p. 54, from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, iv. 1, 2, 19.

[71] Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 7, appears to be intended; but the text of it as given by Sāyaṇa does not correspond with that in the Bibliotheca Indica.

undeveloped condition (. . . . *iti sūtre Taittirīya-gata-vākyasya asachchhabdasya na śūnya-paratvaṁ kintv avyaktāvasthā-paratvam iti nirṇītam* |).[72] Sāyaṇa accordingly concludes (p. 19 of his Preface) that the authority of the whole Veda is proved.

II.—The second passage which I shall quote is from the Vedārthaprakāśa of Mādhava Āchāryya on the Taittirīya Yajur-veda (p. 1 ff. in the Bibliotheca Indica). Mādhava was the brother of Sāyaṇa,[73] and flourished in the middle of the 14th century (Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 301):

Nanu ko 'yaṁ vedo nāma ke vā asya vishaya-prayojana-sambandhādhikāriṇaḥ kathaṁ vā tasya prāmāṇyam | na khalv etasmin sarvasminn asati vedo vyākhyāna-yogyo bhavati | Atra uchyate | Ishṭa-prāpty-anishṭa-parihārayor alaukikam upāyaṁ yo grantho vedayati sa vedaḥ | Alaukika-padena pratyakshānumāne vyāvartyete | Anubhūyamānasya srak-chandana-vanitāder ishṭa-prāpti-hetutvam aushadha-sevāder anishṭa-parihāra-hetutvaṁ cha pratyaksha-siddham | Svenānubhavishyamāṇasya purushāntara-gatasya cha tathātvam anumāna-gamyam | "Evaṁ tarhi bhāvi-janma-gata-sukhādikam anumāna-gamyam" iti chet | na | tad-viśeshasya anavagamāt | Na khalu jyotishṭomādir ishṭa-prāpti-hetuḥ kalanja-bhakshaṇa-varjanādir anishṭa-parihāra-hetur ity amum artham veda-vyatirekeṇa anumāna-sahasreṇāpi tārkika-śiromaṇir apy asyāvagantuṁ śaknoti | Tasmād alaukikopāya-bodhako vedaḥ iti lakshaṇasya na ativyāptaṁ | ata evoktam | "Pratyakshenānumityā vā yas tūpāyo na budhyate | Etaṁ vindanti vedena tasmād vedasya vedatā" iti | sa eva upāyo vedasya vishayaḥ | tad-bodhaḥ eva prayojanam | tad-bodhārthī cha adhikārī | tena saha upakāryyopakāraka-bhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ | nanu "evaṁ sati strī-śūdra-sahitāḥ sarve vedādhikāriṇaḥ syur 'ishṭam me syād anishṭam mā bhūd' iti āśishaḥ sārvajanīnatvāt" | maivam | strī-śūdrayoḥ saty upāye bodhārthitve hetv-antareṇa vedādhikārasya pratibaddhatvāt | upanītasya eva adhyayanādhikāram

[72] Compare with this the passages quoted from the S'atapatha and Taittirīya Brāhmaṇas in the First Volume of this work, pp. 19 f., 24 f., 27 f., and from the Taitt. Sanh. and Brāh. in pp. 52 and 53; and see also the texts referred to and commented upon in the Journ. of the Roy. As. Soc. for 1864, p. 72, and in the No. for 1865, pp. 345–348.

[73] Whether either of these two brothers, who were ministers of state, were the actual writers of the works which bear their names, or whether the works were composed by Pandits patronized by the two statesmen, and called after the names of their patrons, is a point which I need not attempt to decide.

bruvat śāstram anupanītayoḥ strī-śūdrayor vedādhyayanam anishṭa-prāpti-hetur iti bodhayati | katham tarhi tayos tad-upāyāvagamaḥ | purāṇādibhir iti brūmaḥ | ata evoktam | "strī-śūdra-dvijabandhūnām trayī na śruti-gocharā | iti Bhāratam ākhyānam muninā kṛipayā kṛitam" (Bhāg. Pur. i. 4, 25) | *iti | tasmād upanītair eva traivarṇikair vedasya sambandhaḥ | tat-prāmāṇyam tu bodhakatvāt svataḥ eva siddham | paurusheya-vākyam tu bodhakam api sat purusha-gata-bhrānti-mūlatva-sambhāvanayā tat-parihārāya mūla-pramāṇam apekshate na tu vedaḥ | tasya nityatvena vaktṛi-dosha-śankānudayāt | . . . . Nanu vedo 'pi Kālidāsādi-vākya-vat paurusheyaḥ eva Brahma-kāryyatva-śravaṇāt | "richaḥ sāmāni jajnire | chhandāmsi jajnire tasmād yajus tasmād ajāyata" iti śruteḥ | ata eva Bādarāyaṇaḥ* (i. 1, 3) *"śāstra-yonitvād" iti sūtreṇa Brahmaṇo veda-kāraṇatvam avochat | maivam | śruti-smṛitibhyām nityatvāvagamāt | "vāchā Virūpa nityayā"* (R.V. viii. 64, 6) *iti śruteḥ | "anādi-nidhanā nityā vāg utsṛishṭā svayambhuvā" iti smṛiteś cha | Bādarāyaṇo 'pi devatādhikaraṇe sūtrayāmāsa* (i. 3, 29) *"ata eva cha nityatvam" iti | tarhi "paraspara-virodhaḥ" iti chet | na | nityatvasya vyāvahārikatvāt | sṛishṭer ūrdhvam samhārāt pūrvam vyavahāra-kālas tasmin utpatti-vināśādarśanāt | kālākāśādayo yathā nityāḥ evam vedo 'pi vyavahāra-kāle Kālidāsādi-vākya-vat purusha-virachitatvābhāvād nityaḥ | ādi-sṛishṭau tu kālākāśādi-vad eva Brahmaṇaḥ sakāśād vedotpattir āmnāyate | ato vishaya-bhedād na paraspara-virodhaḥ | Brahmaṇo nirdoshatvena vedasya vaktṛi-doshābhāvāt svatas-siddham prāmāṇyam tad-avastham | tasmāl lakshaṇa-pramāṇa-sadbhāvād vishaya-prayojana-sambandhādhikāri-sadbhāvāt prāmāṇyasya susthatvāch cha vedo vyākhyātavyaḥ eva |*

"Now, some may ask, what is this Veda, or what are its subject-matter, its use, its connection, or the persons who are competent to study it? and how is it authoritative? For, in the absence of all these conditions, the Veda does not deserve to be expounded. I reply: the book which makes known (*vedayati*) the supernatural (*lit.* non-secular) means of obtaining desirable objects, and getting rid of undesirable objects, is the Veda. By the employment of the word "supernatural," [the ordinary means of information, viz.] perception and inference, are excluded. By perception it is established that such objects of sense, as garlands, sandal-wood, and women are causes of gratification, and that the use of medicines and so forth is the means of getting rid

of what is undesirable. And we ascertain by inference that we shall in future experience, and that other men now experience, the same results (from these same causes). If it be asked whether, then, the happiness, etc., of a future birth be not in the same way ascertainable by inference, I reply that it is not, because we cannot discover its specific character. Not even the most brilliant ornament of the logical school could, by a thousand inferences, without the help of the Vedas, discover the truths that the *jyotishṭoma* and other sacrifices are the means of attaining happiness, and that abstinence from intoxicating drugs[74] is the means of removing what is undesirable. Thus it is not too wide a definition of the Veda to say that it is that which indicates supernatural expedients. Hence, it has been said, 'men discover by the Veda those expedients which cannot be ascertained by perception or inference; and this is the characteristic feature of the Veda.' These expedients, then, form the subject of the Veda; [to teach] the knowledge of them is its use; the person who seeks that knowledge is the competent student; and the connection of the Veda with such a student is that of a benefactor with the individual who is to be benefitted.

"But, if such be the case, it may be said that all persons whatever, including women and S'ūdras, must be competent students of the Veda, since the aspiration after good and the deprecation of evil are common to the whole of mankind. But it is not so. For though the expedient exists, and women and S'ūdras are desirous to know it, they are debarred by another cause from being competent students of the Veda. The scripture (*śāstra*) which declares that those persons only who have been invested with the sacrificial cord are competent to read the Veda, intimates thereby that the same study would be a cause of unhappiness to women and S'ūdras [who are not so invested]. How, then, are these two classes of persons to discover the means of future happiness? We answer, from the Purāṇas and other such works. Hence it has been said, 'since the triple Veda may not be heard by women, S'ūdras, and degraded twice-born men, the Mahābhārata was, in his benevolence,

[74] *Kalanja-bhakshaṇam* is mentioned in the Commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, x. 33, 28. In his translation of the Kusumānjali, p. 81, note, Professor Cowell says: "Some hold the *Kalanja* to be the flesh of a deer killed by a poisoned arrow—others hemp or bhang,—others a kind of garlic. See Raghunandana's Ekādaśī tattva."

composed by the Muni.'[75] The Veda, therefore, has only a relation to men of the three superior classes who have obtained investiture.

"Then the authority of the Veda is self-evident, from the fact of its communicating knowledge. For though the words of men also communicate knowledge, still, as they must be conceived to participate in the fallibility of their authors, they require some primary authority to remedy that fallibility. But such is not the case with the Veda; for as that had no beginning, it is impossible to suspect any defect in the utterer. . . .

"A doubt may, however, be raised whether the Veda is not, like the sentences of Kālidāsa and others, derived from a personal being,[76] as it proclaims itself to have been formed by Brahmā, according to the text, 'the Rich and Sāman verses, the metres, sprang from him; from him the Yajush was produced;'[77] in consequence of which Bādarāyaṇa, in the aphorism[78] 'since he is the source of the śāstra,' has pronounced that Brahma is the cause of the Veda. But this doubt is groundless; for the eternity of the Veda has been declared both by itself, in the text, 'with an eternal voice, o Virūpa,'[79] and by the Smṛiti in the verse 'an eternal voice, without beginning or end, was uttered by the Self-existent.'[80] Bādarāyaṇa, too, in his section on the deities (Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 29) has this aphorism; 'hence also [its] eternity [is to be maintained].' If it be objected that these statements of his are mutually conflicting, I answer, No. For [in the passages where] the word eternity is applied to the Vedas, it is to be understood as referring to the period of action [or mundane existence]. This period is that which commences with the creation, and lasts till the destruction of the universe, since, during this interval, no worlds are seen to

[75] See the quotation from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, above, p. 42.

[76] This seems to be the only way to translate *paurusheya*, as *purusha* cannot here mean a human being.

[77] R.V. x. 90, 9, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 10; and p. 3, above.

[78] Brahma Sūtras, i. 1, 3, p. 7 of Dr. Ballantyne's Aphorisms of the Vedānta.

[79] These words are part of Rig-veda, viii. 64, 6: *Tasmai nūnam abhidyave vāchā Virūpa nityayā | vṛishṇe chodasva sushṭutim* | "Send forth praises to this heaven-aspiring and prolific Agni, o Virūpa, with an unceasing voice [or hymn]." The word *nityayā* seems to mean nothing more than "continual," though in the text I have rendered it "eternal," as the author's reasoning requires. Colebrooke (Misc. Ess. i. 306), however, translates it by "perpetual." I shall again quote and illustrate this verse further on.

[80] This line, from the M.Bh. S'āntip. 8533, has already been cited above, in p. 16.

originate, or to be destroyed. Just as time and æther (space) are eternal,[81] so also is the Veda eternal, because, during the period of mundane existence, it has not been composed by any person, as the works of Kālidāsa and others have been.[82] Nevertheless, the Veda, like time and æther, is recorded in Scripture to have originated from Brahma at the first creation. There is, therefore, no discrepancy between the two different sets of passages, as they refer to different points. And since Brahma is free from defect, the utterer of the Veda is consequently free from defect; and therefore a self-demonstrated authority resides in it. Seeing, therefore, that the Veda possess a characteristic mark, and is supported by proof, and that it has a subject, a use, a relation, and persons competent for its study, and, moreover, that its authority is established, it follows that it ought to be interpreted."

SECT. VIII.—*Arguments of the Mīmānsakas and Vedāntins in support of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.*

I shall now proceed to adduce some of the reasonings by which the authors of the Pūrva Mīmānsā, and Vedānta, aphorisms, and their commentators, defend the doctrine which, as we have already seen, is held by some of the Indian writers, that the Vedas are eternal, as well as infallible.

I.—*Pūrva Mīmānsā.*—I quote the following texts of the Pūrva Mīmānsā which relate to this subject from Dr. Ballantyne's aphorisms of the Mīmānsā, pp. 8 ff.[83] I do not always follow the words of Dr. Ballantyne's translations, though I have made free use of their substance. (See also Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 306, or p. 195 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) The commentator introduces the subject in the following way:

[81] Passages affirming both the eternity of the æther, and its creation, are given in the First Volume of this work, pp. 130 and 506.

[82] The same subject is touched on by Sāyaṇa, at p. 20 of the introductory portion of his commentary on the Rigveda. The passage will be quoted at the end of the next section."

[83] Since the 1st edition of this Volume was published, the Sanskrit scholar has obtained easy access to a more considerable portion of the Mīmānsā Sūtras with the commentary of S'abara Svāmin by the appearance of the first, second, and part of third, Adhyāyas in the Bibliotheca Indica.

S'abdārthayor utpatty-anantaram purushena kalpita-sanketātmaka-sambandhasya kalpitatvāt purusha-kalpita-sambandha-jnānāpekshitvāt sabdāsya yathā pratyaksha-jnānam śuktikādau satyatvam vyabhicharati tathā purushādhīnatvena śabde 'pi satyatva-vyabhichāra-sambhavāt na dharme chodanā pramāṇam iti pūrva-pakshe siddhāntam āha |

"Since, subsequently to the production of words and the things signified by them, a connection of a conventional character has been established between the two by the will of man, and since language is dependent upon a knowledge of this conventional connection determined by man, [it follows that] as perception is liable to error in respect of mother-of-pearl and similar objects [by mistaking them for silver, etc.], so words also may be exposed to the risk of conveying unreal notions from [their sense] being dependent on human will; and consequently that the Vedic precepts [which are expressed in such words, possessing a merely conventional and arbitrary meaning] cannot be authoritative in matters of duty. Such is an objection which may be urged, and in reply to which the author of the aphorisms declares the established doctrine."

Then follows the fifth aphorism of the first chapter of the first book of the Mīmānsā: *Autpattikas tu*[a] *śabdasya*[b] *arthena sambandhas*[c] *tasya*[d] *jnānam*[e] *upadeśo*[f] *'vyatirekaś cha*[g] *arthe 'nupalabdhe*[h] *tat*[i] *pramāṇam Bādarāyaṇasya anapekshatvāt* | which may be paraphrased as follows: "The connection of a word with its sense is coeval with the origin of both. In consequence of this connection the words of the Veda convey a knowledge of duty, and impart unerring instruction in regard to matters imperceptible. Such Vedic injunctions constitute the proof of duty alleged by Bādarāyaṇa, author of the Vedānta Sūtras; for this proof is independent of perception and all other evidence."

I subjoin most of the remarks of the scholiast as given by Dr. Ballantyne, indicating by letters the words of the aphorism to which they refer:

[a] *Autpattikaḥ* | *svābhāvikaḥ* | *nityaḥ iti yāvat* | "*Autpattika* (original) means natural, eternal in short."

[b] *S'abdasya* | *nitya-veda-ghaṭaka-padasya* "*agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*" *ityādeḥ* | "*S'abda* (word) refers to terms which form part of the eternal Veda, such as, 'the man who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice.'"

(c) *Sambandha* (connection), "in the nature of power," *i.e.* according to Dr. Ballantyne, depending on the divine will that such and such words should convey such and such meanings.

(d) *Atas tasya | dharmasya |* "'Hence' is to be supplied before 'this,' which refers to 'duty.'"

(e) *Jnānam | atra karane lyuṭ | jnapter yathārtha-jnānasya karaṇam |* "In the word *jnāna* (knowledge) the affix *lyuṭ* has the force of 'instrument,' 'an instrument of correct knowledge.'"

(f) *Upadeśaḥ | artha-pratipādanam |* "Instruction, *i.e.* the establishment of a fact."

(g) *Avyatirekaḥ | avyabhichārī dṛiśyate ataḥ |* "'Unerring,' *i.e.* that which is seen not to deviate from the fact."

(h) *Nanu "vahnimān iti śabda-śravaṇānantaram pratyaksheṇa vahniṁ dṛishṭvā śabde pramātvaṁ gṛihṇāti iti loke prasiddheḥ pratyakshāditara-pramāṇa-sāpekshatvāt śabdasya sa kathaṁ dharme pramāṇam ata āha "anupalabdhe" iti | anupalabdhe pratyakshādi-pramāṇair ajnāte'rthe |* "Since it is a matter of notoriety that any one who has heard the words '[the mountain is] fiery' uttered, and afterwards sees the fire with his own eyes, is [only] then [thoroughly] convinced of the authority of the words, it may be asked how words which are thus dependent [for confirmation on] perception and other proofs, can themselves constitute the proof of duty? In reference to this, the word *anupalabdhe* ('in regard to matters imperceptible') is introduced. It signifies 'matters which cannot be known by perception and other such proofs.'"

(i) *Tat | vidhi-ghaṭita-vākyaṁ dharme pramāṇam Bādarāyaṇāchāryasya sammatam | ayam āśayaḥ | 'parvato vahnimān' iti doshavat-purusha-prayuktam vākyam arthaṁ vyabhicharati | ataḥ prāmāṇya-niśchaye pratyakshādikam apekshate | tathā 'gnihotraṁ juhoti iti vākyam kāla-traye 'py arthaṁ na vyabhicharati | ata itara-nirapekshaṁ dharme pramāṇam |* "This, *i.e.* a [Vedic] sentence consisting of an injunction, is regarded by Bādarāyaṇa also as proof of duty. The purport is this. The sentence, 'the mountain is fiery,' when uttered by a person defective [in his organ of vision], may deviate from the reality; it therefore requires the evidence of our senses, etc.' to aid us in determining its sufficiency as proof. Whereas the Vedic sentence regarding the performance of the Agnihotra sacrifice can never deviate from the truth in any time, past, present, or future; and is therefore a proof of duty, independently of any other evidence."

The commentator then proceeds to observe as follows: *Pūrva-sūtre śabdārthayos sambandho nityaḥ ity uktam | tach cha śabda-nityatvādhīnam iti tat sisādhayishur ādau śabdānityatva-vādi-matam pūrva-paksham upādayati* | "In the preceding aphorism it was declared that the connection of words and their meanings [or the things signified by them] is eternal. Desiring now to prove that this [eternity of connection] is dependent on the eternity of words [or sound], he begins by setting forth the first side of the question, viz. the doctrine of those who maintain that sound is not eternal."

This doctrine is accordingly declared in the six following aphorisms (*sūtras*), which I shall quote and paraphrase, without citing, in the original, the accompanying comments. These the reader will find in Dr. Ballantyne's work.

Sūtra 6.—*Karma eke tatra darśanāt* | "Some, *i.e.* the followers of the Nyāya philosophy, say that sound is a product, because we see that it is the result of effort, which it would not be if it were eternal."

Sūtra 7.—*Asthānāt* | "That it is not eternal, on account of its transitoriness, *i.e.* because after a moment it ceases to be perceived."

Sūtra 8.—*Karoti-śabdāt* | "Because, we employ in reference to it the expression 'making,' *i.e.* we speak of 'making' a sound."

Sūtra 9.—*Sattvāntare yaugapadyāt* | "Because it is perceived by different persons at once, and is consequently in immediate contact with the organs of sense of those both far and near, which it could not be if it were one and eternal."

Sūtra 10.—*Prakṛiti-vikṛityoś cha* | "Because sounds have both an original and a modified form; as *e.g.* in the case of *dadhi atra*, which is changed into *dadhy atra*, the original letter *i* being altered into *y* by the rules of permutation. Now, no substance which undergoes a change is eternal."

Sūtra 11.—*Vṛiddhiś cha kartṛi-bhūmnā 'sya* | "Because sound is augmented by the number of those who make it. Consequently the opinion of the Mīmānsakas, who say that sound is merely manifested, and not created, by human effort, is wrong, since even a thousand manifesters do not increase the object which they manifest, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps."

These objections against the Mīmānsaka theory that sound is manifested, and not created, by those who utter it, are answered in the following Sūtras:

Sūtra 12.—*Samaṁ tu tatra darśanam* | "But, according to both schools, viz. that which holds sound to be created, and that which regards it as merely manifested, the perception of it is alike momentary. But of these two views, the theory of manifestation is shown in the next aphorism to be the correct one."

Sūtra 13.—*Sataḥ param adarśanaṁ vishayānāgamāt* | "The non-perception at any particular time, of sound, which, in reality, perpetually exists, arises from the fact that the utterer of sound has not come into contact with his object, *i.e.* sound. Sound is eternal, because we recognise the letter *k*, for instance, to be the same sound which we have always heard, and because it is the simplest method of accounting for the phenomenon to suppose that it is the same. The still atmosphere which interferes with the perception of sound, is removed by the conjunctions and disjunctions of air issuing from a speaker's mouth, and thus sound (which always exists, though unperceived) becomes perceptible.[84] This is the reply to the objection of its 'transitoriness' (Sūtra 7)."

An answer to Sūtra 8 is given in

Sūtra 14.—*Prayogasya param* | "The word 'making' sounds, merely means employing or uttering them."

The objection made in Sūtra 9 is answered in

Sūtra 15.—*Āditya-vad yaugapadyam* | "One sound is simultaneously heard by different persons, just as one sun is seen by them at one and the same time. Sound, like the sun, is a vast, and not a minute object, and thus may be perceptible by different persons, though remote from one another."

An answer to Sūtra 10 is contained in

Sūtra 16.—*Varṇāntaram avikāraḥ* | "The letter *y*, which is substituted for *i* in the instance referred to under Sūtra 10, is not a modification of *i*, but a distinct letter. Consequently sound is not modified."

The 11th Sūtra is answered in

Sūtra 17.—*Nāda-vṛiddhiḥ parā*[85] | "It is an increase of 'noise,' not

[84] "Sound is unobserved, though existent, if it reach not the object (vibrations of air emitted from the mouth of the speaker proceed and manifest sound by their appulse to air at rest in the space bounded by the hollow of the ear; for want of such appulse, sound, though existent, is unapprehended)."—Colebrooke, i. 306.

[85] The text as given in the Bibliotheca Indica has *nāda-vṛiddhi-parā*.

of sound, that is occasioned by a multitude of speakers. The word 'noise' refers to the 'conjunctions and disjunctions of the air' (mentioned under Sūtra 13) which enter simultaneously into the hearer's ear from different quarters; and it is of these that an increase takes place."

The next following Sūtras state the reasons which support the Mīmānsaka view:

Sūtra 18.—*Nityas tu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt* | "Sound must be eternal, because its utterance is fitted to convey a meaning to other persons. If it were not eternal [or abiding], it would not continue till the hearer had learned its sense, and thus he would not learn the sense, because the cause had ceased to exist."

Sūtra 19.—*Sarvatra yaugapadyāt* | "Sound is eternal, because it is in every case correctly and uniformly recognized by many persons simultaneously; and it is inconceivable that they should all at once fall into a mistake."

When the word *go* (cow) has been repeated ten times, the hearers will say that the word *go* has been ten times pronounced, not that ten words having the sound of *go* have been uttered; and this fact also is adduced as a proof of the eternity of sound in

Sūtra 20.—*Sankhyābhāvāt* | "Because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated."

Sūtra 21.—*Anapekshatvāt* | "Sound is eternal, because we have no ground for anticipating its destruction."

"But it may be urged that sound is a modification of air, since it arises from its conjunctions (see Sūtra 17), and because the S'ikshā (or Vedānga treating of pronunciation) says that 'air arrives at the condition of sound;' and as it is thus produced from air, it cannot be eternal." A reply to this difficulty is given in

Sūtra 22.—*Prakhyābhāvāch cha yogyasya* | "Sound is not a modification of air, because, if it were, the organ of hearing would have no appropriate object which it could perceive. No modification of air (held by the Naiyāyikas to be tangible) could be perceived by the organ of hearing, which deals only with intangible sound."

Sūtra 23.—*Linga-darśanāch cha* | "And the eternity of sound is established by the argument discoverable in the Vedic text, 'with an eternal voice, o Virūpa.' (See above, p. 69.) Now, though this sentence had another object in view, it, nevertheless, declares the eternity of language, and hence sound is eternal."

"But though words, as well as the connection of word and sense, be eternal, it may be objected—as in the following aphorism—that a command conveyed in the form of a sentence is no proof of duty."

Sūtra 24.—*Utpattau vā rachanāḥ syur arthasya a-tan-nimittatvāt* | "Though there be a natural connection between words and their meanings, the connection between sentences and their meanings is a factitious one, established by human will, from these meanings (of the sentences) not arising out of the meanings of the words. The connection of sentences with their meanings is not (like the connection of words with their meanings) one derived from inherent power (see Sūtra 5, remark (c), above, p. 72), but one devised by men; how, then, can this connection afford a sufficient authority for duty?"

An answer to this is given in

Sūtra 25.—*Tad-bhūtānāṁ kriyārthena samāmnāyo 'rthasya tan-nimittatvāt* | "The various terms which occur in every Vedic precept are accompanied by a verb; and hence a perception (such as we had not before) of the sense of a sentence is derived from a collection of words containing a verb. A precept is not comprehended unless the individual words which make it up are understood; and the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is nothing else than the comprehension of the exact mutual relation of the meanings arising out of each word."

Sūtra 26.—*Loke sanniyamāt prayoga-sannikarshaḥ syāt* | "As in secular language the application of words is known, so also in the Veda they convey an understood sense, which has been handed down by tradition."

The author now proceeds in the next following Sūtras to state and to obviate certain objections raised to his dogmas of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.

Sūtra 27.—*Vedāṁś cha eke sannikarsham purushākhyāḥ* | "Some (the followers of the Nyāya) declare the Vedas to be of recent origin, *i.e.* not eternal, because the names of men are applied to certain parts of them, as the Kāṭhaka and Kauthuma."

This Sūtra, with some of those which follow, is quoted in Sāyaṇa's commentary on the R.V. vol. i. pp. 19 and 20. His explanation of the present Sūtra is as follows:

Yathā Raghuvaṁśādayaḥ idānīntanās tathā vedāḥ api | *na tu vedāḥ anādayaḥ* | *ataḥ eva veda-kartṛitvena purushāḥ ākhyāyante* | *Vaiyāsikam*

Bhārataṁ Vālmīkīyaṁ Rāmāyaṇam ity atra yathā Bhāratādi-kartṛitrena Vyāsādayaḥ ākhyāyante tathā Kāṭhakāṁ Kauthumaṁ Taittirīyakam ity evaṁ tat-tad-veda-śākhā-karttṛitvena Kaṭhādīnām ākhyātatvāt paurusheyāḥ | Nanu nityānām eva vedānām upādhyāya-vat sampradāya-pravarttakatvena Kāṭhakādi-samākhyā syād ity āśankya yukty-antaraṁ sūtrayati | . . . . kā tarhi Kāṭhakādy-ākhyāyikāyāḥ gatir ity āśankya sampradāya-pravarttanāt sā iyam upapadyate |

"Some say, that as the Raghuvaṁśa, etc., are modern, so also are the Vedas, and that the Vedas are not eternal. Accordingly, certain men are named as the authors of the Vedas. Just as in the case of the Mahābhārata, which is called Vaiyāsika (composed by Vyāsa), and the Rāmāyaṇa, which is called Vālmīkīya (composed by Vālmīki), Vyāsa and Vālmīki are indicated as the authors of these poems; so, too, Kaṭha, Kuthumi, and Tittiri are shown to be the authors of those particular S'ākhās of the Vedas which bear their names, viz. the Kāṭhaka, Kauthuma, and Taittirīya; and consequently those parts of the Vedas are of human composition. After suggesting that the Vedas, though eternal, have received the name of Kāṭhaka, etc., because Kaṭha and others, as teachers, handed them down; he adduces another objection in the next Sūtra."

The explanation here indicated is accepted a little further on, in the remarks on one of the following Sūtras: "What, then, is the fact in reference to the appellations Kāṭhaka, etc.? It is proved to have arisen from the circumstance that Kaṭha, etc., handed down the Vedas." I proceed to

Sūtra 28.—*Anitya-darśanāch cha* | "It is also objected that the Vedas cannot be eternal, because we observe that persons, who are not eternal, but subject to birth and death, are mentioned in them. Thus it is said in the Veda 'Babara Prāvahaṇi desired,' 'Kusuruvinda Auddālaki desired.' Now, as the sentences of the Veda, in which they are mentioned, could not have existed before these persons were born, it is clear that these sentences had a beginning, and being thus non-eternal, they are proved to be of human composition" (*'Babaraḥ Prāvahaṇir akāmayata' 'Kusuruvindaḥ Auddālakir akāmayata' ityādi* (*vākyānāṁ?*) *vedeshu darśanāt teshāṁ jananāt prāg imāni vākyāni nāsann iti sāditvād anityatvam paurusheyatvaṁ cha siddham*).

These objections are answered in the following aphorisms:

Sūtra 29.—*Uktaṁ tu śabda-pūrvatvam* | "But the priority—eternity—of sound has been declared, and, by consequence, the eternity of the Veda."

Sūtra 30.—*Ākhyā pravachanāt* | "The names, derived from those of particular men, attached to certain parts of the Vedas, were given on account of their studying these particular parts. Thus the portion read by Kaṭha was called *Kāṭhaka*, etc."

Sūtra 31.—*Parantu śruti-sāmānya-mātram* | "And names occurring in the Veda, which appear to be those of men, are appellations common to other beings besides men."

"Thus the words *Babara Prāvahaṇi* are not the names of a man, but have another meaning. For the particle *pra* denotes 'pre-eminence,' *vahana* means 'the motion of sound,' and the letter *i* represents the agent; consequently the word *prāvahaṇi* signifies that 'which moves swiftly,' and is applied to the wind, which is eternal. *Babara* again is a word imitating the sound of the wind. Thus there is not even a semblance of error in the assertion that the Veda is eternal" (*Yadyapi Babaraḥ Prāvahaṇir ity asti parantu śrutiḥ prāvahaṇy ādi-śabdaḥ sāmānyam* | *anyārthasyāpi vāchakam* | *tathā hi* | "*pra*" *ity asya utkarshāśrayaḥ* | "*vahanaḥ*" *śabdasya gatiḥ* | *i-kāraḥ karttā* | *tathā cha utkṛishṭagaty-āśrayo vāyu-paraḥ* | *sa cha anādiḥ* | *Babaraḥ iti vāyu-śabdānukaraṇam* | *iti na anupapatti-gandho 'pi* |).

Before proceeding to the 32nd Sūtra, I shall quote some further illustrations of the 31st, which are to be found in certain passages of the Introduction to Sāyaṇa's Commentary on the Rig-veda, where he is explaining another section of the Mīmānsā Sūtras (i. 2, 39 ff.). The passages are as follows (p. 7):

Anitya-saṁyogad mantrānarthakyam | "*kiṁ te kṛiṇvanti Kīkaṭeshv*" *iti mantre Kīkaṭo nāma janapadaḥ āmnātaḥ* | *Tathā Naichaśākhaṁ nāma nagaram Pramagando nāma rājā ity ete 'rthāḥ anityāḥ āmnātāḥ* | *Tathā cha sati prāk Pramagandād na ayam mantro bhūta-pūrvaḥ iti gamyate* | And in p. 10: *Yad apy uktam Pramagandādy-anityārtha-saṁyogād mantrasya anāditvaṁ na syād iti tatrottaram sūtrayati* | "*Uktaś chānitya-saṁyogaḥ*" *iti* | *prathama-pādasya antimādhikaraṇe so 'yam anitya-saṁyoga-doshaḥ uktaḥ parihṛitaḥ* | *Tathā hi* | *tatra pūrva-pakshe Vedānām paurusheyatvaṁ vaktuṁ Kāṭhakaṁ Kālāpakam ity-ādi-purusha-sambandhābhidhānaṁ hetūkṛitya* "*anitya-darśanāch cha*" *iti hetv-antaraṁ*

sūtritam | "Babaraḥ prāvāhaṇir akāmayata" ity anityānām Babarādīnām arthānāṁ darśanāt tataḥ pūrvam asattvāt paurusheyo vedaḥ iti tasya uttaraṁ sūtritam "paraṁ tu śruti-sāmānya-mātram" iti | tasya ayam arthaḥ | yat Kāṭhakādi-samākhyānaṁ tat pravachana-nimittam | yat tu param Babarādy-anitya-darśanaṁ tat śabda-sāmānya-mātraṁ na tu tatra Babarākhyaḥ kaśchit purusho vivakshitaḥ | kintu "babara" iti śabdaṁ kurvan vāyur abhidhīyate | sa cha prāvāhaṇiḥ | prakarsheṇa vahana-śīlaḥ | Evam anyatrāpy ūhanīyam |

"It is objected that the mantras are useless, because they are connected with temporal objects. Thus in the text, 'what are thy cows doing among the Kīkaṭas?'[86] a country called Kīkaṭa is mentioned, as well as a city named Naichaśākha, and a king called Pramaganda, all of them non-eternal objects. Such being the case, it is clear that this text did not exist before Pramaganda." The answer to this is given in p. 10: To the further objection that the mantras cannot be eternal, because such temporal objects as Pramaganda, etc., are referred to in them, an answer is given in the following Sūtra: 'The connection with non-eternal objects has been already explained.' In the last section of the first chapter, this very objection of the hymns being connected with non-eternal things has been stated and obviated (see above, Sūtras 28–31). For in the statement of objections, after it has first been suggested as a proof of the human origin of the Vedas, that they bear names, Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc., denoting their relation to men, a further difficulty is stated in a Sūtra, viz., that 'it is noticed that non-eternal objects are mentioned in the Vedas;' as, for example, where it is said that 'Babara Prāvāhaṇi desired.' Now, as it specifies non-eternal objects of this kind, the Veda, which could not have existed before those objects, must be of human composition. The answer to this is given in the aphorism, 'any further names are to be understood as common to other things.' The meaning is this: the names Kāṭhaka, etc., are given to the Vedas because they are expounded by Kaṭha, etc.; and the further difficulty arising from the names of Babara and other objects supposed to be non-eternal, is removed by such names being common to other objects [which are eternal in their nature]. No persons called Babara, etc., are intended by those names, but the wind, which makes the sound babara, is so designated. And prāvāhaṇi refers

[86] See the First Volume of this work, p. 342, and the Second Volume, p. 362.

to the same object, as it means that which carries swiftly. The same method of explanation is to be applied in other similar cases."

I proceed to the 32nd Sūtra. It is asked how the Veda can constitute proof of duty when it contains such incoherent nonsense as the following: "An old ox, in blanket and slippers, is standing at the door and singing benedictions. A Brāhman female, desirous of offspring, asks, 'Pray, o king, what is the meaning of intercourse on the day of the new moon?' or the following: 'the cows celebrated this sacrifice'" (*Nanu "Jaradgavo kambala-pādukābhyām dvāri sthito gāyati mangalāni*[67] | *tam brāhmaṇī prichhati puttra-kāmā rājann amāyām labhanasya ko'rthaḥ"* | *iti* | *"gāvo vai etat sattram āsata" ity-ādīnām asambaddha-pralāpānām vede sattvāt katham sa dharme pramāṇam*). A reply is contained in

Sūtra 32.—*Krite vā viniyogaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ sambandhāt* | "The passages to which objection is taken may be applicable to the duty to be performed, from the relation in which they stand to the ceremony" (as eulogistic of it).

As a different reading and interpretation of this Sūtra are given by Sāyaṇa in his commentary, p. 20, I shall quote it, and the remarks with which he introduces and follows it:

Nanu vede kvachid evam śrūyate "vanaspatayaḥ satram āsata sarpāḥ satram āsata" iti | *tatra vanaspatīnām achetanatvāt sarpāṇām chetanatve 'pi vidyā-rahitatvād na tad-anushṭhānam sambhavati* | *Ato "Jaradgavo gāyati madrakāṇi" ityādy-unmatta-bāla-vākya-sadriśatvāt kenachit krito vedaḥ ity-āśankya uttaram sūtrayati* | *"Krite cha aviniyogaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ samatvāt"* | *Yadi jyotishṭomādi-vākyam kenachit purusheṇa kriyeta tadānīm krite tasmin vākye svarga-sādhanatve jyotishṭomasya viniyogaḥ na syāt* | *sādhya-sādhana-bhāvasya purusheṇa jnātum aśakyatvāt* | *śrūyate tu viniyogaḥ* | *"jyotishṭomena svarga-kāmo yajeta" iti* | *na cha etat unmatta-vākya-sadriśam laukika-vidhi-vākya-vad bhāvya-karaṇeti-kartavyatā-rūpais tribhir amśair upetāyāḥ bhāvanāyāḥ avagamāt* | *loke hi "brāhmaṇān bhojayed" iti vidhau kim kena katham ity ākānkshāyām*

[67] In his commentary on the following aphorism S'abara Svāmin gives only a part of this quotation, consisting of the words *Jaradgavo gāyati mattakāni*, "An old ox sings senseless words;" and adds the remark: *katham nāma jaradgavo gāyet*, "How now, can an old ox sing?" We must not therefore with the late Dr. Ballantyne take *jaradgava* for a proper name.

tṛiptim uddiśya odanena dravyeṇa śāka-sūpādi-pariveshaṇa-prakāreṇa iti yathā uchyate jyotishṭoma-vidhāv api svargam uddiśya somena dravyeṇa dīkshaṇīyādy-angopakāra-prakāreṇa ity ukte katham unmatta-vākya-sadṛiśam bhaved iti | vanaspaty-ādi-satra-vākyam api na tat-sadṛiśaṁ tasya satra-karmaṇo jyotishṭomādinā samatvāt | yat-paro hi śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ iti nyāya-vidaḥ āhuḥ | jyotishṭomādi-vākyasya vidhāyakatvād anushṭhāne tatparyyam | vanaspaty-ādi-satra-vākyasya arthavādatvād praśaṁsāyāṁ tātparyam | sā cha avidyamānenāpi karttuṁ śakyate | achetanāḥ avidvāṁso 'pi satram anushṭhitavantaḥ kim punaś chetanāḥ vidvāṁso brāhmaṇāḥ iti satra-stutiḥ |

"But it will be objected that the Veda contains such sentences as this: 'trees and serpents sat down at a sacrifice.' Now, since trees are insensible, and serpents, though possessing sensibility, are destitute of knowledge, it is inconceivable that either the one or the other should celebrate such a ceremony. Hence, from its resembling the silly talk of madmen and children, as where it says, 'An old ox sings songs (fit only for the Madras?)' (see the Second Volume of this work, pp. 481 ff.), the Veda must have been composed by some man. The answer to this doubt is contained in the following Sūtra (which I can only render by a paraphrase): 'If prescribed by mere human authority, no rite can have any efficacy; but such ceremonies as the jyotishṭoma rest on the authority of the Veda; and narrative texts such as that regarding the trees and serpents have the same intention as precepts, *i.e.* to recommend sacrifice.' If the sentence enjoining the jyotishṭoma sacrifice had been composed by any man then, as the sentence was so composed, the sacrifice so enjoined would not have been applicable as a means of attaining paradise; for no man could know either the end, or the means of accomplishing it. But the application in question is prescribed in the Veda by the words 'let him, who seeks paradise, sacrifice with the jyotishṭoma.' Now this injunction does not resemble the talk of a madman, since we recognize in it, as in injunctions of a secular kind, the contemplation of the three characteristics of the action to be performed, viz. its end, means, and mode. For, as when a question is put in regard to the object for which, the instrument through which, and the manner in which the precept, 'to feed Brahmans,' is to be fulfilled, we are told that the object is to be their satisfaction, the instrumental substance boiled rice, and the manner, that it is to be served up with

vegetables and condiments;—in the same way, in the Vedic injunction regarding the jyotishṭoma, we are told that paradise is the object, that soma is the instrumental substance, and that the application of the introductory and other portions of the ritual is the manner. And when this is so, how can this precept be compared to the talk of a madman? Nor does the sentence regarding trees, etc., celebrating a sacrifice, admit of such a comparison, since the sacrifice in question is similar to the jyotishṭoma and other such rites. For logicians say that the meaning of a word is the sense which it is intended to intimate. The purport of the sentence regarding the jyotishṭoma, which is of a preceptive character, is to command performance. The object of the sentence regarding trees, etc., attending at a sacrifice, which is of a narrative character, is eulogy; and this can be offered even by a thing which has no real existence. The sacrifice is eulogized by saying that it was celebrated even by insensible trees and ignorant serpents: how much more, then, would it be celebrated by Brāhmans possessed both of sensation and knowledge!"

The following passage from the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, a treatise containing a summary of the doctrines of the Pūrva-mīmānsā of Jaimini, by Mādhava Āchāryya, the brother of Sāyaṇa Āchāryya (see above, p. 66) repeats some of the same reasonings contradicting the idea that the Veda had any personal author (i. 1, 25, 26):

Paurusheyaṁ na vā veda-vākyaṁ syāt paurusheyatā | Kāṭhakādi-samākhyānād vākyatvāch chānya-vākya-vat | Samākhyā 'dhyāpakatvena vākyatvaṁ tu parāhatam | Tatkartr-anupalambhena syāt tato 'paurusheyatā | Kāṭhakaṁ Kauthumaṁ Taittirīyakam ityādi samākhyā tat-tad-veda-vishayā loke drishṭā | taddhita-pratyayaś cha tena proktam ity asminn arthe varttate | tathā sati Vyāsena proktaṁ Vaiyāsikam Bhāratam ity-ādāv iva paurusheyatvam pratīyate | kincha | vimataṁ veda-vākyam paurusheyam | vākyatvāt | Kālidāsādi-vākya-vad iti prāpte brūmaḥ | adhyayana-sampradāya-pravarttakatvena samākhyā upapadyate | Kālidāsādi-grantheshu tat-sargāvasāne karttāraḥ upalabhyante | tathā vedasyāpi paurusheyatve tat-karttā upalabhyeta na cha upalabhyate | ato vākyatva-hetuḥ pratikūla-tarka-parāhataḥ | tasmād apaurusheyo vedaḥ | tathā sati purusha-buddhi-kritasya aprāmāṇyasya anāśankaṇīyatvād vidhi-vākyasya dharme prāmāṇyaṁ susthitam | [88]

[88] I have extracted this passage from Prof. Goldstücker's text of the Nyāya-mālā-

"[Verses] 'Is the word of the Veda derived from a personal author or not? It must (some urge) be so derived, since (1) it bears the names of Kāṭhaka, etc., and (2) has the characters of a sentence, like other sentences. No (we reply); for (1) the names arose from particular persons being teachers of the Vedas, and (2) the objection that the Vedic precepts have the characters of common sentences is refuted by other considerations. The Veda can have no personal author, since it has never been perceived to have had a maker.' [Comment] It is objected (1) that the names Kāṭhaka, Kauthuma, Taittirīyaka, etc., are applied in common usage to the different Vedas; and the taddhita affix by which these appellations are formed, denotes 'uttered by' [Kaṭha, Kuthumi, and Tittiri] (comp. Pāṇini, iv. 3, 101). Such being the case, it is clear that these parts of the Vedas are derived from a personal author, like the Mahābhārata, which is styled Vaiyāsika, because it was uttered by Vyāsa, etc. And further (2), the sentences of the Veda, being subject to different interpretations, must have had a personal author, because they have the properties of a sentence, like the sentences of Kālidāsa, etc. To this we reply (1), the name applied to any Veda originates in the fact that the sage whose name it bears, was an agent in transmitting the study of that Veda. But (2) in the books of Kālidāsa and others, the authors are discoverable [from the notices] at the end of each section. Now if the Veda also were the composition of a personal author, the composer of it would, in like manner, be discoverable; but such is not the case. Hence, the objection that the Veda partakes of the nature of common sentences is refuted by opposing considerations. Consequently the Veda is not the work of a personal author. And such being the case, as we cannot suspect in it any fallibility occasioned by the defects of human reason, the preceptive texts of the Veda are demonstrated to be authoritative in questions of duty."

II.—*Vedārtha-prakāśa.* The verses just quoted are repeated in the Vedārtha-prakāśa of Mādhava on the Taittirīya Sanhitā (p. 26), with a various reading at the beginning of the third line, viz. "*samākhyānam pravachanāt*" instead of "*samākhyā 'dhyāpakatvena.*" The comment by which the verses are explained in the same work, is as follows:

Vālmīkīyam Vaiyāsikīyam ityādi-samākhyānād Rāmāyaṇa-Bhāratā-

vistara; and I am indebted to the same eminent scholar for some assistance in my translation of it.

dikaṁ yathā paurusheyaṁ tathā Kāṭhakaṁ Kauthumaṁ Taittirīyam ity-ādi-samākhyānād vedaḥ paurusheyaḥ | kincha veda-vākyam paurusheyaṁ vākyatvāt Kālidāsādi-vākya-vad iti chet | maivam | sampradāya-pravṛit-tyā samākhyopapatteḥ | Vākyatva-hetus tv anupalabdhi-viruddha-kālātya-yāpadishṭaḥ | Yathā Vyāsa-Vālmīki-prabhṛitayas tad-grantha-nirmāṇā-vasare kaiśchid upalabdhāḥ anyair apy avichhinna-sampradāyena upa-labhyante | na tathā veda-karttā purushaḥ kaśchid upalabdhaḥ | prat-yuta vedasya nityatvaṁ śruti-smṛitibhyām pūrvam udāhṛitam | Para-mātmā tu veda-karttā 'pi na laukika-purushaḥ | tasmāt karttṛi-doshā-bhāvād nāsty aprāmāṇya-śankā |

"It may be said (1) that as the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata, and other such books, are regarded as the works of personal authors from the epithets Vālmīkīya (composed by Vālmīki), Vaiyāsikīya (composed by Vyāsa), etc., which they bear, so too the Veda must have had a similar origin, since it is called by the appellations of Kāṭhaka, Kauthuma, Taittirīya, etc.; and further (2), that the sentences of the Veda must have had this origin, because they possess the properties of a common sentence, like those of Kālidāsa and others. But these objections are unfounded, for (1) the appellations of those parts of the Veda are derived from the sages who were agents in transmitting the study of them; and (2) the objection about the Veda having the properties of a common sentence is opposed to the fact that no author was ever perceived, and so proceeds upon an erroneous generalization.[89] For though Vyāsa and Vālmīki, etc., when employed in the composition of their respective works, were perceived by some persons to be so en-

[89] This phrase thus translated (*kālātyayāpadishṭa*) is a technical term in the Nyāya philosophy, denoting one of the *hetv-abhāsas*, or "mere semblances of reasons," and is thus defined in the Nyāya-sūtras, i. 49, *Kālātyayāpadishṭah kālātītaḥ*, which Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Nyāya, p. 42) thus explains: "That [semblance of a reason] is mis-timed, which is adduced when the time is not [that when it might have availed]. [For example, suppose one argues that] fire does not contain heat, because it is factitious, [his argument is mis-timed if we have already ascertained by the superior evidence of the senses that fire does contain heat]." It does not, however, appear, how the essential validity of an argument can depend at all on the time when it is adduced, as is justly observed by Professor Goldstücker, who has favoured me with his opinion on the sense of the phrase. After consulting the commentary of Vātsyāyana in loco, he thinks the aphorism (which is not very distinctly explained by the commentators) must denote the erroneous transference of a conclusion deduced from the phenomena happening at one "time," *i.e.* belonging to one class of cases, to another class which does not exhibit, or only apparently exhibits, the same phenomena; in short, a vicious generalization.

gaged, and are known by others also [in after ages] to be the authors, from the existence of an unbroken tradition to that effect;—no human author of the Veda has ever been perceived. On the contrary, we have formerly shown that the eternity of the Veda is declared both by itself and by the Smṛiti. And even if the Supreme Spirit be the maker of it, still he is not a mundane person; and consequently, as no defect exists in the maker, there is no reason to suspect fallibility in his work."

No notice has been taken by these commentators of an objection which might have been raised to the validity of this reasoning, viz. that the hymns of the Ṛich and other Vedas are all set down in the Anukramaṇīs, or indices to those works, as being uttered by particular rishis; the rishis being, in fact, there defined as those whose words the hymns were—*yasya vākyaṁ sa ṛishiḥ*.[90] (See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 26, or p. 12 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) Though, however, this objection has not been alluded to in any of the preceding passages, an answer has been provided to it in the well-known assertion of the orthodox Indian writers that the rishis did not compose, but only saw and afterwards repeated the hymns and other parts of the Vedas, which had in reality pre-existed from eternity.

Thus, in the Vedārtha-prakāsa on the Taittirīya Sanhitā, p. 11, it is said: *Atīndriyārtha-drashṭāraḥ ṛishayaḥ* | *Teshāṁ veda-drashṭṛitvaṁ smaryate* | *Yugānte 'ntarhitān*[91] *Vedān setihāsān maharshayaḥ* | *Lebhire tapasā pūrvam anujnātāḥ svayambhuvā* | (Mahābhārata, S'āntiparvan, verse 7660. See above, p. 49.) "The rishis were seers of things beyond the reach of the bodily senses. The fact of their seeing the Vedas is recorded in the Smṛiti: 'The great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, formerly obtained, through devotion, the Vedas and the Itihāsas which had disappeared at the end of the [preceding] Yuga.'"

So, too, Manu (as already quoted, Vol. I. p. 394) says, in similar, although more general language: *Prajāpatir idaṁ śāstraṁ tapasaivāsṛijat prabhuḥ* | *Tathaiva vedān ṛishayas tapasā pratipedire* | "Prajāpati created this S'āstra (the Institutes of Manu) by austere-fervour (*tapas*); and by the same means the rishis obtained the Vedas."

90 Some passages from the Nirukta on this subject will be quoted in a later part of this volume.

91 The text of the Biblioth. Ind. reads *tarhi tān*. I have followed the M. Bh., which evidently gives the true reading.

The following extract from the account of the Pūrva-mīmānsā philosophy, given in the Sarva-darśana-sangraha of Mādhava Āchāryya (Bibliotheca Indica, pp. 127 ff,), contains a fuller summary of the controversy between the Mīmānsakas and the Naiyāyikas respecting the grounds on which the authority of the Veda should be regarded as resting:

Syād etat | vedasya katham apaurusheyatvam abhidhīyate | tat-pratipādaka-pramāṇābhāvāt katham manyethāḥ apaurusheyāḥ vedāḥ | sampradāyāvichchhede saty asmaryyamāṇa-karttṛikatvād ātma-vad iti | tad etad mandaṁ viśeshaṇāsiddheḥ | paurusheya-veda-vādibhiḥ pralaye sampradāya-vichchhedasya kakshīkaraṇāt | kincha kim idam asmaryyamāṇa-karttṛikatvaṁ nāma | apratīyamāna-karttṛikatvam asmaraṇa-gochara-karttṛikatvaṁ vā | na prathamaḥ kalpaḥ Parameśvarasya karttuḥ pramiter abhyupagamāt | na dvitīyo vikalpāsahatvāt | tathā hi | kim ekena asmaraṇam abhipreyate sarvair vā | na ādyaḥ | "yo dharma-śīlo jitamāna-roshaḥ" ityādishu muktakoktishu vyabhichārāt | na dvitīyaḥ | sarvāsmaraṇasya asarvajna-durjnānatvāt |

Paurusheyatve pramāṇa-sambhavāch cha veda-vākyāni paurusheyāṇi | vākyatvāt | Kālidāsādi-vakya-vat | veda-vākyāni āpta-praṇītāni | pramāṇatve sati vākyatvād Manv-ādi-vākya-vad iti |

Nanu | "Vedasyādhyayanaṁ sarvaṁ gurv-adhyayana-pūrvakam | vedādhyayana-sāmānyād adhunā 'dhyayanaṁ yathā" | ity anumānam pratisādhanaṁ pragalbhate iti chet | tad api na pramāṇa-koṭim praveshṭum īshṭe | "Bhāratādhyayanaṁ sarvam gurv-adhyayana-pūrvakam | Bhāratādhyayanatvena sāmpratādhyayanaṁ yathā" iti ābhāsa-samāna-yogakshematvāt | nanu tatra Vyāsaḥ karttā iti smaryyate "ko hy anyaḥ Puṇḍarīkākshād Mahābhārata-kṛid bhavet" ity-ādāv iti chet | tad asāram | "ṛichaḥ sāmāni jajnire | chhandāṁsi jajnire tasmād yajus tasmād ajāyata" iti purusha-sūkte vedasya sa-karttṛikatā-pratipādanāt |

Kincha anityaḥ śabdaḥ sāmānyavattve sati asmad-ādi-vāhyendriya-grāhyatvād ghaṭa-vat | nanv idam anumānaṁ sa evāyaṁ ga-kāraḥ ity pratyabhijnā-pramāṇa-pratihatam iti chet | tad ati phalgu "lūna-punar-jāta-keśa-dalita-kund"-ādāv iva pratyabhijnāyāḥ sāmānya-vishayatvena bādhakatvābhavāt |

Nanv aśarīrasya Parameśvarasya tālv-ādi-sthānābhāvena varṇochchāraṇāsambhavāt kathaṁ tat-praṇītatvaṁ vedasya syād iti chet | na tad bhadraṁ svabhāvato 'śarīrasyāpi tasya bhaktānugrahārthaṁ līlā-vigraha-

grahaṇa-sambhavāt | tasmād vedasya apaurusheyatva-vācho yuktir na yuktā iti chet |

Tatra samādhānam abhidhīyate | Kim idam paurusheyatvaṁ sisādhayishitam | purushād utpannatva-mātram | yathā asmad-ādibhir ahar ahar uchchāryyamāṇasya vedasya | pramāṇāntareṇa artham upalabhya tat-prakāśanāya rachitatvaṁ vā | yathā asmad-ādibhir iva nibadhyamānasya prabandhasya | prathame na vipratipattiḥ | charame kim anumāna-balāt tat-sādhanam āgama-balād vā | na ādyaḥ | Mālatī-mādhavādi-vākyeshu savyabhichāratvāt | atha pramāṇatve sati iti viśishyate iti chet | tad api na vipaśchito manasi vaiśadyam āpadyate | pramāṇāntarāgocharārtha-pratipādakaṁ hi vākyaṁ Veda-vākyam | tat pramāṇāntara-gocharārtha-pratipādakam iti sādhyamāne "mama mātā bandhyā" iti vad vyāghātāpātāt | kincha Parameśvarasya līlā-vigraha-parigrahābhyupagame 'py atīndriyārtha-darśanaṁ na sanjāghaṭīti deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛishṭārtha-grahaṇopāyābhāvāt | na cha tach-chakshur-ādikam eva tādṛik-pratīti-janana-kshamam iti mantavyam | dṛishṭānusāreṇaiva kalpanāyāḥ āśrayaṇīyatvāt | tad uktaṁ Gurubhiḥ sarvajna-nirākaraṇa-velāyām "yatrāpy atiśayo dṛishṭaḥ sa svārthānatilanghanāt | dūra-sūkshmādi-dṛishṭau syād na rūpe śrotra-vṛittitā" iti | ataḥ eva na āgama-balāt tat-sādhanam |

"*Tena proktam*" *iti Pāṇiny-anuśāsane jāgraty api Kāṭhaka-Kālāpa-Taittirīyam ityādi-samākhyā adhyayana-sampradāya-pravarttaka-vishayatvena upapadyate | tad-vad atrāpi sampradāya-pravarttaka-vishayatvenāpy upapadyate | na cha anumāna-balāt śabdasya anityatva-siddhiḥ | pratyabhijnā-virodhāt | . . . .*

Nanv idam pratyabhijnānaṁ gatvādi-jāti-vishayaṁ na gādi-vyakti-vishayaṁ tāsāṁ prati-purusham bhedopalambhād | anyathā "Somaśarmā 'dhīte" iti vibhāgo na syād iti chet | tad api śobhāṁ na bibhartti gādi-vyakti-bhede pramāṇābhāvena gatvādi-jāti-vishaya-kalpanāyām pramāṇābhavāt | Yathā gatvam ajānataḥ ekam eva bhinna-deśa-parimāṇa-saṁsthāna-vyakty-upadhāna-vaśād bhinna-deśam iva alpam iva mahad iva dīrgham iva vāmanam iva prathate tathā ga-vyaktim ajānataḥ ekā 'pi vyanjaka-bhedāt tat-tad-dharmānubandhinī pratibhāsate | etena viruddha-dharmādhyāsād bheda-pratibhāsaḥ iti pratyuktam | tatra kiṁ svābhāviko viruddha-dharmādhyāso bheda-sādhakatvena abhimataḥ prātītiko vā | prathame asiddhiḥ | aparathā svābhāvika-bhedābhyupagame daśa ga-kārān udachārayat Chaitra iti prattipattiḥ syād na tu daśa-

kritvo ga-kāraḥ iti | dvitīye tu na svābhāvika-bheda-siddhiḥ | na hi paropādhi-bhedena svābhāvikam aikyaṁ vihanyate | mā bhūd nabhaso 'pi kumbhādy-upādhi-bhedāt svābhāviko bhedaḥ | . . . . tad uktam āchāryyaiḥ | 'prayojanaṁ tu yaj jātes tad varṇād eva labhyate | vyakti-labhyaṁ tu nādebhyaḥ iti gatvādi-dhīr vṛithā" iti | tathā cha "pratyabhijñā yadā śabde jāgartti niravagrahā | anityatvānumānāni saiva sarvāṇi bādhate" | . . . . tataś cha vedasya apaurusheyatayā nirasta-samasta-śankā-kalankānkuratvena svataḥ siddhaṁ dharme prāmāṇyam iti susthitam |

"Be it so. But how [the Naiyāyikas may ask] is the Veda alleged to be underived from any personal author? How can you regard the Vedas as being thus underived, when there is no evidence by which this character can be substantiated? The argument urged by you Mīmānsakas is, that while there is an unbroken tradition, still no author of the Veda is remembered, in the same way as [none is remembered] in the case of the soul (or self). But this argument is very weak, because the asserted characteristics [unbrokenness of tradition, etc.] are not proved; since those who maintain the personal origin [*i.e.* origin from a person] of the Veda, object that the tradition [regarding the Veda] was interrupted at the dissolution of the universe (*pralaya*).[92] And further: what is meant by the assertion that no author of the Veda is remembered? Is it (1) that no author is believed? or (2) that no author is the object of recollection? The first alternative cannot be accepted, since it is acknowledged [by us] that God (*Parameśvara*) is proved to be the author. Nor can the second alternative be admitted, as it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma, viz. Is it meant (*a*) that no author of the Veda is recollected by some one person, or (*b*) by any person whatever? The former supposition breaks down, since it fails when tried by such detached stanzas as this, 'he who is religious, and has overcome pride and anger,' etc.[93] And the latter supposition is inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any person whatever.

[92] This objection occurs in a passage of the *Kusumāñjali*, which I shall quote further on.

[93] I do not know from what work this verse is quoted, or what is its sequel. To prove anything in point, it must apparently go on to assert that such a saint as is here described remembers the author of the Veda, or at least has such superhuman faculties as would enable him to discover the author.

"And moreover, [the Naiyāyikas proceed], the sentences of the Veda must have originated with a personal author, as proof exists that they had such an origin, since they have the character of sentences, like those of Kālidāsa and other writers. The sentences of the Veda have been composed by competent persons, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

"But [ask the Mīmānsakas] may it not be assumed that, 'All study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character, which was the same in former times as now;'[94] and that this inference has force to prove [that the Veda had no author or was eternal]? Such reasoning [the Naiyāyikas answer] is of no force as proof, [for it might be urged, with an equal show of reason, that] 'All study of the Mahābhārata was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Mahābhārata, from the mere fact of its being such, [must have had the same character in former times] as it has now;' and the advantage of such an argument is simply illusory. But the [Mīmānsakas will ask whether there is not a difference between these two cases of the Veda and the Mahābhārata, since] the Smṛiti declares that [Vishṇu incarnate as] Vyāsa was the author of the latter,—according to such texts as this, 'Who else than Puṇḍarīkāksha (the lotus-eyed Vishṇu) could be the maker of the Mahābhārata?' (see above, p. 39),—[whilst nothing of this sort is recorded in any S'āstra in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is powerless, since it is proved by these words of the Purusha-sūkta, 'From him sprang the Ṛich and Sāman verses and the metres, and from him the Yajush verses,' (above, p. 3) that the Veda had a maker.

"Further [proceed the Naiyāyikas] we must suppose that sound [on the eternity of which the eternity and uncreatedness of the Veda depend] is not eternal, since, while it has the properties belonging to a

[94] The purport of this verse is, that as every generation of students of the Veda must have been preceded by an earlier generation of teachers, and as there is no reason to assume any variation in this process by supposing that there ever had been any student who taught himself; we have thus a *regressus ad infinitum*, and must of necessity conclude that the Vedas had no author, but were eternal.

genus, it can, like a jar, be perceived by the external organs of beings such as ourselves. But [rejoin the Mîmânsakas], is not this inference of yours refuted by the proof arising from the fact that we recognise the letter G [for example] as the same we have heard before? This argument [replies the Naiyâyika] is extremely weak, for the recognition in question having reference to a community of species,—as in the case of such words as 'hairs cut and grown again, or of full-blown jasmine,' etc.,—has no force to refute my assertion [that letters are not eternal].

"But [asks the Mîmânsaka] how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameśvara (God), who has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot be conceived to have pronounced the letters [of which it is composed]? This objection [answers the Naiyâyika] is not happy, because, though Parameśvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet, by way of sport, assume a body, in order to shew kindness to his devoted worshippers. Consequently, the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive.

"I shall now [says the Mîmânsaka] clear up all these difficulties. What is meant by this *paurusheyatva* ('derivation from a personal author') which it is sought to prove? Is it (1) mere procession (*utpannatva*) from a person (*purusha*), like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2) is it the arrangement—with a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, in the sense in which persons like ourselves compose a treatise? If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute. If the second sense be meant, I ask whether the Veda is proved [to be authoritative] in virtue (*a*) of its being founded on inference, or (*b*) of its being founded on supernatural information (*āgama-balāt*)? The former alternative (*a*) [*i.e.* that the Veda derives its authority from being founded on inference] cannot be correct, since this theory breaks down, if it be applied to the sentences of the Mālatī Mādhava or any other secular poem [which may contain inferences destitute of authority]. If, on the other hand, you say (*b*), that the contents of the Veda are distinguished from those of other books by having authority, this explanation also will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the word of the Veda is [defined to be] a word which proves things that are not

provable by any other evidence. Now if it could be established that this Vedic word did nothing more than prove things that are provable by other evidence, we should be involved in the same sort of contradiction as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even if we conceded that Parameśvara might in sport assume a body, it would not be conceivable that [in that case] he should perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature. Nor is it to be thought that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, since men can only attain to conceptions corresponding with what they have perceived. This is is what has been said by the Guru (Prabhākara) when he refutes [this supposition of] an omniscient author: 'Whenever any object is perceived [by the organ of sight] in its most perfect exercise, such perception can only have reference to the vision of something very distant or very minute, since no organ can go beyond its own proper objects, as *e.g.* the ear can never become cognizant of form.' Hence the authority of the Veda does not arise in virtue of any supernatural information [acquired by the Deity in a corporeal shape].

"Without any contravention[95] of the rule of Pānini (iv. 3, 101; see above, p. 83) that the grammatical affix with which the words Kāṭhaka, Kālāpa, and Taittirīya are formed, imparts to those derivatives the sense of 'uttered by' Kaṭha, Kalāpa, etc., it is established that the names first mentioned have reference [not to those parts of the Veda being composed by the sages in question, but] to the fact that these sages instituted the practice of studying those parts of the Veda. Here also these appellations ought to be understood in the same manner, as referring to the fact of those sages being the institutors of the study of the Veda; and we are not to think that the eternity of sound [or of the words of the Veda] is disproved by the force of any inference [to be drawn from those names], since this would be at variance with the recognition [of letters as the same we knew before] (see above, Mīmānsa Sūtras, i. 19 f., p. 75). . . . .

"But [the Naiyāyikas will ask] does not the recognition [of G and other letters as the same we knew before] refer to them as belonging to the [same] species, and not as being the [same] individual letters, since, in fact, they are perceived to be different [as uttered by] each

[95] Literally "although the rule of Pāṇini be awake."

person,—for otherwise it would be impossible for us to make any distinction [between different readers, as when we say], 'Somaśarman is reading?' This objection, however, shines as little as its predecessors, and has been answered in this way, viz. that as there is no proof of any distinction of individuality between G's, etc., there is no evidence that we ought to suppose any such thing as a species of G's, etc. [*i.e.* of G's and other letters each constituting a species]. Just as to the man who is ignorant that G's constitute a species, [that letter], though one only, becomes, through distinction of place, magnitude, form, individuality, and position, variously modified as distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, or as short, in the same way, to the man who is ignorant of an individuality of G's, [*i.e.* of G's being numerically different from each other], this letter, though only one, appears, from the distinction existing between the different persons who utter it, to be connected with their respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way erroneously ascribed [to the letter G], there is a fallacious appearance of distinctness [between different G's]. But does this ascription of contrary characters which is thus regarded as creating a difference [between G's] result from (1) the nature of the thing, or (2) from mere appearance? There is no proof of the first alternative, as otherwise an inherent difference being admitted between different G's, it would be established that Chaitra had uttered ten (different] G's, and not [the same] G ten times. But on the second supposition, there is no proof of any inherent distinction [between G's]; for inherent oneness (or identity) is not destroyed by a difference of extrinsic disguises [or characteristics]. We must not conceive, from the merely apparent distinctness [occasioned by the separation of its parts] by jars, etc., that there is any inherent distinctness in the atmosphere itself. . . . . It has been said by the Āchāryya 'The object which the Naiyāyikas seek, by supposing a species, is in fact gained from the letter itself; and the object at which they aim by supposing an individuality in letters, is attained from audible sounds (*i.e.* the separate utterances of the different letters), so that the hypothesis of species, etc., is useless.' And he thus reaches the conclusion that, 'since, in respect of sounds (letters), recognition has so irresistible a power, [literally, wakes, unrestrained], it alone repels all inferences against the eternity [of sound, or the Veda].'' After some further

argumentation the Mīmānsaka arrives at the conclusion that "as every imputation of doubt which has germinated has been set aside by the underived character of the Veda, its authority in matters of duty is shewn to be self-evident."

I shall not attempt to carry further my translation of this abstruse discussion, as the remainder of it contains much which I should find great difficulty in comprehending.[96]

[Although not directly connected with the subject in hand, the following passage from S'ankara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtras, iii. 2, 40,[97] will throw some further light on the doctrines of the Mīmānsā. In the two preceding Sūtras, as explained by S'ankara, it had been asserted, both on grounds of reason and on the authority of the Veda, that God is the author of rewards. In the 40th S'ūtra a different doctrine is ascribed to Jaimini:

Dharmaṁ Jaiminir ataḥ eva | Jaiminis tv āchāryyo dharmam phalasya dātāram manyate | ata eva hetoḥ śruter upapatteś cha | śrūyate tāvad ayam arthaḥ "svarga-kāmo yajeta" ity evam ādishu vākyeshu | tatra cha vidhi-śruter vishaya-bhāvopagamād yāgaḥ svargasya utpādakaḥ iti gamyate | anyathā hy ananushṭhātṛiko yāgaḥ āpadyeta tatra asya upadeśasya vaiyarthyaṁ syāt | nanv anukshaṇa-vināśinaḥ karmaṇaḥ phalaṁ na upapadyade iti parityakto 'yam pakshaḥ | na esha doshaḥ śruti-prāmāṇyāt | śrutiś chet pramāṇaṁ yathā 'yam karma-phala-sambandhaḥ śrutaḥ upapadyate tathā kalpayitavyaḥ | na cha anutpādya kimapy apūrvaṁ karma vinaśyat kālāntaritam phalaṁ dātuṁ śaknoti ity ataḥ karmaṇo vā sūkshmā kāchid uttarāvasthā phalasya vā pūrvāvasthā apūrvaṁ nāma asti iti tarkyate | upapadyate cha ayam arthaḥ uktena prakāreṇa | Īśvaras tu phalaṁ dadāti ity anupapannam avichitrasya kāraṇasya vichitra-kāryyānupapatteḥ vaishamya-nairghṛiṇya-prasangād anushṭhāna-vaiyarthyāpatteś cha | tasmād dharmād eva phalam iti |

"'Jaimini says that for this reason virtue [is the giver of reward].' The Āchāryya Jaimini regards virtue [*i.e.* the performance of the prescribed rites and duties] as the bestower of reward. 'For this reason,'

[96] In fact I have left out some pages of the translation which I had given in the first edition, as well as the corresponding portion of the text. I am indebted to the kindness of Professor Goldstücker for various suggestions towards the improvement of my translation. But two of the passages on which he had favoured me with his opinion are, to my own apprehension, so obscure, that I have omitted them.

[97] It is partly quoted in Prof. Banerjea's work on Hindu Philosophy.

and because it is proved by the Veda. This is the purport of the Vedic text, 'Let the man who seeks paradise, sacrifice,' and others of the same kind. As from this Vedic injunction we must infer the existence of an object [to be sought after] it is concluded that sacrifice has the effect of producing heavenly bliss; for otherwise we should be involved in the absurdity of a sacrifice without a performer [since no one would care to sacrifice without an object], and thus the injunction would become fruitless. But may it not be said that it is not conceivable that any fruit should result from a ceremony which perishes every moment, so that this view must be abandoned? No, this defect does not attach to our Mīmānsaka statement, since the Veda is authoritative. If the Veda be authority, this connection of the reward with the ceremony must be supposed to exist just as is proved by the Veda. But as a ceremony which perishes without generating any unseen virtue, cannot produce a reward at a distant time, it must be concluded that there is either a certain subtile ulterior form of the ceremony, or a certain subtile anterior form of the reward, which is called 'unseen virtue.' And this result is established in the manner before mentioned. But it it is not proved that God bestows rewards, because it is inconceivable that a uniform Cause [such as He is] should produce various effects, and because the performance of ceremonies would be useless, owing to the partiality and unmercifulness which would attach [to the supposed arbiter of men's deserts]. Hence it is from virtue alone that reward results."

How far this passage may be sufficient to prove the atheism of the Mīmānsā, I will not attempt to say. Before we could decide on such a question, the other Sūtras of that school which refer to this question (if there be any such) would have to be consulted.

Professor Banerjea also quotes the following text from the popular work, the Vidvan-moda-taranginī, in which the Mīmānsakas are distinctly charged with atheism:

Devo na kaśchid bhuvanasya karttā bharttā na harttā 'pi cha kaśchid āste | karmānurūpāṇi śubhāśubhāni prāpnoti sarvo hi janaḥ phalāni | vedasyā karttā na cha kaśchid āste nityāḥ hi śabdāḥ rachanā hi nityā | prāmāṇyam asmin svataḥ eva siddham anādi-siddheḥ parataḥ katham tat |

"There is no God, maker of the world; nor has it any sustainer or destroyer; for every man obtains a recompence in conformity with his

works. Neither is there any maker of the Veda, for its words are eternal, and their arrangement is eternal. Its authoritativeness is self-demonstrated, for since it has been established from eternity, how can it be dependent upon anything but itself?"

I learn from Professor Banerjea that the Mīmānsaka commentator Prabhākara and his school treat the Pūrva Mīmānsā as an atheistic system, while Kumārila makes it out to be theistic. In fact the latter author makes the following complaint at the commencement of his Vārttika, verse 10: *Prāyeṇaiva hi Mīmāṁsā loke lokāyatīkṛitā | tām āstika-pathe karttum ayaṁ yatnaḥ kṛito mayā* | "For in practice the Mīmānsā has been for the most part converted into a Lokāyata[98] (atheistic) system; but I have made this effort to bring it into a theistic path." See also the lines which are quoted from the Padma Purāṇa by Vijnāna Bhikshu, commentator on the Sānkhya aphorisms, in a passage which I shall adduce further on.]

It appears from a passage in Patanjali's Mahābhāshya, that that great grammarian was of opinion that, although the sense of the Veda is eternal, the order of the words has not continued uniform; and that it is from this order having been variously fixed by Kaṭha, Kalāpa, and other sages, that different portions of the Indian scriptures are called by their names.

The following passages from the Mahābhāshya, and from the Commentaries of Kaiyyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa thereon, are extracted from the fuller quotations given by Professor Goldstücker in pp. 147 f. of the Preface to his Mānava-kalpa-sūtra.

Patanjali: *Nanu cha uktaṁ "na hi chhandāṁsi kriyante nityāni chhandāṁsi" iti | yadyapy artho nityaḥ | yā tv asau varṇānupūrvī sā anityā tad-bhedāch cha etad bhavati Kāṭhakaṁ Kālāpakam Maudakam Paippalādakam ityādi* . . . . | Kaiyyaṭa: "*Nityāni*" *iti | karttur asmaraṇāt teshām iti bhāvaḥ* | "*yā tv asāv*" *iti | mahāpralayādishu varṇānupūrvī-vināśe punar utpadya ṛishayaḥ saṁskārātiśayād vedārthaṁ smṛitvā śabda-rachanāḥ vidadhati ity arthaḥ* | "*tad-bhedād*" *iti | ānupūrvī-bhedād ity arthaḥ | tataś cha Kaṭhādayo vedānupūrvyāḥ karttāraḥ eva ityādi* | Nāgojibhaṭṭa: *Aṁśena vedasya nityatvaṁ svīkṛitya aṁśena anityatvam āha "yadyapy arthaḥ" iti | anena vedatvam śabdārthobhaya-vṛitti-dhvanitvam | nanu "dhātā yathā pūrvam akalpayad" ityādi-śruti-balena*

[98] See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 402 ff., or p. 259 ff. of Williams and Norgate's ed.

ānupūrvī api sā eva iti navya-pūrva-mīmāṁsā-siddhāntāt sā nityā iti ayuktam ata āha "mahāpralayādishv" iti | ānupūrvyās tat-tat-kshaṇa-ghaṭitatvena anityatvam iti bhāvaḥ iti kechit | tan na | "yadyapy artho nityaḥ" ityādi-vākya-śesha-virodhāt | arthasyāpi jyotishṭomāder anityatvāt | pravāhāvichchhedena nityatvaṁ tu ubhayor api tasmād manvantara-bhedena ānupūrvī bhinnā eva "prati-manvantaraṁ chaishā śrutir anyā vidhīyate" ity ukter ity anye | pare tu | "artho nityaḥ" ity atra kṛitakatva-virodhy-anityatvasya eva abhyupagamaḥ pūrva-pakshiṇā tādṛiśa-nityatvasya eva chhandassu ukteḥ | evaṁ cha artha-śabdena atra īśvaraḥ | mukhyatayā tasya eva sarva-veda-tātparyya-vishayatvāt | "vedaiś cha sarvair aham eva vedyaḥ" iti Gītokter ity āhūḥ | varṇānupūrvyāḥ anityatve mānam āha "tad-bhedāch cha" iti | anityatva-vyāpya-bhedena tat-siddhiḥ | bhedo 'tra nānātvam | Īśvare tu na nānātvam | bhede mānaṁ vyavahāram āha | "Kāṭhaka" ityādi | arthaikye 'py ānupūrvī-bhedād eva Kāṭhaka-kālāpakādi-vyavahāraḥ iti bhāvaḥ | atra ānupūrvī anityā ity ukteḥ padāni tāny eva iti dhvanitvam | tad āha "tataś cha Kaṭhādayaḥ" ityādi |

As Professor Goldstücker has only given (in p. 146 of his Preface) a translation of the above extract from Patanjali, and has left the passages from Kaiyyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa untranslated, I shall give his version of the first, and my own rendering of the two last.

Patanjali: "Is it not said, however, that 'the Vedas are not made, but that they are permanent (*i.e.* eternal)?' (Quite so); yet though their sense is permanent, the order of their letters has not always remained the same; and it is through the difference in this latter respect that we may speak of the versions of the Kaṭhas, Kalāpas, Mudakas, Pippalādakas, and so on." *Kaiyyaṭa on Patanjali*: "'Eternal;' by this word he means that they are so, because no maker of them is remembered. By the words, 'the order of their letters,' etc., it is meant that, the order of the letters being destroyed in the great dissolutions of the universe, etc., the rishis, when they are again created, recollecting, through their eminent science, the sense of the Veda, arrange the order of the words. By the phrase, 'through the difference of this,' is meant the difference of order. Consequently, Kaṭha and the other sages [to whom allusion was made] are the authors of the order of the Veda." *Nāgojibhaṭṭa on Patanjali and Kaiyyaṭa:* "Admitting in part the eternity of the Veda, he, Patanjali, declares in

the words, 'though the sense is eternal,' etc., that it (the Veda) is also in part not eternal. By this clause it is implied that the character of the Veda as such is constituted both by the words and by the sense.[99] But is not the order also eternal, since it is a settled doctrine of the modern Mīmānsakas, on the strength of such Vedic texts as this, 'the creator made them as before,' etc., that the order also is the very same? No; this is incorrect, and in consequence, he (Kaiyyaṭa) says, 'in the great dissolutions,' etc. Some say the meaning of this is, that the order is not eternal, inasmuch as it is formed in particular moments. But this is wrong, because it is opposed to the conclusion of the sentence, 'though their sense is eternal,' etc., and because the objects signified also, such as the jyotishṭoma sacrifice, are not eternal. Others say that both the sense and the order of the words are eternal [or permanent], owing to the continuity of the tradition; and that, consequently, it is in different manvantaras that the order of the words is different, according to the text, 'in every manvantara this śruti (Veda) is made different.' Others again think that in the words, 'the sense is eternal,' etc., an admission is made by an objector of an eternity opposed to the idea of production, since it is only such a [qualified] eternity that is mentioned in the Veda; and that thus the word 'sense,' or 'object' (*arthaḥ*), here refers to Īśvara, because he is the principal object which is had in view in the whole of the Veda, according to the words of the Bhagavad-gītā (xv. 15), 'It is I whom all the Vedas seek to know.' He next states the proof of the assertion that the order of the letters is not-eternal, in the words, 'through the difference of this,' etc. The difference in the order is proved by the difference in the things included under the category of non-eternity. Difference here means variety. But in Īśvara (God), there is no variety. He declares current usage to be the proof of difference, in the words 'Kāṭhaka,' etc., which mean that, though the sense is the same, we use the distinctions of Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc., in consequence of the difference of arrangement. Here by saying that the order is not eternal, it is implied that the words are the same. And this is what is asserted in the words [of Kaiyyaṭa], 'consequently Kaṭha and the other sages,'" etc.

[99] I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for a correction of my former rendering of this sentence, and of several others in this passage of Nāgojibhaṭṭa.

After quoting these passages at greater length than I have given them, Professor Goldstücker goes on to remark in his note: "I have quoted the full gloss of the three principal commentators, on this important Sūtra [of Pāṇini] and its Vārttikas, because it is of considerable interest in many respects. . . . . We see Kaiyyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa writhing under the difficulty of reconciling the eternity of the Veda with the differences of its various versions, which, nevertheless, maintain an equal claim to infallibility. Patanjali makes rather short work of this much vexed question; and unless it be allowed here to render his expression *varṇa* (which means 'letter'), 'word,' it is barely possible even to understand how he can save consistently the eternity or permanence of the 'sense' of the Veda. That the modern Mīmānsists maintain not only the 'eternity of the sense,' but also the 'permanence of the text,' which is tantamount to the exclusive right of one single version, we learn, amongst others, from Nāgojibhaṭṭa. But as such a doctrine has its obvious dangers, it is not shared in by the old Mīmānsists, nor by Nāgoji, as he tells us himself. He and Kaiyyaṭa inform us therefore that, *amongst other* theories, there is one, according to which the order of the letters (or rather words) in the Vaidik texts got lost in the several Pralayas or destructions of the worlds; and since each manvantara had its own revelation, which differed only in the expression, not in the sense of, the Vaidik texts, the various versions known to these commentators represent these successive revelations, which were 'remembered,' through their 'excessive accomplishments,' by the Ṛishis, who in this manner produced, or rather reproduced, the texts current in their time, under the name of the versions of the Kaṭhas, Kalāpas, and so on. In this way each version had an equal claim to sanctity. There is a very interesting discussion on the same subject by Kumārila, in his Mīmānsa-vārttika (i. 3, 10)."

III. *The Vedānta.*—I proceed to adduce the reasonings by which Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed author of the Brahma, S'ārīraka, or Vedānta Sūtras, as expounded by S'ankara Āchāryya in his *S'ārīraka-mīmāṁsā-bhāshya*, or commentary on those Sūtras, defends the eternity and authority of the Veda. His views, as we shall see, are not by any means identical with those of Jaimini and his school. After discussing the question whether any persons but men of the three highest tribes are qualified for divine knowledge, the author of the Sūtras comes to the conclusion

that S'ūdras, or persons of the fourth tribe, are incompetent, while beings superior to man, the gods, are competent[100] (Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 348, or p. 223 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) In Sūtra, i. 3, 26, the author determines that the gods have a desire for final emancipation, owing to the transitoriness of their glory, and a capacity for attaining it, because they possess the qualities of corporeality, etc.; and that there is no obstacle which prevents their acquiring divine knowledge. A difficulty, however, having been raised that the gods cannot be corporeal, because, if they were so, it is necessary to conceive that they would be corporeally present (as priests actually are) at the ceremonial of sacrifice, in which they are the objects of worship,—a supposition which would not consist with the usual course of such ceremonies, at which the gods are not seen to be corporeally present, and would, in fact, involve an impossibility, since Indra, for example, being but one, could not be corporeally present at numerous sacrifices at once;—this difficulty is solved (under Sūtra i. 3, 27) in two ways, either by supposing (1) that the gods assume different forms, and are present at many sacrifices at once, although invisible to mortals; or by considering (2) that, as a sacrifice is offered to (and not, by) a deity, many persons may present their oblations to that deity at once, just as one Brāhman may be saluted by many different persons at the same time. It is, therefore, concluded that the corporeal nature of the gods is not inconsistent with the practice of sacrifice. Having settled these points, S'ankara comes to Sūtra i. 3, 28:

"*S'abde iti chet* | *na* | *ataḥ prabhavāt* | *pratyakshānumānābhyām*" |

Mā nāma vigrahavattve devādīnām abhyupagamyamāne karmaṇi kaśchid virodhaḥ prasanji | *śabde tu virodhaḥ prasajyeta* | *katham* | *Autpattikam̐ hi śabdasya arthena sambandham āśritya* "*anapekshatvād*" *iti vedasya prāmāṇyam̐ sthāpitam* | *Idānīm̐ tu vigrahavatī devatā 'bhyupagamyamānā yadyapy aiśvaryya-yogād yugapad aneka-karma-sambandhīni havīm̐shi bhunjīta tathāpi vigraha-yogād asmad-ādi-vaj janana-maraṇavatī sā iti nityasya śabdasya anityena arthena nitya-sambandhe pralīyamāne yad vaidike śabde prāmāṇyam̐ sthitam̐ tasya virodhaḥ syād iti chet* | *na ayam apy asti virodhaḥ* | *kasmād* "*ataḥ prabhavāt*" | *Ataḥ eva*

[100] For a discussion of the different question whether the gods can practise the ceremonies prescribed in the Vedas, see the First Volume of this work, p. 365, note.

hi vaidikāt śabdād devādikaṁ jagat prabhavati | Nanu "janmādi asya yataḥ" (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 2) *iti brahma-prabhavatvaṁ jagato 'vadhāritaṁ katham iha śabda-prabhavatvam uchyate | Apicha yadi nāma vaidikāt śabdād asya prabhavo 'bhyupagataḥ katham etāvatā virodhaḥ śabde parihṛitaḥ | yāvatā Vasavo Rudrāḥ Ādityāḥ Viśvedevāḥ Marutaḥ ity ete 'rthāḥ anityāḥ eva utpattimattvāt | Tad-anityatve cha tad-vāchakānaṁ vaidikānāṁ Vasv-ādi-śabdānām anityatvaṁ kena vāryyate | Prasiddhaṁ hi loke Devadattasya putre utpanne Yajnadattaḥ iti tasya nāma kriyate iti | Tasmād virodhaḥ eva śabde iti chet | na | Gavādi-śabdārtha-sambandha-nityatva-darśanāt | Na hi gavādi-vyaktīnām utpattimattve taḍ-ākṛitīnām apy utpattimattvaṁ syād dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṁ hi vyaktayaḥ eva utpadyante na ākṛitayaḥ | Ākṛitibhiś cha śabdānāṁ sambandho na vyaktibhiḥ | vyaktīnām ānantyāt sambandha-grahaṇānupapatteḥ | Vyaktishu utpadyamānāsv apy ākṛitīnāṁ nityatvād na gavādi-śabdeshu kaśchid virodho dṛiśyate | Tathā devādi-vyakti-prabhavābhyupagame 'pi ākṛiti-nityatvād na kaśchid Vasv-ādi-śabdeshu virodhaḥ iti drashṭavyam | Ākṛiti-viśeshas tu devādīnām mantrārthavādādibhyo vigrahavattvādy-avagamād avagantavyaḥ | Sthāna-viśesha-sambandha-nimittāś cha Indrādi-śabdāḥ senāpatyādi-śabda-vat | Tataś cha yo yas tat tat sthānam adhitishṭhati sa sa Indrādi-śabdair abhidhīyate iti na dosho bhavati | Na cha idaṁ śabda-prabhavatvam Brahma-prabhavatva-vad upādāna-kāraṇatvābhiprāyeṇa uchyate | kathaṁ tarhi sthiti-vāchakātmanā nitye śabde nityārtha-sambandhini śabda-vyavahāra-yogyārtha-vyakti-nishpattir "ataḥ prabhavaḥ" ity uchyate | katham punar avagamyate śabdāt prabhavati jagad iti | "pratyakshānumānābhyām" | Pratyakshaṁ śrutiḥ | prāmāṇyam prati anapekshatvāt | anumānaṁ smṛitiḥ | prāmāṇyam prati sāpekshatvāt | Te hi śabda-pūrvāṁ sṛishṭim darśayataḥ | "Ete" iti vai prajāpatir devān asṛijata "asṛigram" iti manushyān "indavaḥ" iti pitṝīṁs "tiraḥ pavitram" iti grahān "āśavaḥ" iti stotraṁ "viśvāni" iti śastram "abhi saubhagā" ity anyāḥ prajāḥ iti śrutiḥ | Tathā 'nyatrāpi "sa manasā vācham mithunaṁ samabhavad"* (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa x. 6, 5, 4, and Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, p. 50) *ityādinā tatra tatra śabda-pūrvikā sṛishṭiḥ śrāvyate | Smṛitir api "anādi-nidhanā nityā vāg utsṛishṭā svayambhuvā | ādau vedamayī divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravṛittayaḥ" ity utsargo 'py ayaṁ vāchaḥ sampradāya-pravarttanātmako drashṭavyaḥ anādi-nidhanāyāḥ anyādṛiśasya utsargasya asambhavāt | Tathā "nāma rūpaṁ cha bhūtānāṁ karmaṇāṁ cha pravarttanam | Veda-śabdebhya evādau nirmame sa*

maheśvaraḥ" iti | *"sarveshām cha sa nāmāni karmāṇi cha pṛithak pṛithak* | *Veda-śabdebhya evādau pṛithak saṁsthāś cha nirmame" iti cha* | *Apicha chikīrshitam artham anutishṭhan tasya vāchakam śabdam pūrvam smṛitvā paśchāt tam artham anutishṭhati iti sarveshām naḥ pratyaksham etat* | *Tathā prajāpater api srashṭuḥ sṛishṭeḥ pūrvam vaidikāḥ śabdāḥ manasi prādurbabhūvuḥ paśchāt tad-anugatān arthān sasarjja iti gamyate* | *Tathā cha śrutiḥ "sa bhūr iti vyāharan bhūmim asṛijata"*[101] *ity-evam-ādikā bhūr-ādi-śabdebhyaḥ eva manasi prādurbhūtebhyo bhūr-ādi-lokān prādurbhūtān sṛishṭān darśayati* | *kim-ātmakam punaḥ śabdam abhipretya idam śabda-prabhavatvam uchyate* | *sphoṭam ity āha* | . . . . *Tasmād nityāt śabdāt sphoṭa-rūpād abhidhāyakāt kriyā-kāraka-phala-lakshaṇam jagad abhidheya-bhūtam prabhavatīti* | . . . . *Tataś cha nityebhyaḥ śabdebhyo devādi-vyaktīnām prabhavaḥ ity aviruddham* |

Sūtra i. 3, 29. *"Ata eva cha nityatvam"* | *svatantrasya karttuḥ smaraṇād eva hi sthite vedasya nityatve devādi-vyakti-prabhavābhyupagamena tasya virodham āśankya "ataḥ prabhavād" iti parihṛitya idānīm tad eva veda-nityatvam sthitam draḍhayati "ata eva cha nityatvam" iti* | *ataḥ eva cha niyatākṛiter devāder jagato veda-śabda-prabhavatvād eva veda-śabda-nityatvam api pratyetavyam* | *Tathā cha mantra-varṇaḥ "yajnena vāchaḥ padavīyam āyan tām anvavindann ṛishishu pravishṭām" iti sthitām eva vācham anuvinnām darśayati* | *Vedavyāsaś cha evam eva smarati* (Mahābhārata, Vanap. 7660) | *"yugānte 'ntarhitān vedān setihāsān maharshayaḥ* | *lebhire tapasā pūrvam anujnātāḥ svayambhuvā" iti* |

"Sūtra i. 3, 28: 'But it is said that there will be a contradiction in respect of sound (or the word); but this is not so, because the gods are produced from it, as is proved by intuition and inference.'

"Be it so, that though the corporeality of the gods, etc., be admitted, no contradiction will arise in respect of the ceremonial. Still [it will be said that] a contradiction will arise in regard to the word. How? [In this way.] By founding upon the inherent connection of a word with the thing signified, the authority of the Veda had been established by the aphorism '*anapekshatvāt*,' etc. (Mīmānsā Sūtras i. 2, 21; see above, p. 75.) But now, while it has been admitted that the deities are corporeal, it will follow that (though from their possession of divine power they can at one and the same time partake of the oblations

[101] Compare S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, xi. 1, 6, 3.

offered at numerous sacrifices), they will still, owing to their corporeality, be subject, like ourselves, to birth and death; and hence, the eternal connection of the eternal word with an object which is non-eternal being lost, a contradiction will arise in regard to the authority proved to belong to the word of the Veda; [for thus the word, not having any eternal connection with non-eternal things, could not be authoritative]. But neither has this supposed contradiction any existence. How? 'Because they are produced from it.' Hence the world of gods, etc., is produced from the Vedic word. But according to the aphorism (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 2) 'from him comes the production, etc., of all this,' it is established that the world has been produced from Brahma. How, then, is it said here that it is produced from the word? And, moreover, if it be allowed that the world is produced from the Vedic word, how is the contradiction in regard to the word thereby removed, inasmuch as all the following classes of objects, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Ādityas, Viśvedevas, Maruts, are non-eternal, because produced; and when they are non-eternal, what is there to bar the non-eternity of the Vedic words Vasu, etc., by which they are designated? For it is a common saying, 'It is only when a son is born to Devadatta, that that son receives the name of Yajnadatta,' [*i.e.* no child receives a name before it exists]. Hence a contradiction does arise in regard to [the eternity of] the word. To this objection we reply with a negative; for in the case of such words as cow we discover an eternal connection between the word and the thing. For although individual cows, etc., come into existence, the species to which they belong does not begin to exist, as it is individual substances, qualities, and acts, which begin to exist, and not their species. Now it is with species that words are connected, and not with individuals, for as the latter are infinite, such a connection would in their case be impossible. Thus as species are eternal (though individuals begin to exist) no contradiction is discoverable in the case of such words as cow, etc. In the same way it is to be remarked that though we allow that the individual gods, etc., have commenced to exist, there is no contradiction [to the eternity of the Vedic word] in the [existence of the] words Vasu, etc. [which denote those individual gods], since the species to which they belong are eternal. And the fact that the gods, etc., belong to particular species may be learned from this, that we discover their corporeality and other attributes in

the hymns and arthavādas (illustrative remarks in the Vedas), etc. The words Indra, etc., are derived from connection with some particular post, like the words 'commander of an army' (*senāpati*), etc. Hence, whosoever occupies any particular post, is designated by the words Indra, and so forth; [and therefore Indra, and the other gods belong to the species of occupants of particular posts]. Thus there is no difficulty. And this derivation from the word is not, like production from Brahma, meant in the sense of evolution from a material cause. But how, since language is eternal and connected with eternal objects, is it declared in the phrase 'produced from it' that the production of individual things, corresponding to the ordinary sense of words, is effected by a thing (sound or language), the very nature of which it is to denote continuance [and not such change as is involved in the idea of production?][102] How, again, is it known that the world is produced from the word? The answer is, [it is known] 'from intuition and inference.' 'Intuition' means the Veda, because it is independent of any (other authority). 'Inference' means the smriti, because it is dependent on another authority (the Veda). These two demonstrate that the creation was preceded by the word. Thus the Veda says, 'at (or with) the word *ete* (these) Prajāpati created the gods; at *asṛigram* (they were poured out) he created men; at *indavaḥ* (drops of soma) he created the pitṛis; at *tiraḥ pavitram* (through the filter) he created the libations; at *āśavaḥ* (swift) he created hymns; at *viśvāni* (all) he created praise; and at the words *abhi saubhagā* (for the sake of blessings) he created other creatures.'[103] And in another place it is said 'with his

[102] This sentence is rather obscure.

[103] According to Govinda Ānanda's Gloss this passage is derived from a Chhandoga Brāhmaṇa. It contains a mystical exposition of the words from Rig-veda, ix. 62, 1 (=Sāma-veda, ii. 180) which are imbedded in it, viz. *ete asṛigram indavas tiraḥ pavitram āśavaḥ* | *viśvāni abhi saubhagā* | "These hurrying drops of soma have been poured through the filter, to procure all blessings." (See Benfey's translation.) It was by the help of Dr. Pertsch's alphabetical list of the initial words of the verses of the Rig-veda (in Weber's Indische Studien, vol. iii.) that I discovered the verse in question in the Rig-veda. Govinda Ānanda gives us a specimen of his powers as Vedic exegete in the following remarks on this passage: *Ity etan-mantra-sthaiḥ padaiḥ smṛitvā Brahmā devādīn asṛijata* | *tattra* "*ete*" *iti padam sarvanāmatvād devānāṁ smārakam asṛig rudhiraṁ tat pradhāne dehe ramante iti* "*asṛigrāḥ*" *manushyāḥ* | *chandra-sthānām pitṝṇām indu-śabdaḥ smārakaḥ ityādi* | "Brahmā created the gods, etc., in conformity with the recollections suggested by the various words in this verse. The word *ete* ('these') as a pronoun suggested the gods. The beings who disport

mind he entered into conjugal connection with Vāch (speech).' (S. P. Br. x. 6, 5, 4, Bṛih. Ār. Up. p. 50.) By these and other such texts the Veda in various places declares that creation was preceded by the word. And when the Smṛiti says, 'In the beginning a celestial voice, eternal, without beginning or end, co-essential with the Vedas, was uttered by Svayambhū, from which all activities [proceeded]' (see above, p. 16), the expression 'utterance of a voice' is to be regarded as employed in the sense of the origination of a tradition, since it is inconceivable that a voice which was 'without beginning or end,' could be uttered in the same sense as other sounds. Again, we have this other text, 'In the beginning Maheśvara created from the words of the Veda the names and forms of creatures, and the origination of actions;' and again, 'He created in the beginning the several names, functions, and conditions of all creatures from the words of the Veda.' (See above, pp. 16 and 6.) And it is a matter of common observation to us all, that when any one is occupied with any end which he wishes to accomplish, he first calls to mind the word which expresses it, and then proceeds to effect his purpose. So, too, in the case of Prajāpati the creator, we conclude that before the creation the words of the Veda were manifested in his mind, and that afterwards he created the objects which resulted from them. Thus the Vedic text which says, 'uttering *bhūḥ*, he created the earth (*bhūmi*), etc.,' intimates that the different worlds, earth, and the rest, were manifested, *i.e.* created from the words *bhūḥ*, etc., manifested in his mind. Of what sort, now, was this word, which is intended, when it is said that the world was produced from the word? It was *sphoṭa* (disclosure or expression), we are told."

I shall not quote the long discussion on which S'ankara here enters, regarding this term. (See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. 305 ff.; Ballantyne's Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy, pp. 192 ff.; the same author's translation of the commencement of the Mahābhāshya, p. 10; and Professor Müller's article on the last-named work in the Journal of the German Or. Soc. vii. 170). S'ankara states his conclusion

themselves in bodies of which blood (*asṛik*) is a predominant element, were *asṛigrāḥ*, 'men.' The word *indu* (which means both the soma plant and the moon) suggested the fathers who dwell in the moon," etc., etc. The sense of *asṛigram*, as given above in the text, is "were poured out." Govinda Ānanda, no doubt, understood it correctly, though he considered it necessary to draw a mystical sense out of it.

to be that "from the eternal word, in the form of *sphoṭa*, which expresses [all things], the object signified by it, viz. the world, under the three characters of action, causer, and the results of action, is produced," and finishes his remarks on this Sūtra (i. 3, 28) by observing: "Consequently there is no contradiction in saying that the individual gods, etc., are derived from eternal words." He then proceeds to Sūtra i. 3, 29: "'Hence results the eternity of the Vedas.'" On this he observes, "The eternity of the Veda had been established by the fact of its being described in the Smṛiti as the work of a Self-dependent Maker. But a doubt had been suggested that this eternity is inconsistent with the admission that individual gods, etc., have commenced to exist. This doubt, however, having been set aside by the preceding aphorism, 'Since they are produced from it,' he now confirms the eternity of the Veda (which had been already proved) by the words of the Sūtra before us, which mean that as a result of this very fact that the world, consisting of gods and other beings belonging to fixed species, was produced from the words of the Vedas, the eternity of these Vedic words themselves also must be believed. Accordingly, the words of the hymn, 'by sacrifice they followed the path of Vāch, and found her entered into the rishis' (R.V. x. 71, 3; see the First Volume of this work p. 254, and Volume Second, p. 220) prove that Vāch already existed when she was discovered. And in the very same way Vedavyāsa records that, 'formerly the great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, obtained through devotion the Vedas and Itihāsas, which had disappeared at the end of the preceding yuga.'"

Sāyaṇa refers to the Sūtra just quoted (i. 3, 29), as well as to another of the Vedānta aphorisms (i. 1, 3) in p. 20 of the introduction to his Commentary on the Rig-veda in these words:

Nanu bhagavatā Bādarāyaṇena Vedasya Brahma-kāryyatvaṁ sūtritam | "śāstra-yonitvād" iti | ṛigvedādi-śāstra-kāraṇatvād Brahma sarvajnam iti sūtrārthaḥ | bāḍham | na etāvatā paurusheyatvam bhavati | manushya-nirmitatvābhāvāt | īdṛiśam apaurusheyatvam abhipretya vyavahāra-daśāyām ākāśādi-vad nityatvam Bādarāyaṇenaiva devatādhikaraṇe sūtritam | "ata evacha nityatvam" iti |

"But it is objected that the venerable Bādarāyaṇa has declared in the aphorism 'since he is the source of the śāstra (Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3), that the Veda is derived from Brahma; the meaning of the aphorism being, that since Brahma is the cause of the Rig-veda and other S'āstras,

he is omniscient. This is true; but it furnishes no proof of the human origin of the Veda, since it was not formed by a man. Bādarāyaṇa had in view such a superhuman origin of the Veda, when in the [other] aphorism 'hence also [its] eternity is to be maintained,' (which is contained in the section on the deities), he declared it to be, like the æther, etc., eternal, during the period of mundane existence." [104]

The remarks of S'ankara on the Brahma Sūtra (i. 1, 3) above referred to, begin as follows:

Mahataḥ ṛig-vedādeḥ śāstrasya aneka-vidyā-sthānopabṛiṁhitasya pradīpa-vat sarvārtha-dyotinas sarvajna-kalpasya yoniḥ kāraṇam Brahma | na hi īdṛiśasya śāstrasya ṛigvedādi-lakshaṇasya sarvajna-guṇānvitasya sarvajnād anyataḥ sambhavo 'sti | Yad yad vistarārthaṁ śāstraṁ yasmāt purusha-viśeshāt sambhavati yathā vyākaraṇādi Pāṇiny-āder jneyaikadeśārtham api sa tato 'py adhikatara-vijnānaḥ iti prasiddhaṁ loke | kimu vaktavyam aneka-śākhā-bheda-bhinnasya deva-tiryaṅ-manushya-varṇāśramādi-pravibhāga-hetor ṛig-vedādy-ākhyasya sarva-jnānākarasya aprayatnena eva līlā-nyāyena purusha-niśvāsa-vad yasmād mahato bhūtād yoneḥ sambhavaḥ ("asya mahato bhūtasya niśvasitam etad yad rig-vedaḥ" ity-ādeḥ śrutes) tasya mahato bhūtasya niratiśayaṁ sarvajnatvaṁ sarvaśaktitvaṁ cha iti |

"Brahma is the source of the great S'āstra, consisting of the Rig-veda, etc., augmented by numerous branches of science, which, like a lamp, illuminates all subjects, and approaches to omniscience. Now such a S'āstra, distinguished as the Rig-veda, etc., possessed of the qualities of an omniscient being, could not have originated from any other than an omniscient being. When an extensive treatise on any subject is produced by any individual, as the works on Grammar, etc., were by Pāṇini and others,—even although the treatise in question have for its subject only a single department of what is to be known,—it is a

[104] See the quotation from the Vedārtha-prakāśa, at the top of p. 70, above. The æther (*ākāśa*) is uncreated according to the Vais'eshikas (Kaṇāda's Sutras, ii. 1, 28, with S'ankara Miśra's commentary, and S'ankara Āchāryya on Vedānta Sūtra, ii. 3, 3: *Na hy ākāśasya utpattiḥ sambhāvayituṁ śakyā śrīmat-Kaṇabhug-abhiprāyānusārishu jīvatsu* | "The production of the æther cannot be conceived as possible, so long as those who follow Kaṇāda's view retain their vitality"). The Vedānta Sūtras, ii. 3, 1-7, on the other hand, assert its production by Brahma, in conformity with the text of the Taittirīyakas which affirms this: *Tasmād vai etasmād ātmanaḥ ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ* | "From that Soul the æther was produced."

matter of notoriety that the author is possessed of still greater knowledge than is contained in his work.[105] What then need we say of the transcendent omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being from whom issued without effort, as an amusement, like a man's breathing (according to the Vedic text 'the Rig-veda is the breathing of that great Being'), that mine of universal knowledge called the Rig-veda, etc., which is divided into many śākhās, and which gave rise to the classes of gods, beasts, and men, with their castes and orders?"[106]

It is clear from the aphorism last quoted that there is a distinction between the doctrine of the Pūrva Mīmānsā, and the Uttara Mīmānsā, or Vedānta, regarding the origin of the Veda, in so far as the former is silent on the subject of its derivation from Brahma, which the latter asserts. It is also to be observed that Sāyaṇa understands the eternity of the Veda as laid down in the Brahma Sūtras in a qualified sense (as limited to the duration of the mundane period) and not as an absolute eternity.

I may remark that in their treatment of the Vedic passages which they cite, the practice of Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma Sūtras, and of his commentator, Sankara Āchāryya, corresponds to their theory of the infallibility of the sacred text. The doctrines inculcated in the Sūtras, and expounded and vindicated by the commentator, profess to be based on the Veda; and numerous texts are cited in their support. Such passages as coincide with the theories maintained in the Sūtras are understood in their proper or literal (*mukhya*) sense;

[105] Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Vedānta, p. 8) renders the last words thus: .... "that man, even in consideration of *that*, is inferred to be exceedingly knowing." Govinda Ānanda's note, however, confirms the rendering I have given. Part of it is as follows: *Yad yach chhāstram yasmād āptāt sambhavati sa tataḥ śāstrād adhikhārtha-jnānaḥ iti prasiddham* | "It is well known that the competent author from whom any treatise proceeds has a knowledge of more than that treatise (contains)." The idea here is somewhat similar to that in the second of Bishop Butler's Sermons "Upon the love of God": "Effects themselves, if we knew them thoroughly, would give us but imperfect notions of wisdom and power; much less of his Being in whom they reside." .... "This is no more than saying that the Creator is superior to the works of his hands."

[106] An alternative explanation of the aphorism is given by the commentator, according to which it would mean: "The body of Scripture, consisting of the Rig-veda, etc., is the source, the cause, the proof, whereby we ascertain exactly the nature of this Brahma" (*athavā yathoktam ṛigvedādi-śāstram yoniḥ kāraṇam pramāṇam asya Brahmaṇo yathāvat svarūpādhigame*).

whilst other texts which appear to be at variance with the Vedantic dogmas, and to favour those of the other philosophical schools, are explained as being merely figurative (*gauṇa* or *bhākta*); or other interpretations are given. See, for example, the Brahma sūtras, i. 1, 6; ii. 4, 2 f., etc., with S'ankara's comments. The supposition of any real inconsistency between the different statements of the sacred volume is never for a moment entertained.[107] As, however, the different authors of the Vedic hymns, of the Brāhmaṇas, and even of the Upanishads, gave free expression to their own vague and unsystematic ideas and speculations on the origin of all things, and the relation of the Deity to the universe, and recognized no fixed standard of orthodox doctrine to which they were bound to conform,—it was inevitable that they should propound a great variety of opinions which were mutually irreconcilable. But as, in later times, the Vedas came to be regarded as supernatural and infallible books, it was necessary that those systematic theologians who sought to deduce from their contents any consistent theory of being and of creation, should attempt to shew that the discrepancies between the different texts were only apparent.

SECT. IX.—*Arguments of the followers of the Nyāya, Vaiśeshika, and Sānkhya Systems in support of the authority of the Vedas, but against the eternity of sound.*

I. *The Nyāya.*—The eternity of sound is, as we have already discovered from the allusions of the Mīmānsaka commentator, (above p. 73), denied by the followers of the Nyāya school. The consideration of this subject is begun in the following way in the Nyāya aphorisms of Gotama, as explained by Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭāchārya in the Nyāya-sūtra-vṛitti, ii. 81:

[107] See S'ankara on the Br. Sūtras, iii. 31 (p. 844 of Bibl. Indica), where he says, *yadi punar ekasmin Brahmaṇi bahūni vijnānāni vedāntāntareshu pratipipādayishitāni teshām ekam abhrāntam bhrāntāni itarāṇi ity anaśvāsa-prasango vedānteshu tasmād na tāvat prativedāntam Brahma-vijnāna-bhedaḥ āśankitum śakyate* | "If, again, in the different Vedāntas (*i.e.* Upanishads) a variety of conceptions regarding the one Brahma be sought to be established, one of these (conceptions) will be correct, and the others erroneous, and thus the objection of being untrustworthy will attach to the Upanishads. It must not, therefore, be suspected that there is in each of the Upanishads a different conception of Brahma."

Vedasya prāmāṇyam āpta-prāmāṇyāt siddham | na cha idaṁ yujyate vedasya nityatvād ity āśankāyāṁ varṇānām anityatvāt kathaṁ tat-samudāya-rūpasya vedasya nityatvam ity āśayena śabdānityatva-prakaraṇam ārabhate | tatra siddhānta-sūṭram | "Ādimattvād aindriyakatvāt kṛitakatvād upachārāch cha" | 81. *S'abdo 'nityaḥ ityādiḥ | ādimattvāt sakāraṇakatvāt | nanu na sakāraṇakatvaṁ kaṇṭha-tālv-ādy-abhighātāder vyanjakatvenāpy upapatter ataḥ āha aindriyakatvād iti sāmānyavattve sati vahir-indriya-janya-laukikika-pratyaksha-vishayatvād ity arthaḥ | . . . . Aprayojakatvam āśankya āha kṛitaketi | kṛitake ghaṭādau yathā upachāro jnānaṁ tathaiva kāryyatva-prakāraka-pratyaksha-vishayatvād ity arthaḥ | tathā cha kāryatvena anāhāryya-sārvalaukika-pratyakshabalād anityatvam eva siddhati |*

"It has been proved (in the 68th Sūtra, see below) that 'the authority of the Veda follows from the authority of the competent person who made it.' But it may be objected that this is not a proper ground on which to base the authority of the Veda, since it is eternal. With the view of proving, in opposition to this, that since letters are not eternal, the Veda, which is a collection of letters, cannot be so either, the author of the Sūtras commences the section on the non-eternity of sound. The Sūtra laying down the established doctrine, is as follows: 'Sound cannot be eternal, as (1) it had an origin, as (2) it is cognizable by sense, and (3) it is spoken of as factitious.' Sound is non-eternal, etc., because (1) it had a beginning, *i.e.* because it had a cause. But it may be said that it had no cause, as, agreeably to the doctrine of the Mīmānsakas (see above, p. 74), the action of the throat and palate in pronunciation may merely occasion a manifestation of sound [without creating it]. In reply to this it is said (2) that sound is cognizable by sense, *i.e.* that though it belongs to a genus, it is an object of ordinary perception through an external sense." [A different explanation given by other interpreters is next quoted, which I omit.] . . . "Then surmising that the preceding definition may be regarded as not to the point, the author adds the words 'since it is spoken of as factitious,' *i.e.* as jars and other such objects are spoken of as—are known to be—products, so, too, sound is distinguishable by sense as being in the nature of a product. And in consequence of this incontrovertible and universal perception of its being produced, it is proved that it cannot be eternal." [Two other explanations of this last clause of the Sūtra are then added.]

Leaving the reader to study the details of the discussion in Dr. Ballantyne's aphorisms of the Nyāya (Part Second, pp. 77 ff.), I will pass over most of the Sūtras, and merely quote the principal conclusions of the Nyāya aphorist. In Sūtra 86 he says in opposition to the 13th Sūtra of the Mīmānsā (above, p. 74):

86. "*Prāg uchchāraṇād anupalambhād āvaraṇādy-anupalabdeḥ*" | *S'abdo yadi nityaḥ syād uchchāraṇāt prāg apy upalabhyeta śrotra-sannikarsha-sattvāt* | *na cha atra pratibandhakam asti ity āha āvaraṇeti āvaraṇādeḥ pratibandhakasya anupalabdhyā abhāva-nirṇayāt* | *deśāntara-gamanaṁ tu śabdasya amūrttatvād na sambhāvyate* | *atīndriyānanta-pratibandhakatva-kalpanām apekshya śabdānityatva-kalpanā eva laghīyasī iti bhāvaḥ* |

"'Sound is not eternal, because it is not perceived before it is uttered, and because we do not perceive anything which should intercept it.' If sound were eternal, it would be perceived even before it was uttered, from its being in contact with the ear. [Sound, as Dr. Ballantyne explains, is 'admitted to be a quality of the all-pervading æther.'] And in the next words the aphorist says that there is no obstacle to its being so heard, since the non-existence of any hindrance, such as an intercepting medium, is ascertained by our not perceiving anything of that sort. And it is not conceivable that sound should have gone to another place [and for that reason be inaudible], since it has no defined form. The supposition that sound is non-eternal, is simpler than the supposition that there are an infinity of imperceptible obstacles to its perception."

The 89th and 90th Sūtras, with part of the comments on them, are as follows:

89. "*Asparśatvāt*" | *śabdo nityaḥ* | *asparśatvād gagana-vad iti bhāvaḥ* | 90. "*Na karmānityatvāt*" *asparśvatvaṁ na śabda-nityatva-sādhakaṁ karmaṇi vyabhichārāt* |

89. "It may be said that sound is eternal, from its being, like the sky, intangible. 90. But this is no proof, for the intangibility of sound does not establish its eternity, since these two qualities do not always go together; for intangibility, though predicable, *e.g.* of action, fails to prove its eternity."

The 100th and following Sūtras are as follows:

100. "*Vināśa-kāraṇānupalabdheḥ*" | 101. "*Aśravaṇa-kāraṇānupalab-*

dheḥ satata-śravaṇa-prasangaḥ" | *Yady apratyakshād abhāva-siddhis tadā 'śravaṇa-kāraṇasya apratyakshatvād aśravaṇaṁ na syād iti satata-śravaṇa-prasangaḥ iti bhāvaḥ* | 102. "*Upalabhyamāne cha anupalabdher asattvād anapadeśaḥ"* | *Anumānādinā upalabhyamāne vināśa-kāraṇe anupalabdher abhāvāt tvadīyo hetur anapadeśaḥ asādhakaḥ asiddhatvāt* | *janya-bhāvatvena vināśa-kalpanam iti bhāvaḥ* |

"It is said (100) that 'sound must be eternal, because we perceive no cause why it should cease.' The answer is (101), first, 'that if the non-existence of any such cause of cessation were established by the mere fact of its not being perceived, such non-perception would occasion our hearing continually, which is an absurdity.' And (102), secondly, 'since such non-perception is not a fact, inasmuch as [a cause of the cessation of sound] is perceived, this argument falls to the ground.' Since a cause for the cessation of sound is discovered by inference, etc., and thus the non-perception of any cause is seen to be untrue, this argument of yours proves nothing, because its correctness is not established. The purport is that we suppose, from sound being produced, that it must also be liable to perish."

Sūtras 106–122 are occupied with a consideration of the question (above treated, pp. 73, 74, in Sūtras 10 and 16 of the Mīmānsā) whether letters can change or not. The conclusion at which Gotama arrives is, that the substance of letters cannot undergo any alteration, though they may be said to change when they are modified in quality by being lengthened, shortened, etc.

In a preceding part of the Second Book (Sūtras 57–68) Gotama treats of the Veda, and repels certain charges which are alleged against its authority. I shall quote most of these aphorisms, and cite the commentary more fully than Dr. Ballantyne has done. (See Ballantyne's Nyāya Aphorisms, Part ii. pp. 56 ff.)

S'abdasya drishṭādrishṭārthakatvena dvaividhyam uktaṁ tatra cha ādrishṭārthaka-śabdasya vedasya prāmāṇyam parīkshitum pūrva-pakshayati | 57. "*Tad-aprāmāṇyam anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ"* | *Tasya drishṭārthaka-vyatirikta-śabdasya vedasya aprāmāṇyam* | *kutaḥ* | *anṛitatvādi-doshāt* | *tatra cha putreshṭi-kāryādau kvachit phalānutpatti-darśanād anṛitatvam* | *vyāghātaḥ pūrvāpara-virodhaḥ* | *yathā "udite juhoti anudite juhoti samayādhyushite juhoti* | *śyāvo 'sya āhutim abhyavaharati ya udite juhoti śavalo 'sya āhutim abhyavaharati yo 'nudite juhoti*

śyāva-śavalāv asya āhutim abhyavaharato yaḥ samayādhyushite juhoti" atra cha uditādi-vākyānāṁ nindānumitānishṭa-sādhanatā-bodhaka-vākya-virodhaḥ | paunaruktyād aprāmāṇyam | Yathā "triḥ prathamām anvāha | trir uttamām anvāha" | ity atra uttamatvasya prathamatva-paryavasānāt triḥ kathanena cha paunaruktyam | eteshām aprāmāṇye tad-dṛishṭāntena tad-eka-karttṛikatvena tad-eka-jātīyatvena vā sarva-vedāprāmāṇyaṁ sādhanīyam iti bhāvaḥ | siddhānta-sūtram | 58. "Na karma-karttṛi-sādhana-vaiguṇyāt" | Na vedāprāmāṇyaṁ karma-karttṛi-sādhana-vaiguṇyāt phalābhāvopapatteḥ | karmaṇaḥ kriyāyāḥ vaiguṇyam ayathāvidhitvādi | karttur vaiguṇyam avidvattvādi | sādhanasya havir-āder vaiguṇyam āprokshitatvādi | Yathokta-karmaṇaḥ phalābhāve hy anṛitatvam | na cha evam asti iti bhāvaḥ | vyāghātam pariharati | 59. "Abhyupetya kāla-bhede dosha-vachanāt" | na vyāghātaḥ iti śeshaḥ | Agny-ādhāna-kāle uditahomādikam abhyupetya svīkṛitya anudita-homādi-karaṇe pūrvokta-dosha-kathanād na vyāghātaḥ ity arthaḥ | paunaruktyam pariharati | 60. "Anuvādopapatteś cha" | chaḥ punar-arthe | anuvādopapatteḥ punar na paunaruktyam | nishprayojanatve hi paunaruktyaṁ doshaḥ | ukta-sthale tv anuvādasya upapatteḥ prayojanasya sambhavāt | ekādaśa-sāmidhenīnām prathamottamayos trir abhidhāne hi panchadaśatvaṁ sambhavati | tathā-cha panchadaśatvaṁ śrūyate | "Imam aham bhrātṛivyam panchadaśāvareṇa vāg-vajreṇa cha bādhe yo 'smān dveshṭi yaṁ cha vayaṁ dvishmaḥ" iti | Anuvādasya sārthakatvaṁ loka-prasiddham iti āha | 61. "Vākya-vibhāgasya cha artha-grahaṇāt" | Vākya-vibhāgasya | anuvādatvena vibhakta-vākyasya artha-grahaṇāt prayojana-svīkārāt | śishṭair iti śeshaḥ | śishṭāḥ hi vidhāyakānuvādakādi-bhedena vākyaṁ vibhajya anuvādakasyāpi saprayojanatvam manyante | Vede 'py evam iti bhāvaḥ | . . . Evam aprāmāṇya-sādhakaṁ nirasya prāmāṇyaṁ sādhayati | 68. "Mantrāyurveda-vach cha tat-prāmāṇyam āpta-prāmāṇyāt" | Āptasya veda-karttuḥ prāmāṇyād yathārthopadeśakatvād vedasya tad-uktatvam arthāl labdham | tena hetunā vedasya prāmāṇyam anumeyam | tatra dṛishṭāntam āha mantrāyurveda-vad iti | mantro vishādi-nāśakaḥ | āyurveda-bhāgaś cha veda-sthaḥ eva | tatra saṁvādena prāmāṇya-grahāt tad-dṛishṭāntena vedatvāvachhedena prāmāṇyam anumeyam | āptaṁ gṛihītam prāmāṇyaṁ yatra sa vedas tādṛiśena vedatvena prāmāṇyam anumeyam iti kechit |

"It had been declared (Nyāya Sūtras, i. 8) that verbal evidence is of two kinds, (1) that of which the subject-matter is seen, and (2) that of which the subject-matter is unseen. With the view, now, of testing

the authority of that verbal evidence which refers to unseen things, viz. the Veda, Gotama states the first side of the question. Sūtra 57. 'The Veda has no authority, since it has the defects of falsehood, self-contradiction, and tautology.' That verbal evidence, which is distinct from such as relates to visible objects, *i.e.* the Veda, has no authority. Why? Because it has the defects of falsehood, etc. Of these defects, that of 'falsehood' is established by the fact that we sometimes observe that no fruit results from performing the sacrifice for a son, or the like. 'Self-contradiction' is a discrepancy between a former and a later declaration. Thus the Veda says, 'he sacrifices when the sun is risen; he sacrifices when the sun is not yet risen; he sacrifices' [I cannot explain the next words]. 'A tawny [dog?] carries away the oblation of him who sacrifices after the sun has risen; a brindled [dog?] carries off the oblation of him who sacrifices before the sun has risen; and both of these two carry off the oblation of him who sacrifices.' . . . . Now here there is a contradiction between the words which enjoin sacrifices, and the words which intimate by censure that those sacrifices will occasion disastrous results. Again, the Veda has no authority, owing to its 'tautology,' as where it is said, 'he repeats the first thrice, he repeats the last thrice.' For as the lastness ultimately coincides with [?] the firstness, and as there is a triple repetition of the words, this sentence is tautological. Now since these particular sentences have no authority, the entire Veda will be proved by these specimens to stand in the same predicament, since all its other parts have the same author, or are of the same character, as these portions."

Here follows the Sūtra which conveys the established doctrine. "58. 'The Veda is not false; it is owing to some fault in the ceremonial, or the performer, or the instrument he employs, that any sacrifice is not followed by the promised results.' Faults in the ceremonial are such as its not being according to rule. Faults in the performer are such as ignorance. Faults in the instrument, *i.e.* in the clarified butter, etc., are such as its not being duly sprinkled, etc. For falsehood might be charged on the Veda, if no fruit resulted from a sacrifice when duly performed as prescribed; but such failure never occurs."

Gotama next repels the charge of self-contradiction in the Vedas. "59. 'There is no self-contradiction, for the fault is only imputed in case the sacrifice should be performed at a different time from that

at first intended.' The fault imputed to these sacrifices in the text in question would [only] be imputed if, after agreeing, at the time of placing the sacrificial fire, to perform the sacrifice after sunrise, one were to change it to a sacrifice before sunrise; there is, therefore, no self-contradiction in the passage referred to."

He next rebuts the charge of tautology. "60. 'The Veda is not tautological because repetition may be proper.' The particle *cha* means 'again.' 'Again, since repetition may be proper, there is no tautology.' For repetition is only a fault when it is useless. But in the passage referred to, since repetition is proper, its utility is apparent. For when the first and the last of the eleven sāmidhenīs (forms of prayer used on throwing fuel into the fire) are each repeated thrice, the whole number of verses will be made up to fifteen.[108] Accordingly, this number of fifteen is mentioned in these words of the Veda, 'I smite this enemy who hates us, and whom we hate, with the last of the fifteen verses, and with the thunderbolt of my words.'"

He next observes that the advantage of repetition is commonly recognised. "61. 'And the Veda is not tautological, because the utility of this division of discourse is admitted,' *i.e.* because the necessity for such a division of language, that is, of a description of language characterized as reiterative, is acknowledged, viz. by the learned. For by dividing language into the different classes of injunctive, reiterative, etc., learned men recognise the uses of the reiterative also. And this applies to the Veda."

The author of the aphorisms then proceeds to state and to define (in Sūtras 62–67) the different sorts of discourse employed in the Veda, and to defend the propriety of reiteration. "Having thus refuted the arguments which aim at showing that the Veda is of no authority, he goes on to prove its authority. 68. 'The authority of the Veda, like that of the formulas, and the Āyur-veda (treatise on medicine) follows from the authority of the competent [persons from whom they proceeded].' Since the competent maker of the Veda possesses authority, *i.e.* inculcates truth, it results from the force of the terms that the Veda was uttered by a person of this character; and by this reasoning the au-

[108] If there are in all eleven formulas, and two of these are each repeated thrice, we have (2 × 3 =) six to add to the nine (which remain of the original eleven), making (6 + 9 =) fifteen. See Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 89 and 393.

thority of the Veda is to be inferred. He illustrates this by the case of the formulas and the Āyur-veda. By formulas (*mantra*) are meant the sentences which neutralize poison, etc., and the section containing the Āyur-veda forms part of the Veda. Now as the authority of these two classes of writings is admitted by general consent, the authority of everything which possesses the characteristics of the Veda must be inferred from this example. Some, however, explain the aphorism thus: a Veda is that in which authority is found or recognised. From such vedicity (or possession of the character of a Veda) the authority of any work is to be inferred."

I add the greater part of the more detailed and distinct exposition of this aphorism given by the commentator Vātsyāyana (Bibliotheca Indica, p. 91):[109]

Kim punar āyurvedasya prāmāṇyam | yad āyurvedena upadiśyate idaṁ kṛitvā ishṭam adhigachchhati idaṁ varjjayitvā 'nishṭaṁ jahāti tasya anushṭhīyamānasya tathā-bhāvaḥ satyārthatā-'viparyyayaḥ | mantra-padānāṁ cha visha-bhūtāśani-pratishedhārthānām prayoge 'rthasya tathā-bhāvaḥ etat prāmāṇyam | kiṁ-kṛitam etat | āpta-prāmāṇya-kṛitam | kim punar āptānām prāmāṇyam | sākshāt-kṛita-dharmatā bhūta-dayā yathā-bhūtārtha-chikhyāpayishā iti | āptāḥ khalu sākshāt-kṛita-dharmāṇah idaṁ hātavyam ayam asya hāni-hetur idam asya adhigantavyam ayam asya adhigamana-hetur iti bhūtāny anukampante | teshāṁ khalu vai prāṇa-bhṛitāṁ svayam anavabudhyamānānāṁ na anyad upadeśād avabodha-kāraṇam asti | na cha anavabodhe samīhā varjjanaṁ vā | na vā akṛitvā svasti-bhāvaḥ | nā 'py asya anyaḥ upakārako 'py asti | hanta vayam ebhyo yathā-darśanaṁ yathā-bhūtam upadiśāmaḥ | te ime śrutvā pratipadyamānāḥ heyaṁ hāsyanty adhigantavyam eva adhigamishyanti iti | evam āptopadeśaḥ etena tri-vidhena āpta-prāmāṇyena parigṛihīto 'nushṭhīyamāno 'rthasya sādhako bhavati | evam āptopadeśaḥ pramāṇam evam āptāḥ pramāṇam | dṛishṭārthena āptopadeśena āyurvedena adṛishṭārtho veda-bhāgo 'numātavyaḥ pramāṇam iti | āpta-prāmāṇyasya hetoḥ samānatvād iti | asya api cha eka-deśo "grāma-kāmo yajeta" ity evam-ādi-dṛishṭārthas tena anumātavyam iti | loke cha bhūyān upadeśāśrayo vyavahāraḥ | laukikasya apy upadeshṭur upadesṭavyārtha-jnānena parānujighṛikshayā yathā-bhūtārtha-chikhyāpayishayā cha prāmāṇyam | tat-pari-

[109] A small portion of this comment, borrowed from Professor Banerjea's Dialogues on Hindu philosophy, was given in the 1st edition of this vol. p. 210.

grahād āptopadeśah pramāṇam iti | drashṭṛi-pravaktṛi-sāmānyāch cha anumānam ye eva āptāḥ vedārthānām drashṭāraḥ pravaktāraś cha te eva āyurveda-prabhṛitīnām | ity āyurveda-prāmāṇya-vad veda-prāmāṇyam anumātavyam iti | nityatvād veda-vākhyānām pramāṇatve tat-prāmāṇyam āpta-prāmāṇyād ity ayuktam | śabdasya vāchakatvād artha-pratipattau pramāṇatvaṁ na nityatvāt | nityatve hi sarvasya sarveṇa vachanāch chhabdārtha-vyavasthā 'nupapattiḥ | na anityatve vāchakatvam iti chet | na | laukikeshv adarśanāt | te 'pi nityāḥ iti chet | na | anāptopadeśād artha-visaṁvādo 'nupapannaḥ | . . . . Manvantara-yugāntareshu cha atītānāgateshu sampradāyābhyāsa-prayogāvichhedo vedānāṁ nityatvam āpta-prāmāṇyāch cha prāmāṇyam | laukikeshu śabdeshu cha etat samānam |

"On what then does the authority of the Āyur-veda depend? The Āyur-veda instructs us that to do so and so, is the means of attaining what is desirable, and to avoid so and so is the means of escaping what is undesirable: and the fact of such action having been followed by the promised result coincides with the supposition that the book declares what is true. So, too, the authority of the formulæ for neutralizing poison, repelling demons, and arresting lightning, is shewn by their application fulfilling its object. How is this result obtained? By the authoritativeness of competent persons. But what is meant by the authoritativeness of competent persons? It means their intuitive perception of duty, their benevolence to all creatures, and their desire to declare the truth of things. Competent persons are those who have an intuitive perception of duty; and they shew their benevolence to all creatures by pointing out that so and so is to be avoided, and that such and such are the means of avoiding it, and that so and so is to be attained, and that such and such are the means of attaining it. 'For these creatures,' they reflect, 'being themselves unaware of such things, have no other means of learning them except such instruction; and in the absence of information they can make no effort either to attain or avoid anything; whilst without such action their welfare is not secured; and there is no one else who can help in this case: come let us instruct them according to the intuition we possess, and in conformity with the reality; and they hearing, and comprehending, will avoid what should be avoided, and obtain what should be obtained.' Thus the instruction afforded by competent persons according to this threefold character of their authoritativeness [viz. (1) intuition, (2)

benevolence, and (3) desire to teach], being received, and acted upon, effects the object desired. And so the instruction given by competent persons is authority, and these competent persons are authorities. From the Āyur-veda, which conveys instruction given by competent persons in reference to objects perceptible by the senses, it is to be inferred that that part also of the Veda which is concerned with imperceptible objects[110] is authoritative, since the cause, the authoritativeness of competent persons, is the same in both cases; and the same inference is to be drawn from the fact that a portion of the injunctions of the last mentioned part of the Veda also have reference to perceptible objects, as in the case of the precept, 'Let the man who desires landed property sacrifice,' etc., etc. In common life, too, men usually rely upon instruction. And the authority of an ordinary instructor depends (1) upon his knowledge of the matter to be taught, (2) upon his disposition to shew kindness to others, and (3) upon his desire to declare the truth. From its being accepted, the instruction imparted by competent persons constitutes proof. And from the fact that the seers and declarers are the same in both cases, viz. that the competent seers and declarers of the contents of the (rest of the) Veda are the very same as those of the Āyur-veda, etc., we must infer that the authoritativeness of the former is like that of the latter. But on the hypothesis that the authority of the Vedic injunctions is derived from their eternity, it will be improper to say that it arises from the authoritativeness of competent persons, since the authority of words as exponents of meanings springs from their declarative character, and not from their eternity. For on the supposition of the eternity of words, every (word) would express every (thing), which would be contrary to the fixity of their signification. If it be objected that unless words are eternal, they cannot be declarative, we deny this, as it is not witnessed in the case of secular words. If it be urged again that secular words also are eternal, we must again demur, since the discrepancy of purport arising from the injunctions of incompetent persons would be at variance with this." After some further argumentation Vātsyāyana concludes: "The eternity of the Vedas [really] consists in the unbroken continuity of their tradition, study, and application, both in the Manvantaras and

[110] Compare the commentator's remarks introductory to the Nyāya aphorism ii. 57, quoted above, p. 112.

Yugas which are past, and those which are to come; whilst their authority arises from the authoritativeness of the competent persons (who uttered them). And this is common to them with secular words."

The phrase *sākshāt-kṛita-dharmāṇaḥ*, "possessing an intuitive perception of duty," which is employed by Vātsyāyana in the preceding extract as a definition of *āptāḥ*, "competent persons," is one which had previously been applied by Yāska (Nirukta, i. 20) to describe the character of the rishis: *Sākshāt-kṛita-dharmāṇaḥ ṛishayo babhūvuḥ | te 'varebhyo 'sākshāt-kṛita-dharmabhyaḥ upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ | upadeśāya glāyanto 'vare bilma-grahaṇāya imaṁ granthaṁ samāmnāsishur vedaṁ cha vedāngāni cha* | "The rishis, who had an intuitive perception of duty, handed down the hymns by (oral) instruction to men of later ages, who had not that intuitive perception. These, declining in their power of giving instruction, compiled this work (the Nirukta), the Veda, and the Vedāngas, in order to facilitate the comprehension of details."

The Vaiśeshika.—Among the aphorisms of this system also there are some which, in opposition to the Mīmānsakas, assert, 1st, that the Vedas are the product of an intelligent mind; and 2nd (if the interpretation of the commentator is to be received) that they have been uttered by God.

The second aphorism of the first section of the first book is as follows:

Yato 'bhyudaya-niśśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ |

"Righteousness is that through which happiness and future perfection[112] are attained."

After explaining this the commentator proceeds to introduce the next aphorism by the following remarks:

Nanu nivṛitti-lakshaṇo dharmas tattva-jnāna-dvārā niśśreyasa-hetur ity

[111] Of the aphorisms, which I am about to quote, the first has been translated by Dr. Ballantyne (who published a small portion of these Sūtras with an English version in 1851); and it, as well as the others, is briefly commented upon by the Rev. Prof. Banerjea, in his Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, pp. 474 ff., and Pref. p. ix., note. See my article in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. xx. for 1862, entitled "Does the Vaiśeshika philosophy acknowledge a Deity or not?" from which the translations now given have been transferred with but little alteration and a few additions. And compare Dr. Roer's German translation of the Vaiśeshika aphorisms in the Journal of the German Oriental Society for 1867, pp. 309 ff.

[112] The Commentator explains *abhyudaya* as = *tattva-jnānam*, "a knowledge of the reality," and *niśśreyasa* as *ātyantikī duḥkha-nivṛittiḥ*, "the complete cessation of suffering."

attra śrutiḥ pramāṇam | śruter eva prāmāṇye vayaṁ vipratipadyāmahe "anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ" | . . . . na cha āmnāya-pratipādakaṁ kinchid asti nityatve viprattipattau | nitya-nirdoshatvam api sandigdham | paurusheyatve tu bhrama-pramāda-vipratipatti-karaṇāpāṭavādi-sambhāvanayā āptoktatvam api sandigdham eva iti na niśśreyasaṁ na vā tattra tattva-jnānaṁ dvāraṁ na vā dharmaḥ iti sarvam etad ākulam | ataḥ āha "tad-vachanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam" | "tad" ity anupakrāntam api prasiddhi-siddhatayā īśvaram parāmṛiśati | yathā "tad-aprāmāṇyam anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ" iti Gautamīya-sūtre tach-chhabdena anupakrānto 'pi vedaḥ parāmṛiśyate | tathā cha tad-vachanāt tena īśvareṇa praṇayanād āmnāyāsya vedasya prāmāṇyam | yadvā "tad" iti sannihitaṁ dharmam eva parāmṛiśati | tathā cha dharmasya "vachanāt" pratipādanād "āmnāyasya" vedasya prāmāṇyam | yad hi vākyam prāmāṇikam artham pratipādayati tat pramāṇam eva yataḥ ity arthaḥ | īśvaras tad-āptatvaṁ cha sādhayishyate |

"But may it not be objected here that it is the Veda which proves that righteousness, in the form of abstinence from action, is, by means of the knowledge of absolute truth, the cause of future perfection; but that we dispute the authority of the Veda because it is chargeable with the faults of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology[113] . . . . And further, there is nothing to prove the authority of the Veda, for its eternity is disputed, its eternal faultlessness is doubted, and if it have a personal author, the fact of this person being a competent utterer is questioned, since there is an apprehension of error, inadvertence, contradiction, and want of skill in composition attaching to him. Thus there is neither any such thing as future perfection, nor is either a knowledge of absolute truth the instrument thereof, or righteousness. Thus everything is perplexed."

In answer to all this the author of the aphorism says:

"The authority of the sacred record arises from its being uttered by Him."

"Here," says the commentator, "the word *tad* (His) refers to Īśvara (God); as, though no mention of Him has yet been introduced, He is proved by common notoriety to be meant; just as in the aphorism of Gautama: 'Its want of authority is shown by the faults of falsehood,

[113] Here the same illustrations are given as in the commentary on the Nyāya aphorisms, quoted above, pp. 113 ff.

contradiction, and tautology,' the Veda, though not previously introduced, is intended by the word *tad*.[114] And so [the meaning of the aphorism is that] the authority of the sacred record, *i.e.* the Veda, is proved by its being spoken by Him, composed by Him, by Īśvara. Or, *tad* (its)[114] may denote *dharma* (duty) which immediately precedes; and then [the sense will be that] the authority of the sacred record, *i.e.* the Veda, arises from its declaring, *i.e.* establishing, duty, for the text which establishes any authoritative matter must be itself an authority. The proof of Īśvara and his competence will be hereafter stated." The commentator then goes on to answer the charges of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology alleged against the Veda.

The next aphorism which I shall quote (vi. 1, 1) is thus introduced by the commentator:

Buddhi-pūrvā vākya-kṛitir vede | saṁsāra-mūla-kāraṇayor dharmādharmayoḥ parīkshā shashṭhādhyāyārthaḥ | dharmādharmau cha "svarga-kāmo yajeta" "na kalanjam bhakshayed". ityādi-vidhi-nishedha-bala-kalpanīyau vidhi-nishedha-vākyayoḥ prāmāṇye sati syātām | tat-prāmāṇyaṁ cha vaktur yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnāna-lakshaṇa-guṇa-pūrvakatvād upapadyate | svataḥ prāmāṇyasya nishedhāt | ataḥ prathamaṁ veda-prāmāṇya-prayojaka-guṇa-sādhanaṁ upakramate | "vākya-kṛitir" vākya-rachanā | sā buddhi-pūrvā vaktṛi-yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnāna-pūrvā | vākya-rachanātvāt | "nadī-tīre pancha phalāni santi" ity asmad-ādi-vākya-rachanā-vat | "vede" iti vākya-samudāye ity arthaḥ | tattra samudāyināṁ vākyānāṁ kṛitiḥ pakshaḥ | na cha asmad-ādi-buddhi-pūrvaka-

[114] For the sake of the reader who does not know Sanskrit, it may be mentioned that *tad* being in the crude, or uninflected form, may denote any of the three genders, and may be rendered either 'his,' 'hers,' or 'its.' I may observe that the alternative explanation which the commentator gives of the Aphorism, i. 1, 3, viz. that the authority of the Veda arises from its being declarative of duty, is a much less probable one than the other, that its authority is derived from its being the utterance of God; for it does not clearly appear how the subject of a book can establish its authority; and, in fact, the commentator, when he states this interpretation, is obliged, in order to give it the least appearance of plausibility, to assume the authoritative character of the precepts in the Veda, and from this assumption to infer the authority of the book which delivers them. I may also observe that Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapanchānana, the author of the Gloss on S'ankara Miśra's Commentary, takes no notice of this alternative interpretation; and that in his comment on the same aphorism when repeated at the close of the work (x. 2, 9) S'ankara Miśra himself does not put it forward a second time. Dr. Roer (Journ. Germ. Or. Soc. for 1867, p. 310) argues in favour of the former of the two interpretations as the true one.

tvena anyathā-siddhiḥ | "*svarga-kāmo yajeta*" *ityādāv ishṭa-sādhana-tāyāḥ kāryyatāyāḥ vā asmad-ādi-buddhy-agocharatvāt* | *tena svatantra-purusha-pūrvakatvaṁ vede siddhyati* | *vedatvaṁ cha śabda-tad-upajīvi-pramāṇātirikta-pramāṇa-janya-pramity-avishayārthakatve sati śabda-janya-vākyārtha-jnānājanya-pramāṇa-śabdatvam* |

"An examination of righteousness and unrighteousness, which are the original causes of the world,[115] forms the subject of the 6th section. Now, righteousness and unrighteousness are to be constituted by virtue of such injunctions and prohibitions as these: 'The man who desires paradise should sacrifice,' 'Let no one eat garlic,' etc., provided these injunctions and prohibitions be authoritative. And this authoritativeness depends upon the fact of the utterer [of these injunctions or prohibitions] possessing the quality of understanding the correct meaning of sentences, for the supposition of inherent authoritativeness is untenable. The author, therefore, first of all enters upon the proof of that quality which gives rise to the authoritativeness of the Veda.

"Aphorism vi. 1. 1.—'There is in the Veda a construction of sentences which is produced (*lit.* preceded) by intelligence.'"

"The 'construction of sentences,' the composition of sentences, 'is produced by intelligence,' *i.e.* by a knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences on the part of the utterer [of them]; [and this is proved] by the fact of these sentences possessing an arrangement like the arrangement of such sentences as 'There are five fruits on the river side,' composed by such persons as ourselves. 'In the Veda,' *i.e.* in the collection of sentences (so called). Here the construction of the sentences composing the collection is the subject of the proposition which is asserted. And this construction must not be ascribed to a wrong cause by assuming that it was the work of a [limited] intelligence such as ours. [Because it was not a limited intelligence which produced these sentences]. For it is not an object of apprehension to the understandings of persons like ourselves that such injunctions as, 'He who desires paradise should sacrifice,' are the instruments of obtaining what we desire, or that they are obligatory in themselves. Hence in the case of the Veda the agency of a self-dependent person is

[115] This, I suppose, means that the existence of the world in its present or developed form, is necessary in order to furnish the means of rewarding righteousness and punishing unrighteousness.

established [since these matters could be known by such a person alone.] And while the contents of the Veda are not the subjects of a knowledge produced by any proof distinct from verbal proof and the proofs dependent thereon, Vedicity, or the characteristic nature of the Veda, consists in its being composed of (authoritative) words, whose authority does not spring from a knowledge of the meaning of sentences arising from words [but depends on the underived omniscience of its author]." "Or, Vedicity consists in being one or other of the four collections, the Rich, Yajush, Sāman, or Atharvan."[116]

I will introduce the next aphorism (x. 2, 9) which I propose to cite (and which is a repetition of aphorism i. 1, 3), by adducing some remarks of the commentator on the one which immediately precedes it, viz. x. 2, 8:

Nanu śruti-prāmāṇye sati syād evam | tad eva tu durlabham | na hi mīmāṁsakānām iva nitya-nirdoshatvena śruti-prāmāṇyaṁ tvayā ishyate paurusheyatvenābhyupagamāt purushasya cha bhrama-pramāda-vipralipsādi-sambhavāt | ataḥ āha "drishṭābhāve" iti | drishṭam purushāntare 'smad-ādau bhrama-pramāda- [viprati?] lipsādikaṁ purusha-dūshaṇaṁ tad-abhāve sati ity arthaḥ | kshiti-karttritvena veda-vaktritvena vā 'numitasya purusha-dhaureyasya nirdoshatvena eva upasthiteḥ | tathā cha tad-vachasāṁ na nirabhidheyatā na viparītābhidheyatā na nishprayojanābhidheyatā | bhūtendriya-manasāṁ doshād bhrama-pramāda-kārānāpāṭavādi-prayuktāḥ eva vachasām aviśuddhayaḥ sambhāvyante | na cha īśvara-vachasi tāsāṁ sambhavaḥ | tad uktam "rāgājnānādibhir vaktā grastatvād anritaṁ vadet | te cheśvare na vidyante sa brūyāt katham anyathā" | nanu tena īśvareṇa vedaḥ praṇītaḥ ity atra eva vipratipattir ataḥ āha | "tad-vachanāt āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam" | iti śāstra-parisamāptau "tad-vachanāt" tena īśvareṇa vachanāt praṇayanād "āmnāyasya" vedasya prāmāṇyam | tathā hi | vedās tāvat paurusheyāḥ vākyatvād iti sādhitam | na cha asmad-ādayas teshāṁ sahasra - śākhāvachchhinnānāṁ vaktāraḥ sambhāvyante atīndriyārthatvāt | na cha atīndriyārtha-darśino 'smad-ādayaḥ | kincha āptoktāḥ vedāḥ mahājana-parigrihītatvāt | yad na āptoktaṁ na tad mahājana-parigrihītaṁ | mahājana-parigrihītaṁ cha idam | tasmād āptoktam | sva-tantra-purusha-praṇītatvaṁ cha āptoktatvam | mahājana-parigrihītatvaṁ cha sarva-darśanāntaḥpāti-purushānushṭhīyamānārthatvam | kvachit phalābhāvaḥ karma-karttri-sādhana-vaiguṇyād

[116] The last words are a translation of the conclusion of Jayanārāyaṇa's gloss.

ity uktam | *karttṛi-smaraṇābhavād na evam iti chet* | *na* | *karttṛi-smaraṇasya pūrvam eva sādhitatvāt* | *tat-praṇītatvaṁ cha sva-tantra-purusha-praṇītatvād eva siddham* | *na tv asmad-ādīnāṁ sahasra-śākha-veda-praṇayane svātantryaṁ sambhavati ity uktatvāt* | *kincha pramāyāḥ guṇa-janyatvena vaidika-pramāyāh api guṇa-janyatvam āvaśyakam* | *tattra cha guṇo vaktṛi-yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnānam eva vāchyaḥ* | *tathā cha tādṛiśaḥ eva vede vaktā yaḥ svargāpūrvādi-vishayaka-sākshātkāravān* | *tādṛiśaś cha na īśvarād anyaḥ iti sushṭhu* |

"Now all this will be so, provided the Veda is authoritative: but this condition is the very one which is difficult to attain; for you do not hold, like the Mīmānsakas, that the authority of the Veda arises from its eternal faultlessness; since you admit that it has a personal author, and error, inadvertence, and a desire to deceive are incident to such a person. It is with a view to this objection that the writer says in his aphorism, 'In the absence of what is seen,' *i.e.* in the absence of those personal faults which are seen in other persons like ourselves,[117] such as error, inadvertence, and a desire to deceive: for the Supreme Person who is inferred from the creation of the world, or the authorship of the Veda, can only exist in a state of freedom from fault; and, consequently, neither want of meaning, nor contradiction of meaning, nor uselessness of meaning, can be predicated of his words. Incorrectnesses in words are to be apprehended as the results of error, inadvertence, or unskilfulness in composition, arising from some defect in the elements, the senses, or the mind. But none of these things is to be imagined in the word of Īśvara (the Lord). And this has been expressed in the following verse: 'A speaker may utter falsehood, from being possessed by affection, ignorance, and the like; but these [defects] do not exist in God; how then can he speak what is otherwise [than true]?'

"But may not the fact that the Veda is composed by God be disputed? In consequence of this, the author says (in the next aphorism):

x. 2, 9. 'The authority of the Vedic record arises from its being uttered by Him.'

[117] A different interpretation is given by the commentator to this phrase *dṛishṭābhāve*, in an earlier aphorism in which it occurs, viz. vi. 2, 1. He there understands it to mean that where there is no visible motive for a prescribed action, an invisible one must be presumed (*yattra dṛishṭam prayojanaṁ nopalabhyate tattra adṛishṭam prayojanaṁ kalpanīyam*).

"Thus at the end of his treatise [the writer lays it down that] the authority of the Veda is derived from its being His word, viz. from its being spoken, *i.e.* composed by Him, *i.e.* by Īśvara. As thus: The Vedas are derived from a person, because they are formed of sentences. This has been proved. And persons like ourselves cannot be conceived as the utterers of these Vedas, which are distinguished by having thousands of S'ākhās (recensions), because their objects are such as lie beyond the reach of the senses; and persons like us have no intuition into anything beyond the reach of the senses. Further, the Vedas [are not only derived from a personal author, but they] have been uttered by a competent author (*āpta*), because they have been embraced by great men. Whatever has not been uttered by a competent person is not embraced by great men: but this (book) is embraced by great men: therefore it has been uttered by a competent person. Now, composition by a self-dependent person is utterance by a competent person; and the reception (of the Veda) by great men is the observance of its contents by persons who are adherents of all the different philosophical schools: and (the infallibility of the Veda is defended by that which) has been already said, viz. that any occasional failure in the results (of ceremonies prescribed in the Veda) is owing to some defect in the rite, or in the performer, or in the instruments employed [and not to any fallibility in the Veda].

"If it be objected to this reasoning, that no author (of the Veda) is recollected, we rejoin, that this is not true, because it has been formerly proved that the author is remembered. And that it was composed by Him is proved by the simple fact of its being composed by a self-dependent person; and because it has been said that the self-dependence [or unassisted ability] of people like us in the composition of the Veda, consisting, as it does, of a thousand S'ākhās, is inconceivable. And since authority (in a writing in general) springs from a quality [in its author], it necessarily follows that the authority of the Veda also springs from a quality. And there the quality in question must be declared to be the speaker's knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences. And thus (we have shewn that) there is such an utterer of the Veda, who possesses an intuitive knowledge of paradise, and of the yet unseen consequences of actions, etc., and such an utterer is no other than Īśvara. Thus all is satisfactory."

The ultimate proofs, then, of the binding authority of the Veda are, according to the commentator, 1st, its extent and subject-matter, and 2ndly, its unanimous reception by great men, adherents of all the different orthodox systems. Of course these arguments have no validity except for those who see something supernatural in the Veda, and on the assumption that the great men who embraced it were infallible; and therefore as against the Bauddhas and other heretics who saw nothing miraculous in the Vedas, and consequently regarded all their adherents as in error, they were utterly worthless. But possibly it was not the object of the commentator (for the greater part of the argumentation is his, not that of the author of the Aphorisms) to state the ultimate reasons on which the authority of the Vedas would have to be vindicated against heretics, but merely to explain the proper grounds on which the orthodox schools who already acknowledged that authority ought to regard it as resting; *i.e.* not, as the Mīmānsakas held their eternal faultlessness, but the fact of their being uttered by an intelligent and omniscient author; whose authorship, again, was proved by the contents of the Vedas having reference to unseen and future matters of which only an omniscient Being could have any knowledge; while the fact of these revelations in regard to unseen things having actually proceeded from such a Being, and being therefore true, was guaranteed by the unanimous authority of the wisest men among the faithful.

As it is a matter of some interest to know what is the nature of inspiration, or supernatural knowledge, as conceived by the Vaiśeshikas, I shall quote some passages bearing on this subject from the aphorisms, or from their expounder, Sankara Miśra. In his remarks on Aphorism viii. 1, 2 (p. 357), the commentator states that opinion (*jnāna*) is of two kinds, true (*vidyā*) and false (*avidyā*); and that the former (*vidyā*) is of two descriptions, arising from perception, inference, recollection, and the infallible intuition "peculiar to rishis" (*Tach cha jnānam dvividham vidyā cha avidyā cha | vidyā chaturvidhā pratyaksha-laingika-smṛity-ārsha-lakshaṇā*). Perception or intuition, again, is of different kinds or degrees (Aphorism ix. 1, 11–15, pp. 385 ff.). Aphorism ix. 1, 11 (p. 386), is as follows:

Tad evam bhāvābhāva-vishayakam laukika-pratyaksham nirūpya yogi-pratyaksham nirūpayitum prakaraṇāntaram ārabhate | ix. 1, 11. "*Ātmany ātma-manasoḥ samyoga-viśeshād ātma-pratyaksham*" | *jnānam ut-*

padyate iti śeshaḥ | dvividhās tāvad yoginaḥ samāhitāntaḥkaraṇāḥ ye "yuktāḥ" ity abhidhīyante asamāhitāntaḥkaraṇāś cha ye "viyuktāḥ" ity abhidhīyante | tattra yuktāḥ sākshātkartavye vastuny ādareṇa mano nidhāya nididhyāsanavantaḥ | teshām ātmani svātmani parātmani cha jnānam utpadyate | "ātma-pratyaksham" iti | ātmā sākshātkāra-vishayo yattra jnāne tat tathā | yadyapy asmad-ādīnām api kadāchid ātma-jnānam asti tathāpy avidyā-tiraskṛitatvāt tad asat-kalpam ity uktam | "ātma-manasos sannikarsha-viśeshād" iti yoga-ja-dharmānugrahaḥ ātma-manasoḥ sannikarsha-viśeshas tasmād ity arthaḥ |

"Having thus defined ordinary perception which has for its objects existence and non-existence, the author, with the view of determining the character of the intuition of yogins, says: 'From a particular concentration of both the soul and the mind [118] on the soul, arises the perception (or intuition) of soul.' On this the commentator remarks: 'There are two kinds of *yogins* (intent, or contemplative, persons), (1) those whose inner sense is fixed *samāhitāntaḥkaraṇāḥ*), who are called (*yuktāḥ*) united (*i.e.* with the object of contemplation), and (2) those whose inner sense is no longer fixed, and who are called disunited (*viyuktāḥ*).[119] Of these the first class, who are called 'united,' fix their minds with reverence on the thing which is to be the object of intuition, and contemplate it intently. In this way knowledge arises in their souls regarding their own souls, and the souls of others. 'Intuition of soul,' that is, a knowledge in which soul is the perceptible object of intuition. Now, although persons like ourselves have sometimes a knowledge of soul, yet from this knowledge being affected by ignorance, it has been said to be like what is unreal. 'From a particular concentration of the soul and the mind;' that is, from a particular conjunction of the soul and the mind which is effected by means of the virtue derived from yoga." See also Aphorism xv. p. 390.

At the conclusion of his remarks (Bibl. Ind. p. 408) on the third sort of true knowledge (referred to in p. 357, Bibl. Ind.), viz. recollection, the commentator remarks that the author of the aphorisms does not make any separate mention of the fourth kind of knowlege, viz. infallible intuition:

[118] The "mind" (*manas*) is regarded by the Indian philosophers as distinct from the soul, and as being merely an internal organ.

[119] This class is the more perfect of the two, as appears from the gloss of Jayanārāyaṇa: *ayam api viśishṭa-yogavattvād viyuktaḥ ity uchyate.*

ix. 2, 6. . . . . *Ārshaṁ jnānam sūtra-kṛitā pṛithaṅ na lakshitam | yogi-pratyakshāntarbhāvitam | padārtha-pradeśākhye tu prakaraṇe tad uktam | tad yathā | " āmnāya-vidhātṛīṇām ṛishīṇām atītānāgata-vartamāneshv atīndriyārtheshv artheshu dharmādishu granthopanibaddheshu vā lingādy-anapekshād ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād dharma-viśeshāch cha prātibhaṁ jnānaṁ yad utpadyate tad ārshaṁ iti | tach cha kadāchil laukikānām api bhavati yathā kanyakā vadati " śvo me bhrātā gantā iti hṛidayam me kathayati " iti |*

"Rishis' (*ārsha*) knowledge," he says, "is not separately defined by the author of the aphorisms, but is included in the intuition of *yogins*.[120] But the following statement has been made (in reference to it) in the section on the categories: 'Rishis' (*ārsha*) knowledge is that which, owing to a conjunction of the soul and the mind, independent of inference, etc., and owing to a particular species of virtue, illuminates those rishis who have composed the record of the Vedas (*āmnāya-vidhātṛīṇām*), in reference to such matters, whether past, future, or present, as are beyond the reach of the senses, or in reference to matters of duty, etc., recorded in books,' etc. And this sort of knowledge is also sometimes manifested by ordinary persons, as when a girl says, 'my heart tells me that my brother will go to-morrow.'" See also Aphorism ix. 2, 13 (Bibl. Ind. pp. 414, 415).

The Tarka-sangraha, another Vaiśeshika work, also affirms the divine authorship of the Veda in these words:[121] *Vākyaṁ dvividhaṁ laukikaṁ vaidikaṁ cha | vaidikam Īśvaroktatvāt sarvam eva pramāṇam laukikaṁ tu āptoktam pramāṇam anyad apramāṇam |* "Sentences are of two kinds, Vedic and secular. Vedic sentences, from being uttered by Īśvara, are all proof [or authoritative]. Of secular sentences, those only which are uttered by competent persons (*āpta*) are proof; the rest are not proof."

In this text, the authority of the Veda is founded on its being uttered by Īśvara; and this characteristic is regarded as limited to the Veda.

120 It had been already noticed by Professor Max Müller in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vii. p. 311, that "the Vaiśeshikas, like Kapila, include the intuition of enlightened rishis under the head of *pratyaksha* (intuition), and thus separate it decidedly from *aitihya*, 'tradition.'" He also quotes the commentator's remark about a similar intuition being discoverable among ordinary persons, which he thinks is not "without a certain irony."

121 See Dr. Ballantyne's ed. with Hindī and English Versions, p. 40 of the Sanskrit.

On the other hand, such secular works as proceed from competent persons (*āpta*) are also declared to possess authority. Here, therefore, a distinction is drawn between the authority of the Veda and that of all other writings, however authoritative, inasmuch as the former was uttered by Īśvara, while the latter have only been uttered by some competent person (*āpta*). But in the Nyāya aphorism, ii. 68, quoted and commented upon above (p. 114), the authority of the Veda itself is made to rest on the authority of the wise, or competent persons (*āpta*), from whom it proceeded.[122] In this aphorism, therefore, either the word "āpta" must mean "Īśvara," or we must suppose a difference of view between the author of the aphorism on the one hand, and the writers of the Vaiśeshika aphorisms and the Tarka-sangraha on the other. We shall see from the next extract that the Kusumānjali coincides with the latter.

I quote from the work just named (of which Udayana Āchārya is the author), and its commentary,[123] some statements of the doctrine maintained by the author regarding the origin and authority of the Veda. Mr. Colebrooke (Misc. Ess. i. 263, or p. 166 of Williams and Norgate's ed.) speaks of this treatise as being accompanied by a commentary of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha; but the one which is printed in the Calcutta edition, as well as in Professor Cowell's, is by Haridāsa Bhaṭṭāchārya. The object of the work is to prove the existence of a personal god (Īśvara), in opposition to various other antagonistic theories.

I. Kusumānjali, 2nd Stavaka, at the commencement: *Anyathā 'pi paraloka-sādhanānushṭhāna-sambhavād iti dvitīya-vipratipattiḥ* | *Anyathā Īśvaraṁ vinā 'pi paraloka-sādhana-yāgādy-anushṭhānaṁ sambhavati yāgādeḥ svarga-sādhanatvasya veda-gamyatvāt* | *nitya-nirdoshatayā cha vedasya prāmāṇyam* | *mahājana-parigrahāch cha prāmāṇyasya grahaḥ iti veda-kāraṇatayā na Īśvara-siddhiḥ* | *yogardhi-sampādita-sārvajnya-Kapi-*

[122] The following words are put by the author of the Vishṇu Purāṇa (iii. ch. 18; Wilson, vol. iii. p. 212) into the mouth of the deluder who promulgated the Bauddha and other heresies: *Na hy āpta-vādāḥ nabhaso nipatanti mahāsurāḥ* | *yuktimad vachanaṁ grāhyam mayā 'nyaiś cha bhavad-vidhaiḥ* | "Words of the competent do not, great Asuras, fall from the sky. It is only words supported by reasons that should be admitted by me and others like yourselves."

[123] This book was published at the Sanskrit Press, Calcutta, in the S'aka year, 1769. A new edition was published by Professor Cowell in 1864, accompanied by an English translation. I have availed myself of this excellent version to correct a good many mistakes in my own.

lādi-pūrvakaḥ eva vā vedo 'stv ity atra āha | "*pramāyāḥ paratantratvāt sarga-pralaya-sambhavāt* | *tad-anyasminn aviśvāsād na vidhāntara-sambhavaḥ*" | *S'ābdī pramā vaktṛi-yathārtha-vakyārtha-dhī-rūpa-guṇa-janyā iti guṇādhāratayā Īśvara-siddhiḥ* | *nanu sakartṛike 'stu yathārtha-vākyārtha-dhīr guṇaḥ* | *akartṛike cha vede nirdoshatvam eva prāmāṇya-prayojakam astu mahājana-parigraheṇa cha prāmāṇya-grahaḥ ity ata āha* | "*sarga-pralaya-sambhavād*" *iti* | *pralayottaram pūrva-veda-nāśād uttara-vedasya katham prāmāṇyam mahājana-parigrahasyāpi tadā abhāvāt* | *śabdasya anityatvam utpanno ga-kāraḥ iti pratīti-siddham* | *pravāhāvichchheda-rūpa-nityatvam api pralaya-sambhavād nāsti iti bhāvaḥ* | *Kapilādayaḥ eva sargādau pūrva-sargābhyasta-yoga-janya-dharmānubhavāt sākshāt-kṛita-sakalārthāḥ karttāraḥ santu* | *ity ata āha* | "*tad-anyasminn*" *iti* | *viśva-nirmāṇa-samarthāḥ aṇimādi-śakti-sampannāḥ yadi sarvajnās tadā lāghavād eka eva tādṛiśaḥ svīkriyatām* | *sa eva bhagavān Īśvaraḥ* | *anityāsarva-vishayaka-jnānavati cha viśvāsaḥ eva nāsti* | *iti vaidika-vyavahāra-vilopaḥ* | *iti na vidhāntara-sambhavaḥ Īśvarānangīkartṛi-naye iti śeshaḥ* |

"The second objection is that [there is no proof of an Īśvara], since the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of any such Being. That is to say, the celebration of sacrifices, etc., which are the instruments of obtaining paradise, can take place otherwise, *i.e.* even without an Īśvara (God). For the fact that sacrifices, etc., are the instruments of obtaining paradise is to be learned from the Veda, while the authority of the Veda rests upon its eternal faultlessness; and the [immemorial] admission of that authority results from its reception by illustrious men. Now in this way there is no proof of the existence of a God to be derived from the idea that he is the cause of the Veda. Or let it be supposed that the Veda was preceded [composed] by Kapila and other sages, who by their wealth in devotion had acquired omniscience.

"In answer to all this the author says: [verse] 'Since truth depends on an external source, since creation and dissolution occur, and since there is no confidence in any other than God, therefore no other manner can be conceived [in which the Veda originated, except from God].' [Comment] Verbal truth [or authoritativeness] is derived from the attribute, possessed by its promulgator, of comprehending the true sense of words [*i.e.* in order to constitute the Veda an authoritative

rule of duty, it must have proceeded from an intelligent being who understood the sense of what he uttered]; and since God is the substratum of this attribute [of intelligence], there is proof of his existence.

"But it may be said that if the Veda had a maker, then, indeed, such comprehension of the true sense of words as you insist upon may be a quality belonging to him; but if the Veda had no maker, let it be its faultlessness which imparts to it its authority, while the [immemorial] admission of that authority results from its reception by illustrious men.

"In answer to this the author says: 'Since creation and dissolution occur.' Since the previous Veda [the one which existed during the former mundane period] perished after the dissolution of the universe, how can the subsequent Veda [*i.e.* the one supposed by our opponents to have existed during the dissolution] be authoritative, since there was not then even any reception of it by illustrious men [who also had all become extinct at the dissolution]. And further, the non-eternity of sound is proved by the conviction we have that letters such as G are produced, [and not eternal]: and even that eternity (or perpetuity) of the Veda which consists in unbroken continuity of tradition, does not exist, as there is probable proof of a dissolution.[124] But, again, it is urged that Kapila and other saints—who, from their perception of duty, springing from the practice of devotion during the former mundane period, had acquired an intuitive knowledge of every subject—may at the creation have been the authors of the Veda. This is answered in the words, 'since there is no confidence in any other but God.' If persons capable of creating the universe and possessing the faculty of minuteness be omniscient, then, for the sake of simplicity, let one such person only be admitted, namely, the divine Īśvara.[125] And no confidence can be reposed in any person who is not eternal, and who is not possessed of a knowledge which extends to all objects. Thus the Vedic tradition disappears. And so he concludes that no other manner [of the origination of the Veda] can be conceived [except

[124] The writers on the other side seem to reply to this Naiyāyika objection about the interruption of the tradition of the Veda through the dissolution of the universe, by saying that the Veda was retained in the memory of Brahmā or the Rishis during the interval while the dissolution lasted. See Kullūka on Manu, i. 23, above, p. 6; and the passage of Kaiyyaṭa on the Mahābhāshya, above, p. 96.

[125] "The law of parsimony bids us assume only one such," etc.—Cowell.

from Īśvara]; that is, in the system of those who deny an Īśvara [no way is pointed out]."

II. Kusumānjali, iii. 16.—"*Na pramāṇam anāptoktir nādṛishṭe kvachid āptatā | adṛiśya-dṛishṭau sarvajno na cha nityāgamaḥ kshamaḥ*" | *ayaṁ hi sarva-kartṛitvābhāvāvedakaḥ śabdaḥ anāptoktaś ched na pramāṇam | āptoktaś ched etad-artha-gochara-jnānavato nitya-sarva-vishayaka-jnānavattvam indriyādy-abhāvāt | āgamasya cha nityatvaṁ dūshitam eva prāg iti veda-kāro nityaḥ sarvajnaḥ siddhyati |*

[Verse] "The word of an incompetent person is not authoritative; nor can there be any competency in regard to a thing unseen [by the speaker]. To perceive invisible things, a person must be omniscient; and an eternal scripture is impossible. [Comment] This [supposed] scriptural testimony, denying the fact of there being a creator of all things, if uttered by an incompetent person, would be no proof. If it was uttered by a competent person, then the person who possessed an acquaintance with this circumstance [that there was no creator] would be master of a knowledge which was eternal, and universal in its range, since he would not be limited by any bodily organs. And we have previously disproved the eternity of any scripture (see the first extract from the Kusumānjali, above). Consequently an omniscient and eternal author of the Veda is established."

III. Kusumānjali, v. 1.—"*Käryyāyojana-dhṛityādeḥ padāt pratyayataḥ śruteḥ | vākyāt sankhyā-viśeshāch cha sādhyo viśvavid avyayaḥ*" | . . . *Pratyayataḥ prāmāṇyāt | veda-janya-jnānaṁ kāraṇa-guṇa-janyam pramātvāt | pratyakshādi-pramā-vat | śruter vedāt | vedaḥ paurusheyo vedatvād āyurveda-vat | kincha vedaḥ paurusheyo vākyatvād bhāratādi-vat | veda-vākyāni paurusheyāṇi vākyatvād asmad-ādi-vākya-vat |*

[Verse] "An omniscient and indestructible Being is to be proved from [the existence of] effects, from the conjunction of [atoms], from the support [of the earth in the sky], etc., from ordinary usages, from belief [in revelation], from the Veda, from sentences, and from particular numbers."

The following is so much of the comment as refers to the words *pratyaya*, *śruti*, and *vākya*: "From belief, *i.e.* from authoritativeness. The knowledge derived from the Veda is derived from the attributes of its Cause; since it is true knowledge, like the true knowledge derived from perception. From the śruti, *i.e.* the Veda. The Veda is [shewn

to be] derived from a person, by its having the characters of a Veda, like the Āyur-veda. It is also [shewn to be] derived from a person, by having the character of sentences, like the Mahābhārata. The words of the Veda are [shewn to be] derived from a person, by their having the character of sentences, like the sentences of persons such as ourselves."

IV. Kusumānjali, v. 16.—"*Syām*" "*abhūvam*" "*bhavishyāmī*" '*tyādau sankhyā pravaktṛi-gā* | *samākhyā 'pi cha śākhānām nādya-pravachanād ṛite* | *Vaidikottama-purushena svatantrochchārayituḥ sankhyā vāchyā* | "*tad aikshata eko 'ham bahu syām*" *ityādi-bahushu uttama-purusha-śruteḥ* | *sankhyā-padārtham anyam āha* "*samākhyā*" *ityādi* | *sarvāsām śākhānam hi Kāṭhaka-Kālāpakādyāḥ samākhyāḥ sanjnā-viśeshāḥ śrūyante* | *te cha na adhyayana-mātra-nibandhanāḥ* | *adhyetṛīṇām ānantyāt* | *ādāv anyair api tad-adhyayanāt* | *tasmād atīndriyārtha-darśī bhagavān eva Īśvaraḥ kāruṇikaḥ sargādāv asmad-ādy-adṛishṭākṛishta-kāṭhakādi-śarīra-viśesham adhishṭhāya yām śākhām uktavāms tasyāḥ śākhāyās tannāmnā vyapadeśaḥ iti siddham Īśvara-mananam moksha-hetuḥ* |

[Verse] "In the phrases 'let me be,' 'I was,' 'I shall be,' [which occur in the Veda], personal designations have reference to a speaker; and the names of the S'ākhās could only have been derived from a primeval utterance. [Comment] The first person (I), when it occurs in the Veda, must be employed to denote a self-dependent utterer. Now there are many instances there of such a use of the first person, as in the words, 'It reflected, I am one, let me become many.' The author then specifies another signification of the term *sankhyā* in the clause, 'and the designations,' etc. For all the S'ākhās of the Veda traditionally bear the names, the special names, of Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, etc. And these names cannot be connected with the mere study [of these S'ākhās by Kaṭha, Kalāpa, etc.] from the infinite multitude of students, since they must have been studied before by others besides the persons just mentioned. Wherefore the particular S'ākhās which Īśvara, the beholder of objects beyond the reach of the senses, the compassionate Lord, himself uttered at the beginning of the creation, when he assumed the bodies of Kaṭha, etc., which were drawn on by the destiny (*adṛishṭa*) of beings like ourselves—these S'ākhās, I say, were designated by the names of the particular sages [in whose persons they were promulgated]. And so it is proved that the contemplation of Īśvara is the cause of final liberation."

I am unable to say if the ancient doctrine of the Nyāya was theistic, as that of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras (at least as interpreted by S'ankara Miśra) appears to be, and as that of the Kusumānjali, the Tarka-sangraha,[126] and the Siddhānta Muktāvali undoubtedly is (p. 6 of Dr. Ballantyne's ed., or p. 12 of his "Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy," and p. 13 of Dr. Röer's Bhāshā-parichchheda, in Bibl. Ind.). The remarks of Dr. Röer on the subject, in pp. xv., xvi., of the introduction to the last named work, may be consulted. The subject is also discussed by Professor Banerjea in his work on Hindu philosophy, pp. 144–153. The solution of the question may depend much on the interpretation to be given to the aphorisms of Gotama, 19–21 of the fourth book.

III. *The Sānkhya.*—The opinions of the author of the Sānkhya aphorisms in regard to the authority of the Veda and the principles on which that authority depends, are contained in the 45th to the 51st aphorisms of the Fifth Book, which I extract with the comments of Vijnāna Bhikshu:[127]

45. "*Na nityatvaṁ Vedānāṁ kāryatva-śruteḥ*" | "*Sa tapo 'tapyata tasmāt tapas tepānāt trayo vedā ajāyanta*" *ity ādi-śruter vedānāṁ na nityatvam ity arthaḥ* | *veda-nityatā-vākyāni cha sajātīyānupūrvī-pravāhānuchchheda-parāṇi* | *Tarhi kim paurusheyāḥ vedāḥ* | *na ity āha* | 46. "*Na paurusheyatvaṁ tat-kartuḥ purushasya abhāvāt*" | *īśvara-pratishedād iti śeshaḥ* | *sugamam* | *aparaḥ karttā bhavatv ity ākānkshāyām āha* | 47. "*Muktāmuktayor ayogyatvāt*" | *Jīvan-mukta-dhurīṇo Vishṇur viśuddha-sattvatayā niratiśaya-sarvajno 'pi vīta-rāgatvāt sahasra-śākha-veda-nirmāṇāyogyaḥ* | *amuktas tv asarvajnatvād eva ayogyaḥ ity arthaḥ* | *nanv evam apaurusheyatvād nityatvam eva āgatam* | *tatrāha* | 48. "*Na apaurusheyatvād nityatvam ankurādi-vat*" | *Spashṭam* | *nanv ankurādishv api kāryatvena ghaṭādi-vat purusheyatvam anumeyam* | *tatrāha* | 49. "*Teshām api tad-yoge drishṭa-bādhādi-prasaktiḥ*" | *Yat paurusheyaṁ tach chha-*

[126] *Jnānādhikaraṇam ātmā* | *sa dvividho jīvātmā paramātmā cha* | *tatra Īśvaraḥ sarvajnaḥ paramātmā eka eva* | *jīvātmā prati śarīram bhinno vibhur nityaścha* | "The substratum of knowledge is soul. It is of two kinds, the embodied soul, and the supreme soul. Of these the supreme soul is the omniscient Īs'vara, one only. The embodied soul is distinct in each body, all-pervading, and eternal."

[127] Compare Dr. Ballantyne's translation of the Sānkhya Aphorisms, books v. and vi., published at Mirzapore in 1856, pp. 26 ff., as well as that which subsequently appeared in the Bibliotheca Indica (in 1865), pp. 127 ff.

rīra-janyam iti vyāptir loke drishṭā tasyāḥ bādhādir evam sati syād iti arthaḥ | nanv Ādi-purushochcharitatvād Vedāḥ api paurusheyāḥ eva ity āha | 50. "*Yasmin adrishṭe'pi krita-buddhir upajāyate tat paurusheyam*" | *Drishṭe iva adrishṭe 'pi yasmin vastuni krita-buddhir buddhi-pūrvakatva-buddhir jāyate tad eva paurusheyam iti vyavahriyate ity arthaḥ | etad uktam bhavati | na purushochcharitatā-mātreṇa paurusheyatvaṁ śvāsa-praśvāsayoḥ sushupti-kālīnayoḥ paurusheyatva-vyavahārābhāvāt kintu buddhi-pūrvakatvena | Vedās tu niḥśvāsa-vad eva adrishṭa-vaśād abuddhi-pūrvakāḥ eva Svayambhuvaḥ sakāśāt svayam bhavanti | ato na te paurusheyāḥ | tathā cha śrutiḥ* "*tasyaitasya mahato bhūtasya niśvasitam etad yad rigvedo ity ādir*" *iti | nanv evam yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnānāpūrvakatvāt śuka-vākyasyeva vedānām api prāmāṇyaṁ na syāt tatrāha* | 51. "*Nija-śakty-abhvyakteḥ svataḥ prāmāṇyam*" | *Vedānām nijā svābhāvikī yā yathārtha-jnāna-janana-śaktis tasyāḥ mantrāyurvedādāv abhivyakter upalambhād akhila-vedānām eva svataḥ eva prāmāṇyaṁ siddhyati na vaktri-yathārtha-jnāna-mūlakatvādinā ity arthaḥ | tathā cha Nyāya-sūtram* | "*mantrāyurveda-prāmāṇya-vach cha tat-prāmāṇyam*" *iti* |

"Sūtra 45. 'Eternity cannot be predicated of the Vedas, since various texts in these books themselves declare them to have been produced.' The sense is this, that the Vedas are proved not to be eternal by such texts as the following: 'He performed austerity; from him, when he had thus performed austerity, the three Vedas were produced.' [See above, p. 4.] Those other texts which assert the eternity [or perpetuity] of the Vedas refer merely to the unbroken continuity of the stream of homogeneous succession [or tradition]. Are the Vedas, then, derived from any personal author? 'No,' he replies in Sūtra 46. 'The Vedas are not derived from any personal author (*paurusheya*), since there is no person to make them.' We must supply the words, 'since an *Īśvara* (God) is denied.' The sense is easy. In answer to the supposition that there may be some other maker, he remarks, Sūtra 47, 'No; for there could be no fit maker, either liberated or unliberated.' Vishṇu, the chief of all those beings who are liberated even while they live,[128] although, from the pure goodness of his nature, he is possessed of perfect omniscience, would, owing to his impassiveness, be unfit to compose the Veda consisting of a thousand śākhās (branches),

[128] See Colebrooke's Essays, i. 369, or p. 241 of Williams and Norgate's ed.

while any unliberated person would be unfit for the task from want of omniscience. (See Śankara's comment on Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3; above, p. 106.) But does not, then, the eternity of the Vedas follow from their having no personal author? He replies (48), 'Their eternity does not result from their having no personal author, as in the case of sprouts, etc.' This is clear. But is it not to be inferred that sprouts, etc., since they are products, have, like jars, etc., some personal maker? He replies (49), 'If such a supposition be applied to these (sprouts, etc.) it must there also be exposed to the objection that it is contrary to what we see, etc.' Whatever is derived from a personal author is produced from a body; this is a rule which is seen to hold invariably. But if we assert that sprouts are derived from a personal author, we contradict the rule in question, [since they evidently did not spring from any embodied person].' But are not the Vedas, too, derived from a person, seeing that they were uttered by the primeval Purusha? He answers (50), 'That object only (even though it be an invisible one), which its maker is conscious of having made, can be said to be derived from [or made by] such a person.' It is only those objects, be they seen or unseen, in regard to which a consciousness of design arises, that are ordinarily spoken of as made by a person. The sense is, that it is not mere utterance by a person which constitutes formation by that person (since we do not ordinarily speak of the inspirations and expirations of any person during the time of sleep, as being formed by that person), but only utterance with conscious design. But the Vedas proceed of their own accord from Svayambhū (the self-existent), like an expiration, by the force of *adṛishṭa* (destiny), without any consciousness on his part. Hence they are not formed by any person. Thus the Veda says, 'This Rig-veda, etc., is the breath of this great Being, etc.' [See above, p. 8.] But will not the Vedas, also, be in this way destitute of authority, like the chatter of a parrot, since they did not result from any knowledge of the correct meaning of the words of which they are made up? In reference to this, he says (51), 'The Vedas have a self-proving authority, since they reveal their own inherent power.' The self-evidencing authority of the entire Vedas is established by the perception of a manifestation in certain portions of them, viz. in the formulas and the Āyur-veda, etc., of that inherent power which they (the Vedas) possess of generating correct knowledge, and does not depend on

its being shown that they (the Vedas) are founded on correct knowledge in their utterer,[129] or on any other ground of that sort. And to this effect is the Nyāya Sūtra, that 'their authority is like the authority of the formulas and the Āyur-veda.' (See above, p. 114.)

In reference to the 46th Sūtra I add here the 98th aphorism of the 1st book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed:

Nanu chet sadā sarvajnaḥ īśvaro nāsti tarhi vedānta-mahāvākyārthasya vivekasya upadeśe 'ndha-paramparāśankayā aprāmāṇyam prasajyeta | tattra āha | 98. *Siddha-rūpa-boddhṛitvād vākyārthopadeśaḥ* | *Hiraṇyagarbhādīnāṁ siddha-rupāṇāṁ*[130] *yathārthārthasya boddhṛitvāt tad-vaktṛikāyurvedādi-prāmāṇyena avadhṛitāch cha eshāṁ vākyārthopadeśaḥ pramāṇam iti śeshaḥ* |

"But may it not be said that if there be no eternally omniscient Īśvara, the charge of want of authority will attach to the inculcation of discriminative knowledge which is the subjeet of the great texts of the Upanishads, from the doubt lest these texts may have been handed down by a blind tradition. To this he replies: 86. 'From the fact that beings perfect in their nature understood them, it results that we have an (authoritative) inculcation of the sense.' As Hiraṇyagarbha (Brahmā) and other beings who were perfect in their nature understood the true sense, and are ascertained to have done so by the authoritativeness of the Āyur-veda, etc., which they uttered, their inculcation of the sense of the texts is authority;—such is the complete meaning of the aphorism."

In the 57th and following Sūtras of the fifth book, Kapila denies that sound has the character of *sphoṭa*, or that letters are eternal:

57. "*Pratīty-apratītibhyāṁ na sphoṭātmakaḥ śabdaḥ*" | *Pratyeka-varṇebhyo 'tiriktaṁ kalaśaḥ ityādi-rūpam akhaṇḍam eka-padam sphotaḥ iti yogair abhyupagamyate* | *kambu-grīvādy-avayavebhyo 'tirikto ghaṭādy-avayavīva* | *sa cha śabda-viśesho padākhyo 'rtha-sphuṭīkaraṇāt sphoṭaḥ ity uchyate* | *sa śabdo 'prāmāṇikaḥ* | *kutaḥ* | "*pratīty-apratītibhyām*" | *sa śabdaḥ kim pratīyate na vā* | *ādye yena varṇa-samudāyena ānupurvī-*

[129] This directly contradicts the doctrine enunciated in the Vaiśeshika Sūtras and the Kusumānjali. See above, pp. 121, 123, and 129 f.

[130] This is a various reading given by Dr. Hall in the appendix to his edition of the Sānkhya-pravachana-bhāshya; and I have adopted it in preference to *siddha-rūpasya* which he gives in his text, as the former seems to afford a better sense.

viśesha-viśishṭena so 'bhivyajyate tasya eva artha-pratyāyakatvam astu | *kim antargaḍunā tena* | *antye tv ajnāta-sphoṭasya nāsty artha-pratyāyana-śaktir iti vyarthā sphoṭa-kalpanā ity arthaḥ* | *Pūrvaṁ vedānāṁ nityatvam pratishiddham* | *idanīṁ varṇa-nityatvam api pratishedati* | 58. "*Na śabda-nityatvaṁ kāryatā-pratīteḥ*" | *Sa eva ayaṁ ga-kāraḥ ityādi-pratyabhijnā-balād varṇa-nityatvaṁ na yuktam* | *utpanno ga-kāraḥ ityādi-pratyayena anityatva-siddher ity arthaḥ* | *pratyabhijnā taj-jātīyatā-vishayiṇī* | *anyathā ghaṭāder api pratyabhijnāyāḥ nityatāpatter iti* | *śankate* | 59. "*Pūrva-siddha-sattvasya abhivyaktir dīpeneva ghaṭasya*" | *Nanu pūrva-siddha-sattākasyaiva śabdasya dhvany-ādibhir yā 'bhivyaktis tan-mātram utpattiḥ pratīter vishayaḥ* | *abhivyaktau dṛishṭānto dīpeneva ghaṭasya iti* | *Pariharati* | 60. "*Sat-kāryya-siddhāntaś chet siddha-sādhanam*" | *Abhivyaktir yady anāgatāvasthā-tyāgena varttamānāvasthā-lābhaḥ ity uchyate tadā sat-kāryya-siddhāntaḥ* | *tādṛiśa-nityatvaṁ cha sarva-kāryāṇām eva iti siddha-sādhanam ity arthaḥ* | *yadi cha varttamānatayā sataḥ eva jnāna-mātra-rūpiṇy abhivyaktir uchyate tadā ghaṭādīnām api nityatvāpattir ityādi* |

"'Sound has not the character of *sphoṭa*, from the dilemma that the latter must be either apparent or not apparent.' A modification of sound called *sphoṭa*, single, indivisible, distinct from individual letters, existing in the form of words like *kalaśa* (jar), distinguished also from parts of words like *kambu-grīva* (striped-neck) and forming a whole like the word *ghaṭa* (jar), is assumed by the Yogas. And this species of sound called a word (*pada*) is designated *sphoṭa* from its manifesting a meaning. But the existence of this form of sound is destitute of proof. Why? 'From the dilemma that it must be either apparent or not apparent.' Does this form of sound appear or not? If it appears, then let the power of disclosing a meaning [which is ascribed by our opponents to *sphoṭa*] be regarded as belonging to that collection of letters, arranged in a particular order, by which the supposed *sphoṭa* is manifested. What necessity is there then for that superfluous *sphoṭa*? If, on the contrary, it does not appear, then that unknown *sphoṭa* can have no power of disclosing a meaning, and consequently it is useless to suppose that any such thing as *sphoṭa* exists.

"The eternity of the Vedas has been already denied. He now denies the eternity of letters also. 58. 'Sound is not eternal, since it is clear that it is a production.' The meaning is, that it is not reasonable to

infer on the strength of the recognition of the letter G as the same that we knew before (see Mīmānsā Aphorisms i. 13; above, p. 74), that letters are eternal; since it is clear that G and other letters are produced, and therefore cannot be eternal. The recognition of these letters has reference to their being of the same species as we have perceived before; since otherwise we are landed in the absurdity that, because we recognize a jar or any other such object to be the same, it must therefore be eternal.

"He expresses a doubt: 59. 'What we hear may be merely the manifestation of a previously existing thing, as a jar is manifested (not created) by the light of a lamp.' (See Mīmānsa Aphorisms i. 12, 13; above, p. 74.) Is it not the fact that it is merely the manifestation of previously existing language by sounds, etc., which we perceive as originating? An illustration of such manifestation is that of a jar by means of a lamp.

"He repels this doubt: 60. 'If the axiom that an effect exists in its cause be here intended, this is merely proving what is already admitted.' If by manifestation is meant the relinquishment by any substance of its past (?) condition, and the attainment of its present state, then we have merely the recognized principle of an effect virtually existing in its cause (see Sānkhya Kārika Aph. ix.); and as such eternity is truly predicable of all effects whatever, it is proving a thing already proved to assert it here. If, on the other hand, by manifestation be merely meant the perception of a thing actually existing, then we shall be involved in the absurdity of admitting that jars, etc., also are eternal, etc."

SECT. X.—*On the use which the authors of the different Darśanas make of Vedic texts, and the mode of interpretation which they adopt.*

I have already (in p. 107) touched on the mode of interpretation applied by the author of the Brahma Sūtras, or his commentator S'ankara Āchāryya, to the Vedic texts, derived chiefly from the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads, on which the Vedāntic doctrines are based, or by which they are defended, or with which, at least, they are asserted to be consistent. It will, however, be interesting to enquire a little more in detail into the extent to which the Indian scriptures are appealed to, and the manner in which they are treated by the authors or expounders of the different

Darśanas. The object proposed by the Pūrva-mīmānsā is an enquiry into duty (*dharma-jijnāsā*—Aph. i.). Duty is defined as something enjoined by the Veda (*chodanā-lakshaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ*—Aph. ii.); and which cannot be ascertained to be duty except through such injunction.[131] The first six lectures of the Mīmānsā, according to Mr. Colebrooke, "treat of positive injunction;" the remaining six concern "indirect command." "The authority of enjoined duty is the topic of the first lecture: its differences and varieties, its parts, ... and the purpose of performance, are successively considered in the three next. . . . The order of performance occupies the fifth lecture; and qualification for its performance is treated in the sixth. The subject of indirect precept is opened in the seventh lecture generally, and in the eighth particularly. Inferable changes, adapting to the variation or copy what was designed for the type or model, are discussed in the ninth, and bars or exceptions in the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh lecture; and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth." . . . . "Other matters are introduced by the way, being suggested by the main topic or its exceptions" (Misc. Essays, i. 304 f.). It appears, therefore, that the general aim of the Pūrva-mīmānsā is (1) to prove the authority of the Veda, and then to (2) deduce from it the duties, whether enjoined directly or indirectly, which are to be performed, the manner and conditions of their performance, and their results. It is also termed the Karma-mīmānsā, "as relating to works or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends" (Colebrooke, i. 296, 325).

The Brahma-mīmānsā, or Vedānta, is, according to the same author, the complement of the Karma-mīmānsā, and "is termed *uttara*, later, contrasted with *pūrva*, prior, being the investigation of proof deducible from the Vedas in regard to *theology*, as the other is in regard to *works* and their merit. The two together, then, comprise the complete system of interpretation of the precepts and doctrine of the Vedas, both practical and theological. They are parts of one whole. The later Mīmānsā is supplementary to the prior, and is expressly affirmed to be so: but differing on many important points, though agreeing on others, they are essentially distinct in a religious as well as a philosophical view" (Misc. Ess. i. 325). In fact the Brahma-mīmānsā proceeds upon a depreciation of the value of the objects aimed at by the Karma-mīmānsā,

[131] See Ballantyne's Mīmānsā aphorisms, p. 7.

since the rewards which the latter holds out even in a future state are but of temporary duration; and according to Sankara it is not even necessary that the seeker after a knowledge of Brahma should first have studied the Karma-mīmānsā before he conceives the desire to enter upon the higher enquiry (*nanv iha karmāvabodhānantaryyaṁ viśeshaḥ | na | dharma-jijnāsāyāḥ prāg apy adhīta-vedāntasya Brahma-jijnāsopapatteḥ*). (Sankara on Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 1, p. 25 of Bibl. Ind.) This is distinctly expressed in the following passage, p. 28:

Tasmāt kim api vaktavyam yad-anantaram Brahma-jijnāsā upadiśyate iti | uchyate | nityānitya-vastu-vivekaḥ ihāmutrārtha-phala-bhoga-virāgaḥ śama-damādi-sādhana-sampad mumukshatvaṁ cha | teshu hi satsu prāg api dharma-jijnāsāyāḥ ūrddhvaṁ cha śakyate Brahma jijnāsayituṁ jnātuṁ cha na viparyyaye | tasmād "atha" śabdena yathokta-sādhana-sampatty-ānantaryyam upadiśyate | "ataḥ" śabdo hetv-arthaḥ | yasmād vedaḥ eva agnihotrādīnāṁ śreyas-sādhanānām anitya-phalatāṁ darśayati "tad yathā iha karma-chito lokaḥ kshīyate evam eva amuttra puṇya-chito lokaḥ kshīyate" ity-ādi | tathā Brahma-vijnānād api param purushārthaṁ darśayati Brahma-vid āpnoti param" ity-ādi | tasmād yathokta-sādhana-sampatty-anantaram Brahma-jijnāsā kartavyā |

The author is explaining the word *atha* 'now,' or 'next,' with which the first Sūtra begins; and is enquiring what it is that is referred to as a preliminary to the enquiry regarding Brahma: "What, then, are we to say that that is after which the desire to know Brahma is enjoined?' The answer is, 'it is the discrimination between eternal and non-eternal substance, indifference to the enjoyment of rewards either in this world or the next, the acquisition of the means of tranquillity and self-restraint, and the desire for final liberation. For if these requisites be present, a knowledge of Brahma can be desired, and Brahma can be known, even before, as well as after, an enquiry has been instituted into duty. But the converse does not hold good (*i.e.* without the requisites referred to, though a man may have a knowledge of duty, *i.e.* of ceremonial observances, he possesses no preparation for desiring to know Brahma). Hence by the word *atha* it is enjoined that the desire in question should follow the possession of those requisites.' The next word *ataḥ*, 'hence,' denotes the reason. Because the Veda itself,—by employing such words as these, 'Wherefore just as in this life the world which has been gained by works

perishes, so too in a future life the world gained by merit perishes'—points out that the rewards of the agnihotra sacrifice and other instruments of attaining happiness are but temporary. And by such texts as this, 'He who knows Brahma attains the highest exaltation,' the Veda further shews that the highest end of man is acquired by the knowledge of Brahma. Hence the desire to know Brahma is to be entertained after the acquisition of the means which have been already referred to."

In the Mīmānsā Sūtras, i. 1, 5, as we have seen above (p. 71), Bādarāyaṇa, the reputed author of the Brahma Sūtras, is referred to as concurring in the doctrine there laid down. But in many parts of the Brahma Sūtras, the opinions of Jaimini are expressly controverted, both on grounds of reason and scripture, as at variance with those of Bādarāyaṇa.[132]

I adduce some instances of this difference of opinion between the two schools:

We have seen above, p. 99, that according to the Brahma Sūtras the gods possess the prerogative (*adhikāra*) of acquiring divine science. This, however, is contested by Jaimini (see Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 31), who objects (1) that in that case (as all divine sciences possess the characteristic of being science) the gods would also have the prerogative of becoming adepts in the science called Madhuvidyā, etc., which would be absurd, because the sun (Āditya), being the virtual object of worship in the ritual connected with that science, could not be worshipped by another sun, who, according to the supposition, would be one of the deities skilled in it, and one of the worshippers. Similar difficulties are furnished by other cases, as, for instance, that on the hypothesis referred to, the Vasus, Rudras, and three other classes of gods, would be at once the objects to be known and the knowers. In the next Sūtra the further objection is made (2) that the celestial luminaries, commonly called gods, are in reality destitute of sensation and desire; and on this ground also the prerogative in question is denied to the supposed deities. Bādarāyaṇa replies in the 33rd Sūtra (1) that although

[132] Dr. Ballantyne refers to the Mīmānsakas as being the objectors alluded to by S'ankara in his remarks which introduce and follow Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 4; but as Jaimini is not expressly mentioned there, I shall not quote this text in proof of my assertion. See Ballantyne's Aphorisms of the Vedānta, p. 12.

the gods cannot concern themselves with such branches of knowledge as the Madhuvidyā, with which they themselves are mixed up, yet they do possess the prerogative of acquiring pure divine science, as that depends on the desire and capacity for it, and the non-existence of any obstacle to its acquisition (*tathāpy asti hi śuddhāyām brahma-vidyāyām sambhavo 'rthitva-sāmarthyāpratishedhādy-apekshatvād adhikārasya*). An exception in regard to a particular class of cases cannot, he urges, set aside a rule which otherwise holds good; for if it did, the circumstance that the generality of men belonging to the three highest castes are excluded from the performance of particular rites, such as the Rājasūya, would have the effect of rendering them incapable of performing any sacrifice whatever. And he goes on to cite several Vedic texts which prove that the gods have both the capacity and the desire for divine knowledge. Thus: *Tad yo yo devānām pratyabudhyata sa eva tad abhavat tathā ṛishīnām tathā manushyāṇām* | "Whosoever, whether of gods, rishis, or men, perceived That, he became That." Again: *Te ha ūchur "hanta tam ātmānam anvichhāmo yam ātmānam anvishya sarvān lokān āpnoti sarvāṁś cha kāmān" iti* | *Indro ha vai devānām abhi pravavrāja Virochano 'surāṇām iti* | "They said, 'come, we shall enquire after that Soul, after investigating which, one obtains all worlds, and all objects of desire.' Accordingly Indra among the gods, and Virochana among the Asuras, set out" ("to go to Prajāpati the bestower of divine knowledge," according to Govinda Ānanda). And in reply to the second objection, Śankara maintains that the sun and other celestial luminaries are each of them embodied deities possessed of intelligence and power; an assertion which he proceeds to prove from texts both of the Veda and the Smṛiti. He then replies to a remark of the Mīmānsakas, referred to under Sūtra 32, that allusions in the Vedic mantras and arthavādas (illustrative passages) cannot prove the corporeality of the gods, as these texts have another object in view: and his reply is that it is the evidence, or the want of evidence, derivable from any texts which occasions us to believe or disbelieve in the existence of anything; and not the circumstance that such a text was or was not primarily intended to prove that particular point. The Mīmānsaka is represented as still unsatisfied: but I need not carry my summary further than to say that Śankara concludes by pointing out that the precepts which enjoin the offerings to certain gods imply that these gods have a particular form which the wor-

shipper can contemplate; and that in fact such contemplation is enjoined in the text, "Let the worshipper when about to repeat the Vashaṭkara meditate on the deity to whom the oblation is presented" (*yasyai devatāyai havir gṛihītaṁ syāt tāṁ dhyāyed vashaṭkarishyan*).[133]

In Brahma Sūtras, iii. 4, 1, it is laid down as the principle of Bādarāyaṇa that the knowledge of Soul, described in the Upanishads, is the sole means of attaining the highest end of man, *i.e.* final liberation; that it is not to be sought with a view to, and that its operation is altogether independent of, ceremonial observances (*ataḥ | asmāt vedānta-vihitād ātma-jnānāt svatantrāt purushārthaḥ siddhyati iti Bādarāyaṇaḥ ācharyyo manyate*). This he proves by various texts (*ity-evaṁ-jātīyakā śrutir vidyāyāḥ kevalāyāḥ purushārtha-hetutvaṁ śrāvayati*), such as *Tarati śokam ātma-vit | sa yo ha vai tat param Brahma veda Brahma eva bhavati | Brahma-vid āpnoti param |* "He who knows soul overpasses grief" (Chhāndogya Up. see above, p. 33); "He who knows that Brahma becomes Brahma;" "He who knows Brahma obtains the highest (exaltation);" etc. In the following Sūtra (2) Jaimini is introduced as contesting this principle, and as affirming that the knowledge of soul is to be acquired with a view to the performance of ceremonial works. The Sūtra in question, as explained by S'ankara, means that "as the fact that soul is an agent in works implies an ultimate regard to works, the knowledge of soul must also be connected with works by means of its object" (*karttṛitvena ātmanaḥ karma-śeshatvāt tad-vijnānam api . . . vishaya-dvāreṇa karma-sambandhy eva iti*). The same view is further stated in the following Sūtras 3–7, where it is enforced by the example of sages who possessed the knowledge of Brahma and yet sacrificed (Sūtra 3), by a text which conjoins knowledge and works (Sūtra 5), by a second which intimates that a person who knows all the contents of the Veda has a capacity for ceremonial rites (Sūtra 6), and by others (7). S'ankara replies under Sūtra 8 to the view set forth in Sūtra 2, which he declares to be founded on a mistake, as "the soul which is proposed in the Upanishads as the object of knowledge is not the embodied soul, but the supreme Spirit, of which agency in regard to rites is not predicable. That knowledge, he affirms, does not promote, but on the

[133] The passage in which S'ankara goes on to answer the objection that in cases like this the Itihāsas and Purāṇas afford no independent evidence, will be quoted below.

contrary, puts an end to all works" (*na cha tad-vijnānam karmaṇām pravarttakam bhavati pratyuta tat karmāṇy uchchhinatti*), and under Sūtra 16 he explains how this takes place, viz. by the fact that "knowledge annihilates the illusory conceptions of work, worker, and reward, which are caused by ignorance, and are necessary conditions of capacity for ceremonial observances" (*Api cha karmādhikāra-hetoḥ kriyā-kāraka-phala-lakshaṇasya samastasya prapanchasya avidyā-kṛitasya vidyā-sāmarthyāt svarūpopamarddam āmananti*). To Sūtra 3 Bādarayaṇa replies that the ceremonial practice of sages is the same whether they do or do not acquire knowledge with a view to works; to Sūtra 5, by saying that in the text in question works and knowledge are not referable to one and the same person, but works to one and knowledge to another; and to Sūtra 6, by declaring that it is merely the reading of the Veda, and not a knowledge of all its contents that is referred to in the text in question. Another reason assigned in Sūtra 17 to shew that divine knowledge is not dependent on, or subservient to works, is that ascetics who practise no Vedic ceremonies are yet recognized in the Veda as competent to acquire it (*ūrdhhvaretassu cha āśrameshu vidyā śrūyate na cha tattra karmāngatvam vidyāyāḥ upapadyate karmābhāvāt | na hy agnihottrādīni vaidikāni karmāṇi teshām santi*). In the following Sūtra (18) Jaimini is introduced as questioning the validity of this argument on the ground that the Vedic texts, which are adduced in support of it, merely allude to the existence of ascetics, and do not recognize such an order as consistent with Vedic usage, or that they have another object, or are ambiguous; while another text actually reprehends the practice of asceticism. To this Bādarāyaṇa rejoins in Sūtra 19, that the texts in question prove the recognized existence of the ascetic order as much as that of any other; and that the alleged ambiguity of one of the passages is removed by the consideration that as two of the three orders referred to, viz. those of the householder and brahmachārin, are clearly indicated, the third can be no other than that of the ascetic. The subject is further pursued in the next Sūtra 20, where the author and his commentator (who adduces additional texts) arrive at the conclusion that the practice of asceticism is not only alluded to, but enjoined in the Veda, and that consequently knowledge, as being inculcated on those who practise it, is altogether independent of works (*tasmāt siddhā ūrddhvaretasaḥ āśramāḥ siddham cha ūrddhvaretassu vidhānād vidyāyāḥ svātantryam*).

Again in Brahma Sūtras, iv. 3, 7–14, the question is discussed whether the words *sa etān Brahma gamayati*, "He conducts them to Brahman," refer to the supreme Brăhmă, or to the created Brăhmā. Bādari (Sūtra 7) holds that the latter is meant, whilst Jaimini (in Sūtra 12) maintains that the former is intended. The conclusion to which the commentator comes at the close of his remarks on Sūtra 14 is that the view taken by Bādari is right, whilst Jaimini's opinion is merely advanced to display his own ability (*tasmāt "kāryyam Bādarir" ity esha eva pakshaḥ sthitaḥ* | *"param Jaiminir" iti cha pakshāntara-pratipādana-māttra-pradarśanam prajnā-vikāśanāya iti drashṭavyam*).

Further, in Brahma Sūtras, iv. 4, 10, it is stated to be the doctrine of Bādari that the sage who has attained liberation no longer retains his body or bodily organs, but his mind (*manas*) alone, whilst in the following Sūtra (11) it is declared to be Jaimini's opinion that he retains his body and senses also. In the 12th Sūtra it is laid down as the decision of Bādarāyaṇa that either of the two supposed states may be assumed at will by the liberated spirit.

Jaimini and his opinions are also mentioned in Brahma Sūtras i. 2, 28, and 31; i. 4, 18; and iv. 4, 5.

I shall now adduce some illustrations of the claims which the founders of the other philosophical schools put forward on behalf of their own principles as being in conformity with the Vedas. I begin with a passage on this subject from S'ankara's note introductory to Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 5 ff.:

Brahma cha sarvajnaṁ sarvaśakti jagad-utpatti-sthiti-nāśa-kāraṇam ity uktam | *Sānkhyādayas tu parinishṭhitaṁ vastu pramāṇāntara-gamyam eva iti manyamānāḥ pradhānādīni kāraṇāntarāṇi anumimānās tat-paratayā eva vedānta-vākyāni yojayanti* | *sarveshv eva tu vedānta-vākyeshu sṛishṭi-vishayeshu anumānena eva kāryyeṇa kāraṇam lilakshayishitam* | *Pradhāna-purusha-saṁyogāḥ nityānumeyāḥ iti Sānkhyāḥ manyante* | *Kāṇādās tv etebhyaḥ eva vākyebhyaḥ Īśvaraṁ nimitta-kāraṇam anumimate aṇūṁś cha samavāyi-kāraṇam* | *evam anye 'pi tārkikāḥ vākyābhāsa-yuktyābhāsāvashṭambhāḥ pūrva-paksha-vādinaḥ iha uttishṭhante* | *tattra pada-vākya-pramāṇa-jnena āchāryyena vedānta-vākyānām Brahmāvagati-paratva-pradarśanāya vākyābhāsa-yukty-ābhāsa-pratipattayaḥ pūrvapakshīkṛitya nirākriyante* | *tattra Sānkhyāḥ pradhānam triguṇam achetanaṁ jagataḥ kāraṇam iti manyamānāḥ āhur "yāni vedānta-vākyāni sarvajna-*

sya sarvaśakter Brahmaṇo jagat-kāraṇatvam pratipādayanti ity avochas tāni pradhāna-kāraṇa-pakshe 'pi yojayituṁ śakyante | sarvaśaktitvaṁ tāvat pradhānasyāpi sva-vikāra-vishayam upapadyate | evaṁ sarvajnatvam upapadyate | katham | yat tvaṁ jnānam manyase sa sattva-dharmaḥ "sattvāt sanjāyate jnānam" iti smṛiteḥ | tena cha sattva-dharmeṇa jnānena kāryya-karaṇavantaḥ purushāḥ sarvajnāḥ yoginaḥ prasiddhāḥ | sattvasya hi niratiśayotkarshe sarvajnatvam prasiddham | na cha kevalasya akāryya-kāraṇasya purushasya upalabdhi-māttrasya sarva-jnatvaṁ kinchij-jnatvaṁ vā kalpayituṁ śakyam | triguṇatvāt tu pradhānasya sarva-jnāna-kāraṇa-bhūtaṁ sattvam pradhānāvasthāyām api vidyate iti pradhānasya achetanasya eva sataḥ sarvajnatvam upacharyyate vedānta-vākyeshu | avaśyaṁ cha tvayā 'pi sarvajnam Brahma abhyupagachhatā sarva-jnāna-śaktimattvena eva sarvajnatvam abhyupagantavyam | na hi sarva-vishayaṁ jnānaṁ kurvad eva Brahma varttate | tathā hi jnānasya nityatve jnāna-kriyām prati svātantryaṁ hīyeta | atha anityaṁ tad iti jnāna-kriyāyāḥ uparame uparameta api Brahma | tadā sarva-jnāna-śaktimattvena eva sarvajnatvam āpatati | api cha prāg utpatteḥ sarva-kāraka-śūnyam Brahma ishyate tvayā | na cha jnāna-sādhanānāṁ śarīrendriyādīnām abhāve jnānotpattiḥ kasyachid upapannā | api cha pradhānasya anekātmakasya pariṇāma-sambhavāt kāraṇatvopapattir mṛid-ādi-vat | na asaṁhatasya ekātmakasya Brahmaṇaḥ | ity evam prāpte idam sūtram ārabhyate | 5. "*Īkshater na | aśabdam" | na Sānkhya-parikalpitam achetanam pradhānaṁ jagataḥ kāraṇaṁ śakyaṁ vedānteshv āśrayitum | aśabdaṁ hi tat | katham aśabdam | "īkshiteḥ" | īkshitṛitva-śravaṇāt kāraṇasya | katham | evaṁ hi śrūyate "Sad eva saumya idam agre āsīd ekam eva advitīyam" ity upakramya "tad aikshata 'bahu syām prajāyeya' iti tat tejo 'sṛijata" iti | tattra idaṁ-śabda-vāchyaṁ nāma-rūpa-vyākṛitaṁ jagat prāg utpatteḥ sad-ātmanā 'vadhāryya tasya eva prakṛitasya sach-chhabda-vāchyasya īkshaṇa-pūrvakaṁ tejaḥ-prabhṛiteḥ srashṭṛitvaṁ darśayati | tathā cha anyatra "ātmā vai idam ekaḥ eva agre āsīt | na anyat kinchana mishat | sa aikshata 'lokān nu sṛijai' iti sa imān lokān asṛijata" iti īkshā-pūrvikām eva sṛishṭim āchashṭe | . . . . ity-evam-ādīny api sarvajneśvara-kāraṇa-parāṇi vākyāny udāharttavyāni | yat tu uktam "sattva-dharmeṇa jnānena sarvajnam pradhānam bhavishyati" iti tad na upapadyate | na hi pradhānāvasthāyāṁ guṇa-sāmyāt sattva-dharmo jnānaṁ sambhavati | nanu uktam "sarva-jnāna-śaktimattvena sarvajnam bhavishyati" iti tad api na upapadyate | yadi guṇa-sāmye sati sattva-vyapāśrayāṁ jnāna-śaktim*

āśritya sarvajnam pradhānam uchyeta kāmaṁ rajas-tamo-vyapāśrayām api jnāna-pratibandhaka-śaktim āśritya kinchij-jnatvam uchyeta | api cha na asākshikā sattva-vrittir jānāti na abhidhīyate | na cha achetanasya pradhānasya sākshitvam asti | tasmād anupannam pradhānasya sarvajnatvam | yogināṁ tu chetanatvāt sarvotkarsha-nimittaṁ sarvajnatvam upapannam ity anudāharaṇam | atha punaḥ sākshi-nimittam īkshitṛitvam pradhānasya kalpyeta yathā agni-nimittam ayaḥ-piṇḍāder dagdhṛitvaṁ tathā sati yan-nimittaṁ īkshitṛitvam pradhānasya tad eva sarvajnam mukhyam Brahma jagataḥ kāraṇam iti yuktam | yat punar uktam Brahmaṇo 'pi na mukhyaṁ sarvajnatvam upapadyate nitya-jnāna-kriyatve jnāna-kriyām prati svātantryāsambhavād ity attra uchyate | idaṁ tāvad bhavān prashṭavyaḥ "kathaṁ nitya-jnāna-kriyatve sarvajnatva-hānir" iti | yasya hi sarva-vishayāvabhāsana-kshamaṁ jnānaṁ nityam asti so 'sarvajnaḥ iti vipratishiddham | anityatve hi jnānasya kadāchij jānāti kadāchid na jānāti ity asarvajnatvam api syāt | na asau jnāna-nityatve dosho 'sti | jnāna-nityatve jnāna-vishayaḥ svātantrya-vyapadeśo na upapadyate iti chet | na | pratataushṇa-prakāśe 'pi savitari dahati prakāśayati iti svātantrya-vyapadeśa-darśanāt | nanu savitur dāhya-prakāśya-saṁyoge sati dahati prakāśayati iti vyapadeśaḥ syāt | na tu Brahmaṇaḥ prāg utpatter jnāna-karma-saṁyogo 'sti iti vishamo dṛishṭāntaḥ | na | asaty api karmaṇi savitā prakāśate iti karttṛitva-vyapadeśa-darśanāt | evam asaty api jnāna-karmaṇi Brahmaṇas "tad aikshata" iti karttṛitva-vyapadeśopapatter na vaishamyam | karmāpekshāyāṁ tu Brahmaṇi īkshitṛitva-śrutayaḥ sutarām upapannāḥ | kim punas tat karma yat prāg utpatter īśvara-jnānasya vishayībhavati iti | tattvānyatvābhyām anirvachanīye nāma-rūpe avyākṛite vyāchikīrshite iti brūmaḥ | yat-prasādād hi yoginām apy atītānāgata-vishayam pratyakshaṁ jnānam ichhanti yoga-śāstra-vidaḥ kimu vaktavyaṁ tasya nitya-śuddhasya īśvarasya sṛishṭi-sthiti-saṁhṛiti-vishayaṁ nitya-jnānam bhavati iti | yad apy uktam prāg utpatter Brahmaṇaḥ śarīrādi-sambandham antareṇa īkshitṛitvam anupapannam iti na tach chodyam avatarati savitṛi-prakāśa-vad Brahmaṇo jnāna-svarūpa-nityatvena jnāna-sādhanāpekshānupapatteḥ | . . . . yad apy uktam "pradhānasya anekātmakatvād mṛid-ādi-vat kāraṇatvopapattir na asaṁhatasya Brahmaṇaḥ" iti tat pradhānasya aśabdatvena eva pratyuktam | yathā tu tarkeṇāpi Brahmaṇaḥ eva kāraṇatvaṁ nirvoḍhuṁ śakyate na pradhānādīnāṁ tathā prapanchayishyate "na vilakshaṇatvād asya" ity-evam-ādinā (Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 4) |

Attra āha yad uktaṁ "na achetanam pradhānaṁ jagat-kāraṇam īkshitritva-śravaṇād" iti tad anyathā 'py upapadyate | achetane 'pi chetana-vad upachāra-darśanāt | pratyāsanna-pātanatāṁ kūlasya ālakshya kūlam pipatishati ity achetane 'pi kūle chetana-vad upachāro drishṭas tad-vad achetane 'pi pradhāne pratyāsanna-sarge chetana-vad upachāro bhavishyati "tad aikshata" iti | yathā loke kaśchich chetanaḥ snātvā bhuktvā cha "aparāhne grāmaṁ rathena gamishyāmi" iti īkshitvā anantaraṁ tathaiva niyamena pravarttate tathā pradhānam api mahad-ādy-ākāreṇa niyamena pravarttate | tasmāch chetana-vad upacharyyate | kasmāt punaḥ kāraṇad vihāya mukhyam īkshitritvam aupachārikaṁ kalpyate | "tat tejaḥ aikshata" "tāḥ āpaḥ aikshanta" iti cha achetanayor apy ap-tejasoś chetana-vad upachāra-darśanāt | tasmāt sat-karttrikam api īkshaṇam aupachārikam iti gamyate upachāra-prāye vachanād ity evam prāpte idaṁ sūtram ārabhyate | 6. "*Gauṇaś chet* | *na* | *ātma-śabdāt*" | *yad uktam pradhānam achetanaṁ sach-chhabda-vāchyam tasminn aupachārikī īkshitir ap-tejasor iva iti tad asat* | *kasmāt* | *ātma-śabdāt* | "*sad eva saumya idam agre asīd*" *ity upakramya* "*tad aikshata tat tejo 'srijata*" *iti cha tejo 'b-annānāṁ srishṭim uktvā tad eva prakritaṁ sad īkshitri tāni cha tejo-'b-annāni devatā-śabdena parāmriśya āha* "*sā iyaṁ devatā aikshata hanta aham imās tisro devatāḥ anena jīvena ātmanā 'nupraviśya nāma-rūpe vyākaravāṇi*" *iti* | *tattra yadi pradhānam achetanaṁ guṇa-vrittyā īkshitri kalpyeta tad eva prakritatvāt sā iyaṁ devatā parāmriśyeta* | *na tadā devatā jīvam ātma-śabdena abhidadhyāt* | *jīvo hi nāma chetanaḥ śarīrādhyakshaḥ prāṇānāṁ dhārayitā prasiddher nirvachanāch cha* | *sa katham achetanasya pradhānasya ātmā bhavet* | *ātmā hi nāma svarūpam* | *na achetanasya pradhānasya chetano jīvaḥ svārūpam bhavitum arhati* | *attra tu chetanam Brahma mukhyam īkshitri parigrihyate* | *tasya jīva-vishayaḥ ātma-śabda-prayogaḥ upapadyate* | *tathā* "*sa yaḥ esho 'ṇimā etadātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyaṁ sa ātmā tat tvam asi S'vetaketo*" *ity attra* "*sa ātmā*" *iti prakritaṁ sad-aṇimānam ātmānam ātma-śabdena upadiśya* "*tat tvam asi S'vetaketo*" *iti chetanasya S'vetaketor ātmatvena upadiśati* | *ap-tejasos tu vishayatvād achetanatvaṁ nāma-rūpa-vyākaraṇādau cha prayojyatvena eva nirdeśāt* | *na cha ātma-śabda-vat kinchid mukhyatve kāraṇam asti iti yuktaṁ kūla-vad gauṇatvam īkshitritvasya* | *tayor api cha sad-adhishṭhitatvāpeksham eva īkshitritvam* | *satas tv ātma-śabdād na gauṇam īkshitritvam ity uktam* | *atha uchyate* | *achetane 'pi pradhāne bhavaty ātma-śabdaḥ* | *ātmanaḥ sarvārtha-kāritvāt* |

yathā rājnaḥ sarvārtha-kāriṇi bhṛitye bhavaty ātma-śabdo "mama ātmā Bhadrasenaḥ" iti | pradhānaṁ hi purushātmano[134] *bhogāpavargau kurvad upakaroti rājnaḥ iva bhṛityaḥ sandhi-vigrahādishu varttamānaḥ | athavā ekaḥ eva ātma-śabdaś chetanāchetana-vishayo bhavishyati "bhūtātmā" "indriyātmā" iti cha prayoga-darśanād yathā ekaḥ eva jyotiḥ-śabdaḥ kratu-jvalana-vishayaḥ | tattra kutaḥ etad ātma-śabdādīkshiter agauṇatvam ity attra uttaram paṭhati | 7. "Tan-nishṭhasya mokshopadeśāt" | na pradhānam achetanam ātma-śabdālambanam bhavitum arhati "sa ātmā" iti prakṛitaṁ sad aṇimānam ādāya "tat tvam asi S'vetaketo" iti chetanasya S'vetaketor mokshayitavyasya tan-nishṭhām upadiśya "Āchāryyavān purusho veda tasya tāvad eva chiraṁ yāvad na vimokshye atha sampatsye" iti mokshopadeśāt | yadi hy achetanam pradhānaṁ sach-chhabda-vāchyaṁ "tad asi" iti grāhayed mumukshuṁ chetanaṁ santam "achetano 'si" iti tadā viparīta-vādi śāstram purushasya anarthāya ity apramāṇaṁ syāt | na tu nirdoshaṁ śāstram apramāṇaṁ kalpayituṁ yuktam | yadi cha ajnasya sato mumukshor achetanam anātmānam "ātmā" ity upadiśet pramāṇa-bhūtaṁ śāstraṁ sa śraddadhānatayā 'ndha-go-lāngūla-nyāyena tad-ātma-dṛishṭiṁ na parityajet tad-vyatiriktaṁ cha ātmānaṁ na pratipadyeta | tathā sati purushārthād vihanyeta anarthaṁ cha ṛichhet | tasmād yathā svargādy-arthino 'gnihotrādi-sādhanaṁ yathā-bhūtam upadiśati tathā mumukshor api "sa atmā | tat tvam asi S'vetaketo" iti yathā-bhūtam eva ātmānam upadiśati iti yuktam | evaṁ cha sati tapta-paraśu-grahaṇa-moksha-dṛishṭāntena satyābhisandhasya mokshopadeśaḥ upapadyate | . . . . tasmād na sad-aṇimany ātma-śabdasya gauṇatvam | bhṛitye tu svāmi-bhṛitya-bhedasya pratyakshatvād upapanno gauṇaḥ ātma-śabdo "mama ātmā Bhadrasenaḥ" iti | api cha kvachid gauṇaḥ śabdo dṛishṭaḥ iti na etāvatā śabda-pramāṇake 'rthe gauṇī kalpanā nyāyyā sarvattra anāśvāsa-prasangāt | yat tu uktaṁ chetanāchetanayoḥ sādhāraṇaḥ ātma-sabdaḥ kratu-jvalanayor iva jyotiḥ-śabdaḥ iti | tad na | anekārthatvasya anyāyyatvāt | tasmāch chetana-vishayaḥ eva mukhyaḥ ātma-śabdaś chetanatvopachārād bhūtādishu prayujyate "bhūtātmā" "indriyātmā" iti cha | sādhāraṇatve 'py ātma-śabdasya na prakaraṇam upapadaṁ vā kinchid niśchāyakam antareṇa anyatara-vṛittitā nirdhārayituṁ śakyate | na cha atra achetanasya niśchāyakaṁ kinchit kāraṇam asti prakṛitaṁ tu sad īkshitṛi sannihitaś cha chetanaḥ S'vetaketuḥ | na hi chetanasya S'vetaketor achetanaḥ ātmā sam-*

[134] The edition printed in Bengali characters reads *purushasya ātmanaḥ*.

bhavati ity avochāma | *tasmāch chetana-vishayaḥ iha ātma-śabdaḥ iti niśchīyate* |

"And it has been declared that Brahma, omniscient and omnipotent, is the cause of the creation, continuance, and destruction of the world. But the Sānkhyas and others, holding that an ultimate (*parinishṭhita*)[135] substance is discoverable by other proofs, and inferring the existence of Pradhāna or other causes, apply the texts of the Upanishads as having reference to these. For (they assert that) all the texts of the Upanishads which relate to the creation, design inferentially to indicate the cause by the effect. The Sānkhyas think that the conjunctions of Pradhāna and Purusha (Soul) are to be inferred as eternal. From the very same texts the followers of Kaṇāda (the Vaiśeshikas) deduce that Īśvara is the instrumental cause and atoms the material cause[136] (of the world). So, too, other rationalizing objectors rise up who rely on fallacies founded on texts or reasoning. Here then our teacher (*āchāryya*), who understood both words and sentences and evidence, with the view of pointing out that the texts of the Upanishads have for their object the revelation of Brahma, first puts forward and then refutes the fallacies founded by those persons on texts or reasoning. The Sānkhyas regarding Pradhāna, consisting of the three qualities (*guṇas*, viz. *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, or "Goodness," "Passion," and "Darkness"), and inanimate, as the cause of the world, tell us: (*a*) 'Those texts in the Upanishads which, as you say, declare that an omniscient and omnipotent Brahma is the cause of the world, can be applied to support the view that Pradhāna is the cause. For omnipotence in regard to its own developments is properly predicable of Pradhāna also; and omniscience too may be rightly ascribed to it. You will ask, how? We answer (*b*), What you call knowledge is a characteristic of 'Goodness' (*sattva*), according to the text of the Smṛiti, 'From Goodness springs knowledge.' And (*c*) through this knowledge, which is a characteristic of Goodness, Yogins, who are men

[135] Compare Sānkhya Sūtras, i. 69: *pāramparyye 'py ekatra parinishṭhā*, etc., which Dr. Ballantyne renders, "Even if there be a succession, there is a halt (*parinishṭhā*) at some one point," etc.

[136] The phrase so translated is *samavāyi-kāraṇam*. The word *samavāya* is rendered by Dr. Ballantyne, in his translation of the Bhāshāparichheda (published January, 1851), p. 22, by "intimate relation" (the same phrase as Dr. Roer had previously employed in 1850); and in the translation of the Tarka-sangraha (published in September of the same year), pp. 2 and 4, by "co-inherence."

with bodily organs,[137] are reputed to be omniscient; for owing to the transcendent excellence of Goodness its omniscience is matter of notoriety. Nor it is only of a person (*purusha*) whose essence is mere perception, and who is devoid of corporeal organs, that either omniscience or partial knowledge can be predicated: but from Pradhāna being composed of the three qualities, Goodness, which is the cause of omniscience, belongs to it too in the condition of Pradhāna. And so in the texts of the Upanishads omniscience is figuratively ascribed to it, although it is unconscious. And (*d*) you also, who recognize an omniscient Brahma, must of necessity acknowledge that His omniscience consists in His possessing the power of omniscience. For He does not continually exercise knowledge in regard to all objects. For (*e*) if His knowledge were continual. His self-dependence (or voluntary action) in reference to the act of knowledge would be lost. But if knowledge be not continual, then when the act of knowledge ceases Brahma must cease (to know). And so omniscience results from the possession of the power of omniscience. Further (*f*) you, too, hold that before the creation Brahma was devoid of any impulse to action. Nor can knowledge be conceived to arise in anyone who has no bodily organs or other instruments of knowledge. Moreover (*g*) causality can properly be ascribed to Pradhāna (as it can to earth, etc.) owing to the variety in its nature,[138] and the consequent possibility of its development, but not to Brahma whose essence is simple and uniform.' These arguments having been urged, the following Sūtra is introduced: 5. 'No; for in consequence of the word 'beholding' being employed, your view is contrary to the Veda.' (*a*) The unconscious Pradhāna, imagined by the Sānkhyas as the cause of the world, can find no support in the Upanishads. For it is unscriptural. How so? From its beholding, *i.e.* because the act of 'beholding' (or 'reflecting') is in scripture ascribed to the cause. How? Because the Veda contains a text which begins thus: 'This, o fair youth, was in the beginning' 'Existent, one without a second' (Chh. Up. vi. 2, 1); and proceeds: 'It beheld, let

[137] The epithet *kāryya-karaṇavantaḥ* is rendered *dehendriya-yukta* in the Bengali translation of S'ankara's comment, which forms part of the edition of the S'ārīraka-sūtras, with comment and gloss, published at Calcutta in 1784 of the S'aka æra. This translation is useful for ascertaining the general sense, but it does not explain all the difficult phrases which occur in the original.

[138] The meaning of this is that Pradhāna, as cause, possesses in its nature a variety corresponding to that exhibited by the different kinds of objects which constitute the visible creation; whilst Brahma is one and uniform.

me multiply, and be propagated.' 'It created light' (3). By these words the scripture, having first determined that the world, denoted by the word 'this' and now developed as Name and Form, subsisted before the creation in the form of the 'Existent,' then goes on to shew that this very subject of the text, denoted by the word 'Existent,' became, after 'beholding,' the creator of light and other objects. And accordingly another text (Ait. Up. i. 1) declares in the following words that the creation was preceded by 'beholding:' 'This was in the beginning Soul, one only: there was nothing else which saw.[139] It beheld, Let me create worlds; it created these worlds.'" After quoting two other texts Śankara proceeds: "These and other passages may also be adduced which shew that an omniscient Īśvara was the cause (of all things). And (*b*) the opinion which has been referred to, that Pradhāna will be omniscient in virtue of the knowledge which is an attribute of Goodness, is groundless. For since the three qualities are in a state of equilibrium as long as the state of Pradhāna lasts, knowledge as an attribute of Goodness cannot then belong to it. And the assertion (*d*) that Pradhāna will be omniscient from possessing the power of omniscience is equally untenable. If (*b*) in reliance on the power of knowledge residing in Goodness during the state of equilibrium, it be maintained that Pradhāna is then omniscient, a merely partial knowledge may with equal reason be ascribed to it on the strength of the power to obstruct knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkness (the other two qualities which constitute it). Besides, no function of Goodness can either be, or be called, knowledge, unless it be accompanied by the power of observing (or witnessing). But Pradhāna, being unconscious, possesses no such power. Consequently the omniscience of Pradhāna is untenable. And the omniscience of Yogins, (*c*) springing from their eminence in every attribute, becomes possible in consequence of their being conscious creatures; and therefore cannot be adduced as an illustrative argument in the case before us. If, again, you ascribe to Pradhāna a power of reflection derived from an observer (like the power of burning possessed by iron balls, etc., which is derived from fire) then it will be right to say that the source from which that power of reflection comes to Pradhāna, viz. the omniscient Brahma in the proper sense, and nothing else, is the cause of the world. Once more, (*e*) it is

[139] This is the sense assigned in Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon to the word *mishat*. The commentators render it "moving" (*chalat*).

urged that omniscience cannot in the literal sense be properly attributed even to Brahma himself, because if the cognitive acts were continual, His self-dependence (or spontaneity), in regard to the act of cognition, would be no longer conceivable: we reply, that we must ask you how the supposition that cognitive acts are continual, interferes with the existence of omniscience. Because it is a contradiction to say that he who possesses a perpetual knowledge which can throw light upon all subjects can be otherwise than omniscient. For although on the hypothesis that knowledge is not continual, a negation of omniscience would result, as in that case the person in question would sometimes know and sometimes not know,—the same objection does not attach to the supposition of a perpetuity of knowledge. If you reply that on that supposition, self-dependence (or spontaneity), in regard to knowledge can no longer be attributed, we deny this, because we observe that spontaneity, in regard to burning and illuminating, is attributed to the sun, although he continually burns and shines. If you again object that this illustration does not hold good, because the power in question is ascribed to the sun only when his rays are in contact with the objects to be burnt or illuminated, whereas before the creation, Brahma has no contact with the object of knowledge;—we reply that the parallel is exact, because we observe that agency in shining is attributed to the sun even when there is no object [for his beams]; and in the same way agency in regard to 'beholding,' is justly ascribed to Brahma, even when there is no object of knowlege. But the texts which record the fact of 'beholding' will be applicable to Brahma with still greater propriety if that 'beholding' have had reference to a positive object. What then is the object which is contemplated by Brahma before the creation? We reply, the undeveloped Name and Form which were not describable either in their essence or differences, and which He wished to develope. For what need we say to prove the perpetual knowledge, relating to the creation, continuance, and destruction of the world, which belongs to Īśvara, the perpetually pure, from whose grace it is that the intuitive knowledge of things past and future, which men learned in the Yoga doctrine attribute to Yogins, is derived? And as regards the further objection (*f*) that Brahma, who before the creation was without body or organs of sense, could not be conceived to 'behold,'—that argument cannot be sustained, as from

Brahma's existence in the form of knowledge being, like the sun's lustre, perpetual, he cannot be supposed dependent upon any (bodily organs as) instruments of knowledge." . . . . "Then as regards the assertion (*g*) that Pradhāna, from its multiformity of character can (like earth, etc.,) be readily conceived as the cause (of the manifold products which we see around us), whilst such causality cannot be ascribed to the simple and uniform Brahma,—that has been answered by the remark that the existence of Pradhāna is not established by scripture. And that the causality of Brahma, but not that of Pradhāna, etc., can be established by reasoning will hereafter be shewn in the Sūtras, 'Brahma, you say, cannot be the material cause of this world, because it differs from him in its nature,' etc. (Brahma Sūtras, ii. 1, 4 ff.). Here the Sānkhyas remark: 'As regards your objection that the unconscious Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world, because the Veda describes that cause as 'beholding,' we observe (*h*) that that text, if otherwise explained, will be consistent with our view. For we find that even unconscious objects are figuratively spoken of as conscious. Thus we notice that any one who perceives that the bank of a river is on the point of falling, speaks in a figurative way of that unconscious bank as intending to fall.[140] In the same way when Pradhāna is on the point of creating, it can be figuratively said of it, although unconscious, as of a conscious being, that it 'beheld.'[141] Just as any conscious person, after bathing and eating, resolves that on the following day he will proceed to his village in a car, and afterwards acts according to that plan, so too Pradhāna (becoming developed) in the form of Mahat (intellect), etc., acts according to a law, and therefore is figuratively spoken of as conscious. If you ask us, why we abandon the proper sense of 'beholding,' and adopt a figurative one, we answer that we do so because we find the term figuratively applied to Water and to Light, though unconscious objects, in the Vedic texts, 'The Light beheld,' 'the Waters beheld' (Chh. Up. vi. 2, 3f.). Hence from the fact that the expression is for the most

[140] *Kūlam pipatishati*, literally, "The bank wishes to fall;" but, as is well known, a verb, or verbal noun, or adjective, in the desiderative form, often indicates nothing more than that something is about to happen. Here, however, the Sānkhyas are introduced as founding a serious argument on this equivocal form of speech.

[141] See Vijnāna Bhikshu's remarks on the Sānkhya Sūtra, i. 96, where the same illustration is given.

part figuratively employed, we conclude that the act of beholding,' performed by the 'Existent' also was a figurative one." These objections having been brought forward, the following Sūtra is introduced: 6. "If you say that the act of 'beholding' is figuratively ascribed to Pradhāna, it is not so, because the word Soul also is applied to the cause." (*h*) "The assertion that the unconscious Pradhāna is designated by the word 'Existent,' and that 'beholding' is figuratively ascribed to it, as to Water and Light, is incorrect. Why? Because the word Soul also is employed. The text which begins with the words, 'This, o fair youth, was in the beginning Existent,' and goes on 'It beheld, it created light,' after relating the creation of Light, Water, and Food, refers to that 'Existent,' the 'beholder,' which is the subject of the text, and to Light, Water, and Food, under the appellation of deities, thus: 'This deity beheld (or resolved), come let me enter into these three deities with this living Soul, and make manifest Name and Form' (vi. 3, 2). Here if the unconscious Pradhāna were regarded as being, through the function of the quality (of Goodness), the 'beholder,' it would from the context be referred to in the phrase 'that deity;' and then the deity in question could not denote a 'living being' by the term 'Soul.' For the principle of life is both according to common usage, and interpretation, the conscious ruler of the body, and the sustainer of the vital breaths. How could such a principle of life be the Soul of the unconscious Pradhāna? For Soul means the essential nature, and a conscious principle of life cannot be the essence of the unconscious Pradhāna. But in reality the conscious Brahma is understood in this text as the 'beholder' in the proper sense of the term; and the word Soul, as relating to the principle of life, is rightly applied to Him. And thus in the sentence 'This entire universe is identical with this subtile particle; it is true; it is Soul: Thou art it, o S'vetaketu,' (Chh. Up. vi. 8, 6 f.) the author by employing the words 'it is Soul' designates the subtile particle, the Existent, which is the subject of the text, as Soul, by the term Soul, and so in the words 'thou art it, o S'vetaketu,' describes the conscious S'vetaketu as being Soul. But Water and Fire are unconscious things, because they are objects of sense,[142] and because it is pointed out that they were employed in the manifestation of Name and Form; and so there is no reason, as in the

[142] *Vishayatvāt* = *dṛig-vishayatvāt*, "from their being objects of the sense of sight."—Govinda Ānanda.

case of Soul, to describe them as 'beholders' in the proper sense: that term must be applied to them by a figure, as in the case of the 'river bank.' And their act of 'beholding' was dependent on their being governed by the 'Existent.' But, as we have said, the act of 'beholding' is not figurative in the case of the 'Existent,' because the word Soul is applied to it. But it is now urged (*i*), that the term Soul does apply to Pradhāna, though unconscious, because it fulfils all the objects of soul; just as it is applied by a king to his servant who accomplishes all his designs, when he says 'Bhadrasena is my soul.' For Pradhāna renders aid to a man's soul by obtaining for it both celestial enjoyment, and final liberation, as a king's servant assists him by acting in peace and war, etc. Or (*j*) the one word Soul may apply both to conscious and unconscious objects, as we see it employed in the phrases 'soul of the elements,' 'soul of the bodily organs;' just as the same word *jyotis* means both sacrifice and light. Why then, the Sānkhyas conclude, should you infer from the word 'Soul' that the term 'beholding' cannot be figuratively used?

"This is answered in the 7th Sūtra ('Soul cannot denote Pradhāna), because it is declared that the man who fixes his thoughts upon it obtains final emancipation.' Unconscious Pradhāna must not be understood to derive any support from the word 'Soul;' for after referring in the words 'it is Soul' to the 'Existent,' the 'very subtile thing,' which is the subject of the passage, and indicating in the words 'thou art it, o S'vetaketu,' that the conscious S'vetaketu, who was about to obtain emancipation, was intent upon it, the text above adduced declares his emancipation in the words 'the man who has an instructor knows, "this will only last until I am liberated; I shall then be perfected."' (Chh. Up. vi. 14, 6) For if the unconscious Pradhāna were denoted by the term 'Existent,' the words 'thou art it,' would cause the conscious person, who was seeking after emancipation, to understand (of himself) 'Thou art unconscious;' and in that case the S'āstra which declared what was contradictory would be unauthoritative, because injurious to the person in question. But we cannot conceive a faultless S'āstra to be unauthoritative. And if a S'āstra esteemed authoritative should inform an ignorant seeker after emancipation, that a thing which was not soul was soul, he (the ignorant seeker) would in consequence of his faith, persist in regarding it as soul, as in the case of

the blind man and the bull's tail,[143] and would fail of attaining to soul which was quite different from it; and would in consequence lose the object of its efforts, and suffer injury. It is therefore proper to conclude that just as the Vedic precept, that he who desires paradise should perform the agnihotra sacrifice is conformable to truth, so, too, the text which says to the man seeking after emancipation, 'this is soul, thou art that, o S'vetaketu,' declares to him soul in conformity with the reality. And so,—as in the case of the man (charged with theft) who takes into his hand the red-hot axe, and (in consequence of the truth of his protestation of innocence) is delivered (Chh. Up. vi. 16, 2),—the promise of final emancipation will hold good in the case of the man whose thoughts are fixed on the true Brahma. . . . Consequently the application of the word 'soul' to the 'existent subtile thing' is not figurative. Whereas (*i*) the use of the same word when applied to a servant (as when it is said 'Bhadrasena is my soul'), is shown to be figurative by the manifest distinctness of a servant from his master. And the fact that a word is sometimes observed to be employed figuratively does not justify the supposition that it is so used in cases where the (proper) sense is established by the words; because that would give rise to doubt in every instance. Again, (*j*) it is incorrect to say that the word soul is common to things conscious and unconscious, (as the term *jyotis* means both sacrifice and flame), because the assertion that it has a variety of significa-

143 The story or fable here alluded to is told at length by Ānanda Giri, and more briefly by Govinda Ānanda as follows: *Kaśchit kila dushṭātmā mahāraṇya-mārge patitam andhaṁ sva-bandhu-nagaraṁ jigamishum babhāshe "kim attra āyushmatā duḥkhitena sthīyate" iti* | *sa cha andhaḥ sukha-vāṇīm ākarṇya tam āptam matvā uwācha "aho mad-bhāgadheyaṁ yad attra bhavān māṁ dīnaṁ svābhīshṭa-nagara-prāpty-asamartham bhāshate" iti* | *sa cha vipralipsur dushṭa-go-yuvānam ānīya tadīya-lāngūlam andhaṁ grāhayāmāsa upadideśa cha enam andham "esha go-yuvā tvāṁ nagaraṁ neshyati mā tyaja lāngūlam" iti sa cha andhaḥ śraddhālutayā tad atyajan svābhīshṭam aprāpya anartha-paramparām prāptas tena nyāyena ity arthaḥ* | "A certain malicious person said to a blind man who was lying on the road through a forest, and wishing to proceed to the city of his friends, 'Why, distressed old man, do you stay here?' The blind man hearing the agreeable voice of the speaker, and regarding him as trustworthy, replied: 'O how great is my good fortune that you have accosted me who am helpless, and unable to go to the city which I desire to reach!' The other, wishing to deceive him, brought a vicious young bull, and made the blind man lay hold of his tail, and told him that the young bull would conduct him to the city, enjoining him not to let go the tail. Trusting to the speaker, the blind kept his hold, but did not attain the object of his desire, and encountered a series of mishaps;—such is the illustration."

tions is unreasonable. Hence the word soul, which properly refers to conscious things, is applied to the elements, etc., by a figurative ascription to them of consciousness, as when we say, 'the soul of the elements,' or 'the soul of the bodily organs.' And even if it were admitted that the word soul was common to different things, it could not be ascertained whether it had reference to one thing or another unless the context or some auxiliary word determined the point. But in the case before us there is nothing to determine that it denotes anything unconscious; on the contrary, the subject of the sentence is the 'Existent, the beholder,' and in immediate connection with it is the conscious S'vetaketu; for as we have already said an unconscious thing cannot be conceived as the soul of the conscious S'vetaketu. Thus it is settled that the word 'soul' refers to a conscious being," etc.

In the fourth section (*pāda*) of the 1st Book, the author of the Sūtras returns to his controversy with the Sānkhyas, and S'ankara, after alluding to the aphorisms in which they had previously been combated, proceeds as follows (p. 334):

Idaṁ tv idānīm avaśishṭam āśankyate | yad uktam pradhānasya aśabdatvaṁ tad asiddhaṁ kāsuchit śākhāsu pradhāna-samarpaṇābhāsānāṁ śabdānaṁ śrūyamāṇatvāt | ataḥ pradhānasya kāraṇatvaṁ veda-prasiddham eva mahadbhiḥ paramarshibhih Kapilādibhiḥ parigṛihītam iti prasajyate | tad yāvat teshāṁ śabdānām anya-paratvaṁ na pratipādyate tāvat sarvajnam Brahma jagataḥ kāraṇam iti pratipāditam apy ākulībhavet | atas teshām anya-paratvaṁ darśayitum paraḥ sandarbhaḥ pravarttate | "ānumānikam api" (Br. Sūtra i. 4, 1) *anumāna-nirūpitam api pradhānam "ekeshāṁ" śākhināṁ śabdavad upalabhyate | Kāṭhake hi paṭhyate "mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt purushaḥ paraḥ" iti | tattra ye eva yan-nāmāno yat-kramakāś cha mahad-avyakta-purushāḥ smṛiti-prasiddhās te eva iha pratyabhijnāyante | tattra "avyaktam" iti smṛiti-prasiddheḥ śabdādi-hīnatvāch cha na vyaktam avyaktam iti vyutpatti-sambhavāt smṛiti-prasiddham pradhānam abhidhīyate | atas tasya śabdavattvād aśabdatvam anupapannam*[144] *| tad eva cha jagataḥ kāraṇaṁ śruti-smṛiti-prasiddhibhyaḥ iti chet | na etad evam | na hy etat Kāṭhaka-vākyaṁ smṛiti-prasiddhayor mahad-avyaktayor astitva-param | na hy attra yādṛiśaṁ smṛiti-prasiddhaṁ svātantraṁ kāraṇaṁ triguṇam pradhānaṁ*

[144] The text given in the Bibl. Indica has *upapannam*, but I follow the old edition in Bengali characters in reading *anupapannam*, which seems required by the sense.

tādṛiśam pratyabhijnāyate | śabda-māttram hy attra avyaktam iti pratyabhijnāyate | sa cha śabdo na vyaktam avyaktam iti yaugikatvād anyasminn api sūkshme durlakshye cha prayujyate na cha ayaṁ kasminśchid rūḍhaḥ | yā tu pradhāna-vādinām rūḍhiḥ sā teshām eva pāribhāshikī satī na vedārtha-nirūpaṇe kāraṇa-bhāvam pratipadyate | na cha krama-māttra-sāmarthyāt samānārtha-pratipattir bhavaty asati tad-rūpa-pratyabhijnāne | na hy aśva-sthāne gām paśyann aśvo 'yam ity amūḍho 'dhyavasyati | prakaraṇa-nirūpaṇāyāṁ cha attra na para-parikalpitam pradhānam pratīyate śarīra-rūpaka-vinyasta-gṛihīteḥ | śarīraṁ hy attra ratha-rūpaka-vinyastam avyakta-śabdena parigṛihyate | kutaḥ | prakaraṇāt pariśeshāch cha | tathā hy anantarātīto granthaḥ ātma-śarīrādīnāṁ rathi-rathādi-rūpaka-klṛiptiṁ darśayati | (Kaṭha Upanishad, i. 3, 3 f.) "*ātmānaṁ rathinaṁ viddhi śarīraṁ ratham eva cha | buddhiṁ cha sārathiṁ viddhi manaḥ pragraham eva cha* | 4. *Indriyāṇi hayān āhur vishayāṁs teshu gocharān | ātmendriya-mano-yuktam bhoktety āhur manīshiṇaḥ*" | *taiś chaindriyādibhir asaṁyataiḥ saṁsāram adhigachchhati | saṁyatais tv adhvanaḥ pāraṁ tad Vishṇoḥ paramam padam āpnoti iti darśayitvā kiṁ tad adhvanaḥ pāraṁ Vishṇoḥ paramam padam ity asya ākānkshāyāṁ tebhyaḥ eva prakṛitebhyaḥ indriyādibhyaḥ paratvena paramātmānam adhvanaḥ pāraṁ tad Vishṇoḥ paramam padaṁ darśayati* | Kaṭha Up. i. 3, 10 f.) "*indriyebhyaḥ parāḥ hy arthāḥ arthebhyaś cha param manaḥ | manasas tu parā buddhir buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ* | 11. *Mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt purushaḥ paraḥ | purushād na paraṁ kinchit sā kāshṭhā sā parā gatir*" *iti* | . . . . "*Buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ*" *yaḥ sa* "*ātmānaṁ rathinaṁ viddhi*" *iti rathitvena upakshiptaḥ | kutaḥ | ātma-śabdād bhoktuś cha bhogopakaraṇāt paratvopapatteḥ | mahattvaṁ cha asya svāmitvād upapannam* | . . . . *yā prathamajasya Hiraṇyagarbhasya buddhiḥ sā sarvāsām buddhīnām paramā pratishṭhā sā iha* "*mahān ātmā*" *ity uchyate | sā cha pūrvattra buddhi-grahaṇena eva gṛihītā satī hirug iha upadiśyate tasyāḥ apy asmadīyābhyo buddhibhyaḥ paratvoupapatteḥ* | . . . . *tad evaṁ śarīram eva ekam pariśishyate | teshu*[145] *itarāṇi indriyādīni prakṛitāny eva parama-pada-didarśayishayā samanukrāman pariśishyamāṇena iha anena avyakta-śabdena pariśishyamāṇam prakṛitaṁ śarīraṁ darśayati iti gamyate* | . . . . *tad evam pūrvāparālochanāyāṁ nāsty attra para-parikalpitasya pradhānasya avakāśaḥ* | 2. "*Sūkshaṁ tu tad-arhatvāt*" | *uktam etat prakaraṇa-*

[145] The earlier edition above referred to omits *teshu*.

pariśeshābhyām śarīram avyakta-śabdam na pradhānam iti | idam idānīm āśankyate katham avyakta-śabdārhatvam śarīrasya yāvatā sthūlatvāt spashṭataram idam śarīram vyakta-śabdārham aspashṭa-vachanas tv avyakta-śabdaḥ iti | ataḥ uttaram uchyate | sūksham tv iha kāraṇātmanā śarīram vivakshyate sūkshmasya avyakta-śabdārhatvāt | yadyapi sthūlam idam śarīram na svayam avyakta-śabdam arhati tathāpi tasya tv ārambhakam bhūta-sūksham avyakta-śabdam arhati | . . . . attra āha yadi jagad idam anabhivyakta-nāma-rūpam vījātmakam prāg-avastham avyakta-śabdārham abhyupagamyeta tad-ātmanā cha śarīrasyāpy avyakta-śabdārhatvam pratijnāyeta sa eva tarhi pradhāna-kāraṇa-vādaḥ evam saty āpadyeta asya eva jagataḥ prāg-avasthāyāḥ pradhānatvena abhyupagamād iti | attra uchyate | yadi vayam svatantrām kānchit prāg-avasthām jagataḥ kāraṇatvena abhyupagachchhema prasanjayema tadā pradhāna-kāraṇa-vādam | Parmeśvarādhīnā tv iyam asmābhiḥ prāg-avasthā jagato 'bhyupagamyate na svatantrā | sā cha avaśyam abhyupagantavyā | arthavatī hi sā | na hi tayā vinā Parameśvarasya srashṭritvam siddhyati śakti-rahitasya tasya pravṛitty-anupapatteḥ muktānām cha punar-utpattir vidyayā tasyāḥ vīja-śakter dāhāt | avidyātmikā hi sā vīja-śaktir avyakta-śabda-nirdeśyā Parameśvarāśrayā māyāmayī mahāsushuptir yasyām svarūpa-pratibodha-rahitāḥ śerate saṁsāriṇo jīvāḥ | tad etad avyaktam kvachid ākāśa-śabda-nirdishṭam | "etasmin nu khalv akshare Gārgi ākāśaḥ otaś cha protaś cha" iti śruteḥ | kvachid akshara-śabdoditam "aksharāt parataḥ paraḥ" iti śruteḥ | kvachid māyā iti sūchitam "māyām tu prakṛitim vidyād māyinam tu maheśvaram" iti mantra-varṇāt | avyaktā hi sā māyā tattvānyatva-nirūpaṇasya aśakyatvāt | tad idam "mahataḥ param avyaktam" ity uktam avyakta-prabhavatvād mahato yadā Hairaṇyagarbhī buddhir mahān | yadā tu jīvo mahāṁs tadā 'py avyaktādhīnatvāj jīva-bhāvasya mahataḥ param avyaktam ity uktam | avidyā hy avyaktam avidyāvattve cha jīvasya sarvaḥ saṁvyavahāraḥ santato varttate | tach cha avyakta-gatam mahataḥ paratvam abhedopachārāt tad-vikāre śarīre parikalpyate |

"But now this doubt still remains. The assertion that the existence of Pradhāna is not supported by the Veda is, say the Sānkhyas, destitute of proof, as certain Vedic S'ākhās contain passages which have the appearance of affirming Pradhāna. Consequently the causality of Pradhāna has been received by Kapila and other great rishis on the ground that it is established by the Veda; and this is an objection to the state-

ment which you make to the contrary. Until, therefore, it be established that these passages have a different object, the doctrine that an omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world, even though it has been proved, will be again unsettled; and consequently you bring forward a great array of arguments to shew that these texts apply to something else. In the words 'it may be deduced also,' *i.e.* it is determined by inference,—it is shewn that in the opinion of certain schools the doctrine of Pradhāna is scriptural, for in the Kaṭha Upanishad (i. 3, 11) we read the words 'Above the Great one is Avyakta (the Unmanifested one), and above the Unmanifested one is Purusha (Soul).' Here we recognize 'the Great one,' 'the Unmanifested one,' and Purusha, with the same names and in the same order in which they are known to occur in the Smṛiti (*i.e.* the system of Kapila). Here that which is called Pradhāna in the Smṛiti is denoted by the word 'the Unmanifested one,' as we learn both from its being so called in the Smṛiti, and from the epithet 'unmanifested' (which is derived from the words 'not' and 'manifested') being properly applicable to it in consequence of its being devoid of sound, and the other objects of sense: wherefore, from its having this Vedic authority to support it, its (*i.e.* Pradhāna's) unscriptural character is refuted; and it is proved both by the Veda, the Smṛiti, and common notoriety to be the cause of the world. If the Sānkhyas argue thus, we reply that the case is not so; for this text of the Kaṭha Upanishad does not refer to the existence of the 'Great one' and the 'Unmanifested one,' which are defined in the Smṛiti (of Kapila); for here we do not recognize such a self-dependent cause, viz. Pradhāna, composed of the three qualities, as is declared in that Smṛiti, but the mere epithet 'unmanifested.' And this word 'unmanifested,' owing to its sense as a derivative from the words 'not' and 'manifested,' is also applied to anything else which is subtile or indistinguishable, and has not properly a conventional meaning in reference to any particular thing. As for the conventional use which the assertors of Pradhāna make of it, that is a technical application peculiar to themselves, and does not afford any means for determining the sense of the Vedas. Nor does the mere identity of the order (of the three words) furnish any proof of identity of meaning unless we can recognise the essential character of the things to be the same. For no man but a fool, if he saw a cow in the place where he expected to see a horse, would falsely

ascribe to it the character of a horse. And if we determine the sense of the context, it will be found that the Pradhāna imagined by our opponents finds no place here, since it is the 'body' which is indicated in the preceding simile. For here the body as represented under the figure of a chariot, etc., is to be understood by the word 'the Unmanifested.' Why? From the context and the remainder of the sentence. For the context which immediately precedes sets forth the soul, the body, etc., under the figure of a rider, a chariot, etc., as follows: 'Know that the soul is the rider, the body the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses are called the horses, and the objects of sense the roads on which they go. The soul accompanied by the senses and the mind is the enjoyer;[146] so say the wise.' After pointing out (in the following verses) that with these senses, etc., if uncontrouled, the soul gains only this world, but if they are kept under controul, it attains to the highest state of Vishṇu, which is the end of its road; the author (in answer to the question 'What is that highest state of Vishṇu which is the end of the road?') shews in the following verses that it is the supreme Spirit who transcends the senses, etc. (which form the subject of the context), who is alluded to as the goal, and the highest state of Vishṇu: 'The objects of sense are higher than the senses; the mind is higher than the objects of sense; the intellect is higher than the mind; the Great soul is higher than the intellect; the Unmanifested one is higher than the Great soul; the spirit (Purusha) is greater than the Unmanifested: there is nothing higher than Spirit, that is the end, that is the highest goal.'" After observing that the various terms in these lines are the same which had been previously introduced in the simile of the chariot, charioteer, rider, horses, etc., S'ankara assigns the reason of the superiority attributed to each succeeding object over that which precedes it, and then goes on to say in regard to intellect and soul: "'The Great soul is higher than the intellect,' that soul, namely, which is figuratively described as a rider, in the words 'Know the soul to be the rider.' But why is the Soul

[146] The words of the original, both as given here and in the text of the Kaṭha Upanishad are *ātmendriya-mano-yuktam bhoktā*, which are not very clear. The commentators understand *ātman* at the beginning of the compound as denoting body, and supply *ātmānam* as the subject. See Dr. Roer's translation of the Upanishads (Bibl. Ind. p. 107).

superior to the intellect? Both from the use of the word Soul and because it aids the enjoyment of the enjoyer, it is shewn to be superior. Its character as the Great soul is proved by its being the master. . . The intellect of Hiranyagarbha, the first-born, is the highest basis of all intellect; and it is that which is here called the 'Great soul.' It had been previously comprehended under the word 'intellect,' but is here separately specified, because it also is superior to our intellects. . . . . Thus the body alone remains of the objects referred to in the passage. After going over all the others in order, with the view of pointing out the highest state to be attained, he indicates by the one remaining word, the 'Unapparent,' the one remaining subject of the text, viz. the body—such is our conclusion. . . . Hence after examining both the earlier and later portions of the passage, we find that there is no place for the Pradhāna imagined by our opponents." Going on to interpret the next aphorism (i. 4, 2) 'But the subtile body may also be properly called 'unmanifested,' S'ankara begins:

"We have declared that, looking to the context and the only word which remained to be explained, the body, and not Pradhāna, is denoted by the word the 'Unapparent.' But here a doubt arises: 'How can the body be properly designated by the word 'unapparent,' inasmuch as from its grossness it is very distinctly perceptible, and therefore should rather be denoted by the word 'apparent,' while the word 'unapparent' signifies something that is not perceptible? We answer: In this passage the subtile body in its character of cause is intended, since what is subtile is properly designated by the term 'unapparent.' Although this gross body itself cannot properly be described by the word 'Unapparent,' still this term applies to the subtile element which is its originator" . . . . S'ankara begins his interpretation of the next aphorism (i. 4, 3) as follows: "Here the Sānkhyas rejoin: 'If you admit that this world in its primordial condition, before its name and form had been manifested, and while it existed in its rudimentary form, could be properly designated by the word 'Unapparent,' and if the same term be declared applicable to body also while continuing in that state, then your explanation will exactly coincide with our doctrine of Pradhāna as the cause of all things; since you will virtually acknowledge that the original condition of this world was that of Pradhāna. To this we reply: If we admitted any self-dependent original

condition as the cause of the world, we should then lay ourselves open to the charge of admitting that Pradhāna is the cause. But we consider that this primordial state of the world is dependent upon the supreme Deity (Parameśvara) and not self-dependent. And this state to which we refer must of necessity be assumed, as it is essential. For without it the creative action of the supreme Deity could not be accomplished, since, if he were destitute of his Śakti (power), any activity on his part would be inconceivable. And so, too, those who have been emancipated from birth are not born again, because this germinative power (on the destruction,—which implies the previous existence,—of which emancipation depends) is consumed by knowledge.[147] For that germinative power, of which the essence is ignorance, and which is denoted by the word 'Unapparent,' has its centre in the supreme Deity, and is a great illusive sleep, during which mundane souls repose unconscious of their own true nature. This 'Unapparent one' is in some places indicated by the term æther (*ākāśa*), as in the text (Bṛih. Ār. Up. iii. 8, 11) 'On this undecaying Being, o Gārgī, the æther is woven as warp and woof;' in other places by the word 'undecaying' (*akshara*), as in the text, 'Beyond the Undecaying is the Highest;' and is elsewhere designated by the term 'illusion' (*māyā*) as in the line (Śvetaśv. Up. 4, 10) 'Know that Prakṛiti (or matter) is illusion, and the great Deity the possessor of illusion.' For this 'illusion' is 'unapparent,' because it cannot be defined in its essence and difference. This is the 'Unapparent' which is described as above the 'Great one,' since the latter, when regarded as identical with the intellect of Hiraṇyagarbha, springs from the former. And even if the 'Great one' be identified with the embodied soul (*jīva*), the 'Unapparent' can be said to be above it, as the condition of the embodied soul is dependent upon the 'Unapparent.' For the 'Unapparent' is ignorance, and it is during its condition of ignorance that the entire mundane action of the embodied soul is car-

[147] Govinda Ānanda explains this clause as follows: *Bandha-mukti-vyavasthārtham api sā svīkāryyā ity āha "muktānām" iti | yan-nāśād muktiḥ sā svīkāryyā tām vinā eva sṛishṭau muktānām punar bandhāpattir ity arthaḥ* | "In the words 'Those who had been emancipated,' etc., he tells us that this ignorance must be admitted, in order to secure the permanence of emancipation from the bondage (of birth): that is, that ignorance by the destruction of which emancipation is obtained must be admitted; as without it those who had been emancipated would at the creation be again involved in bondage," [because to be released at all, they must be released from something].

ried on. And that superiority of the 'Unapparent' over the 'Great one' is by a figurative description of body as identical with the former attributed to body also."

By these subtle and elaborate explanations S'ankara scarcely appears to make out his point. But I cannot follow further the discussion of this question, and now go on to the eighth aphorism (i. 4, 8) where the purport of another Vedic text is investigated:

"*Chamasa-vad aviśeshāt*" | *punar api pradhāna-vādī aśabdatvam pradhānasya asiddham ity āha* | *kasmāt* | *mantra-varṇāt* | (S'vetāśvatara Upanishad, iv. 5) "*ajām ekām lohita-śukla-krishṇām bahvīḥ prajāḥ srijamānām svarūpāḥ*[148] | *ajo hy eko jushamāṇo 'nuśete jahāty enām bhukta-bhogām ajo 'nyaḥ*" *iti* | *attra hi mantre lohita-śukla-krishṇa-śabdaiḥ rajaḥ-sattva-tamāṁsy abhidhīyante* | *lohitam rajo ranjanātmakatvāt śuklam sattvam prakāśātmakatvāt krishṇam tamaḥ āvaraṇātmakatvāt* | *teshām sāmyāvasthāvayava-dharmair vyapadiśyate lohita-śukla-krishṇā iti* | *na jāyate iti cha* "*ajā*" *syād* "*mūla-prakritir avikritir*" *ity abhyupagamāt* | *nanv ajā-śabdaś chhāgāyām rūḍhaḥ* | *vāḍham* | *sā tu rūḍhir iha na āśrayitum śakyā vidyā-prakaraṇāt* | *sā cha bahvīḥ prajās traiguṇyānvitāḥ janayati* . . . . *tasmāt śruti-mūlā eva pradhānādi-kalpanā Kāpilānām ity evam prāpte brūmaḥ* | *na anena mantreṇa śruti-mūlatvam Sānkhya-vādasya śakyam āśrayitum* | *na hy ayam mantraḥ svātantryeṇa kanchid api vādam samarthayitum utsahate* | *sarvatrāpi yayā kayāchit kalpanayā ajātvādi-sampādanopapatteḥ Sānkhya-vādaḥ eva iha abhipretaḥ iti viśeshāvadhāraṇa-kāraṇābhāvāt* | "*chamasa-vat*" |

"'Because, as in the case of the spoon, there is nothing distinctive.' The assertor of Pradhāna again declares that Pradhāna is not proved to be unscriptural. Why? From the following verse (S'v. Up. iv. 5): 'One unborn male, loving the unborn female of a red, white, and black colour, who forms many creatures possessing her own character, unites himself with her: another unborn male abandons her after he has enjoyed her.' For in this verse the words 'red,' 'white,' and 'black,' denote (the three Qualities) Passion, Goodness, and Darkness; —Passion, from its stimulating character, being designated by the term

148 The text of Dr. Röer's ed. of the Upanishad (Bibl. Ind. vol. vii.) has two various readings in this line, viz. *lohita-krishṇa-varṇām* for *lohita-śukla-krishṇam* (which latter, however, is the reading referred to by S'ankara in his commentary on that work), and *sarūpām* for *svarūpāḥ*.

'red,' Goodness, from its illuminating character, by 'white,' and Darkness, from its enveloping character, by 'black.' The unborn female is described as red, white, and black, with reference to the characteristics of the three components which make up the state of equilibium. She must be called 'unborn' (*Ajā*), because she is not produced, since it is admitted that 'original matter' (Mūla-Prakṛiti = Pradhāna) is not a modification (of any other substance—Sānkhya Kārikā, verse 3). But is not *ajā* the conventional name for 'she-goat?' True (reply the Sānkyas), but that conventional sense cannot be adopted here, because knowledge is the subject of the context. And this unborn female produces many creatures characterized by the three Qualities . . . . And from this it is concluded that the theory of Kapila's followers regarding Pradhāna, etc., is based upon the Veda. We reply: that it cannot be admitted on the strength of this verse that the theory of the Sānkhyas is founded on the Veda. For the verse in question, if regarded independently, is powerless to sustain any hypothesis whatever; and the reason is that, as this description of the state of the unborn female may be rendered applicable on any hypothesis whatever, there is no ground for determining specifically that the Sānkhya theory is here intended—'as in the case of the spoon.'" This aphorism refers to a verse quoted in the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, ii. 2, 3 (Bibl. Ind. p. 413 of the Sanskrit, and p. 174 of Dr. Roer's translation), and beginning 'a cup with its mouth down, and its bottom upwards,' which, as S'ankara remarks, cannot, without some further indication, be applied to any one cup in particular; and in the same way, he argues, the unborn female in the passage under discussion cannot, in the absence of anything to restrict the application in any special way be understood as denoting Pradhāna (*evam ihāpy aviśesho 'jām ekām ity asya mantrasya | na asmin mantre Pradhānam eva ajā 'bhipretā iti śakyate niyantum*). The question then arises what is meant by this 'unborn female.' To this the author of the aphorisms and S'ankara reply, that the word denotes the material substance of a four-fold class of elements, viz. light, heat, water, and food, all derived from the supreme Deity (*Parameśvarād utpannā jyotiḥ-pramukhā tejo 'b-anna-lakshaṇā chatur-vidha-bhūta-grāmasya prakṛiti-bhūtā iyam ajā pratipattavyā*). These four elements he however seems (p. 357) to identify with three, in the words: *bhūta-traya-lakshaṇā eva iyam ajā vijneyā na guṇa-traya-lakshaṇā* | 'This

unborn female is formed by three elements, not by the three qualities;' and the ascription of the three colours in the text to these three elements is supported by a quotation from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vi. 4, 1, which is as follows: *Yad agneḥ rohitam rūpaṁ tejasas tad rūpaṁ yat śuklaṁ tad apāṁ yat krishṇaṁ tad annasya* | "The red colour of fire is that of heat; its white colour is that of water; and its black colour is that of food (which here means earth, according to the commentator on the Chhāndogya Upanishad).[149] In this way, he adds, the words denoting the three colours are used in the proper sense, whereas if applied to the three qualities they would be figuratively employed (*rohitādīnāṁ cha śabdānāṁ rūpa-viśesheshu mukhyatvād bhāktatvāch cha guṇa-vishayatvasya*). Śankara concludes that this verse, descriptive of the unborn female, does not denote any self-dependent material cause called Pradhāna, but is shewn from the context to signify the Divine Power in its primordial state before Name and Form were developed (*na svatantrā kāchit prakritih pradhānaṁ nāma ajā-mantreṇa āmnāyāte iti śakyate vaktum | prakaraṇāt tu sā eva daivī śaktir avyākrita-nāma-rūpā nāma-rūpayoḥ prāg avasthānenāpi mantreṇa āmnāyate ity uchyate*).

Passing over the further questions, which are raised on this subject, I go on to the 11th Sūtra and the comment upon it, from which we learn that the words 'knowing him by whom the five times five men, and the æther are upheld, to be Soul,' etc. (*yasmin pancha pancha-janāḥ ākāśaś cha pratishṭhitaḥ | tam evānyaḥ ātmānam vidvān ityādi*), are adduced by the Sānkhyas in support of their system, as the number of the principles (*tattva*), which it affirms (see Sānkhya Kārikā, verse 3, and Sānkhya Sūtras, i. 61), corresponds to the number twenty-five in this text; while the applicability of the passage is denied by the Vedāntins on the ground that the 'principles' of the Sānkhya are not made up of five homogeneous sets of five each (p. 362); that if the Soul and æther mentioned in the text are added, as they must be, to the twenty-five, the aggregate number will exceed that of the Sānkhya 'principles,' among which both Soul and æther are comprehended (pp. 364 f.); that the fact of the correspondence of the numbers, if admitted, would not suffice to shew that the 'principles' of the Sānkhya were referred to, as they are not elsewhere recognized in the Veda, and as the word

[149] See Babu Rajendra Lāl Mittra's translation of this Upanishad, p. 106.

'men' (*janāḥ*) is not usually applied to denote 'principles' (p. 365); and further that the phrase 'the five five men,' signifies only 'five,' and not 'five times five' (p. 366), etc. The conclusion arrived at in the twelfth aphorism is that the breath, and other vital airs, are referred to in the passage under consideration; and that although the word 'men' (*janāḥ*) is not generally applied to 'breath,' etc., any more than to 'principles,' the reference is determined by the context. Others, as S'ankara observes, explain the term 'the five men' (*panchajanāḥ*) of the gods, fathers, gandharvas, asuras, and rakshases, and others again of the four castes, and the Nishādas.[150] The Vedāntic teacher (Bādarāyaṇa) however, as his commentator adds, has decided that the breath, etc., are intended.

If we now turn to the Sānkhya aphorisms themselves, we shall find that their author constantly refers to texts of the Veda as supporting, coinciding with, or reconcileable with his dogmas. I have noticed the following instances, viz. Sūtras i. 5, 36, 51, 54, 78, 84, 148, 155; ii. 20–22; iii. 14, 15, 80; iv. 22; v, 1, 12, 15, 21; vi. 32, 34, 51, 58, 59, which may be consulted in Dr. Ballantyne's translation. I can only refer more particularly to a few of these with the commentator's remarks.

I begin with Sūtra i. 155,[151] in which the author of the Aphorisms maintains that the great distinctive dogma of the Vedānta, the oneness of Soul, is not supported by the Veda. In Sūtra 150 he had laid it down as his own conclusion, established by the fact of the variety observable in the conditions of birth, etc., that there is a multitude of souls, and he now defends this as conformable to Scripture.

"*Na advaita-śruti-virodho jāti-paratvāt*" | *ātmaikya-śrutīnām virodhas tu nāsti tāsām jāti-paratvāt* | *jātiḥ sāmānyam eka-rūpatvam tattra advaita-śrutīnām tātparyyād na tv akhaṇḍatve prayojanābhāvād ity arthaḥ* | .... *yathā-śruta-jāti-śabdasya ādare tv* "*ātmā idam ekaḥ eva agre asīt*" "*sad eva saumya idam agre āsīd ekam eva advitīyam*" (Chhānd. Up. vi. 2, 1) *ity-ādy-advaita-śruty-upapādakatayā eva sūtram vyākheyam* | "*jāti-paratvāt*" | *vijātīya-dvaita-nishedha-paratvād ity arthaḥ* | *tattra ādya-vyākhyāyām ayam bhāvaḥ* | *ātmaikya-śruti-smṛitishv ekādi-śabdāś chid-*

[150] See the First Volume of this work, pp. 176 ff.
[151] i. 154 in Dr. Hall's edition in the Bibl. Ind.

ekarūpatā-mātra-parāḥ bhedādi-śabdāś cha vaidharmya-lakshaṇa-bheda-parāḥ |

"155. 'This is not opposed to the Vedic doctrine of non-duality, since that merely refers to genus.' Our doctrine that souls are numerous does not conflict with the Vedic texts which affirm the oneness of Soul, since these passages refer to oneness of genus. Genus means sameness, oneness of nature; and it is to this that the texts regarding non-duality relate, and not to the undividedness (or identity) of Soul; since there is no occasion for the latter view. The Sūtra must be explained with due regard to the sense of the word genus as it occurs in the Veda, so as (thereby) to bring out the proper meaning of such texts, expressing non-duality, as these, 'This was in the beginning Soul, one only;' 'This was in the beginning, o fair youth, Existent, one without a second.' The words 'since that merely refers to genus,' mean 'since that is merely intended to deny a duality denoting a difference of genus.' The first of two interpretations given of the Sūtra is as follows: In the texts of the S'ruti and Smṛiti relating to the oneness of Soul, the words 'One,' etc., denote simply that Spirit is one in its nature; whilst the words, 'distinction,' etc., designate a distinction defined as difference of nature." At the close of his remarks the commentator gives a second explanation of the Sūtra.

The author returns to this subject in the 61st Sūtra of the fifth Book:

"*Na advaitam ātmano lingāt tad-bheda-pratīteḥ*" | *yadyapy ātmanām anyonyam bheda-vākya-vad abheda-vākyāny api santi tathāpi na advaitam* | *na atyantam abhedaḥ* | *ajādi-vākya-sthaiḥ prakṛiti-tyāgātyāgādi-lingair bhedasyaiva siddher ity arthaḥ* | *na hy atyantābhede tāni lingāny upapadyante* |

"'Soul is not one; for a distinction of souls is apparent from various signs.' Although there are texts affirming that there is no distinction, just as there are others which assert a distinction, of souls, still non-duality, *i.e.* an absolute absence of distinction must be denied; because a distinction is established by signs, such as the abandonment and non-abandonment of Prakṛiti, etc., mentioned in such texts as that about the 'unborn female,' etc. (See above, p. 165.) For these signs are inconsistent with the hypothesis of an absolute absence of distinction," etc.

A kindred subject is introduced in the next Sūtra, the 62nd:

"*Na anātmanā 'pi pratyaksha-bādhāt*" | *anātmanā 'pi bhogya-prapan-*

chena ātmano na advaitam pratyakshenāpi bādhāt | ātmanaḥ sarva-bhogyābhede ghaṭa-paṭayor apy abhedaḥ syāt | ghaṭādeḥ paṭādy-abhinnātmābhedāt | sa cha bheda-grāhaka-pratyaksha-bādhitaḥ |

"'Further, there is not an absence of distinction (*i.e.* identity) between Soul and non-soul, as this is disproved by the evidence of sense.' That is: non-duality (*i.e.* identity) is not predicable of Soul on the one hand, and non-soul, *i.e.* the perceptible objects by which our senses are affected, on the other, because this is opposed to the evidence of sense. For if soul were identical with all that is perceptible, there would also be no distinction between a jar and cloth, inasmuch as jars, etc., would not be distinct from soul which is not distinct from cloth, etc.; and such identity (of jars, etc., with cloth, etc.) is opposed to the evidence of sense which obliges us to perceive a distinction."

But how is this to be reconciled with such Vedic texts as 'this is nothing but soul' (*ātmā eva idam*)? An answer is given in Sūtra 64, which seems to admit that the passages in question do at least on a *prima facie* view convey the sense ascribed to them by the Vedāntins:

"Anya-paratvam avivekānām tattra" | avivekānām aviveki-purushān prati tattra advaite 'nya-paratvam upāsanārthakānuvādaḥ ity arthaḥ | loke hi śarīra-śarīriṇor bhogya-bhoktroś cha avivekena abhedo vyavahriyate "'haṁ gauro" "mama ātmā Bhadrasenaḥ" ityādiḥ | atas tam eva vyavahāram anūdya tān eva prati tathā upāsanām śrutir vidadhāti sattva-śuddhy-ādy-artham iti |

"'These texts have another object, with a view to those who have no discrimination.' That is: in the passages which affirm non-duality another object is intended, viz. a reference (to vulgar ideas) with a view to stimulate devotion. For it commonly occurs that undiscriminating persons confound the body and the soul, the object to be experienced, and the person who experiences it, as when they say 'I am white,' 'Bhadrasena is myself.' The Veda, therefore, referring to this mode of speaking, inculcates on such undiscerning people the practice of devotion with a view to the promotion of goodness, purity, etc."

The author returns to the subject of non-duality in Sūtra vi. 51, which is introduced by the remark:

Nanv evam pramāṇādy-anurodhena dvaita-sidhhāv advaita-śruteḥ kā gatir iti |

"But if duality be thus established in accordance with proofs, etc., what becomes of the Vedic texts declaring non-duality?"

The answer is as follows:

"*Na śruti-virodho rāgiṇām vairāgyāya tat-siddheḥ*" | *advaita-śruti-virodhas tu nāsti rāginām purushātirikte vairāgyāya eva śrutibhir advaita-sādhanāt* |

"'Our view is not opposed to the Veda, as the texts in question establish non-duality with a view to produce apathy in those who are actuated by desire.' That is to say: There is in our doctrine regarding non-duality nothing contrary to the Veda, as the passages referred to affirm this principle with the view of producing in those who have desire an indifference in regard to everything except Soul."

The 12th aphorism of the fifth Book asserts that according to the Veda, Pradhāna, and not Īśvara, is the cause of the world. The details of the reasoning on which this view is founded, as here stated by the commentator, differ in some respects from those which S'ankara puts into the mouth of the Sānkhyas:

"*S'rutir api pradhāna-kāryyatvasya*" | *prapanche pradhāna-kāryyatvasya eva śrutir asti na chetana-kāraṇatve* | *yathā* "*ajām ekām lohita-śukla-krishṇām bahvīḥ prajāḥ srijamānām sarūpāḥ*" | "*tad ha idam tarhy avyākṛitam asīt tad nāma-rūpābhyām vyākriyata*" *ity-adir ity arthaḥ* | *yā cha* "*tad aikshata bahu syām*" *ityādiś chetana-kāraṇatā-śrutiḥ sā sargādāv utpannasya mahat-tattvopādhikasya mahāpurushasya janya-jnāna-parā* | *kimvā bahu-bhavanānurodhāt pradhāne eva* "*kūlam pipatishati*" *iti-vad gauṇī* | *anyathā* "*sākshī chetāḥ kevalo nirguṇaś cha*" (S'vetāśvatara Upanishad, vi. 11) *ity-ādi-śruty-uktāpariṇāmitvasya purushe 'nupapatter iti* | *ayam cha īśvara-pratishedhaḥ aiśvaryye vairāgyārtham īśvara-jnānam vinā 'pi moksha-pratipādanārtham cha praudhi-vāda-māttram iti prāg eva vyākhyātam* |

"'There are also Vedic texts to support the doctrine that the world has sprung from Pradhāna, as its cause.' That is: There are Vedic texts to shew that the phenomenal world has sprung from Pradhāna, and that it has not had a conscious being for its cause. They are such as these: 'An unborn female, red, white, and black in hue, producing many creatures like herself, etc.;' 'This was once undeveloped: it was developed with Name and Form.' As regards those other texts which affirm the causality of a conscious being, such as 'It reflected, let me become many,' they refer to the knowledge which sprang up in the great Male who was produced at the beginning of the creation pos-

sessing the attributes of the principle of Intellect (*Mahat*). Or, in accordance with the idea of becoming multiplied, the expression (indicating consciousness and will) is figuratively applied to Pradhāna, as when it is said of the bank of a river that it 'intends to fall.' For on any other supposition the incapability of any modification which is ascribed to Purusha in such texts as 'He who is the witness, the conscious, the sole being, free from the Qualities,' could not properly be applied to him (since if he were the material cause of the creation he must become modified). And it has been before explained[152] that this denial of an Īśvara is a mere display of ingenuity, introduced for the purpose of producing apathy in regard to glory, and of propounding a method of final liberation even independently of the knowledge of an Īśvara."

The following is the 34th Sūtra of the sixth Book, with the remarks by which it is introduced and followed:

Nanu "bahvīḥ prajāḥ purushāt samprasūtāḥ" ity-ādi-śruteḥ purushasya kāraṇatvāvagamād vivarttādi-vādāḥ āśrayaṇīyāḥ ity āśankya āha | "śruti-virodhād na kutarkāpasadasya ātma-lābhaḥ" | purusha-kāraṇatāyāṁ ye ye pakshāḥ sambhāvitās te sarve śruti-viruddhāḥ iti | atas tad-abhyupagantṛīṇāṁ kutārkikādy-adhamānām ātma-svarūpa-jnānaṁ na bhavati ity arthaḥ | etena ātmani sukha-duḥkhādi-guṇopādānatva-vādino 'pi kutārkikāḥ eva | teshām apy ātma-yathārtha-jnānaṁ nāsti ity avagantavyam | ātma-kāraṇatā-śrutayaś cha śakti-śaktimad-abhedena upāsanārthāḥ eva "ajām ekām" ity-ādi-śrutibhiḥ pradhāna-kāraṇatā-siddheḥ | yadi cha ākāśasya abhrādy-adhishṭhāna-kāraṇatā-vad ātmanaḥ kāraṇatvam uchyate tadā tad na nirākurmaḥ pariṇāmasya pratishedhāt |

"But must we not adopt the theories of an illusory creation, etc., because the causality of Purusha (soul) is to be learned from such texts as the following 'many creatures have been produced from Purusha?' To this difficulty he replies: 'From his opposition to Scripture the illogical outcaste does not attain to Soul.' The sense of this is, that all the propositions, affirming the causality of Soul, which have been devised, are contrary to the Veda; and consequently the low class of bad logicians, etc., who adopt them have no knowledge of the nature of

[152] See Vijnāna Bhikshu's remarks, introductory to the Sūtras (p. 5, at the foot), which will be quoted in the next Section, and his comment on Sūtra i. 92. He is, as we shall find, an eclectic, and not a thorough-going adherent of the Sānkhya.

Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those also who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities of pleasure and pain, etc., are incompetent reasoners: they too are destitute of the true knowledge of Soul. The Vedic texts which declare its causality are intended to inculcate devotion on the ground that there is no distinction between Power (*S'akti*) and the possessor of Power (*S'aktimat*); for the causality of Pradhāna is established by such texts as that relating to the 'one unborn female,' etc. But if it be affirmed that Soul is the cause of the world merely in the same sense in which the æther is the cause of clouds, etc., viz. by affording them a receptacle, we do not object to that, since we only deny the transformation (of Soul into material productions)."[153]

In regard to the question whether the principles of the Vedānta or those of the Sānkhya are most in harmony with the most prevalent doctrine of the Upanishads, I shall quote some of the remarks of Dr. Röer, the translator of many of these treatises. In his introduction to the Taittirīya Upanishad he observes that we there find "the tenets peculiar to the Vedānta already in a far advanced state of development; it contains as in a germ the principal elements of this system." "There are, however," he adds, "differences" (Bibliotheca Indica, vol. xv. p. 5). The same nearly is the case with the Aitareya Upanishad (ibid. p. 27). In reference to the S'vetāśvatara Upanishad he remarks: "S'ankara in his commentary on this Upanishad generally explains its fundamental views in the spirit of the Vedānta. He is sometimes evidently wrong in identifying the views of some of the other Upanishads with the tenets of the Vedānta, but he is perfectly right to do so in the explanation of an Upanishad which appears to have been composed for the express purpose of making the principle of the Vedānta agreeable to the followers of the Sānkhya" (ibid. pp. 43 f.). Of the Kaṭha Upanishad Dr. Röer says (ibid. p. 97): "The standing point of the Kaṭha is on the whole that of the Vedānta. It is the absolute spirit which is the foundation of the world. . . . . In the order of manifestations or emanations from the absolute spirit it deviates, however, from that adopted by the other Upanishads and by the later Vedānta, and is evidently more closely allied to the Sānkhya. The order is here: The unmanifested (*avyakta*), the great soul (*mahātma*, or *mahat*), intellect

[153] See Dr. Ballantyne's translation, which I have often followed. He does not, however, render in extenso all the passages which I have reproduced.

(*buddhi*), mind, the objects of the senses, and the senses," etc.[154] The reader who wishes to pursue the subject further may consult the same author's remarks on the other Upanishads. On the whole question of the relation of the Vedānta and the Sānkhya respectively to the Veda, Dr. Röer thus expresses himself in his introduction to the S'vetāśvatara Upanishad (p. 36): "The Vedānta, although in many important points deviating from the Vedas, and although in its own doctrine quite independent of them, was yet believed to be in perfect accordance with them, and being adopted by the majority of the Brāhmans, it was never attacked on account of its orthodoxy. The same cannot be said of the Sānkhya; for it was not only frequently in opposition to the doctrine of the Vedas, but sometimes openly declared so. Indeed, the Vedānta also maintained that the acquisition of truth is independent of caste (1) or any other distinction, and that the highest knowledge which is the chief end of man cannot be imparted by the Vedas (vide Kaṭha ii. 23); yet it insisted that a knowledge of the Vedas was necessary to prepare the mind for the highest knowledge (2). This the Sānkhya denied altogether, and although it referred to the Vedas, and especially to the Upanishads, still it did so only when they accorded with its own doctrines, and it rejected their authority (3) in a case of discrepancy."

I make a few remarks on some points in this quotation indicated by the figures (1), (2), and (3). (1) We have already learned above, p. 99, that, according to the Brahma Sūtras (see i. 3, 34 ff., and S'ankara's explanation of them), at least, a S'ūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge. (2) It appears from S'ankara's argument against Jaimini that he does not consider a knowledge of the ceremonial part of the Veda as necessary for the acquisition of divine knowledge, but he seems to regard the Upanishads as the source from which the latter is derived. (3) I do not know on what authority this statement that the Sānkhyas ever actually rejected the authority of the Vedas is founded. Their attempts to reconcile their tenets with the letter of the Veda may often seem to be far-fetched and sophistical; but I have not observed that S'ankara, while arguing elaborately against the interpretations of the Sānkhyas, anywhere charges them either with denying the authority of the Veda, or with insincerity in the appeals which they make to the sacred texts.

[154] See above, p. 161.

On the subject of the Upanishads the reader may also consult Prof. Max Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature.

I subjoin in a note some extracts from this work.[155]

The Nyāya and Vaiśeshika Sūtras do not appear to contain nearly so many references to Vedic texts as the Sānkhya; but I have noticed the following: Nyāya iii. 32 (= iii. 1, 29 in the Bibl. Ind.); Vaiśeshika ii. 1, 17; iii. 2, 21; iv. 2, 11; v. 2, 10.

The author of the Vaiśeshika Sūtras affirms, in iii. 2, 20, the doctrine that souls are numerous; and in the 21st Sūtra, which I quote, along with the comment of S'ankara Miśra, and the gloss of the editor Paṇḍit Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapanchānana, he claims Vedic authority for this tenet:

21. "*S'āstra-sāmarthyāch cha*" | (S'ankara Miśrā) *S'āstraṁ srutiḥ* |

[155] "They (the Upanishads) contain, or are supposed to contain, the highest authority on which the various systems of philosophy in India rest. Not only the Vedānta philosopher, who, by his very name, professes his faith in the ends and objects of the Veda, but the Sānkhya, the Vais'eshika, the Nyāya, and Yoga philosophers, all pretend to find in the Upanishads some warranty for their tenets, however antagonistic in their bearing. The same applies to the numerous sects that have existed and still exist in India. Their founders, if they have any pretensions to orthodoxy, invariably appeal to some passage in the Upanishads in order to substantiate their own reasonings. Now it is true that in the Upanishads themselves there is so much freedom and breadth of thought that it is not difficult to find in them some authority for almost any shade of philosophical opinion." (p. 316 f.) Again: "The early Hindus did not find any difficulty in reconciling the most different and sometimes contradictory opinions in their search after truth; and a most extraordinary medley of oracular sayings might be collected from the Upanishads, even from those which are genuine and comparatively ancient, all tending to elucidate the darkest points of philosophy and religion, the creation of the world, the nature of God, the relation of man to God, and similar subjects. That one statement should be contradicted by another seems never to have been felt as any serious difficulty." (p. 320 f.) Once more: "The principal interest of the older Upanishads consists in the absence of that systematic uniformity which we find in the later systems of philosophy; and it is to be regretted that nearly all the scholars who have translated portions of the Upanishads have allowed themselves to be guided by the Brahmanic commentators," etc. (p. 322). "In philosophical discussions, they (the Brahmans) allowed the greatest possible freedom; and although at first three philosophical systems only were admitted as orthodox (the two Mīmānsās and the Nyāya), their number was soon raised to six, so as to include the Vais'eshika, Sānkhya, and Yoga schools. The most conflicting views on points of vital importance were tolerated as long as their advocates succeeded, no matter by what means, in bringing their doctrines into harmony with passages of the Veda, strained and twisted in every possible sense. If it was only admitted that besides the perception of the senses and the induction of reason, revelation also, as contained in the Veda, furnished a true basis for human knowledge, all other points seemed to be of minor importance." (p. 78 f.)

tayā 'py ātmano bheda-pratipādanāt | śruyate hi . . . . (Jayanārāyaṇa) *ito 'py jīvasya īśvara-bhinnatvam ity āha | śāstrasya śruteḥ śāmarthyāj jīveśvarayor bheda-bodhakatvāt | tathā hi |* "*dve brahmaṇī veditavye*" (Maitrī Up. vi. 22) | "*dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānaṁ vṛiksham parishasvajāte | tayor anyaḥ pippalaṁ svādu atti anaśnann anyo abhichākaśīti*" (Rig-veda Sanhitā, i. 164, 20; Svetāśv. Up. vi. 6; Muṇḍaka Up. i. 3, 1, 1) *ity-ādi-śruter jīveśvarayor bhedo 'vaśyam angīkāryyaḥ | na cha* "*tat tvam asi S'vetaketo*" "*Brahma-vid Brahma eva bhavati*" *ity-ādi-śrutīnāṁ kā gatir iti vāchyam |* "*tat tvam asi*" *iti śrutes tad-abhedena tadīyatva-pratipādanena abheda-bhāvanā-paratvāt |* "*Brahma-vid Brahma eva*" *iti śrutis cha nirduḥkhatvādinā Īśvara-sāmyaṁ jīvasya abhidhatte na tu tad-abhedam |* "*niranjanaḥ paraṁ sāmyam upaiti*" *iti śruter gaty-antarāsambhavāt | asti hi laukika-vākyeshu* "*sampad-ādhikye purohito 'yaṁ rājā saṁvṛittaḥ*" *ity-ādishu sādṛiśya-pareshv abhedopachāraḥ | na cha moksha-daśāyām ajnāna-nivṛittāv abhedo jāyate iti vāchyaṁ bhedasya nityatvena nāśāyogād bheda-nāśāngīkāre 'pi vyakti-dvayāvasthānasya āvaśyakatvāch cha iti sankshepaḥ | bheda-sādhakāni yukty-antarāṇi śruty-antarāṇi cha grantha-gaurava-bhiyā parityaktāni |*

"'And this opinion is confirmed by the S'āstra.' (S'ankara Miśra) The S'āstra means the Veda; by which also a distinction of Souls is established. For it is said," etc. [He then quotes two texts which are repeated by Jayanārāyaṇa, the author of the gloss, whose remarks are as follows:] "There is another proof of the Soul being distinct from Īśvara; viz. this, that it is confirmed by the S'āstra, the Veda, which declares the distinctness of the two; and this principle must of necessity be admitted from such texts as these: 'Two Brăhmăs are to be known;'[156] and 'Two birds, united, friends, attach themselves to the same tree; one of them eats the sweet fruit of the pippala tree, while the other, without eating, looks on.' Nor are we to ask what will then become of such other texts as (1) 'Thou art that, o S'vetaketu;' (2) 'He who knows Brahma becomes Brahma;' for the former of these two passages (1) tends to convey the idea of identity by representing as identity with That, the fact of S'vetaketu's entirely belonging to That; whilst

[156] The full text is: *Dve brahmaṇī veditavye śabda-brahma paraṁ cha yat—śabda-brahmaṇi nishṇātaḥ param brahmādhigachhati* | "Two Brăhmăs are to be known, the verbal and the supreme. He who is initiated in the former attains the latter." Here, however, by the verbal Brăhmă, the Veda must be intended.

the second (2) affirms the equality of the Soul with Īśvara, in consequence of its freedom from pain and other weaknesses, and not its identity with Him; for it is shewn by another Vedic text, viz. 'The passionless man attains the highest state of equality,' that any other destiny would be inconceivable. In secular modes of speaking also, such as the following, 'From the abundance of his wealth the domestic priest has become the king,' we find a figurative assertion of identity. Nor can it be said that distinction disappears on the cessation of ignorance in the state of final emancipation, because distinction, from its eternity, cannot be destroyed, and because, even if its destructibility were admitted, two separate personalities must still continue to exist. Such is a summary of our argument: further proofs from reasoning, and further texts of the Veda, are omitted from a dread of making the book too bulky."

The charge of open contempt of the Veda is brought by S'ankara against S'āṉḍilya, the author of the Bhāgavata heresy, as the orthodox Vedāntin considers it.[157] Of that doctrine S'ankara thus speaks in his remarks on Brahma Sūtra ii. 2, 45:

Veda-vipratishedhaś cha bhavati | chaturshu vedeshu paraṁ śreyo 'labdhvā S'āṉḍilyaḥ idaṁ śāstram adhigatavān ity-ādi-veda-nindā-darśanāt | tasmād asangatā eshā kalpanā iti siddham |

"And it also contradicts the Veda: for we see such an instance of contempt of the Vedas as this, that S'āṉḍilya, not finding the means of attaining the highest good in the whole four of them, devised this S'āstra. Hence it is established that these imaginations are absurd."

The points of the Bhāgavata doctrine objected to by S'ankara do not however appear to be those which are principally insisted on in the Bhakti Sūtras of S'āṉḍilya, published by Dr. Ballantyne in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1861. I will notice some of these doctrines. The leading principle of the system is that it is not knowledge (*jnāna*) but devotion (*bhakti*) which is the means of attaining final liberation (Sūtra 1). Devotion is defined in the 2nd Sūtra to be a supreme love of God (*sā parā anuraktir Īśvare*). Knowledge cannot, the author considers, be the means of liberation, as it may co-exist with hatred of the object known (Sūtra 4). Neither the study of the Veda nor the acqui-

[157] See Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, i. 413: "A passage quoted by S'ankara Āchārya seems to intimate that its promulgator was S'āṉḍilya," etc., etc.

sition of such qualities as tranquility of mind is a necessary preliminary to devotion. The only requisite is a desire of emancipation, according to the commentator (remarks on Sūtra 1). Ceremonial works, too, have no bearing upon devotion (Sūtra 7), which may be practised by men of all castes, and even by Chāṇḍālas, since the desire to get rid of the evils of mundane existence is common to all (Sūtra 78). The commentator explains that the authority of the Vedas as the only source of supernatural knowledge is not denied, nor the fact that only the three highest castes have the right to study them: but it is urged that women, S'ūdras, etc., may attain by means of the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, etc., to knowledge founded on the Vedas, whilst Chāṇḍālas, etc., may acquire it by traditional instruction based on the Smṛiti and the practice of virtuous men. Those whose devotion is not matured in the present world, will find the opportunity of perfecting it in S'vetadvīpa, the world of the divine Being (Sūtra 79). Even the wicked may have a penitential devotion (*ārtti-bhaktāv eva adhikāraḥ*), and after they are freed from their guilt, they may attain to full devotion. The Bhagavad Gītā is much quoted by the commentator on these Sūtras; but the Veda is also sometimes adduced in proof of their doctrines; as *e.g.* the following words of the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 25, 2, are cited to prove that devotion is the chief requisite, and knowledge, etc., subservient to it:

"*Ātmā eva idaṁ sarvam iti | sa vai esha evam paśyann evam manvānaḥ evaṁ vijānann ātma-ratir ātma-krīḍaḥ ātma-mithunaḥ ātmānandaḥ sa svarāḍ bhavati" | tattra "ātma-rati-"rūpāyāḥ para-bhakteḥ "paśyann" iti darśanam apriyatvādi-bhrama-nirāsa-mukhena angaṁ bhavati* |

"'All this is Soul. He who perceives this, thinks this, knows this, delights in Soul, sports with Soul, consorts with Soul, takes pleasure in Soul; he becomes self-resplendent.' Here the sight expressed in the words 'perceiving,' etc., is by removing all errors regarding disagreeableness, etc., an adjunct of supreme devotion in the form of 'delight in Soul.'"

In his remarks on Sūtra 31 the commentator quotes another passage of the same Upanishad, iii. 14, 4, in which a S'āṇḍilya is referred to as the author of a statement. S'ankara in his commentary on the Upanishad calls him a rishi. He cannot, however, have been the same person as the author of the Sūtras; although, even if he had been so reputed,

S'ankara would have had little difficulty in denying that they could have been written by a rishi, as we shall see in the next section that he contradicts the opinion that the rishi Kapila, referred to in the S'vetāśvatara Upanishad, was the author of the Sānkhya aphorisms.

SECT. XI.—*Distinction in point of authority between the Veda and the Smritis or non-Vedic S'āstras, as stated in the Nyāya-mālā-vistara, and by the Commentators on Manu, and the Vedānta, etc.; difference of opinion between S'ankara and Madhusūdana regarding the orthodoxy of Kapila and Kaṇāda, etc.; and Vijnāna Bhikshu's view of the Sānkhya.*

A distinct line of demarcation is generally drawn by the more critical Indian writers between the Vedas, and all other classes of Indian S'āstras, however designated. The former, as we have seen, are considered to possess an independent authority and to be infallible, while the latter are regarded as deriving all their authority from the Veda, and (in theory at least) as infallible guides only in so far as they coincide with its dicta. This will be clear from the following passages:

I. *Nyāya-mālā-vistara.*—The first text which I adduce has been already quoted in the Second Volume of this work, but is repeated here for facility of reference. It is from the treatise just named, i. 3, 24:

Baudhāyanāpastambāśvalāyana-kātyāyanādi-nāmānkitāḥ kalpa-sūtrādi-granthāḥ nigama- nirukta-shaḍ-anga-granthāḥ Manv-ādi-smṛitayaś cha apaurusheyāḥ dharma-buddhi-janakatvāt veda-vat | na cha mūla-pramāṇa-sāpekshatvena veda-vaishamyam iti śankanīyam | utpannāyāḥ buddheḥ svataḥ-prāmāṇyāngīkāreṇa nirapekshatvāt | Maivam | uktānumānasya kālātyayāpadishṭatvāt | Baudhāyana-sūtram Āpastamba-sūtram ity evam purusha-nāmnā te granthāḥ uchyante | na cha Kāṭhakādi-samākhyā-vat pravachana-nimittatvaṁ yuktam | tad-grantha-nirmāṇa-kāle tadānīntanaiḥ kaiśchid upalabdhatvāt | tach cha avichhinna-pāramparyeṇa anuvarttate | tataḥ Kālidāsādi-grantha-vat paurusheyāḥ | tathāpi veda-mūlatvāt pramāṇam | . . . . kalpasya vedatvaṁ nādyāpi siddham | kintu prayatnena sādhanīyam | na cha tat sādhayituṁ śakyam | paurusheyatvasya samākhyayā tat-karttur upalambhena cha sādhitatvāt |

"It may be said that the Kalpa Sūtras and other works designated by the names of Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, Āśvalayana, Kātyāyana, etc.,

and the Nigama, Nirukta, and six Vedāngas, together with the Smṛitis of Manu and others, are superhuman, because they impart a knowledge of duty, as the Vedas do; and that they should not be suspected of inferiority to the Vedas on the ground that they depend upon a primary authority, since the knowledge which they impart is independent, because it is admitted to be self-evidencing. But this view is incorrect, for the inference in question proceeds upon an erroneous generalization. The books referred to are called by the names of men, as 'the Sūtras of Baudhāyana,' 'the Sūtras of Āpastamba;' and these designations cannot correctly be said to originate in the exposition of the works by those teachers whose names they bear (as is really the case in regard to the Kāṭhaka, and other parts of the Veda); for it was known to some of the contemporaries of these men, at the time when they were composing these Sūtras, Smṛitis, etc., that they were so engaged; and this knowledge has descended by unbroken tradition. Hence these books are, like the works of Kālidāsa and others, of human origin. Nevertheless, they possess authority, as being founded on the Veda." . . . The following additional remarks represent the opinion of the Guru (Prabhākara) on the same question: "It is not yet proved that the Kalpa Sūtras possess the character of the Veda; it would require great labour to prove it; and, in fact, it is impossible to prove it. For the human origin of these books is established by the names which they bear, and by their being observed to have had authors."

II. *Kullūka.*—The same thing is admitted by Kullūka, the commentator on Manu, who (in his remarks on i. 1) thus defines the relation of his author to the Vedas:

Paurusheyatve 'pi Manu-vākyānām avigīta-mahājana-parigrahāt śruty-upagrahāch cha veda-mūlakatayā prāmāṇyam | Tathā cha chhāndogya-brāhmaṇe śrūyate "Manur vai yat kinchid avadat tad bheshajam bheshajatāyai" iti | Vṛihaspatir apy āha "Vedārthopanibandhṛitvāt prādhānyam hi Manoḥ smṛitam | Manv-artha-viparītā tu yā smṛitiḥ sā na śasyate | Tāvach chhāstrāṇi śobhante tarka-vyākaraṇāni cha | Dharmārtha-mokshopadeshṭā Manur yāvad na dṛiśyate" | Mahābhārate 'py uktam "Purāṇam Mānavo dharmaḥ sāngo vedaś chikitsitam | ājnā-siddhāni chatvāri na hantavyāni hetubhiḥ" | virodhi-Bauddhādi-tarkair na hantavyāni | anukūlas tu mīmāṁsādi-tarkaḥ pravarttanīyaḥ eva | ata eva vakshyati "ārshaṁ dharmopadeśaṁ cha veda-śāstrāvirodhinā | yas tarkeṇānusandhatte sa dharmaṁ veda netaraḥ" iti |

"Though the Institutes of Manu had a personal author, still, as their reception by illustrious men of unimpeached [orthodoxy], and their conformity to the Veda, prove that they are based upon the latter, they are authoritative. Accordingly it is recorded in the Chhāndogya Brāhmaṇa that, 'Whatever Manu said is a medicine for remedial purposes.' And Vṛihaspati says: 'As Manu depends upon the contents of the Veda, he is traditionally celebrated as pre-eminent. But that Smṛiti which is contrary to the sense of Manu, is not approved. Scriptures and books on logic and grammar are all eclipsed as soon as Manu, our instructor in duty, and in the means of attaining both earthly prosperity, and final liberation, is beheld.' And it is said in the Mahābhārata: 'The Purāṇas, the Institutes of Manu, the Veda with its appendages, and treatises on medicine, these four, which are established by authority, are not to be assailed by rationalistic arguments;' that is, they are not to be attacked by hostile reasonings, such as those of the Bauddhas. But friendly arguments, such as those of the Mīmānsakas, are to be employed. And accordingly we shall find below (Manu xii. 106) that he says, 'the man who investigates the injunctions of the rishis, and the rules of duty by reasoning which is agreeable to the Veda, he, and he only, is acquainted with duty.'" (See above, p. 24, note 29.)

III. *Nyāya-mālā-vistara.*—But the precepts of the Smṛiti are not considered useless or superfluous. On the contrary, an authority is attributed to them corresponding to the antiquity, elevated position, and sacred character of their supposed authors. Thus the author of the Nyāya-mālā-vistara says (i. 3, 3):

Vimatā smṛitir veda-mūlā | vaidika-manv-ādi-praṇīta-smṛititvāt | upanayanādhyayanādi-smṛiti-vat | na ćha vaiyarthyam śankanīyam | asmad-ādīnām pratyaksheshu parokseshu nānā vedeshu viprakīrṇasya anushṭheyārthasya ekatra sankshipyamāṇatvāt |

"The variously understood Smṛiti is founded on the Veda, because the traditions, such as those regarding investiture, study, etc., have been compiled by Vedic men, such as Manu and others. Nor is it to be surmised that the Smṛiti is useless, since it throws together in a condensed form a variety of injunctions regarding matters to be observed, which are scattered through different Vedas, both such as are visible and such as are invisible to us." (This last expression appears

to refer to the supposition that some parts of the Veda which Manu and others had before them when compiling their own works have now been lost. See Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 103–107.)

Accordingly the Smṛitis have an authority superior to that founded merely on the practice of learned men of modern date, who have no intuition into the past and invisible. Thus the Nyāya-mālā-vistara says (i. 3, 19):

Na hi idānīntanāḥ śishṭāḥ Manv-ādi-vad deśa-kāla-viprakṛishtaṁ vedaṁ divya-jnānena sākshātkarttuṁ śaknuvanti yena śishṭāchāro mūla-vedam anumāpayet |

"For learned men of the present day do not possess the power, which Manu and others had, of placing before their minds, through divine knowledge, the Veda which is far removed from them both in place and time, so as to justify us in regarding the practice of these moderns as a sufficient ground for inferring the existence of a Veda as its foundation."

But as learned men, in any particular country or at any particular time, may be able to consult some Smṛiti which authorizes their particular observances, "these observances may serve as ground for inferring the existence of some Smṛiti on which they are founded, but not for inferring a Veda (*tasmāch chhishṭāchāreṇa smṛitir anumātuṁ śakyate na tu śrutiḥ*). But a Smṛiti which is thus merely inferred to exist is set aside by any visibly existing Smṛiti of contrary import (*anumitā cha smṛitir viruddhayā pratyakshayā smṛityā bādhyate*)."

IV. *S'ankara.*—The above passages, by assuming that Manu and other eminent sages had the power of consulting Vedic texts now no longer accessible, make them practically almost infallible. The same view is taken by S'ankara Āchāryya. (See, however, the passage quoted from him above, in note 67, p. 62; but there he has the author of the Sānkhya in view, whose tenets he regarded as contrary to the Veda.) In answer to the remark of a Mīmānsaka objector stated in the comment on the Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 32, that the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, being of human origin, have only a derived and secondary authority ('*itihāsa-purāṇam api paurusheyatvāt pramāṇāntara-mūlatām ākānkshate*'), Sankara argues in his explanation of the following Sūtra (i. 3, 33) that they have an independent foundation:

Itihāsa-purāṇam api vyākhyātena mārgeṇa sambhavad mantrārthavāda-

mūlatvāt prabhavati devatā-vigrahādi prapanchayitum | pratyaksha-mūlam api sambhavati | bhavati hi asmākam apratyaksham api chirantanānām pratyaksham | tathā cha Vyāsādayo devatābhiḥ pratyaksham vyavaharanti iti smaryate | yas tu brūyād idānīntanānām iva pūrveshām api nāsti devādibhir vyavaharttum sāmarthyam iti sa jagad-vaichitryam pratishedet | idānīm iva cha na anyadā 'pi sārvabhaumaḥ kshatriyo 'sti iti brūyāt tataś cha rāja-sūyādi-chodanāḥ uparundhyāt | idānīm iva cha kālāntare 'py avyavasthita-prāyān varṇāśrama-dharmān pratijānīta tataś cha vyavasthā-vidhāyi śāstram anarthakam kuryāt | Tasmād dharmotkarsha-vaśāt chirantanāḥ devādibhiḥ pratyaksham vyajahrur iti ślishyate | api cha smaranti "svādhyāyādishṭa-devatā-samprayogaḥ" ityādi | yogo 'py aṇimādy-aiśvarya-prāpti-phalakaḥ smaryamāṇo na śakyate sāhasa-mātreṇa pratyākhyātum | śrutiś cha yoga-māhātmyam prakhyāpayati | "pṛithvy-ap-tejo-'nila-khe samutthite panchātmake yoga-guṇe pravṛitte | na tasyo rogo na jarā na mṛityuḥ prāptasya yogād[158] nimisham śarīram" iti | ṛishīṇām api mantra-brāhmaṇa-darśinām sāmarthyam na asmadīyena sāmarthyena upamātum yuktam | tasmāt sa-mūlam itihāsa-purāṇam |

"The Itihāsas and Purāṇas also, having originated in the way which has been explained, have power, as being based on the hymns and arthavādas, to evince the corporeality, etc., of the gods. It is also reasonable to suppose that they are founded upon intuition. For there were things palpable through intuition to the ancients, though they are not thus palpable to us.[159] Accordingly it is recorded in the Smṛiti that Vyāsa and others associated face to face with the gods.[160] Any man

[158] Instead of *yogād nimisham* the text of the Biblioth. Indica reads *yogāgnimayam.*

[159] See above, pp. 116, 118, and 127; and also Prof. Müller's article on the Vaiśeshika Philosophy in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. vii. p. 311, where it is remarked that the Vaiśeshikas, like Kapila, include the intuition of rishis under the category of *pratyaksha* (*ārsham jnānam sūtra-kṛitā pṛithak na lakshitam yogi-pratyakshe 'ntar-bhāvāt*).

[160] Compare with this R.V. i. 179, 2: *Ye chid hi pūrve ṛitasāpaḥ āsan sākam devebhir avadann ṛitāni | te chid avāsur ityādi* | "The pious sages who lived of old and who conversed about sacred truths with the gods,—they led a conjugal life," etc. See also the passages quoted from the Vana-parvan of the Mahābhārata, the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, and Plato in the First Volume of this work, p. 147; and compare Hesiod fragment 119: ξυναὶ γὰρ τότε δαῖτες ἔσαν, ξυναὶ δε θόωκοι ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι καταθνήτοις τ' ἀνθρώποις.

"Immortal gods, not unfamiliar, then
Their feasts and converse shared with mortal men."

And Herodotus writes of the Egyptians, ii. 144: Τὸ δὲ πρότερον τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων

who should maintain that the ancients, like his own contemporaries, were destitute of power thus to associate with superhuman beings like the gods, would be denying all variety in the history of the world. Such a person would in like manner affirm that as now there is no Kshattriya possessed of universal sovereignty, so neither was there ever such a prince; and would thus impugn the scriptural injunctions regarding the *rājasūya* sacrifice [which was only to be performed by a universal monarch]. He would also allege that in former times, as now, the dutes of castes and of orders were scarcely at all in force, and would thus render fruitless the scriptures by which the rules relating to them are prescribed. By these considerations it is intimated that the ancients, in consequence of their eminent holiness, were admitted to associate immediately with the gods, etc. And the Smṛiti[161] says that nearness to, and converse with the gods is gained by reading the Veda, etc. Again, when the Smṛiti talks of the practice of Yoga resulting in the acquisition of superhuman faculties, such as minuteness, this assertion cannot be impugned through mere audacity, [*i.e.* it must have had some good foundation]. The Veda, too, declares the immense power of devotion in these words: 'When the fivefold influence of Yoga, connected with the elements of earth, water, fire, air, and æther, has begun to act, and a man has attained an æthereal [or fiery] body, he is no longer affected by disease, decay, or death.' And it is unreasonable to estimate, by the analogy of our own power, the power of the rishis, the seers of the Vedic hymns and Brāhmaṇas. Wherefore the Itihāsas and Purāṇas have an (independent) foundation.' "

S'ankara does not, however, treat all the ancients in this way. Like many other systematizers, he finds no difficulty in rejecting or explaining away any authorities which come into conflict with his views. It is thus that he deals with Kapila, the author of the Sānkhya. That eminent sage is thus spoken of in the S'vetāśvatara Upanishad, v. 2:

Yo yoniṁ yonim adhitishṭhaty eko viśvāni rūpāṇi yonīś cha sarvāḥ |

θεοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἄρχοντας, οἰκέοντας ἅμα τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι, "And [the Egyptian priests said] that before these men the gods were the rulers in Egypt, dwelling together with men."

[161] It appears from the gloss of Govinda Ānanda that one of the Yoga Sūtras is here quoted. I give the sense according to his explanation: *mantra-japād deva-sannidhyaṁ tat-sambhāshaṇaṁ cha iti sūtrārthaḥ.*

ṛishim prasūtaṁ Kapilaṁ yas tam agre jnānair bibhartti jāyamānaṁ cha paśyet |

"The god who alone superintends every source of production and all forms, who formerly nourished with various knowledge his son the rishi Kapila, and beheld him at his birth, etc."[163]

Towards the close of his comment on Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 1, which I shall cite at some length, S'ankara makes some remarks on this passage of that Upanishad. After stating the points that had been established in the first Book (*adhyāya*) of the Brahma Sūtras, and alluding to the objections which had been urged against the Sānkhya and other hostile doctrines as contrary to the Veda, S'ankara goes on to explain the object of the second book, and the purport of the aphorism with which it begins, as follows:

Idānīṁ sva-pakshe smṛiti-nyāya-virodha-parihāraḥ pradhānādi-vādānāṁ cha nyāyābhāsopabṛiṁhitatvam prativedāntaṁ sṛishṭy-ādi-prakriyāyāḥ avigītatvam ity asya artha-jātasya pratipādanāya dvitīyo 'dhyāyaḥ ārabhyate | *tattra prathamaṁ tāvat smṛiti-virodham upanyasya pariharati* | *yad uktam Brahma eva sarvajnaṁ jagataḥ kāraṇaṁ tad ayuktam* | *kutaḥ "smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangāt"* | *smṛitiś cha tantrākhyā paramarshi-praṇītā śishṭa-parigṛihītā* | *anyāś cha tad-anusāriṇyaḥ smṛitayaḥ* | *evaṁ saty anavakāśāḥ prasajyeran* | *tāsu hy achetanam pradhānaṁ svatantraṁ jagataḥ kāraṇam upanibadhyate* | *Manv-ādi-smṛitayas tāvach chodanā-lakshaṇena agnihotrādinā dharma-jātena apekshitam arthaṁ samarpayantyaḥ sāvakāśāḥ bhavanti asya varṇasya asmin kāle 'nena vidhānena upanayanam īdṛiśaś cha āchāraḥ itthaṁ vedādhayanam itthaṁ samāvarttanam itthaṁ saha-dharma-chāriṇī-saṁyogaḥ iti tathā purushārthāṁś chatur-varṇāśrama-dharmān nānā-vidhān vidadhati* | *na evaṁ kāpilādi-smṛitīnam anushṭheye vishaye 'vakāśo 'sti moksha-sādhanam eva hi samyag-darśanam adhikṛitya tāḥ praṇītāḥ* | *yadi tattra apy anavakāśāḥ syur ānarthakyam eva āsām prasajyeta* | *tasmāt tad-avirodhena vedāntāḥ vyākhyātavyāḥ* | *katham punar "īkshity-"ādibhyo hetubhyo Brahma eva sarvajnaṁ jagataḥ kāraṇam ity avadhāritaḥ śruty-arthaḥ* | *"smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangena" punar ākshipyate* | *bhaved ayam anākshepaḥ sva-tantra-prajnānām* | *para-tantra-prajnās tu prāyeṇa janāḥ*

[163] See S'ankara's commentary on this passage in Bibl. Ind. vii. 351, and Dr. Röer's translation, p. 62, with the note; also Dr. Hall's note in p. 19 of the preface to his edition of the Sānkhya Sāra, in the Bibl. Ind.

svātantryeṇa śruty-artham avadhārayitum aśaknuvantaḥ prakhyāta-praṇetṛikāsu smṛitishv avalamberan tad-balena cha śruty-artham pratipatserann asmat-kṛite cha vyākhyāne na viśvasyur bahu-mānāt smṛitīnām praṇetṛishu | kapila-prabhṛitīnāṁ cha ārshaṁ jnānam apratihataṁ smaryyate śrutiś cha bhavati "ṛishim prasūtaṁ kapilaṁ yas tam agre jnānair bibhartti jāyamānaṁ cha paśyed" iti | tasmād na eshām matam ayathārthaṁ śakyaṁ sambhāvayitum | tarkāvashṭambhena cha te 'rtham pratishṭhāpayanti | tasmād api smṛiti-balena vedāntāḥ vyākhyeyāḥ iti punar ākshepaḥ | tasya samādhir "na | anya-smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangād" iti | yadi smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasangena īśvara-kāraṇa-vādaḥ ākshipyeta evam apy anyāḥ īśvara-kāraṇa-vādinyaḥ smṛityo 'navakāśāḥ prasajyeran | tāḥ udāharishyāmaḥ | . . . . evam anekaśaḥ smṛitishv api īśvaraḥ kāraṇatvena upādānatvena cha prakāśyate | smṛiti-balena pratyavatishṭhamānasya smṛiti-balena eva uttaram pravakshyāmi ity ato 'yam anya-smṛity-anavakāśa-doshopanyāsaḥ | darśitaṁ tu śrutīnam īśvara-kāraṇa-vādam prati tātparyyam | vipratipattau cha smṛitīnām avaśya-kartavye 'nyatara-parigrahe 'nyatarasyāḥ parityāge cha śruty-anusāriṇyaḥ smṛitayaḥ pramāṇam anapekshyāḥ itaraḥ | tad uktam pramāṇa-lakshaṇe "virodhe tv anapekshaṁ syād asati hy anumānām" iti (Mīmānsā Sūtras i. 3, 3) | *na cha atīndriyān arthān śrutim antareṇa kaśchid upalabhate iti śakyaṁ sambhāvayituṁ nimittābhāvāt | śakyaṁ kapilādīnāṁ siddhānām apratihata-jnānatvād iti chet | na | siddher api sāpekshatvāt | dharmānushṭhānāpekshā hi siddhiḥ sa cha dharmaś chodanā-lakshaṇaḥ | tataś cha pūrva-siddhāyāś chodanāyāḥ artho na paśchima-siddha-purusha-vachana-vaśena atiśankituṁ śakyate | siddha-vyapāśraya-kalpanāyām api bahutvāt siddhānām pradarśitena prakāreṇa smṛiti-vipratipattau satyāṁ na śruti-vyapāśrayād anyad nirṇaya-kāraṇam asti | para-tantra-prajnasya api na akasmāt smṛiti-viśesha-vishayaḥ pakshapāto yuktaḥ | kasyachit kvachit tu pakshapāte sati purusha-mati-vaiśvarūpyeṇa tattvāvyasthāna-prasangāt | tasmāt tasya api smṛiti-vipratipatty-upanyāsena śruty-anusārānanusāra-vivechanena cha san-mārge prajnā sangrahaṇīyā | Yā tu śrutiḥ Kapilasya jnānātiśayaṁ darśayantī pradarśitā na tayā śruti-viruddham api Kāpilam mataṁ śraddhātuṁ śakyaṁ "Kapilam" iti "śruti-sāmānya-mātratvād"*[163] *anyasya cha Kapilasya Sagara-putrāṇām prataptur Vāsudeva-nāmnaḥ smaraṇāt | anyārtha-darśanasya cha prāpti-rahitasya asādhakatvāt | Bhavati cha anyā Manor māhātyam prakhyā-*

[163] Mīmānsā-sūtra i. 1, 31. See above, pp. 78 f.

payantī śrutir "yad vai kincha Manur avadat tad bheshajam"[164] *iti* | *Manunā cha* (xii. 91) "*sarva-bhūteshu chātmānam sarva-bhūtāni chātmani* | *samam paśyann ātma-yājī svārājyam adhigachchhati*" *iti sarvātmatva-darśanam praśaṁsatā Kāpilam mataṁ nindyate iti gamyate* | *Kapilo hi na sarvātmatva-darśanaṃ anumanyate ātma-bhedābhyupagamāt* | . . . . *ataś cha ātma-bheda-kalpanayā 'pi Kāpilasya tantrasya veda-viruddhatvaṁ vedānusāri-Manu-vachana-virudhatvaṁ cha na kevalaṁ svatantra-prakṛiti-parikalpanayā eveti siddham* | *vedasya hi nirapekshaṁ svārthe prāmaṇyaṁ raver iva rūpa-vishaye purusha-vachasāṁ tu mūlāntarāpekshaṁ svārthe prāmāṇyaṁ vaktṛi-smṛiti-vyavahitaṁ cha iti viprakarshaḥ* | *tasmād veda-viruddhe vishaye smṛity-anavakāśa-prasango na doshaḥ* |

"But now the second chapter is commenced with the view of effecting the following objects, viz. (*a*) to refute, in our own favour, the charge of contradicting the reasonings of the Smṛiti, to shew (*b*) that the doctrines regarding Pradhāna, etc., have nothing more than an appearance of reason, and (*c*) that the manner in which the subjects of creation, etc., are treated in each of the Upanishads is unimpeachable. First of all then the author states, and removes, the objection of contrariety to the Smṛiti. Our opponents urge that it is incorrect to say that the omniscient Brahma is the cause of the world. Why? Because, (1) as they allege, that doctrine 'is chargeable with the objection of setting aside the Smṛiti as useless' (Br. Sūtra, ii. 1, 1). This term 'Smṛiti' denotes a systematic treatise (*tantra*) composed by an eminent rishi, and received by the learned; and there are other Smṛitis in conformity with it. And the alleged difficulty is that (on the theory that Brahma is the cause) all these would be set aside as useless; since they propound an unconscious Pradhāna as the self-dependent cause of the world. The Smṛitis of Manu and others, indeed, which affirm that by means of the agnihotra and other enjoined ceremonies, the objects desired (by those who practise these rites) will be accomplished, will still retain their use, viz. of prescribing the objects to be pursued, viz. the various duties of the four castes and orders,—that such and such a caste shall be initiated at such a time and by such a process, and shall follow such and such a mode of life, that the Veda is to be studied, that the cessation of study is to take place, and that union with a woman following the same rites is to

[164] See above, p. 181, and the First Volume of this work, pp. 188, and 510.

celebrated, in such and such ways. But [on the hypothesis of Brahma being the creator] no such room is left for the Smṛitis of Kapila and others, on the ground of any ceremonies to be performed [in conformity with their prescriptions]; for they have been composed as embodying perfect systems affording the means of final liberation. If in this respect also no place be left for them the difficulty will arise that they are quite useless. And hence the conclusion is reached that the Upanishads should be interpreted so as to harmonize with them. But, such being the case, how, it is again objected, have you determined on the strength of the reasons furnished by the texts about 'beholding,' etc., that it is the meaning of the Veda that Brahma is the omniscient cause of the world, thus exposing yourself to the charge of leaving no place for the Smṛiti? Although we hold that this charge is harmless as regards those who think for themselves; yet men have for the most part no independent opinion, and are unable by an unassisted act of their own judgment to determine the sense of the Vedas, and will consequently lean upon the Smṛitis composed by renowned authors, and adopt the sense of the Vedas which they enforce: and from their lofty opinion of these authors they will have no confidence in our interpretations. And it is moreover urged (2) that Kapila and the others are declared by the Smṛiti to have possessed an unobstructed intuitive (*ārsha*[165]) knowledge; and there is also a Vedic text to the effect 'He who of old sustains with manifold knowledge Kapila when he is produced, and beholds him when born,' etc. (S'vetāsv. Up. v. 2). Consequently their doctrines cannot be imagined to be untrue. And they further support their tenets by argument. On these grounds also, it is urged, the Upanishads must be interpreted by the aid of the Smṛitis. The questions thus raised are settled by the concluding words of the Sūtra, 'No; for this conclusion is vitiated by the objection that other Smṛitis would in this way be rendered useless.' (1) If the doctrine that God is the cause of the world is chargeable with the objection that it leaves no room for the Smṛiti, in the same way the difficulty will arise (on the other theory) that other texts of the Smṛiti which affirm that God is the cause will be set aside. These we shall adduce." After quoting some passages, S'ankara proceeds: "In the same manner in numerous texts of the Smṛiti God is shewn to be both the instrumental and the material cause. I must answer on the

[165] See above, pp. 116, 118, and 127.

strength of the Smṛiti the person who opposes me on the same ground, and so I just indicate this objection against his views as having the effect of setting aside other Smṛitis. But it has been shown that the sense of the Vedic texts is in favour of the causality of God. And since, if the Smṛitis are at variance with each other, we must of necessity accept the one set and reject the other, those of them which are conformable to the Veda will be authoritative, and the rest will deserve no attention: for it has been said in the section (of the Pūrva Mīmānsā) on proof (i. 3, 3), that 'if it (the Smṛiti) be contrary (to the Veda) it must be disregarded; but if there be no (contrariety) it must be inferred (that the former is founded on the latter).' And it is inconceivable that anyone should discover things beyond the reach of the senses without the aid of the Veda, since the means of doing so are wanting. If it be urged that we can conceive such discovery (of imperceptible things without the help of the Veda) as possible in the case of Kapila and other perfect persons (*siddhānām*), because there was nothing to obstruct their knowledge;—we reply, No; because perfection (*siddhi*) is dependent upon something else, viz. on the practice of duty. Now duty is defined as something which is enjoined. And the subject-matter of an injunction which was previously promulgated cannot be called into doubt on the strength of the words of a man who became perfect at a subsequent period. And even on the supposition that confidence could be placed in such 'perfect' persons, yet, as they are numerous, and as such a mutual contradiction as we have already pointed out exists between the Smṛitis of different 'perfect' persons, there is no means left of determining the truth, but reliance on the Veda. Causeless partiality to any particular Smṛiti, on the part even of a man who has no independent opinion, is improper; but if anyone ever does exhibit such partiality, the charge of depriving truth of all fixity attaches to his procedure, because the opinions of men (which he takes as the standard of his belief) assume all sorts of forms. Consequently his judgment also should be directed into the right path by indicating the mutual contradictions between the different Smṛitis, and by distinguishing those of them which are conformable to, from those which are at variance with, the Veda. And (2) the Vedic text which has been pointed out, showing the transcendent character of Kapila's knowledge, cannot be a warrant for believing the doctrine of Kapila, though con-

trary to the Veda, since the word Kapila 'has, in this text, a general sense' [applicable to others besides the author of the Sānkhya] (Mīm. Sūtra, i. 1, 31), and another Kapila called Vāsudeva, the consumer of Sagara's sons, is also mentioned in the Smṛiti; and since the indication of something which has a different object in view, and is therefore irrelevant to the matter in question, can prove nothing.'[166] There is, besides, another text of the Veda which sets forth the eminent diginity of Manu in these terms, 'Whatever Manu said is medicine.'[167] And Manu—when he employs the words (xii. 91), 'He who, with impartial eye, beholds himself in all beings, and all beings in himself, thus sacrificing his own personalty, attains to self-refulgence;' and, by saying this commends the tenet that everything is one with the supreme Spirit—must be understood as censuring Kapila's doctrine. For Kapila does not assent to the identity of Brahma and the universe, since he holds a diversity of souls." . . . (After quoting one passage from the Mahābhārata, and another from the Veda, to prove that Kapila is wrong, S'ankara proceeds): "Hence it is proved that Kapila's system is at variance with the Veda and with the words of Manu, who follows the Veda, not only in supposing an independent Prakṛiti (nature), but also in supposing a diversity of souls. Now the Veda has an independent authority in regard to its own contents, as the sun has (an inherent power) of manifesting forms; whilst the words of men have, as regards their own sense, an authority which is dependent on another source (the Veda), and which is distinguished (from the authority of the Veda) by the fact of their authors being remembered. Consequently it forms no objection to a doctrine that it sets aside a Smṛiti on a point which is contrary to the Veda."

[166] The words thus translated are explained as follows in the Gloss of Govinda Ānanda: *Kincha "yaḥ Kapilam jnanair bibhartti tam īs'varam pas'yed" iti vidhīyate tathā cha anyārthasya īsvara-pratipatti-śeshasya Kapila-sarvajnatvasya dars'anam anuvādas tasya mānāntareṇa prāpti-śūnyasya svārtha-sādhakatvāyogād na anuvāda-mātrād sarvajnatva-siddhir ity āha* | "And it is enjoined (in the text of the S'vetās'vatara Upanishad): 'Let him behold that Īs'vara who nourishes Kapila with various knowledge;' and so since this 'indication' of, this reference to, the omniscience of Kapila, which has another object in view, and ends in the establishment of an Īs'vara, and which on other grounds is shewn to be irrelevant, cannot prove its own meaning, —this mere reference does not suffice to evince Kapila's omniscience:—This is what S'ankara means to say."

[167] See the First Volume of this work, pp. 188 and 510.

See also Śankara's commentary on the Taittirīya Upanishad, Bib. Ind. vii. pp. 136, 137, where he says:

Kāpila-kāṇādādi-tarka-śāstra-virodhaḥ iti chet | *na* | *teshām mūlābhāve veda-virodhe cha bhrāntyopapatteḥ* |

"If it be objected that this is contrary to the rationalistic doctrines of Kapila and Kaṇāda [and therefore wrong], I answer no, since these doctrines are proved to be erroneous, as having no foundation, and as being in opposition to the Veda."

His remarks on a passage of the Praśna Upanishad, which are as follows, afford a curious specimen of the contemptuous manner in which this orthodox Vedāntist treats the heretical Sānkhyas, etc. (Praśna Up. vi. 4; Bib. Ind. viii. 244):

Sānkhyās tu avidyā-'dhyāropitam eva purushe karttṛitvaṁ kriyā-kārakam phalaṁ cha iti kalpayitvā āgama-vāhyatvāt punas tatas trasyantaḥ paramārthataḥ eva bhoktṛitvam purushasya ichchhanti | *tattvāntaraṁ cha pradhānam purushāt paramārtha-vastu-bhūtam eva kalpayanto 'nya-tārkika-kṛita-buddhi-vishayāḥ santo vihanyante* | *Tathā itare tārkikāḥ sānkhyair ity evam paraspara-viruddhārtha-kalpanātaḥ āmishārthinaḥ iva prāṇino 'nyonyaṁ viruddhamānāḥ artha-darśitvāt paramārtha-tattvāt tad-dūram eva apakṛishyante* | *atas tan-matam anādṛitya vedāntārtha-tattvam ekatva-darśanam prati ādaravanto mumukshavaḥ syur iti tārkika-mate dosha-darśanaṁ kinchid uchyate 'smābhir na tu tārkika-tātparyyeṇa* |

"The followers of the Sānkhya imagine that the functions of action, and the enjoyment of reward which causes action, become erroneously attributed to the soul (*purusha*) in consequence of supervening ignorance; but as this doctrine differs from that of Scripture, they become afraid of it, and seek to ascribe to the soul enjoyment in the proper sense. And supposing another principle distinct from soul, viz. Pradhāna (or nature), which they regard as substance in the proper sense, they become the objects of correction by other rationalists, and are crushed. Thus, in consequence of the contrariety between the conceptions of the Sānkhyas and those of other freethinkers, the two parties quarrel with each other like animals fighting for flesh; and thus, from their having an (exclusive) regard to (their own) views, they are all drawn away to a distance from the essential truth. Wherefore let men, disregarding their tenets, seek for final liberation by paying honour to the principles of the Vedantic doctrine, which maintains the unity of all being. We

have thus pointed out something of the errors of the rationalists, and have said nothing in accordance with their views."

IV.—In thus depreciating Kapila, Sankara is in direct opposition to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (which, however, may be a work of later date than his[168]), in which the author of the Sānkhya is spoken of with the greatest reverence. Thus in Bhāg. Pur. i. 3, 10, he is described as the fifth incarnation of Vishṇu:

Panchamaḥ Kapilo nāma siddheśaḥ kāla-viplutam | provāchāsuraye sānkhyaṁ tattva-grāma-vinirṇayam |

"In his fifth manifestation, he [in the form of] Kapila, and lord of saints, declared to Āsuri the Sānkhya which defines the series of principles, and which had been lost through the lapse of time."

And again, in Bhāg. Pur. ix. 8, 12, 13, Kapila is made the subject of eulogy. A legend narrates that the sixty thousand sons of king Sagara, conceiving Kapila to be the robber of a horse which had been carried away from their sacrifice, advanced to slay him, when they were burnt up by fire issuing from his body. The author of the Purāṇa, however, denies that this was in any degree owing to passion on the part of the sage:

Na sādhu-vādo muni-kopa-bharjitāḥ nṛipendra-putrāḥ iti sattva-dhāmani | kathaṁ tamo roshamayaṁ vibhāvyate jagat-pavitrātmani khe rajo bhuvaḥ | yasyeritā sānkhyamayī dṛiḍheha naur yayā mumukshus tarate duratyayam | bhavārṇavam mṛityu-pathaṁ vipaśchitaḥ parātma-bhūtasya katham pṛithaṅmatiḥ |

"It is not an assertion befitting a good man to say that the king's sons were burnt up by the wrath of the sage; for how is it conceivable that the darkness (*tamas*) of anger should reside in the abode of goodness (*sattva*), or that the dust (or passion, *rajas*) of the earth should ascend into the sky, the region of purity? How could that sage, one with the supreme Spirit, by whom the strong ship of the Sānkhya was launched, on which the man seeking emancipation crosses the ocean of existence, hard to be traversed, and leading to death,—how could he entertain the idea of any distinction between himself and others [and so treat any one as an enemy]?"

It is not necessary for me to quote any further passages in praise of the author of the Sānkhya. There is a great deal about this system

[168] See Wilson's Vish. Pur., preface, pp. xliv. and li.

in the Mahābhārata, S'āntiparvan, verses 11,037 ff. See Colebrooke's Essays, i. 236 (p. 149 of Williams and Norgate's ed.); Wilson's Vishṇu Purāṇa, pref. p. xciv. and text, pp. 18 ff. with notes; Bhāgavata Purāṇa, iii. chapters 24–30; Weber's Ind. Stud. passim; Dr. Röer's Introduction to S'vetāśvatara Upanishad, Bibl. Ind. xv. 35 ff.; and Dr. Hall's preface to the Sānkhya-sāra in the Bibl. Ind. p. 19, note.

We have thus seen that a distinct line of demarcation is drawn by the most accurate and critical of the Indian writers, between the S'ruti, which they define to be superhuman and independent, and the Smṛiti, which they regard as of human origin, and as dependent for its authority on its conformity with the S'ruti. S'ankara, indeed, as we have also observed (above, p. 183 f.), goes very nearly, if not altogether, so far as to assign an independent foundation to the Smṛitis; but he confines this distinction to such of these works as coincide in doctrine with the S'ruti or Veda, according to his own Vedāntic interpretation of its principles, while all other speculators are denounced by him as heterodox. It is, however, clear from the S'vetāśvatara Upanishad, the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavad Gītā, the Vishṇu, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇas, etc., that the doctrines of the Sānkhya must have been very prevalent in ancient times, and that S'ankara, when he condemned them as erroneous, must have done so in the face of many powerful opponents.[169]

[169] I quote the following passage from Dr. Röer's Introduction to the S'vetāśvatara Upanishad, pp. 36 f.: "At the time of the composition of the S'wetāśwatara, the Sankhya was not a new system, which had to overcome the resistance of old received opinions, and the prejudices of men in power, whose interest might be opposed to the introduction of a doctrine by which their authority could be questioned. It had found many adherents; it was the doctrine of Manu, of some parts of the Mahābhārata, and to its founder divine honour had been assigned by general consent. It was a doctrine whose argumentative portion demanded respect, and as it was admitted by many Brāmhans (*sic*), distinguished for their knowledge of the Vedas, it could not be treated as a heresy. The most learned and eminent of the Brāmhans were evidently divided among themselves with reference to the truth of the Sānkhya and Vedānta, and this must have afforded to the opponents of the Vedaic system a most powerful weapon for attacking the Vedas themselves. If both the Sānkhya and Vedānta are divine revelations, both must be true; but if the doctrine of the one is true, the doctrine of the other is wrong; for they are contradictory among themselves. Further, if both are derived from the Vedas, it is evident that also the latter cannot reveal the truth, because they would teach opposite opinions about one and the same point. Such objections to the Vedas had been made already in ancient times, as is clear from the Upanishads, from several passages of Manu, from Yāska, etc.; and under these circumstances it cannot be wondered at, if early attempts were made to reconcile the

It is not necessary for me here to inquire with any accuracy what the relation was in which the different philosophical systems stood to each other in former ages. It may suffice to say that the more thorough-going adherents of each—of the Vedānta, the Sānkhya, the Nyāya, etc.—must, according to all appearance, have maintained their respective principles with the utmost earnestness and tenacity, and could not have admitted that any of the rival systems was superior to their own in any particular. It is impossible to study the Sūtras of the several schools, and come to any other conclusion. The more popular systems of the Purāṇas, on the other hand, blended various tenets of the different systems syncretically together. In modern times the superior orthodoxy of the Vedānta seems to be generally admitted. But even some who hold this opinion refuse to follow the example of S'ankara in denouncing the founders of the rival schools as heretical. On the contrary, they regard them all as inspired Munis, who, by adapting their doctrines to the capacities or tendencies of different students, have paved the way for the ultimate reception of the Vedāntic system. Such is the view taken in the Prasthāna-bheda of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who gives the following lucid summary of the leading principles of the different schools of speculation (Weber's Indische Studien, i. 23):

Sarveshāṁ cha sankshepeṇa trividhaḥ eva prasthāna-bhedaḥ | tatra ārambha-vādaḥ ekaḥ | pariṇāma-vādo dvitīyaḥ | vivartta-vādas tṛitīyaḥ | pārthivāpya-taijasa-vāyavīyāś chaturvidhāḥ paramāṇavo dvy-aṇukādi-krameṇa brahmāṇḍa-paryantaṁ jagad ārambhante | asad eva kāryyaṁ kāraka-vyāpārād utpadyate iti prathamas tārkikāṇām mīmāṁsakānāṁ cha | sattva-rajas-tamo-guṇātmakam pradhānam eva mahad-ahankārādi-krameṇa jagad-ākāreṇa pariṇamate | pūrvam api sūkshma-rūpeṇa sad eva kāryaṁ kāraṇa-vyāpāreṇa abhivyajyate iti dvitīyaḥ pakshaḥ Sānkhya-Yoga-Pātanjala-Pāśupatānām | Brahmaṇaḥ pariṇāmo jagad iti Vaishṇavānām | sva-prakāśa-paramānandādvitīyam Brahma sva-māyā-vaśād mithyaiva jagad-ākāreṇa kalpate iti tṛitīyaḥ paksho

tenets of the Vedānta and Sānkhya to save the uniformity of the doctrine, and thereby the sacredness of the Vedas as the Scriptures derived from the immediate revelation of God. So, for instance, it is recorded that Vyāsa, the reputed author of the Bramha Sūtras, wrote also a commentary to Patanjali's Yoga-s'āstra, which is still extant under his name. In the same manner composed Gauḍapāda, the eminent Vedāntist, and teacher of S'ankara's teacher, Govinda, a commentary to Īs'vara Kṛishṇa's Sānkhya Kārikā; and the Bhagavad Gītā has also the same object."

Brahma-vādinām | sarveshām prasthāna-karttṛīṇām munīnām vivartta-vāda-paryavasānena advitīye Parameśvare eva pratipādye tātparyam | na hi te munayo bhrāntāḥ sarvajnatvāt teshām | kintu vahir-vishaya-pravaṇānām āpātataḥ purushārthe praveśo na sambhavati iti nāstikya-vāraṇāya taiḥ prakāra-bhedāḥ pradarśitāḥ | tatra teshām tātparyam abuddhvā veda-viruddhe 'py arthe tātparyam utprekshamāṇās tan-matam eva upādeyatvena gṛihṇanto janāḥ nānā-patha-jusho bhavanti | iti sarvam anavadyam |

"The difference in principle between these various schools is, when briefly stated, three-fold. The first doctrine is that of a commencement of the world; the second is that of an evolution; the third is that of an illusion. Atoms of four descriptions—earthy, aqueous, igneous, and aerial—beginning with compounds of two atoms, and ending in the egg of Brahmā (the world), originate the universe: and effects, previously non-existent, come into being from the action of a causer. This is the first theory, that of the Logicians and Mīmānsakas. The second theory, that of the Sānkhyas, Yogas, Pātanjalas, and Pāśupatas, is that *Pradhāna* (or *Prakṛiti* = nature), consisting of the three *guṇas* (qualities), *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, is evolved, through the successive stages of *mahat* (intellect), and *ahankāra* (consciousness), etc., in the form of the world; and that effects, which had previously existed in a subtile form, are [merely] manifested by the action of their cause. Another form of this theory is that of the Vaishṇavas [the Rāmānujas], who hold the universe to be an evolution of Brahma. The third view, that of the Brahma-vādins (Vedāntists), is, that Brahma, the self-resplendent, the supremely happy, and the one sole essence, assumes, unreally, the form of the world through the influence of his own illusion (Māyā).

The ultimate scope of all the Munis, authors of these different systems, is to support the theory of illusion, and their only design is to establish the existence of one Supreme God, the sole essence; for these Munis could not be mistaken [as some of them must have been, if they were not all of one opinion, or, as those of them must have been who did not hold Vedāntic principles], since they were omniscient. But as they saw that men, addicted to the pursuit of external objects, could not all at once penetrate into the highest truth, they held out to them a variety of theories, in order that they might not fall into atheism. Misunderstanding the object which the Munis thus had in view, and

representing that they even designed to propound doctrines contrary to the Vedas, men have come to regard the specific doctrines of these several schools with preference, and thus become adherents of a variety of systems. Thus all has been satisfactorily stated."

I find that Vijnāna Bhikshu, the commentator on the Sānkhya aphorisms, takes very nearly the same view as is here quoted from Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in regard to the superiority of the Brahma Mīmānsā or Vedānta over the other Darśanas.

In his Sānkhya-pravachana-bhāshya (Bibliotheca Indica, pp. 3 ff.), he thus writes:

Syād etat. | *Nyāya-vaiśekikābhyām atra avirodho bhavatu* | *brahma-mīmāṁsā-yogābhyāṁ tu virodho 'sty eva* | *tābhyāṁ nityeśvara-sādhanāt* | *atra cha Īśvarasya pratishidhyamānatvāt* | *na cha atrāpi vyāvahārika-pāramārthika-bhedena seśvara-nirīśvara-vādayor avirodho 'stu seśvara-vādasya upāsanā-paratva-sambhavād iti vāchyam* | *vinigamakābhāvāt* | *īśvaro hi durjneyaḥ iti nirīśvaratvam api loka-vyavahāra-siddham aiśvaryya-vairāgyāya anuvaditum śakyate ātmanaḥ saguṇatvam iva* | *na tu kvāpi śruty-ādāv īśvaraḥ sphuṭam pratishidhyate yena seśvara-vādasyaiva vyāvahārikatvam avadhāryeta iti* | *atra uchyate* | *atrāpi vyāvahārika-pāramārthika-bhāvo bhavati* | *"asatyam apratishṭhaṁ te jagad āhur anīśvaram" ityādi-śāstrair nirīśvara-vādasya ninditatvāt* | *asminn eva śāstre vyāvahārikasyaiva pratishedhasya aiśvaryya-vairāgyādy-artham anuvādatvauchityāt* | *yadi hi laukāyatika-matānusāreṇa nityaiśvaryyaṁ na pratishidhyeta tadā paripūrṇa-nitya-nirdoshaiśvaryya-darśanena tatra chittāveśato vivekābhyāsa-pratibandhaḥ syād iti sānkhyāchāryyāṇām āśayaḥ* | *seśvara-vādasya na kvāpi nindādikam asti yena upāsanādi-paratayā tat śāstraṁ sankochyeta* | *yat tu "nāsti sānkhya-samaṁ jnānaṁ nāsti yoga-samam balam* | *atra vaḥ saṁśayo mā bhūj jnānaṁ sānkhyam param smṛitam" ityādi vākyam tad-vivekāṁśe eva sānkhya-jnānasya darśanāntarebhyaḥ utkarsham pratipādayati na tv īśvara-pratishedāṁśe 'pi* | *tathā Parāśarādy-akhila-śishṭa-saṁvādād api seśvara-vādasyaiva pāramārthikatvam avadhāryate* | *api cha "Akshapāda-praṇīte cha Kāṇāde sānkhya-yogayoḥ* | *tyājyaḥ śruti-virudho 'ṁśaḥ śruty-eka-śaraṇair nṛibhiḥ* | *Jaiminīye cha Vaiyāse virudhāṁśo na kaśchana* | *śrutyā vedārtha-vijnāne śruti-pāraṁ gatau hi tāv" iti Parāśaropapurāṇādibhyo 'pi brahma-mīmāṁsāyāḥ īśvarāṁśe balavattvam* | *yathā* | *"nyāya-tantrāṇy anekāni tais tair uktāni vādibhiḥ* | *hetv-āgama-sadāchārair yad yuktaṁ*

tad upāsyatām" iti moksha-dharma-vākyād api Parāśarādy-akhila-śishṭa-vyavahāreṇa brahma-mīmāṁsā-nyāya-vaiśeshikādy-uktaḥ īśvara-sādhaka-nyāyaḥ eva grāhyo balavattvāt | tathā | "Yaṁ na paśyanti yogīndrāḥ sānkhyāḥ api maheśvaram | anādi-nidhanam brahma tam eva śaraṇaṁ vraja" ityādi-kaurmādi-vākyaiḥ sānkhyānām īśvarājnānasyaiva nārāyaṇādinā proktatvāch cha | kincha brahma-mīmāṁsāyāḥ īśvaraḥ eva mukhyo vishayaḥ upakramādibhir avadhṛitaḥ | tatrāṁśe tasya bādhe śāstrasyaiva aprāmāṇyaṁ syāt | "yat-paraḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ" iti nyāyāt | sānkhya-śāstrasya tu purushārtha-tat-sādhana-prakṛiti-purusha-vivekāv eva mukhyo vishayaḥ | iti īśvara-pratishedhāṁśa-bādhe 'pi na aprāmāṇyam | "Yat-paraḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ" iti nyāyāt | ataḥ sāvakāśatayā sānkhyam eva īśvara-pratishedhāṁśe durbalam iti | na cha brahma-mīmāṁsāyām api īśvāraḥ eva mukhyo vishayo na tu nityaiśvaryam iti vaktuṁ śakyate | "smṛity-anavakāśa-dosha-prasanga"-rūpa-pūrva-pakshasya anupapattyā nityaiśvaryya-viśishṭatvena eva brahma-mīmāṁsā-vishayatvāvadhāraṇāt | brahma-śabdasya para-brahmaṇy eva mukhyatayā tu "athātaḥ para-brahma-jijnāsā" iti na sūtritam iti | etena sānkhya-virodhād brahma-yoga-darśanayoḥ kāryyeśvara-paratvam api na śankanīyam | prakṛiti-svātantryāpattyā "rachanānupapatteś cha na anumānam" ityādi brahma-sūtra-paramparā-'nupapatteś cha | tathā "sa purveshām api guruḥ kālena anavachchhedād" iti yoga-sūtra-tadīya-vyāsa-bhāshyābhyāṁ sphuṭam īśa-nityatāvagamāch cha iti | tasmād abhyupagama-vāda-prauḍhi-vādādinā eva sānkhyasya vyāvahārikeśvara-pratishedha-paratayā brahma-mīmāṁsā-yogābhyāṁ saha na virodhaḥ | abhyupagama-vādaś cha śāstre dṛishṭaḥ | yathā Vishṇu-purāṇe (i. 17, 54) | *"Ete bhinna-dṛiśāṁ daityāḥ vikalpāḥ kathitāḥ mayā | kṛitvā'bhyupagamaṁ tatra sankshepaḥ śrūyatām mama" | iti | astu vā pāpināṁ jnāna-pratibandhārtham āstika-darśaneshv apy aṁśataḥ śruti-viruddhārtha-vyavasthāpanaṁ teshu teshv aṁśeshv aprāmāṇyaṁ cha | śruti-smṛity-aviruddheshu tu mukhya-vishayeshu prāmāṇyam asty eva | ataḥ eva Padma-purāṇe brahma-yoga-darśanātiriktānāṁ darśanānām nindā 'py upapadyate | Yathā tatra Pārvatīm prati Īśvara-vākyam | "śriṇu devi pravakshyāmi tāmasāni yathā-kramam | yeshāṁ śravaṇa-mātreṇa pātityaṁ jnāninām api | prathamaṁ hi mayaivoktaṁ S'aivam Pāśupatādikam | mach-chhakty-āveśitair vipraiḥ samproktāni tataḥ param | Kaṇādena tu samproktaṁ śāstraṁ vaiśeshikam mahat | Gautamena tathā nyāyaṁ sānkhyaṁ tu Kapilena vai | dvijanmanā Jaimininā pūrvaṁ vedamayārthataḥ | nirīśvareṇa vādena kṛitam*

śāstram mahattaram | Dhishaṇena tathā proktam chārvākam ati-garhitam | daityānāṁ nāśanārthāya Vishṇunā Buddha-rūpiṇā | bauddha-śāstram asat proktaṁ nagna-nīla-paṭādikam | māyā-vādam asach-chhāstram prachchhannam bauddham eva cha | mayaiva kathitam devi kalau brāhmaṇa-rūpiṇā | apārthaṁ śruti-vākyānāṁ darśayat loka-garhitam | karma-svarūpa-tyājyatvam atra cha pratipādyate | sarva-karma-paribhraṁśād naishkarmyaṁ tatra chochyate | parātma-jīvayor aikyam mayā 'tra pratipādyate | brahmaṇo 'sya paraṁ rūpaṁ nirguṇaṁ darśitam mayā | sarvasya jagato 'py asya nāśanārthaṁ kalau yuge | vedārthavad mahāśāstram māyā-vādam avaidikam | mayaiva kathitaṁ devi jagatāṁ nāśa-kāraṇād" iti | adhikaṁ tu brahma-mīmāṁsā-bhāshye prapanchitam asmābhir iti | tasmād āstika-śāstrasya na kasyāpy aprāmāṇyaṁ virodho vā sva-sva-vishayeshu sarveshām abādhāt avirodhāch cha iti | nanv evam purusha-bahutvāṁśe 'py asya śāstrasya abhyupagama-vādatvaṁ syāt | na syāt | avirodhāt | brahma-mīmāṁsāyām apy "aṁśo nānā-vyapadeśād" ityādi-sūtra-jātair jīvātma-bahutvasyaiva nirṇayāt | sānkhya-siddha-purushāṇām ātmatvaṁ tu brahma-mīmāṁsayā bādhyate eva | "ātmā iti tu upayanti" iti tat-sūtreṇa paramātmanaḥ eva paramārtha-bhūmāv ātmatvāvadhāraṇāt | tathāpi cha sānkhyasya na aprāmāṇyam | vyāvahārikātmano jīvasya itara-viveka-jnānasya moksha-sādhanatve vivakshitārthe bādhābhāvāt | etena śruti-smṛiti-prasiddhayor nānātmaikātmatvayor vyāvahārika-pāramārthika-bhedena avirodhaḥ |

"Be it so: let there be here no discrepancy with the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika. But it will be said that the Sānkhya is really opposed to the Brahma-mīmānsā (the Vedānta) and the Yoga [of Patanjali]; since both of these systems assert an eternal Īśvara (God), while the Sānkhya denies such an Īśvara. And it must not be said (the same persons urge) that here also [as in the former case of the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika], owing to the distinction between practical [or conventional, or regulative] and essential truths, there may be no [real] contrariety between the theistic and the atheistic theories, inasmuch as the theistic theory may possibly have a view to devotion [and may therefore have nothing more than a practical end in view];—you are not, it will be said, to assert this, as there is nothing to lead to this conclusion [or, distinction]. For as Īśvara is difficult to be known, the atheistic theory also, which is founded on popular opinion, may, indeed, be adverted to for the purpose of inspiring indifference to the conception of a Deity,

(just as it is [conventionally] asserted that soul has qualities); but neither the Veda, nor any other śāstra contains a distinct denial of an Īśvara, by which the merely practical [or conventional] character of the theistic theory could be shewn. [Consequently the theistic theory is not a mere conventional one, but true, and the contradiction between the atheistic Sānkhya and the theistic systems is real and irreconcilable].

"To this we reply: in this case also the distinction of practical and essential truths holds. For although the atheistic theory is censured by such texts as the following: 'They declare a world without an Īśvara to be false and baseless;' yet it was proper that in this system (the Sānkhya), the merely practical (or conventional) denial [of Īśvara] should be inculcated for the purpose of inspiring indifference to the conception of a Deity, and so forth. Because the idea of the author of the Sānkhya was this, that if the existence of an eternal Īśvara were not denied, in conformity with the doctrine of the Laukāyatikas, men would be prevented by the contemplation of a perfect, eternal, and faultless godhead, and by fixing their hearts upon it, from studying to discriminate [between spirit and matter]. But no censure on the theistic theory is to be found in any work, whereby [the scope of] that system might be restricted, as having devotion, etc., in view as its only end. And as regards such texts as the following: 'There is no knowledge like the Sānkhya, no power like the Yoga; doubt not of this, the knowledge of the Sānkhya is considered to be the highest,' they [are to be understood as] proving the superiority of the Sānkhya doctrine over other systems, not in respect of its atheism, but only of its discrimination [between different principles]. It is, moreover, established by the concurrence of Parāśara, and all other well instructed persons, that the theistic theory is that which represents the essential truth. Further, such texts as the following of the Parāśara Upapurāṇa, and other works, shew that the strength of the Brahma-mīmānsā lies on the side of its theism, viz., 'In the systems of Akshapāda (Gotama) and Kaṇāda, and in the Sānkhya and Yoga, that part which is opposed to the Veda should be rejected by all persons who regard the Veda as the sole authority. In the systems of Jaimini and Vyāsa (the Vedānta) there is no portion contrary to the Veda, since both these sages have attained to a perfect comprehension of its true meaning. In the same way it results from this text of the Moksha-dharma (a part of the

S'ānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata), viz.: 'Many systems of reasoning have been promulgated by different authors; [in these] whatever is established on grounds of reason, of scripture and of approved custom, is to be respected;' [from this text also, I say, it results] that the theory,—declared in the Brahma-mīmānsā, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeshika, etc., in consonance with the tradition of Parāśara and all other well-instructed men,—which asserts an Īśvara, is alone to be received, in consequence of its strength; and [the same thing follows] from the fact that in such passages as this of the Kaurma-purāṇa, etc., viz.—'Take refuge with that Maheśvara, that Brahma without beginning or end, whom the most eminent Yogins, and the Sānkhyas do not behold,'—Nārāyaṇa (Vishṇu) and others assert that the Sānkhyas are ignorant of Īśvara.

"Moreover, Īśvara is determined to be the principal subject of the Brahma-mīmānsā by the introductory statement, etc., of that system. If it were open to objection on that side [*i.e.* on the side of its principal subject], the entire system would be without authority. For it is a rule that 'the sense of a word is that which it is intended to denote.' Whereas the principal subjects of the Sānkhya are—(1) the grand object of human pursuit, and (2) the distinction between nature (*prakṛiti*) and spirit (*purusha*), which is the instrument of attaining that grand object. Thus this system does not lose its authority, even though it be erroneous in so far as it denies an Īśvara. For it is a rule that 'the sense of a word is that which it is intended to denote.' Hence, as the Sānkhya has a certain applicability of its own, it is weak only in so far as it denies an Īśvara.

"Nor can it be alleged that it is Iśvara only, and not the eternity of his existence, that is the principal subject of the Brahma-mīmānsā; since, through the disproof of the objection (*pūrva-paksha*) that the theistic theory 'is chargable with the defect of rendering the Smṛiti inapplicable,'[170] it is ascertained that the assertion of an eternal Īśvara is the main object of the Brahma-mīmānsā. But as the word 'Brahma' is properly employed to denote the supreme Brahma, the first aphorism of the Brahma-mīmānsā does not run thus, 'Now follows the enquiry regarding the supreme Brahma;' [but thus, 'Now follows the

[170] The aphorism here referred to (Brahma Sūtras ii. 1, 1), with most of S'ankara's comment on it, has been already quoted above, pp. 185 ff.

enquiry regarding Brahma.'] Hence we are not to surmise that, as they [would otherwise] contradict the Sānkhya, the Brahma-mīmānsā and Yoga systems must aim at establishing [not an eternal Deity] but a [secondary] Īśvara, who is merely an effect. For this is disproved (1) by the series of Brahma Sūtras (ii. 2, 1 ff.) which affirm that 'an unintelligent cause of the world cannot be inferred, as it is not conceivable that such a cause should frame anything,' and which would be rendered inconclusive by the assumption of the independent action of Prakṛiti; and (2) by the fact that the eternity of God is clearly understood from the Yoga aphorism [i. 26], viz. 'He is also the instructor of the ancients, as he is not circumscribed by time,' as well as from the commentary of Vyāsa thereon.[171] Hence, as the Sānkhya, arguing on its own special principles, and at the same time making a great display of ingenuity[172] and so forth, has in view a merely practical denial of an Īśvara, it does not contradict the Brahma-mīmānsā or the Yoga. The method of reasoning on special principles is referred to in the S'āstra. Thus it is said in the Vishṇu Purāṇa [i. 17, 54, Wilson, vol. ii. p. 44], 'These notions, Daityas, which I have described, are the guesses of persons who look on the Deity as distinct from themselves. Accepting them as partially correct, hear from me a summary (of transcendental truth).

"Or let it be [supposed] that even orthodox systems, with the view of preventing sinners from attaining knowledge, lay down doctrines which are partially opposed to the Veda; and that in those particular portions they are not authoritative. Still in their principal contents,

[171] I quote the commentary of Bhoja-rājā on this Sūtra, as given by Dr. Ballantyne (Aphorisms of the Yoga, part first, p. 32): *Pūrveshām | ādyānām Brahmādīnām api sa gurur upadeshṭā yataḥ sa kālena nāvachchhidyate anāditvāt | teshām punar ādimattvād asti kālena avachchhedaḥ* | "Of the ancients, that is, of the earliest [beings], Brahmā and the rest, he is the *guru*, *i.e.*, the instructor, because He, as having no beginning, is not circumscribed by time; while they, on the other hand, having had a beginning, are circumscribed by time."

[172] I am indebted to Professor Cowell for a satisfactory interpretation of the first of these two phrases, *abhyupagama-vāda* and *prauḍhi-vāda*, as well as for various other improvements in my translation of this passage. The phrase *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is rendered by Dr. Ballantyne "Implied dogma" (Nyāya aphorisms, i. 31, p. 30, as corrected in MS.). Professor Goldstücker *s.v.* renders it by "implied axiom." In Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon the phrase *abhyupagama-vāda* is rendered "a discussion in a conciliatory spirit." In regard to the sense of *prauḍhi-vāda* see above, p. 172.

which are consonant to the S'ruti and the Smṛiti, they possess authority. Accordingly, in the Padma Purāṇa we find a censure passed even upon the several philosophical systems (*Darśanas*), with the exception of the Brahma (the Vedānta) and the Yoga. For in that work Īśvara (Mahādeva) says to Pārvatī, 'Listen, goddess, while I declare to you the Tāmasa works (the works characterised by *tamas*, or the quality of darkness) in order; works by the mere hearing of which even wise men become fallen. First of all, the S'aiva systems, called Pāśupata, etc., were delivered by myself. Then the following were uttered by Brāhmans penetrated by my power, viz. the great Vaiśeshika system by Kaṇāda, and the Nyāya, and Sānkhya, by Gotama and Kapila respectively. Then the great system, the Pūrva-[mīmānsā], was composed by the Brāhman Jaimini on Vedic subjects, but on atheistic principles. So too the abominable Chārvāka doctrine was declared by Dhishaṇa,[173] while Vishṇu, in the form of Buddha, with a view to the destruction of the Daityas,[174] promulgated the false system of the Bauddhas, who go about naked, or wear blue garments. I myself, goddess, assuming the form of a Brāhman, uttered in the Kali age, the false doctrine of Māyā [illusion, the more modern form of the Vedānta], which is covert Buddhism, which imputes a perverted and generally censured signification to the words of the Veda, and inculcates the abandonment of ceremonial works, and an inactivity consequent on such cessation. In that system I propound the identity of the supreme and the embodied soul, and show that the highest form of this Brahma is that in which he is devoid of the [three] qualities. It was I myself, goddess, by whom this great śāstra, which, composed of Vedic materials and inculcating the theory of illusion, is yet un-Vedic, was declared in the Kali age for the destruction of this entire universe.' We have entered into fuller explanations on this subject in the Brahma-mīmānsā-bhāshya. There is, therefore, no want of authority, nor any contradiction, in any orthodox system, for they are all incapable of refutation in their own especial subjects, and are not mutually discrepant. Does, then, this system (the Sānkhya) lay down a theory based only on its own assumptions in respect of the multitude of souls also? It does not. For in the Brahma-mīmānsā also it is determined by such a kind of texts

[173] A name of Vṛihaspati, according to Wilson's dictionary.

[174] See Wilson's Vishṇu Purāṇa, pp. 334 ff.

as the following (Brahma Sūtras, ii. 3, 43), viz. 'the embodied spirit is a portion[175] of the supreme soul, from the variety of appellations,' that there is a multitude of embodied spirits. But it is denied by the Brahma-mīmānsā that the spirits (*purusha*) asserted by the Sānkhya have the character of Soul; for it is determined by the Brahma Sūtra (iv. 1, 3), 'they approach Him as one with themselves,'[176] that, on the ground of transcendental truth, the supreme Soul alone has the character of Soul. But, nevertheless, the Sānkhya is not unauthoritative; for as the knowledge of its own distinctness from other things, obtained by the embodied spirit in its worldly condition, is instrumental to final liberation, this system is not erroneous in the particular subject matter which it aims at propounding. In this way it results from the distinction of practical and real, that there is no contradiction between the two theories (made known by the S'ruti and Smṛiti), of a multitude of souls, and the unity of all soul.

The view taken by Madhusūdana, as quoted above, and partially confirmed by Vijnāna Bhikshu, of the ultimate coincidence in principle of all the different schools of Hindu philosophy, however mutually hostile in appearance, seems, as I have remarked, to be that which is commonly entertained by modern Pandits. (See Dr. Ballantyne's Synopsis of Science, advertisement, p. iv.) This system of compromise, hwoever, is clearly a deviation from the older doctrine; and it practically abolishes the distinction in point of authority between the Vedas and the Smṛitis, Darśanas, etc. For if the Munis, authors of the six Darśanas, were omniscient and infallible, they must stand on the same level with the Vedas, which can be nothing more.

I return, however, from this digression regarding the hostility of S'ankara to the adherents of the Sānkhya and other rationalistic schools,

175 On this, however, S'ankara (*in loco*) remarks as follows: *Jīvaḥ Īs'varasya aṁs'o bhavitum arhati yathā 'gner visphulingaḥ* | *aṁs'aḥ iva aṁs'aḥ* | *na hi niravayavasya mukhyo 'ṁs'aḥ sambhavati* | *kasmāt punar niravayavatvāt sa eva na bhavati* | "*nānā-vyapades'āt* | "The embodied soul must be 'a portion' of Īs'vara, as a spark is of fire (and not merely dependent upon him as a servant on his master). 'A portion' means, 'as it were a portion;' for nothing can be, in the proper sense, 'a portion' of that which has no parts. Why, then, as Īs'vara has no parts, is not the embodied soul the very same as he? 'From the variety of appellations,' etc., etc."

176 The original Sūtra runs thus: *Ātmā iti tu upagachchhanti grāhayanti cha* | "They approach Him as one with themselves, and [certain texts] cause them to receive Him as one with themselves." This refers to certain texts which S'ankara adduces from one of the Upanishads, apparently.

and the opinions of later authors concerning the founders of those several systems. The distinction drawn by the Indian commentators quoted in this section between the superhuman Veda and its human appendages, the Kalpa Sūtras, etc., as well as the other Smṛitis, is not borne out by the texts which I have cited above (pp. 8, 31) from the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka (= S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa), and Muṇḍaka Upanishads. By classing together the Vedic Sanhitās, and the other works enumerated in the same passages, the authors of both the Upanishads seem to place them all upon an equal footing; and the former of the two authorities speaks of them all as having proceeded from the breathing of the Great Being. If the one set of works are superhuman, it may fairly be argued that the others are so likewise. According to the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, neither of them (if we except only the Vedāntas or Upanishads) can be placed in the highest rank, as they equally inculcate a science which is only of secondary importance.

As, however, S'ankara (who, no doubt, perceived that it would be inconsistent with modern theories to admit that any of the works usually classed under the head of Smṛiti had been really breathed forth by the Creator, and that such a directly divine origin could, on orthodox principles, be assigned only to writings coming under the designation of S'ruti), maintains in his comment on the text of the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad that the whole of the works there enumerated, excepting the Sanhitās of the four Vedas, are in reality portions of the Brāhmaṇas, it will be necessary to quote his remarks, which are as follows (Bibl. Ind. ii. 855 ff.):

. . . *Niśvasitam iva niśvasitam | yathā aprayatnenaiva purusha-niśvāso bhavaty evaṁ vā | are kiṁ tad niśvasitaṁ tato jātam ity uchyate | Yad ṛigvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo 'tharvangirasaś chaturvidham mantra-jātam | itihāsaḥ ity Ūrvaśī-Purūravasor saṁvādādir "Ūrvaśī ha apsarāḥ" ityādi-brāhmaṇam eva | purāṇam "asad vā idam agre āsīd" ityādi | vidyā devajana-vidyā "vedaḥ so 'yam" ityādiḥ | upanishadaḥ "priyam ity etad upāsīta" ityādyāḥ | ślokāḥ "brāhmaṇa-prabhavāḥ mantrās tad ete ślokāḥ" ity ādayaḥ | sūtrāṇi vastu-sangraha-vākyāni vede yathā "ātmā ity eva upāsīta" ityādīni | anuvyākhyānāni mantra-vivaraṇāni | vyākhyānāni arthavādāḥ | . . . . evam ashṭavidham brāhmaṇam | evam mantra-brāhmaṇayor eva grahaṇam | niyata-rachanāvato vidyamānasyaiva vedasya abhivyaktiḥ purusha-niśvāsa-vat | na cha purusha-buddhi-prayatna-pūr-*

vakaḥ | ataḥ pramāṇam nirapekshaḥ eva svārthe | .... tena vedasya aprāmāṇyam āśankate | tad-āśankā-nivṛitty-artham idam uktam | purusha-niśvāsa-vad aprayatnotthitatvāt pramāṇaṁ vedo na yathā 'nyo granthaḥ iti |

"'His breathing' means, 'as it were, his breathing,' or it denotes the absence of effort, as in the case of a man's breathing. We are now told what that breathing was which was produced from him. It was the four classes of mantras (hymns), those of the Ṛich, Yajush, Sāman and Atharvāngirases (Ātharvaṇa); Itihāsa (or narrative), such as the dialogue between Urvaśī and Purūravas, viz. the passage in the Brāhmaṇa beginning 'Urvaśī the Apsaras,' etc. [S'. P. Br. p. 855]; Purāṇa, such as, 'This was originally non-existent,' etc.; Vidyā (knowledge), the knowledge of the gods, as, 'This is the Veda,' etc.; Upanishads, such as, 'Let him reverence this, as beloved,' etc.; S'lokas, such as those here mentioned, 'The mantras are the sources of the Brāhmaṇas, on which subject there are these ślokas,' etc.; Sūtras (aphorisms) occurring in the Veda which condense the substance of doctrines, as, 'Let him adore this as Soul,' etc.; Anuvyākhyānas, or interpretations of the mantras; Vyakhyānas, or illustrative remarks." The commentator adds alternative explanations of the two last terms, and then proceeds: "Here, therefore, eight sorts of texts occurring in the Brāhmaṇas are referred to; and consequently the passage before us embraces merely mantras and Brāhmaṇas. The manifestation of the Veda, which already existed in a fixed form of composition, is compared to the breathing of a person. The Veda was not the result of an effort of the intelligence of any person.[177] Consequently, as proof in respect of its own contents, it is independent of everything else."

S'ankara terminates his remarks on this passage by intimating, as one supposition, that the author of the Upanishad means, in the words

[177] Compare S'ankara's Comment on Brahma Sūtra, i. 1, 3, as quoted above in p. 106, where this same text of the Bṛih. Ār. Up. is referred to. As the fact of Brahma being the author of the Vedas is there adduced to prove the transcendent character of his knowledge, and of his power, we must, apparently (unless we are to charge the great commentator with laying down inconsistent doctrines in the two passages), suppose that in the text before us he does not mean to deny that Brahma was conscious of the procession of the Vedas, etc., from himself, and cognizant of their sense (as the author of the Sānkhya aphorisms and his commentator seem to have understood, see above p. 135), but merely that his consciousness and cognizance were not the result of any effort on his part.

on which he comments, to remove a doubt regarding the authority of the Veda, arising from some words which had preceded, and therefore affirms that "the Veda is authoritative, because it was produced without any effort of will, like a man's breathing, and not in the same manner as other books." (See Sānkhya Sūtras, v. 50; above, p. 135.)

This attempt to explain the whole of the eight classes of works enumerated in the Upanishad as nothing else than parts of the Brāhmaṇas, cannot be regarded as altogether satisfactory, since some of them, such as the Sūtras, have always been referred to a distinct class of writings, which are regarded as uninspired (see Müller's Anc. Ind. Lit. pp. 75, 86); and the Itihāsas and Purāṇas had in all probability become a distinct class of writings at the period when the Upanishad was composed. And S'ankara's explanation is rendered more improbable if we compare with this passage the other from the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, i. 1, 5, already quoted above (p. 31), where it is said, "The inferior science consists of the Ṛich, Yajush, Sāman, and Atharvan Vedas, accentuation (*śikshā*), ritual prescriptions (*kalpa*), grammar, commentary (*nirukta*), prosody (*chhandas*), and astronomy."[178] Here various appendages of the Vedas, which later writers expressly distinguish from the Vedas themselves, and distinctly declare to have no superhuman authority, are yet mentioned in the same category with the four Sanhitās, or collections of the hymns, as constituting the inferior science (in opposition to the knowledge of the supreme Spirit). From this we may reasonably infer that the author of the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad also, when he specifies the Sūtras and some of the other works

[178] I take the opportunity of introducing here Sāyaṇa's remarks on this passage in his Commentary on the Rig-veda, vol. i., p. 33: *Atigambhīrasya vedasya artham avabodhayitum śikshādīni shaḍ-angāni pravṛittāni | ata eva teshām apara-vidyā-rūpatvam Muṇḍakopanishady Ātharvaṇikāḥ āmananti | "dve vidye" ityādi | . . . . sādhana-bhūta-dharma-jnāna-hetutvāt shaḍ-anga-sahitānāṁ karma-kāṇḍānām apara-vidyātvam | parama-purushārtha-bhūta-brahma-jnāna-hetutvād upanishadāṁ para-vidyātvam |* "The S'ikshā and other five appendages are intended to promote the comprehension of the sense of the very deep Veda. Hence, in the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, the followers of the Atharva-veda declare that these works belong to the class of inferior sciences, thus: 'There are two sciences,' etc. [see the entire passage in p. 31.] Since the sections of the Veda which relate to ceremonies [including, of course, the hymns], as well as the six appendages, lead to a knowledge of duty, which is an instrument [of something further], they are ranked as an inferior science. On the other hand the Upanishads, which conduct to a knowledge of Brahma, the supreme object of man, constitute the highest science."

which he enumerates, intended to speak of the Vedāngas or appendages of the Vedas, and perhaps the Smṛitis also, as being the breathing of Brahma. The works which in the passage from the Muṇḍaka are called Kalpa, are also commonly designated as the Kalpa Sūtras.

This conclusion is in some degree confirmed by referring to the passage from the Mahābhārata, S'ānti-parvan, 7,660, which has been cited in p. 105, where it is said that the "great rishis, empowered by Svayambhū, obtained by devotion the Vedas, and the Itihāsas, which had disappeared at the end of the preceding Yuga." Whatever may be the sense of the word Itihāsa in a Vedic work, there can be no doubt that in the Mahābhārata, which is itself an Itihāsa, the word refers to that class of metrical histories. And in this text we see these Itihāsas placed on a footing of equality with the Vedas, and regarded as having been, like them, pre-existent and supernatural. See also the passage from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, vii. 1, 1 ff. (Bibl. Ind., vol. iii. pp. 473 ff.), quoted above (p. 33), where the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are spoken of as "the fifth Veda of the Vedas." The same title of "fifth Veda" is applied to them in the Bhāg. Pur. iii. 12, 39 : *Itihāsa-purāṇāni panchamaṁ vedam Īsvaraḥ | sarvebhyaḥ eva mukhebhyaḥ sasṛije sarva-darśanaḥ* | "The omniscient Īśvara (God) created from all his mouths the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, as a fifth Veda." See also the passages quoted above in pp. 27–30, from the Purāṇas and Mahābhārata, where the Itihāsas and Purāṇas themselves are placed on an equality with, if not in a higher rank, than the Vedas. The claims put forward by these popular works on their own behalf are not, indeed, recognized as valid by more critical and scientific authors, who, as we have seen at the beginning of this section, draw a distinct line of demarcation between the Vedas and all other works; but it would appear from the passages I have quoted from the Upanishads that at one time the Vedas were, at least, not so strictly discriminated from the other S'āstras as they afterwards were.

SECT. XII.—*Recapitulation of the Arguments urged in the Darśanas, and by Commentators, in support of the Authority of the Vedas, with some remarks on these reasonings.*

As in the preceding sections I have entered at some length into the arguments urged by the authors of the philosopical systems and their

commentators, in proof of the eternity and infallibility of the Vedas, it may be convenient to recapitulate the most important points in these reasonings; and I shall then add such observations as the consideration of them may suggest.

The grounds on which the apologists of the Vedas rest their authority are briefly these: First, it is urged that, like the sun, they shine by their own light, and evince an inherent power both of revealing their own perfection, and of elucidating all other things, past and future, great and small, near and remote (Sāyaṇa, as quoted above, p. 62; Śankara on Brahma Sūtras i. 1, 3, above, p. 190). This is the view taken by the author of the Sānkhya Sūtras also, who, however, expressly denies that the Vedas originated from the conscious effort of any divine being (see p. 135). Second, it is asserted that the Veda could have had no (human) personal author, as no such composer is recollected (Mādhava, above, pp. 83 ff), and cannot therefore be suspected of any such imperfection as would arise from the fallibility of such an author (pp. 69 f.; Sāyaṇa p. 106). Third, the Pūrva-mīmānsā adds to this that the words of which the Vedas are composed are eternal, and have an eternal connection (not an arbitrary relation depending upon the human will) with their meanings, and that therefore the Vedas are eternal, and consequently perfect and infallible [179] (Mīmānsā Sūtras and Commentary, above, pp. 71 ff., and Sarva-darśana-sangraha, above, pp. 91 f.) Fourth, the preceding view is either explained or modified by the commentator on the Taittirīya Sanhitā (above, p. 69), as well as by Sāyaṇa in his Introduction to the Rig-veda (above, p. 106), who say that, like time, æther, etc., the Veda is only eternal in a qualified sense, *i.e.* during the continuance of the existing mundane system; and that in reality it sprang from Brahmā at the beginning of the creation. But this origin cannot according to their view affect the perfection of the Veda, which in consequence of the faultlessness of its author possesses a self-demonstrating authority. Fifth, although the Vedānta, too, speaks of the eternity of the Veda (above, p. 105), it also in the same passage makes mention of its self-dependent author; while in another passage (p. 106) it distinctly ascribes the origin of the Indian Scripture to Brahma as its source or

[179] In the Bṛihad Araṇyaka Upanishad (p. 688 of Dr. Röer's ed.) it is said: *Vāchaiva samrāḍ Brahma jnāyate vāg vai samrāṭ paramam Brahma* | "By speech, o monarch, Brahma is known. Speech is the supreme Brahma."

cause. Brahma here must be taken as neuter, denoting the supreme Spirit, and not masculine, designating the personal creator, as under the fourth head.[180] Sixth, according to the Naiyāyika doctrine the authority of the Veda is established by the fact of its having emanated from competent persons who had an intuitive perception of duty, and whose competence is proved by their injunctions being attended with the desired results in all cases which come within the cognizance of our senses and experience (Nyāya Sūtras, above, pp. 116). Seventh, agreeably to the Vaiśeshika doctrine, and that of the Kusumānjali, the infallibility of the Veda results from the omniscience of its author, who is God (Vaiśeshika Sūtras, Tarka Sangraha, and Kusumānjali, pp. 119 ff., 127, and 129 ff., above).

These arguments, as the reader who has studied all their details will have noticed, are sometimes in direct opposition to each other in their leading principles; and they are not likely to seem convincing to any persons but the adherents of the schools from which they have severally emanated. The European student (unless he has some ulterior practical object in view) can only look upon these opinions as matters of historical interest, as illustrations of the course of religious thought among a highly acute and speculative people. But they may be expected to possess a greater importance in the eyes of any Indian readers into whose hands this book may fall; and as such readers may desire to learn in what light these arguments are regarded by Western scholars, I shall offer a few remarks on the subject.

In regard to the first ground in support of the infallibility of the Veda, viz. the evidence which radiates from itself, or its internal evidence, I may observe first, that this is a species of proof which can only be estimated by those who have made the Indian Scripture the object of careful study; and, second, that it must be judged by the reason and conscience of each individual student. This evidence may appear conclusive to men in a certain stage of their national and personal culture, and especially to those who have been accustomed from their infancy to regard the Vedas with a hereditary veneration; whilst to persons in a different state of mental progress, and living under different influences, it will appear perfectly futile. It is quite clear that, even in India itself, there existed in former ages multitudes of learned

[180] See note in p. 205, above.

and virtuous men who were unable to see the force of this argument, and who consequently rejected the authority of the Vedas. I allude of course to Buddha and his followers. And we have even found that some of those writers who are admitted to have been orthodox, such as the authors of the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gītā, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, while they attach the highest value to the divine knowledge conveyed by the latest portions of the Veda, depreciate, if they do not actually despise, the hymns and the ceremonial worship connected with them.

In regard to the second argument, viz. that the Vedas must be of supernatural origin, and infallible authority, as they are not known to have had any human author, I observe as follows. The Greek historian, Herodotus, remarks (ii. 23) of a geographer of his own day who explained the annual inundations of the river Nile by supposing its stream to be derived from an imaginary ocean flowing round the earth, which no one had ever seen, that his opinion did not admit of confutation, because he carried the discussion back into the region of the unapparent (ἐς ἀφανὲς τὸν μῦθον ἀνενείκας οὐκ ἔχει ἔλεγχον). The same might be said of the Indian speculators, who argue that the Veda must have had a supernatural origin, because it was never observed to have had a human author like other books;—that by thus removing the negative grounds on which they rest their case into the unknown depths of antiquity, they do their utmost to place themselves beyond the reach of direct refutation. But it is to be observed (1) that, even if it were to be admitted that no human authors of the Vedas were remembered in later ages, this would prove nothing more than their antiquity, and that it would still be incumbent on their apologists to show that this circumstance necessarily involved their supernatural character; and (2) that, in point of fact, Indian tradition does point to certain rishis or bards as the authors of the Vedic hymns. It is true, indeed, as has been already noticed (p. 85), that these rishis are said to have only "seen" the hymns, which (it is alleged) were eternally preexistent, and that they were not their authors. But as tradition declares that the hymns were uttered by such and such rishis, how is it proved that the rishis to whom they are ascribed, or those, whoever they were, from whom they actually proceeded, were not uttering the mere productions of their own minds? The whole character of these compositions, and the circumstances under which, from internal evi-

dence, they appear to have arisen, are in harmony with the supposition that they were nothing more than the natural expression of the personal hopes and feelings of those ancient bards by whom they were first recited. In these songs the Aryan sages celebrated the praises of their ancestral gods (while at the same time they sought to conciliate their goodwill by a variety of oblations supposed to be acceptable to them), and besought of them all the blessings which men in general desire—health, wealth, long life, cattle, offspring, victory over their enemies, forgiveness of sin, and in some cases also celestial felicity.

The scope of these hymns is well summed up in the passage which I have already quoted (from Colebrooke's Misc. Essays i. 26) in the Second Volume, p. 206: *Arthepsavaḥ ṛishayo devatāś chhandobhir abhyadhāvan* | "The rishis desiring [various] objects, hastened to the gods with metrical prayers." The Nirukta, vii. 1, quoted in the same place, says: *Yat-kāmaḥ ṛishir yasyāṁ devatāyām arthapatyam ichhan stutim prayunkte tad-devataḥ sa mantro bhavati* | "Each particular hymn has for its deity the god to whom the rishi, seeking to obtain any object of desire which he longs for, addresses his prayer." And in the sequel of the same passage from the Nirukta (vii. 3), the fact that the hymns express the different feelings or objects of the rishis is distinctly recognized:

Paroksha-kritāḥ pratyaksha-kritāś cha mantrāḥ bhūyishṭhāḥ alpaśaḥ ādhyātmikāḥ | *athāpi stutir eva bhavati na āśīrvādaḥ "Indrasya nu vīryāṇi pravocham" iti yathā etasmin sūkte* | *athāpi āśīr eva na stutiḥ "suchakshāḥ aham akshībhyām bhūyāsaṁ suvarchāḥ mukhena suśrut karṇābhyām bhūyāsam" iti* | *tad etad bahulam ādhvaryave yājneshu cha mantreshu* | *athāpi śapathābhiśāpau* | *"adya murīya" ityādi . . . athāpi kasyachid bhāvasya āchikhyāsā* | *"na mṛityur āsīd" ityādi . . .* | *athāpi paridevanā kasmāchchid bhāvāt* | *"sudevo adya prapated anāvṛid" ityādi* | *athāpi nindā-praśaṁse* | *"kevalāgho bhavati kevalādī" ityādi* | *evam aksha-sūkte dyūta-nindā cha kṛishi-praśaṁsā cha* | *evaṃ uchchāvachair abhiprāyair ṛishīṇām mantra-dṛishṭayo bhavanti* |

"[Of the four kinds of verses specified in the preceding section], (*a*) those which address a god as absent, (*b*) those which address him as present, and (*c*) those which address the worshippers as present and the god as absent, are the most numerous, while those (*d*) which refer to the speaker himself are rare. It happens also that a god is

praised without any blessing being invoked, as in the hymn (R.V. i. 32). 'I declare the heroic deeds of Indra,' etc. Again, blessings are invoked without any praise being offered, as in the words, 'May I see well with my eyes, be resplendent in my face, and hear well with my ears.' This frequently occurs in the Ādhvaryava (Yajur) Veda, and in the sacrificial formulæ. Then again we find oaths and curses, as in the words (R.V. vii. 104, 15), 'May I die to-day, if I am a Yātudhāna,' etc. (See Vol. I. p. 327.) Further, we observe the desire to describe some particular state of things, as in the verse (R.V. x. 129, 2), 'Death was not then, nor immortality,' etc. Then there is lamentation, arising out of a certain state of things, as in the verse (R.V. x. 95, 14), 'The beautiful god will disappear and never return,' etc. Again, we have blame and praise, as in the words (R.V. x. 117, 6), 'The man who eats alone, sins alone,' etc. So, too, in the hymn to dice (R.V. x. 34, 13) there is a censure upon dice, and a commendation of agriculture. Thus the objects for which the hymns were seen by the rishis were very various."[181]

It is to be observed, however, that although in this passage the author, Yāska, speaks of the various desires which the rishis expressed in different hymns, he nevertheless adheres to the idea which was recognized in his age, and in which he doubtless participated, that the rishis "saw" the hymns.

In the Nirukta, x. 42, the form of the metre in particular hymns is ascribed to the peculiar genius of the rishi Paruchhepa:[182] *Abhyāse*

[181] In Nirukta, iv. 6, allusion is made to a rishi Trita perceiving a particular hymn when he had been thrown into a well (*Tritam̃ kūpe 'vahitam etat sūktam prati babhau*).

[182] A Paruchhepa is mentioned in the Taittīriya Sanhitā, ii. 5, 8, 3, as follows: *Nṛimedhas cha Paruchhepaś cha brahmavādyam avadetām "asmin dārāv ārdre 'gnim̃ janayāva yataro nau brahmīyān" iti | Nṛimedho 'bhyavadat sa dhūmam ajanayat | Paruchhepo 'bhyavadat so 'gnim ajanayat | "ṛishe" ity abravīd "yat samāvadvidva kathā tvam agnim ajījano nāham" iti | "samidhenīnām eva aham̃ varṇam̃ veda" ity abravīt | "yad ghṛitavat padam anūchyate sa āsām̃ varṇas 'tam̃ tvā samidbhir Angiraḥ' ity āha sāmidhenīshv eva taj jyotir janayati"* | "Nṛimedha and Paruchhepa had a discussion concerning sacred knowledge. They said, 'Let us kindle fire[1] in this moist wood, in order to see which of us has most sacred knowledge.'[2] Nṛimedha pronounced (a text); but produced only smoke. Paruchhepa pronounced (a text) and generated fire. Nṛimedha said, 'Rishi, since our knowledge is equal, how is it that thou hast generated fire, while I have not.' Paruchhepa replied, 'I know the lustre

[1] "Without friction."—Comm.

[2] "In regard to the Sāmidhenī formulas."—Comm.

bhūyāṁsam artham manyante yathā "aho darśanīya aho darśanīya" iti | *tat Paruchchhepasya śīlam* | "Men consider that by repetition the sense is intensified, as in the words 'o beautiful, o beautiful.' This is Paruchhepa's habit."

In Nirukta, iii. 11, the rishi Kutsa is mentioned as being thus described by the interpreter Aupamanyava: *Ṛishiḥ Kutso bhavati karttā stomānām ity Aupamanyavaḥ* | "'Kutsa is the name of a rishi, a maker of hymns,' according to Aupamanyava."

So too the same work, x. 32, says of the rishi Hiraṉyastūpa that "he declared this hymn" (*Hiraṉyastūpaḥ ṛishir idaṁ sūktam provācha*).

I do not, as I have already intimated, adduce these passages of the Nirukta to show that the author regarded the hymns as the ordinary productions of the rishis' own minds, for this would be at variance with the expression "seeing," which he applies to the mental act by which they were produced. It appears also from the terms in which he speaks of the rishis in the passage (Nirukta, i. 20) quoted above, p. 120, where they are described as having an intuitive insight into duty, that he placed them on a far higher level than the inferior men of later ages. But it is clear from the instances I have adduced that Yāska recognizes the hymns as being applicable to the particular circumstances in which the rishis were placed, and as being the bonâ fide expression of their individual emotions and desires. (See also the passages from the Nirukta, ii. 10 and 24, quoted in Vol. I. pp. 269 and 338, which establish the same point.) But if this be true, the supposition that these hymns, *i.e.* hymns specifically suited to express the various feelings and wishes of all the different rishis, were eternally pre-existent, and were perceived by them at the precise conjunctures when they were required to give utterance to their several aims, is perfectly gratuitous and unnecessary. It might be asserted with nearly the same shew of reason that the entire stock of ordinary language employed by human beings to express their ideas had existed from eternity.[183]

of the Sāmidhenīs. The sentence which contains the word ghṛita (butter) forms their lustre. When any one repeats the words, "We augment thee, o Angiras (Agni) with fuel and with butter," he then generates that lustre in the Sāmidhenīs.'"

[183] A difficulty of the same nature as that here urged, viz. that men and objects which existed in time are mentioned in the Vedas which are yet said to be eternal, was felt by Jaimini, as we have already seen (pp. 77 ff.). I recur to this subject in p. 215.

In regard to the third argument for the authority of the Vedas, viz. that they are eternal, because the words of which they are composed are eternal, and because these words have an inherent and eternal (and not a merely conventional) connection with the significations or objects, or the species of objects, which they represent, it is to be observed that it is rejected both by the Nyāya and Sānkhya schools.[184] And I am unable (if I rightly comprehend this orthodox reasoning) to see how it proves the authority of the Veda more than that of any other book. If the words of the Veda are eternal, so must those of the Bauddha books be eternal, and consequently, if eternal pre-existence is a proof of perfection, the infallibility of these heretical works must be as much proved by this argument as the divine origin of the Vedas, whose pretensions they reject and oppose. Or if the meaning is that the words of the Veda alone are eternal and infallible, this is an assumption which requires proof. If their reception by great rishis be alleged as evidence, it must be remarked that the authority of these rishis is itself a point which cannot be admitted until it has been established.

In regard to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh of the arguments above stated, as put forward by the representatives of different schools or opinions in favour of the authority of the Veda, it may suffice to say that they for the most part assume the point to be proved, viz. that the Veda did proceed from an omniscient, or at least a competent, author. The only exception to this remark is to be found in the reasoning of the Nyāya and Sānkhya aphorisms that the infallibility of the Vedas is shown by the fact that the employment of the formulas or prescriptions of those parts of them which deal with temporal results, such as can be tested by experience, is always found to be efficacious; a premiss from which the conclusion is drawn that those other parts of the Veda, which relate to the unseen world, must be equally authoritative, as the authors of these different parts are the same persons. This argument cannot appear convincing to any but those who admit first, the invariable efficacy of all the formulas and prescriptions

See, however, the comment on Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 30, regarding the perpetual recurrence of the same things in successive creations from, and to, all eternity, which will be quoted in the Appendix.

184 See Dr. Ballantyne's remarks on this controversy, in pp. 186, 189, 191, and 192 of his "Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy."

of the Veda which relate to such matters as can be tested by experience, and secondly, the identity of the authors of the parts of the Veda which contain these formulas and prescriptions with the authors of the other parts. It would be impossible to prove the former point, and next to impossible to prove the latter.

Against the eternity of the Vedas an objection has been raised, which Jaimini considers it necessary to notice, viz. that various historical personages are named in their pages, and that as these works could not have existed before the persons whose doings they record, they must have commenced to exist in time. This difficulty Jaimini attempts, as we have seen above (pp. 77 ff.), to meet by explaining away the names of the historical personages in question. Thus Babara Prāvahiṇi is said to be nothing else than an appellation of the wind, which is eternal. And this method, it is said, is to be applied in all similar cases. Another of the passages mentioned by an objector (see above, p. 79) as referring to non-eternal objects is R.V. iii. 53, 14, "What are the cows doing for thee among the Kīkaṭas?" etc. The author of the Mīmānsā Sūtras would no doubt have attempted to show that by these Kīkaṭas we are to understand some eternally pre-existing beings. But Yāska, the author of the Nirukta, who had not been instructed in any any such subleties, speaks of the Kīkaṭas as a non-Āryan nation. (Vol. I. p. 342, and Vol. II. p. 362.) It is difficult to suppose that Jaimini—unless he was an enthusiast, and not the cool and acute reasoner he has commonly proved himself to be—could have seriously imagined that his rule of interpretation could ever be generally received or carried out.[155] The Brāhmaṇas evidently intend to represent the numerous occurrences which they narrate, as having actually taken place in time, and the actors in them as having been real historical personages. See, for instance, the legends from the S'atapatha and Aitareya Brāhmaṇas, the Taittarīya Sanhitā, etc., quoted in the First

[155] In Sāyaṇa's Introduction to R.V. vol. i. p. 23, it is said: *Manushya-vṛittānta-pratipādakaḥ ṛicho nārāśaṁsyaḥ* | "The Nārāśaṁsīs are verses which set forth the histories of men." Yāska's definition is the same in substance, Nir. ix. 9. If these Nārāśaṁsīs are, as Sāyaṇa says, verses of the hymns (*ṛichaḥ*), and if according to his definition their object is to record events in human history, it follows that they must refer to non-eternal objects. See also the explanation of the words *nārāsaṁśena stomena* in Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, 3, 53, given by the Commentator Mahīdhara, which will be quoted further on.

Volume of this work, pp. 182, 192, 194, 328, 355, etc. And it is impossible to peruse the Vedic hymns without coming to the conclusion that they also record a multitude of events, which the writers believed to have been transacted by men on earth in former ages. (See the passages quoted from the Rig-veda in the First and Second Volumes of this work, passim; those, for example, in Vol. I. pp. 162 ff., 318 ff., 339 ff., and Vol. II. p. 208.)

We shall, no doubt, be assisted in arriving at a correct conclusion in regard to the real origin and character of the hymns of the Veda, if we enquire what opinion the rishis, by whom they were confessedly spoken, entertained of their own utterances; and this I propose to investigate in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II.

THE RISHIS, AND THEIR OPINIONS IN REGARD TO THE ORIGIN OF THE VEDIC HYMNS.

I HAVE already shewn, in the preceding pages, as well as in the Second Volume of this work, that the hymns of the Rig-veda themselves supply us with numerous data by which we can judge of the circumstances to which they owed their origin, and of the manner in which they were created. We have seen that they were the natural product and expression of the particular state of society, of the peculiar religious conceptions, and of all those other influences, physical and moral, which prevailed at the period when they were composed, and acted upon the minds of their authors. (Vol. I. pp. 161 f., Vol. II. pp. 205 ff.; and above, pp. 211 f.) We find in them ideas, a language, a spirit, and a colouring totally different from those which characterize the religious writings of the Hindus of a later era. They frequently discover to us the simple germs from which the mythological conceptions current in subsequent ages were derived,—germs which in many cases were developed in so fanciful and extravagant a manner as to shew that the simplicity of ancient times had long since disappeared, to make way for a rank and wild luxuriance of imagination. They afford us very distinct indications of the locality in which they were composed (Vol. II. pp. 354–372); they shew us the Aryan tribes living in a state of warfare with surrounding enemies (some of them, probably, alien in race and language), and gradually, as we may infer, forcing their way onward to the east and south (Vol. II. pp. 374 ff., 384 ff., 414 ff.); they supply us with numerous specimens of the particular sorts of prayers, viz. for protection and victory, which men so circumstanced would naturally address to the gods whom they worshipped, as well as of those

more common supplications which men in general offer up for the various blessings which constitute the sum of human welfare; and they bring before us as the objects of existing veneration a class of deities (principally, if not exclusively, personifications of the elements, and of the powers either of nature, or of reason) who gradually lost their importance in the estimation of the later Indians, and made way for gods of a different description, invested with new attributes, and in many cases bearing new appellations.

These peculiarities of the hymns abundantly justify us in regarding them as the natural product and spontaneous representation of the ideas, feelings, and aspirations of the bards with whose names they are connected, or of other ancient authors, while the archaic forms of the dialect in which they are composed, and the references which are made to them, as pre-existent, in the liturgical works by which they are expounded and applied, leave no reason for doubt that they are the most ancient of all the Indian Scriptures.

We can also, as I have shewn, discover from the Vedic hymns themselves, that some of them were newer and others older, that they were the works of many successive generations of poets, that their composition probably extended over several centuries, and that in some places their authors represent them as being the productions of their own minds, while in other passages they appear to ascribe to their own words a certain divine character, or attribute their composition to some supernatural assistance. (Vol. I. p. 4, and II. pp. 206 ff., 219 ff.)

I shall now proceed to adduce further proofs from the hymns of the Rig-veda in support of these last mentioned positions; repeating, at the same time, for the sake of completeness, the texts which I have already cited in the Second Volume.

SECT. I.—*Passages from the Hymns of the Veda which distinguish between the Rishis as Ancient and Modern.*

The appellations or epithets applied by the authors of the hymns to themselves, and to the sages who in former times had instituted, as well as to their contemporaries who continued to conduct, the different rites of divine worship, are the following: *ṛishi, kavi, medhāvin, vipra,*

vipaśchit, *vedhas*, *muni*, etc. The rishis are defined in Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, to be persons "who, whether singly or in chorus, either on their own behalf or on behalf of others, invoked the gods in artificial language, and in song;" and the word is said to denote especially "the priestly bards who made this art their profession." The word *kavi* means "wise," or "a poet," and has ordinarily the latter sense in modern Sanskrit. *Vipra* means "wise," and, in later Sanskrit, a "Brāhman;" *medhāvin* means "intelligent;" *vipaśchit* and *vedhas*, "wise" or "learned." *Muni* signifies in modern Sanskrit a "sage" or "devotee." It is not much used in the Rig-veda, but occurs in viii. 17, 13 (Vol. II. p. 397).

The following passages from the Rig-veda either expressly distinguish between contemporary rishis and those of a more ancient date, or, at any rate, make reference to the one or the other class. This recognition of a succession of rishis constitutes one of the historical elements in the Veda. It is an acknowledgment on the part of the rishis themselves that numerous persons had existed, and events occurred, anterior to their own age, and, consequently, in time; and it therefore refutes, by the testimony of the Veda itself, the assertion of Jaimini (above, pp. 77 ff.) that none but eternally pre-existing objects are mentioned in that book.

If, under this and other heads of my inquiry, I have cited a larger number of passages than might have appeared to be necessary, it has been done with the intention of showing that abundant evidence of my various positions can be adduced from all parts of the Hymn-collection.[1]

R. V. i. 1, 2. *Agniḥ pūrvebhir ṛishibhir īḍyo nūtanair uta | sa devān eha vakshati |*

"Agni, who is worthy to be celebrated by former, as well as modern rishis, will bring the gods hither."

The word *pūrvebhiḥ* is explained by Sāyaṇa thus: *Purātanair Bhṛigv-angiraḥ-prabhṛitibhir ṛishibhiḥ* | "By the ancient rishis, Bhṛigu, Angiras," etc.; and *nūtanaiḥ* is interpreted by *idānīntanair asmābhir api*, "by us of the present day also." See also Nirukta, vii. 16.

[1] I have to acknowledge the assistance kindly rendered to me by Prof. Aufrecht in the revision of my translation of the passages quoted in this and the following sections. As, however, the texts are mostly quite clear in so far as regards the points which they are adduced to prove, any inaccuracies with which I may be chargeable in other respects are of comparatively little importance.

i. 45, 3. *Priyamedha-vad Atri-vaj Jātavedo Virūpa-vat | Angiras-vad mahi-vrata Praskaṇvasya śrudhi havam | 4. Mahi-keravaḥ ūtaye Priyamedhāḥ ahūshata |*

"O (god) of great power, listen to the invocation of Praskaṇva, as thou didst listen to Priyamedha, Atri, Virūpa, and Angiras. 4. The Priyamedhas, skilled in singing praises, have invoked thee."

Here Praskaṇva is referred to, in verse 3, as alive, whilst Priyamedha, Atri, Virūpa, and Angiras belong to the past. In verse 4 the descendants of Priyamedha are however alluded to as existing. The three other names are also, no doubt, those of families. In R.V. iii. 53, 7, (see Vol. I. p. 341) the Virūpas appear to be referred to; while in viii. 64, 6 (which will be quoted below), a Virūpa is addressed. In v. 22, 4, the Atris are spoken of.

i. 48, 14. *Ye chid hi tvām ṛishayaḥ pūrve ūtaye juhūre ityādi |*

"The former rishis who invoked thee for succour," etc.

i. 80, 16. *Yām Atharvā Manush pitā Dadhyañ dhiyam atnata | tasmin brahmāṇi pūrvathā Indre ukthā samagmata ityādi |*

"In the ceremony [or hymn] which Atharvan, or our father Manu, or Dadhyanch performed, the prayers and praises were, as of old, congregated in that Indra," etc.

i. 118, 3 (repeated in iii. 58, 3). *Āhur viprāsaḥ Aśvinā purājaḥ |*

"O Aśvins, the ancient sages say," etc.

i. 131, 6. *Ā me asya vedhaso navīyaso manma śrudhi navīyasaḥ |*

"Hear the hymn of me this modern sage, of this modern [sage]."

i. 139, 9. *Dadhyañ ha me janusham pūrvo Angirāḥ Priyamedhaḥ Kaṇvo Atrir Manur vidur ityādi |*

"The ancient Dadhyanch, Angiras, Priyamedha, Kaṇva, Atri, and Manu know my birth."

i. 175, 6. *Yathā pūrvebhyo jaritṛibhyaḥ Indra mayaḥ iva āpo na tṛishyate babhūtha | Tām anu tvā nividam johāvīmi ityādi |*

"Indra, as thou hast been like a joy to former worshippers who praised thee, like waters to the thirsty, I invoke thee again and again with this hymn," etc.

iv. 20, 5. *Vi yo rarapśe ṛishibhir navebhir vṛiksho na pakvaḥ sṛiṇyo na jetā | maryo na yoshām abhi manyamāno achhā vivakmi puruhūtam Indram |*

"Like a man desiring a woman, I call hither that Indra, invoked by

many, who, like a ripe tree, like a conqueror expert in arms,[2] has been celebrated by recent rishis."

iv. 50, 1. *Tam pratnāsaḥ ṛishayo dīdhyānāḥ puro viprāḥ dadhire mandra-jihvam* |

"The ancient rishis, resplendent and sage, have placed in front of them [Bṛihaspati] with gladdening tongue."

v. 42, 6. .... *Na te pūrve Maghavan na aparāso na vīryaṁ nūtanaḥ kaśchana āpa* |

"Neither the ancients nor later men, nor any modern man, has attained to [conceived] thy prowess, o Maghavan."

x. 54, 3. *Ke u nu te mahimanaḥ samasya asmat pūrve ṛishayo antam āpuḥ* | *yad mātaraṁ cha pitaraṁ cha sākam ajanayathās tanvāḥ svāyāḥ* |

"Who among the rishis who were before us have attained to the end of all thy greatness? for thou didst at once produce from thy own body both the mother and the father (earth and heaven)."

vi. 19, 4. *Yathā chit pūrve jaritāraḥ āsur anedyāḥ anavadyāḥ arishṭāḥ* |

"As [Indra's] former worshippers were, [may we be] blameless, irreproachable, and unharmed."

vi. 21, 5. *Idā hi te vevishataḥ purājāḥ pratnāsaḥ āsuḥ purukṛit sakhāyaḥ* | *Ye madhyamāsaḥ uta nūtanāsaḥ utāvamasya puruhūta bodhi* |

"For now, o energetic god, men are thy worshippers, as the ancients born of old and the men of the middle and later ages have been thy friends. And, o much-invoked, think of the most recent of all."[3]

vi. 21, 1. *Sa tu śrudhi Indra nūtanasya brahmaṇyato vīra kārudhāyaḥ* |

"Heroic Indra, supporting the poet, listen to the modern [bard] who wishes to celebrate thee."

vi. 22, 2. *Tam u naḥ pūrve pitaro navagvāḥ sapta viprāsaḥ abhi vājayantaḥ ityādi* |

"To Him (Indra) our ancient fathers, the seven Navagva sages, desiring food, (resorted) with their hymns," etc.

vi. 50, 15. *Evā napāto mama tasya dhībhir Bharadvājāḥ abhyarchanti arkaiḥ* |

"Thus do the Bharadvājas my grandsons adore thee with (my?) hymns and praises."

[2] Prof. Aufrecht thinks *sriṇyo na jetā* may perhaps mean, "like a winner of sickles (as a prize)."

[3] This verse is translated in Benfey's Glossary to the Sāma-veda, p. 76, col. i.

vii. 18, 1. *Tve ha yat pitaraś chid naḥ Indra viśvā vāmā jaritāro asanvann ityādi* |

"Since, in thee, o Indra, even our fathers, thy worshippers, obtained all riches," etc.

vii. 29, 4. *Uto gha te purushyāḥ id āsan yeshām pūrveshām aśriṇor rishīṇām* | *adha aham tvā Maghavan johavīmi tvaṁ naḥ Indra asi pramatiḥ piteva* |

"Even they were of mortal birth,—those former rishis whom thou didst hear. I invoke thee again and again, o Maghavan; thou art to us wise as a father."

vii. 53, 1. . . . . *Te chid hi pūrve kavayo gṛiṇantaḥ puro mahī dadhire devaputre* |

"The ancient poets, celebrating their praises, have placed in the front these two great [beings, heaven and earth] of whom the gods are the children."

vii. 76, 4. *Te id devānāṁ sadhamādaḥ āsann ṛitāvānaḥ kavayaḥ pūrvyāsaḥ* | *gūḷhaṁ jyotiḥ pitaro anvavindan satya-mantrāḥ ajanayann ushāsam* |

"They shared in the enjoyments of the gods, those ancient pious sages. Our fathers discovered the hidden light; with true hymns they caused the dawn to arise."

vii. 91, 1. *Kuvid anga namasā ye vṛidhāsaḥ purā devāḥ anavadyāsaḥ āsan* | *te Vāyave Manave bādhitāya avāsayann*[4] *ushasaṁ sūryeṇa* |

"Certainly those gods who were formerly magnified (or grew) by worship were altogether blameless. They lighted up the dawn and the sun to Vāyu (Āyu?) and the afflicted Manu." (See Vol. I. p. 172.)

viii. 36, 7. *S'yāvāśvasya sunvatas tathā śṛiṇu yathā aśṛiṇor Atreḥ karmāṇi kṛiṇvataḥ* |

"Listen to S'yāvāśva pouring forth libations, in the same way as thou didst listen to Atri when he celebrated sacred rites."[5]

ix. 96, 11. *Tvayā hi naḥ pitaraḥ Soma pūrve karmāṇi chakruḥ pavamāna dhīrāḥ* |

"For through thee, o pure Soma, our wise forefathers of old performed their sacred rites."

[4] See Benfey's Glossary to Sāma-veda, under the word *vas* 2.

[5] Compare viii. 35, 19; and viii. 37, 7.

ix. 110, 7. *Tve Soma prathamāḥ vṛikta-varhisho mahe vājāya śravase dhiyaṁ dadhuḥ* |

"The former [priests] having strewed the sacred grass, offered up a hymn to thee, o Soma, for great strength and food."

x. 14, 15 (=A.V. xviii. 2, 2). *Idaṁ namaḥ ṛishibhyaḥ pūrvajebhyaḥ pathikṛidbhyaḥ* |

"This reverence to the rishis, born of old, the ancients, who showed us the road." (This verse may also be employed to prove that at the end of the Vedic period the rishis had become objects of veneration.)

x. 66, 14. *Vasishṭhāsaḥ pitṛivad vācham akrata devān iḷānāḥ ṛishivad | ityādi* |

"The Vasishṭhas, like the forefathers, like the rishis, have uttered their voice, worshipping the gods."

x. 67, 1—will be quoted in a following section.

x. 96, 5. *Tvam aharyathāḥ upastutaḥ pūrvebhir Indra harikeśa yajvabhiḥ* |

"Indra, with golden hair, thou didst rejoice, when lauded by the ancient priests."

x. 98, 9. *Tvām pūrve ṛishayo gīrbhir āyan tvām adhvareshu puruhūta viśve* |

"To thee the former rishis resorted with their hymns; to thee, thou much invoked, all men [resorted] at the sacrifices."

Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, xviii. 52. *Imau te pakshāv ajarau patatriṇau yābhyāṁ rakshāṁsi apahaṁsi Agne | tābhyām patema sukṛitām u lokaṁ yatra ṛishayo jagmuḥ prathamajāḥ purāṇāḥ* |

"But these undecaying, soaring pinions, with which, o Agni, thou slayest the Rakshases,—with them let us ascend to the world of the righteous, whither the earliest-born ancient rishis have gone." (This verse is quoted in the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, ix. 4, 4, 4, p. 739.)

The ancient rishis, as Sāyaṇa says in his note on R.V. i. 2, were Bhṛigu, Angiras, and others whom he does not name. In another place we find Atharvan, Manu, Dadhyanch, and others mentioned. I will not here enter into any particulars regarding these ancient sages. For some texts relating to Bhṛigu, I may refer to the First Volume of this work, pp. 443 ff.; and various passages relating to Manu will be found in the same volume pp. 162 ff., and in pp. 324–332 of the Second Volume. In regard to Atharvan, as well as Angiras, Professor Gold-

stücker's Sanskrit and English Dictionary, and in regard to the same personages and Dadhyanch, the Sanskrit and German Lexicon of Boehtlingk and Roth, may be consulted.

SECT. II.—*Passages from the Veda in which a distinction is drawn between the older and the more recent hymns.*

From the passages which I propose to bring forward in the present section, it will be found that the hymns which the rishis addressed to the gods are frequently spoken of as new, while others of ancient date are also sometimes mentioned. The rishis no doubt entertained the idea that the gods would be more highly gratified if their praises were celebrated in new, and perhaps more elaborate and beautiful compositions, than if older, and possibly ruder, prayers had been repeated.

The fact that a hymn is called new by its author, does not, however, by any means enable us to determine its age relatively to that of other hymns in the collection, for this epithet of new is, as we shall see, applied to numerous compositions throughout the Veda; and often when a hymn is not designated as new, it may, nevertheless, be in reality of recent date, compared with the others by which it is surrounded. When, however, any rishi characterizes his own effusion as new, we are of course necessarily led to conclude that he was acquainted with many older songs of the same kind. The relative ages of the different hymns can only be settled by means of internal evidence furnished by their dialect, style, metre, ideas, and general contents; and we may, no doubt, hope that much will by degrees be done by the researches of critical scholars towards such a chronological classification of the constituent portions of the Rig-veda.

The hymns, praises, or prayers uttered by the rishis are called by a great variety of names, such as *ṛich*, *sâman*, *yajush*, *brahman*, *arka*, *uktha*, *mantra*, *manman*, *mati*, *manīshā*, *sumati*, *dhī*, *dhīti*, *dhishaṇā*, *stoma*, *stuti*, *sushṭuti*, *praśasti*, *śaṁsa*, *gir*, *vāch*, *vachas*, *nītha*, *nivid*, etc.

R.V. i. 12, 11. *Sa naḥ stavānaḥ ābhara gāyatreṇa navīyasā | rayiṁ vīravatīm ishaṁ |*

"Glorified by our newest[6] hymn, do thou bring to us wealth and food with progeny." (Sāyaṇa explains *navīyasā* by *pūrvakair apy asampāditena gāyatreṇa* | "A hymn not formed even by former rishis.")

[6] Compare Psalms, 33, 3; 40, 3; 96, 1; 98, 1; 144, 9; 149, 1; and Isaiah, 42, 10.

i. 27, 4. *Imam ū shu tvam asmākaṁ saniṁ gāyatraṁ navyāṁsam* | *Agne deveshu pravochaḥ* |

"Agni, thou hast announced [or do thou announce] among the gods this our offering, our newest hymn."

i. 60, 3. *Taṁ navyasī hṛidaḥ ā jāyamānam asmat sukīrttir madhu-jihvam aśyāḥ* | *yam ṛitvijo vṛijane mānushāsaḥ prayasvantaḥ āyavo jīja-nanta* |

"May our newest laudation (springing) from (our) heart, reach him, the sweet-tongued, at his birth, (him) whom mortal priests the descendants of Manu, offering oblations, have generated in the ceremonial." (See iii. 39, 1, in next page, and i. 171, 2 and ii. 35, 2, which will be quoted further on in the next section).

i. 89, 3. *Tān pūrvayā nividā hūmahe vayam Bhagam Mitram Aditiṁ Daksham Asridham ityādi* |

"We invoke with an ancient hymn Bhaga, Mitra, Aditi, Daksha, Asridh [or the friendly]," etc. (*Pūrvakālīnayā* | *nityayā* | *nividā* | *vedātmikayā vāchā* | "With an ancient—eternal, hymn—a Vedic text."—Sāyaṇa.)

i. 96, 2. *Sa pūrvayā nividā kavyatā Āyor imāḥ prajāḥ ajanayad ma-nūnām* |

"Through the ancient hymn, the poetic work, of Āyu he (Agni) generated these children of men." [7]

i. 130, 10. *Sa no navyebhir vṛisha-karmann ukthais purāṁ darttaḥ pāyubhiḥ pāhi śagmaiḥ* |

"Through our new hymns, do thou, vigorous in action, destroyer of cities, sustain us with invigorating blessings."

i. 143, 1. *Pra tavyasīṁ navyasīṁ dhītim Agnaye vācho matiṁ sahasaḥ sūnave bhare* |

"I bring to Agni, the son of strength, a new and energetic hymn, a production of thought uttered by the voice (*vāchaḥ*)."

ii. 17, 1. *Tad asmai navyam Angiras-vad archata ityādi* |

"Utter to him [Indra] that new [hymn] like Angiras." ("New, *i.e.* never before seen among other people" *anyeshv adṛishṭa-pūrvam*—Sāyaṇa.)

ii. 18, 3. *Harī nu kaṁ rathe Indrasya yojam āyai sūktena vachasā navena* | *mo shu tvām atra bahavo hi viprāḥ ni rīraman yajamānāso anye* |

[7] See the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, p. 143 of Prof. Haug's translation; and Vol. I. p. 18*l*.

"With this new and well-expressed hymn I have yoked[8] the steeds in Indra's car, in order that he may come hither. Let not the other wise sacrificers, who are numerous, stop thee (from coming to me)."

ii. 24, 1. *Sa imām aviḍḍhi prabhṛitiṁ yaḥ īśishe | ayā vidhema navayā mahā girā |*

"Do thou who rulest receive this, our offering [of praise]: let us worship thee with this new and grand song."

iii. 1, 20. *Etā te Agne janimā sanāni pra pūrvyāya nūtanāni vocham |*

"These ancient [and these] new productions I have uttered to thee, Agni, who art ancient." (Comp. R.V. viii. 84, 5, in the next section.)

iii. 32, 13. *Yaḥ stomebhir vāvṛidhe pūrvyebhir yo madhyamebhir uta nūtanebhiḥ |*

"[Indra] who has grown through (or been magnified by) ancient, intermediate, and modern hymns."

iii. 39, 1. *Indram matir hṛidaḥ ā vachyamānā achhā patiṁ stomatashṭā jigāti | ā jāgṛivir vidathe śasyamānā Indra yat te jāyate viddhi tasya | 2. Divaś chid ā pūrvyā jāyamānā vi jāgṛivir vidathe śasyamānā | bhadrā vastrāṇi arjunā vasānā sā iyam asme sanajā pitryā dhīḥ |*

"1. The vigilant hymn, formed of praise, and uttered from the heart, proceeds to Indra the lord, when chaunted at the sacrifice: be cognizant, Indra, of this [praise] which is produced for thee. 2. Produced even before the daylight, vigilant, chaunted at the sacrifice, clothed in beautiful and radiant garments,—this is our ancient ancestral hymn." (*Pitryā* is rendered by Sāyaṇa as *pitṛi-kramāgatā*, "received by succession from our fathers.")

iii. 62, 7. *Iyaṁ te Pūshann āghṛiṇe sushṭutir deva navyasī | asmābhis tubhyaṁ śasyate |*

"Divine and glowing Pūshan, this new laudation is recited by us to thee."

v. 42, 13. *Pra sū mahe suśaraṇāya medhāṁ giram bhare navyasīṁ jāyamānām |*

"I present to the mighty protector a mental production, a new utterance [now] springing up."

[8] Compare the expressions *vacho-yujā harī*, "brown horses yoked by the hymn (R.V. viii. 45, 39; viii. 87, 9); *brahma-yuj*, "yoked by prayer" (i. 177, 2; iii. 35, 4; viii. 1, 24; viii. 2, 27; viii. 17, 2); and *mano-yuj*, "yoked by the mind, or will" (i. 14, 6; i. 51, 10; iv. 48, 4; v. 75, 6; viii. 5, 2).

v. 55, 8. *Yat pūrvyam Maruto yach cha nūtanaṁ yad udyate Vasavo yach cha śasyate | viśvasya tasya bhavatha navedasah |*

"Be cognizant of all that is ancient, Maruts, and of all that is modern, of all that is spoken, Vasus, and of all that is recited."

vi. 17, 13. . . . . *Suvīraṁ tvā svāyudhaṁ suvajram ā brahma navyam avase vavṛityāt |*

"May the new prayer impel thee, the heroic, well-accoutred, the loud-thundering, to succour us." ("New, *i.e.* never made before by others: prayer, *i.e.* the hymn made by us" *Nūtanam anyair akṛita-pūrvam | brahma asmābhiḥ kṛitaṁ stotram*—Sāyaṇa.)

vi. 22, 7. *Taṁ vo dhiyā navyasyā śavishṭham pratnam pratna-vat paritaṁsayadhyai |*

"I seek, like the ancients, to stimulate thee, the ancient, with a new hymn."

vi. 34, 1. *Saṁ cha tve jagmur giraḥ Indra pūrvīr vi cha tvad yanti vibhvo manīshāḥ | purā nūnaṁ cha stutayaḥ ṛishīṇām paspṛidhre Indre adhi ukthārkāḥ |*

"Many songs, Indra, are collected in thee; numerous thoughts issue forth from thee; both before and now the praises, texts and hymns of rishis have hastened emulously to Indra."

vi. 44, 13. *Yaḥ pūrvyābhir uta nūtanābhir gīrbhir vāvṛidhe griṇatām ṛishīṇām |*

"He (Indra) who grew through the ancient and modern hymns of lauding rishis." (See R.V. iii. 32, 13, above p. 223.)

vi. 48, 11. *Ā sakhāyaḥ subardughāṁ dhenum ajadhvam upa navyasā vachaḥ |*[9]

"Friends, drive hither the milch cow with a new hymn."

vi. 49, 1. *Stushe janaṁ suvrataṁ navyasībhir gīrbhir Mitrāvaruṇā sumnayantā |*

"With new praises I celebrate the righteous race, with Mitra and Varuna, the beneficent." ("The well-acting race, *i.e.* the divine race, the company of the gods," *sukarmāṇaṁ janaṁ daivyaṁ janaṁ deva-sangham*—Sāyaṇa.)

vi. 50, 6. *Abhi tyaṁ vīraṁ girvaṇasam archa Indram brahmaṇā jaritar navena |*

"Sing, o worshipper, with a new hymn, to the heroic Indra, who delights in praise."

[9] Compare the words *ni Agne navyasā vachas tanūshu śaṁsam esham*, viii. 39, 2.

vi. 62, 4. *Tā navyaso jaramāṇasya manma upa bhūshato yuyujāna-saptī ityādi* | 5. *Tā valgū dasrā puruśākatamā pratnā navyasā vachasā vivāse* |

"4. These (Aśvins), with yoked horses, approach the hymn of their new worshipper. . . . . 5. I adore with a new hymn these brilliant, strong, most mighty, and ancient (gods)."

vii. 35, 14, will be quoted in the next section.

vii. 53, 2. *Pra pūrvaje pitarā navyasībhir gīrbhiḥ kṛiṇudhvam sadane ṛitasya ityādi* |

"In the place of sacrifice propitiate with new hymns the ancient, the parents" (*i.e.* Heaven and Earth), etc.

vii. 56, 23. *Bhūri chakra Marutaḥ pitryāṇi ukthāni yā vaḥ śasyante purā chit* |

"Ye have done great things, o Maruts, when our fathers' hymns were recited of old in your honour."

vii. 59, 4. . . . . *abhi vaḥ āvartt sumatir navīyasī*[10] *tūyaṁ yāta pipīshavaḥ* |

"May the new hymn turn you hither; come quickly, desirous to drink."

vii. 61, 6. . . . . *Pra vām manmāni ṛichase navāni kṛitāni brahma jujushann imāni* |

"May the new hymns made to praise you, may these prayers gratify you."

vii. 93, 1. *Śuchiṁ nu stomaṁ nava-jātam adya Indrāgnī Vṛittra-hanā jushetham* | *ubhā hi vāṁ suhavā johavīmi ityādi* |

"Indra and Agni, slayers of Vṛittra, receive with favour the pure hymn newly produced to-day. For again and again do I invoke you who lend a willing ear," etc.

viii. 5, 24. *Tābhir āyātam ūtibhir navyasībhiḥ suśastibhiḥ yad vāṁ vṛishaṇvasū huve* |

"Come with those same succours, since I invoke you, bountiful [deities], with new praises." (The epithet *navyasībhiḥ* in this text might possibly be construed with the word *ūtibhiḥ*, "aids.")

viii. 6, 11. *Aham pratnena manmanā giraḥ śumbhāmi Kaṇva-vat* | *yena Indraḥ śushmam id dadhe* |

[10] The same words, *sumatir navīyasī*, occur in viii. 92, 9, where they may not have the same sense as here.

"I decorate my praises with an ancient hymn, after the manner of Kaṇva, whereby Indra put on strength."

viii. 6, 43. *Imām su pūrvyām dhiyam madhor ghṛitasya pipyushīm Kaṇvāḥ ukthena vavṛidhuḥ* |

"The Kaṇvas with their praise have augmented this ancient hymn, replenished with sweet butter."

viii. 12, 10. *Iyam te ṛitviyāvatī dhītir eti navīyasī saparyantī ityādi* |

"This new and solemn hymn advances to honour thee," etc.

viii. 20, 19. *Yūnaḥ ū su navishṭhayā vṛishṇaḥ pāvakān abhi Sobhare girā | gāya ityādi* |

"Sing, o Sobhari, with a new hymn to these youthful, vigorous, and brilliant (gods).

viii. 23, 14. *S'rushṭī Agne navasya me stomasya vīra viśpate vi māyinas tapushā rakshaso daha* |

"Heroic Agni, lord of the people, on hearing my new hymn, burn up with thy heat the deluding Rakshases."

viii. 25, 24. . . . . *Kaśāvantā viprā navishṭhayā matī | maho vājināv arvantā sachā asanam* |

"I have celebrated at the same time with a new hymn, these two sage and mighty [princes], strong, swift, and carrying whips."

viii. 39, 6. *Agnir veda marttānām apīchyam . . . . Agnir dvārā vyūrṇute svāhuto navīyasā* |

"Agni knows the secrets of mortals . . . . Agni, invoked by a new [hymn], opens the doors."

viii. 40, 12. *Eva Indrāgnibhyām pitṛi-vad navīyo Māndhātṛi-vad Angiras-vad avāchi ityādi* |

"Thus has a new [hymn] been uttered to Indra and Agni after the manner of our fathers, and of Māndhātṛi, and of Angiras."

viii. 41, 2. *Tam ū shu samanā girā pitṝīṇām cha manmabhiḥ Nābhākasya praśastibhir yaḥ sindhūnām upa udaye sapta-svasā sa madhyamaḥ* |

"[Worship] him (Varuṇa) continually with a song, with the hymns of the fathers,[11] and with the praises of Nābhāka. He who dwells at the

[11] The expression here employed, *pitṝīṇām cha manmabhiḥ*, occurs also in R.V. x. 57, 3 (=Vāj. S. 3, 53): *Mano nu ā huvāmahe nārāśaṁsena somena pitṝīṇām cha manmabhiḥ* | "We summon his soul with Soma, accompanied by human praises, and with the hymns of the fathers." The Vājasaneyi Sanhitā reads *stomena*, "hymn," instead of *somena*. The commentator there explains *nārāśaṁsena stomena* as "a hymn

birth-place of the streams, the lord of the seven sisters, abides in the centre." (This verse is quoted in the Nirukta x. 5. Nābhāka is said by Yāska to have been a rishi (*ṛishir Nābhāko babhūva*). A translation of the passage is given in Roth's Illustrations of the Nir. p. 135, where reference is also made to two verses of the preceding hymn (viii. 40, 4, 5), in which Năbhāka (the ancestor of Nābhāka) is mentioned thus: (verse 4) *Abhyarcha Năbhāka-vad Indrāgnī yajasā girā* . . . . (verse 5) *Pra brahmāṇi Năbhāka-vad Indrāgnibhyām irajyata* | "Worship Indra and Agni with sacrifice and hymn, like Năbhāka . . . . Like Năbhāka, direct your prayers to Indra and Agni." In explanation of the seven sisters, Roth refers to Nir. v. 27 (R.V. viii. 58, 12) where the seven rivers are mentioned. See his Illustrations of Nir. pp. 70, 71.

viii. 44, 12. *Agniḥ pratnena manmanā śumbhānas tanvaṁ svām kaviḥ vipreṇa vavṛidhe* |

"The wise Agni, illuminating his own body at [the sound of] the sage and ancient hymn, has become augmented."

viii. 55, 11. *Vayaṁ gha te apūrvyā Indra brahmāṇi vṛittrahan | purutamāsaḥ puruhūta vajrivo bhṛitiṁ na pra bharāmasi* |

"Indra, slayer of Vṛittra, thunderer, invoked of many, we [thy] numerous [worshippers] bring to thee, as thy hire, hymns which never before existed."

viii. 63, 7, 8. *Iyaṁ te navyasī matir Agne adhāyi asmad ā mandra sujāta sukrato amūra dasma atithe | sā te Agne śantamā chanishṭhā bhavatu priyā tayā vardhasva sushṭutah* |

"O Agni, joyful, well-born, strong, unerring, and wondrous guest, this new hymn has been offered to (or, made for) thee by us; may it be dear to thee, agreeable and pleasant: lauded by it, do thou increase."

viii. 65, 5, 6. . . . . *Indraṁ gīrbhir havāmahe | Indram pratnena manmanā marutvantam havāmahe ityādi* | 12. (=S.V. ii. 340.) *Vācham ashṭāpadīm aham nava-sraktim ṛita-spṛiśam | Indrāt pari tanvam mame* |

"5. We invoke Indra with songs; we invoke Indra, attended by the Maruts, with an ancient hymn. . . . . 12. I compose for the sake of

in which men are praised," and *pitṛīṇāṁ cha manmabhiḥ*, as hymns "in which the father sare reverenced" (*pitaro yaiḥ stotrair manyante te manmānas tair ityādi*). See Prof. Max Müller's translation of this hymn in the Journal of Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, pp. 449 and 458.

Indra a hymn of eight feet and nine lines, abounding in sacred truth." (This verse is translated and explained by Professor Benfey, Sāma-veda, p. 255.)

ix. 9, 8. *Nu navyase navīyase sūktāya sādhaya pathaḥ* | *pratna-vad rochaya ruchaḥ* |

"Prepare (o Soma) the paths for our newest, most recent, hymn; and, as of old, cause the lights to shine."

ix. 42, 2. *Esha pratnena manmanā devo devebhyaḥ pari* | *dhārayā pavate sutaḥ* |

"This god, poured forth to the gods, with an ancient hymn, purifies with his stream."

ix. 91, 5. *Sa pratna-vad navyase viśva-vāra sūktāya pathaḥ kṛiṇuhi prāchaḥ ityādi* |

"O god, who possessest all good, make, as of old, forward paths for this new hymn."

ix. 99, 4 (= S.V. ii. 983). *Taṁ gāthayā purāṇyā punānam abhi anūshata* | *uto kṛipanta dhītayo devānāṁ nāma bibhratīḥ* |

"They praised the pure god with an ancient song; and hymns embracing the names of the gods have supplicated him." (Benfey translates the last clause differently.)

x. 4, 6. . . . . *Iyaṁ te Agne navyasī manīshā yukshva rathaṁ na śuchayadbhir angaiḥ* |

"This is for thee, Agni, a new hymn: yoke thy car as it were with shining parts."

x. 89, 3. *Samānam asmai anapāvṛid archa kshmayā divo asamam brahma navyam ityādi* |

"Sing (to Indra) without ceasing a new hymn, worthy of him, and unequalled in earth or heaven."

x. 91, 13. *Imām pratnāya sushṭutiṁ navīyasīṁ vocheyam asmai uśate śriṇotu naḥ* |

"I will address to this ancient [deity] my new praises, which he desires; may he listen to us."

x. 96, 11. . . . . *Navyaṁ navyaṁ haryasi manma nu priyam ityādi* |

"Thou delightest in ever new hymns, which are dear to thee," etc.

x. 160, 5. *Aśvāyanto gavyanto vājayanto havāmahe tvā upa gantavai u* | *ābhūshantas te sumatau navāyāṁ vayam Indra tvā śunaṁ huvema* |

"Desiring horses, cattle, and wealth, we invoke thee to approach us.

Paying homage to thee in a new hymn, may we, o Indra, invoke thee auspiciously."

SECT. III.—*Passages of the Rig-veda, in which the rishis describe themselves as the composers of the hymns.*

In this section I propose to quote, first of all, those passages in which the rishis distinctly speak of themselves as the authors of the hymns, and express no consciousness whatever of deriving assistance or inspiration from any supernatural source. I shall then adduce some further texts in which, though nothing is directly stated regarding the composition of the hymns, there is at the same time nothing which would lead the reader to imagine that the rishis looked upon them as anything else than the offspring of their own minds.

I shall arrange the quotations in which the rishis distinctly claim the authorship, according to the particular verb which is employed to express this idea. These verbs are (1) *kṛi*, "to make," (2) *taksh* (= the Greek τεκταίνομαι), "to fabricate," and (3) *jan*, "to beget, generate, or produce," with others which are less explicit.

I. I adduce first the passages in which (1) the verb *kṛi*, "to make," is applied to the composition of the hymns. (Compare R.V. vii. 61, 6, already quoted in the last section.)

R.V. i. 20, 1. *Ayaṁ devāya janmane stomo viprebhir āsayā*[13] | *akāri ratna-dhātamaḥ* |

"This hymn, conferring wealth, has been *made* to the divine race, by the sages, with their mouth [or in presence of the gods]."

i. 31, 18. *Etena Agne brahmaṇā vāvṛidhasva śaktī vā yat te chakṛima vidā vā* |

"Grow, o Agni, by this prayer which we have *made* to thee according to our power, or our knowledge."

i. 47, 2. . . . . *Kaṇvāso vām brahma kriṇvanti adhvare teshāṁ su śriṇutaṁ havam* |

"The Kaṇvas make a prayer to you: hear well their invocation."

i. 61, 16. *Evā te hariyojanā suvṛikti Indra brahmāṇi Gotamāsaḥ akran* |

"Thus, o Indra, yoker of steeds, have the Gotamas *made* hymns for thee efficaciously."

[13] See the note on vi. 32, 1, below.

i. 117, 25. *Etāni vām Aśvinā vīryāṇi pra pūrvyāṇi āyavaḥ avochan | brahma kṛiṇvanto*[13] *vṛishaṇā yuvabhyām suvīrāso vidatham ā vadema |*

"These, your ancient exploits, o Aśvins, men have declared. Let us, who are strong in bold men, *making* a hymn for you, o vigorous gods, utter our offering of praise."

i. 184, 5. *Esha vām stomo Aśvināv akāri mānebhir maghavānā suvṛikti |*

"This hymn has efficaciously been *made* to you, o opulent Aśvins, by the Mānas. (Comp. i. 169, 8; 171, 5; 182, 8; 184, 3.)

ii. 39, 8. *Etāni vām Aśvinā vardhanāni brahma stomam Gṛitsamadāsaḥ akran |*

"These magnifying prayers, [this] hymn, o Aśvins, the Gṛitsamadas have *made* for you."

iii. 30, 20. *Svaryavo matibhis tubhyam viprāḥ Indrāya vāhaḥ Kuśikāsaḥ akran |*

"Aspiring to heaven, the sage Kuśikas have *made* a hymn with praises to thee, o Indra." (The word *vāhaḥ* is stated by Sāyaṇa to be = *stotra,* "a hymn.")

iv. 6, 11. *Akāri brahma samidhāna tubhyam ityādi |*

"O kindled [Agni], a prayer has been *made* to thee."

iv. 16, 20. *Eved Indrāya vṛishabhāya vṛishṇe brahma akarma Bhṛiyavo na ratham | . . . . 21. Akāri te harivo brahma navyam dhiyā syāma rathyaḥ sadāsāḥ |*

"Thus have we *made* a prayer for Indra, the productive, the vigorous, as the Bhṛigus [fashioned] a car. . . . . 21. A *new* prayer has been *made* for thee, o lord of steeds. May we, through our hymn (or rite), become possessed of chariots and perpetual wealth."

vi. 52, 2. *Ati vā yo maruto manyate no brahma vā yaḥ kriyamāṇam ninitsāt | tapūmshi tasmai vṛijināni santu brahma-dvisham abhi tam śochatu dyauḥ |*

"Whoever, o Maruts, regards himself as superior to us, or reviles the prayer which is being *made*, may burning injuries be his lot; may the sky scorch the enemy of prayer.[14]

[13] The reader will find Prof. Haug's opinion of the sense of this phrase in p. 11 f. of his German dissertation "on the original signification of the word *brahma*," of which the author has been kind enough to send me a copy, which has reached me as this sheet is passing through the press. Prof. Haug mentions R.V. i. 88, 4; vii. 103, 8, as passages (additional to those I have given) in which the expression occurs.

[14] Translated by Prof. Haug in the Dissertation above referred to, p. 6.

vii. 35, 14. *Ādityāḥ Rudrāḥ Vasavo jushanta* (the Atharva-veda has *jushantām*) *idam brahma kriyamāṇaṁ navīyaḥ | śriṇvantu no divyāḥ pārthivāso gojātāḥ ityādi* |

"The Ādityas, Rudras, and Vasus receive with pleasure this new prayer which is being *made*. May the gods of the air, the earth, and the sky hear us."

vii. 37, 4. *Vayaṁ nu te dāśvāṁsaḥ syāma brahma kriṇvantaḥ ityādi* |

"Let us offer oblations to thee, *making* prayers," etc.

vii. 97, 9. *Iyaṁ vām Brahmaṇaspate suvṛiktir brahma Indrāya vajriṇe akāri* |

"Brahmaṇaspati, this efficacious hymn, [this] prayer has been *made* for thee, and for Indra, the thunderer."

viii. 51, 4. *Āyāhi kriṇavāma te Indra brahmāṇi varddhanā ityādi* |

"Come, Indra, let us *make* prayers, which magnify thee," etc.

viii. 79, 3. *Brahma te Indra girvaṇaḥ kriyante anatidbhutā | imā jushasva haryaśva yojanā yā te amanmahi* |

"Unequalled prayers are made for thee Indra, who lovest hymns. Receive favourably, lord of the brown steeds, those which we have thought out for thee, to yoke thy horses."

x. 54, 6. . . . . *Adha priyam śūsham Indrāya manma brahmakṛito*[15] *Vṛihadukthād avāchi* |

". . An acceptable and powerful hymn has been uttered to Indra by Vṛihaduktha, *maker* of prayers."[16]

x. 101, 2. *Mandrā kriṇudhvaṁ dhiyaḥ ā tanudhvaṁ nāvam aritraparaṇīṁ kriṇudhvam* |

"*Make* pleasant (hymns), prepare prayers, make a ship propelled by oars."

It is possible that in many of these passages the verb *kṛi* may have merely the signification which the word *make* has in English when we speak of "making supplications," etc., in which case it of course means to *offer up*, rather than to *compose*. But this cannot be the case in such passages as R.V. iv. 16, 20 (p. 233), where the rishi speaks of making

[15] Compare *ṛishayo mantrakṛito manīshiṇaḥ* in Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 8, 8, 5; and R.V. ix. 114, 2: *Rishe mantra-kṛitāṁ stomaiḥ Kaśyapodvardhayam giraḥ | somaṁ namasya rājanaṁ yo jajne vīrudhām patiḥ* | "Rishi Kaśyapa, augmenting thy words with the praises of the makers of hymns, reverence King Soma, who was born the lord of plants."

[16] Prof. Haug thinks the word *brahma-kṛit* here refers to hymns, and mentions other passages in which it occurs: see p. 12 of the Dissertation above referred to.

the hymn as the Bhṛigus made a chariot.[17] And such an interpretation would be altogether inadmissible in the case of the texts which I next proceed to cite.

II. Passages in which the word *taksh*, "to fashion, or fabricate," is applied to the composition of the hymns.

i. 62, 13. *Sanāyate Gotamaḥ Indra navyam atakshad brahma hariyo-janāya ityādi* |

"Nodhas, descendant of Gotama, *fashioned* this new hymn for [thee], Indra, who art of old, and who yokest thy steeds," etc.

i. 130, 6. *Imām̐ te vācham̐ vasuyantaḥ āyavo ratham̐ na dhīraḥ sva-pāḥ atakshishuḥ sumnāya tvām atakshishuḥ* |

"Desiring wealth, men have *fashioned* for thee this hymn, as a skilful workman [fabricates] a car; and thus they have disposed (*lit.* fashioned) thee to (confer) happiness."

i. 171, 2. *Esha vaḥ stomo Maruto namasvān hṛidā tashṭo manasā dhāyi devāḥ* |

"This reverential hymn, o divine Maruts, *fashioned* by the heart, has been presented [or, made] by the mind. [According to Sāyaṇa, the last words mean, 'let it be received by you with a favourable mind']."

ii. 19, 8. *Evā te Gṛitsamadāḥ śūra manma avasyavo na vayunāni takshuḥ* |

"Thus, o hero, have the Gṛitsamadas, desiring succour, *fashioned* for thee a hymn, as men make works." (Sāyaṇa explains *vayuna* by "road.")

ii. 35, 2. *Imam̐ su asmai hṛidaḥ ā sutashṭam mantram̐ vochema kuvid asya vedat* |

"Let us address to him this *well-fashioned* hymn proceeding from the heart; will he not be aware of it?"

v. 2, 11. *Etam̐ te stomam̐ tuvi-jāta vipro ratham̐ na dhīraḥ svapāḥ ataksham* |

"I, a sage, have *fabricated* this hymn for thee, o powerful [deity], as a skilful workman fashions a car."

v. 29, 15. *Indra brahma kriyamāṇā jushasva yā te śavishṭha navyā akarma* | *vastreva bhadrā sukṛitā vasūyuḥ ratham̐ na dhīraḥ svapāḥ ataksham* |

[17] See also v. 29, 15, and x. 39, 14, which will be quoted a little further on; and in which the verbs *kṛi* and *taksh* are both employed.

"O mighty Indra, regard with favour the prayers which are *made*, the new [prayers] which we have *made* for thee. Desirous of wealth, I have *fabricated* them like beautiful well-fashioned garments, as a skilful workman [constructs] a car." (Compare R.V. iii. 39, 2; above, p. 226.)

v. 73, 10. *Imā brahmāṇi vardhanā Aśvibhyām santu śantamā | yā takshāma rathān iva avochāma brihad namaḥ |*

"May these magnifying prayers which we have *fashioned*, like cars, be pleasing to the Aśvins: we have uttered great adoration."

vi. 32, 1 (=S.V. i. 322). *Apūrvyā purutamāni asmai mahe vīrāya tavase turāya | virapśine vajriṇe śantamāni vachāṁsi āsā*[18] *sthavirāya taksham |*

"To this great hero, vigorous, energetic, the adorable, unshaken thunderer, I have with my mouth *fabricated* copious and pleasing prayers, which have never before existed."

vi. 16, 47. *Ā te Agne ṛichā havir hṛidā tashṭam bharāmasi |*

"In this verse, Agni, we bring to thee an oblation *fabricated* by the heart." (Comp. R.V. iii. 39, 1, in p. 226.)

vii. 7, 6. *Ete dyumnebhir viśvam ātiranta mantraṁ ye vā araṁ naryāḥ atakshan |*

"These manly (Vasishthas), who have skilfully *fabricated* the hymn, have by their energy accomplished all things (?)."

vii. 64, 4. *Yo vāṁ garttam manasā takshad etam ūrddhvāṁ dhītiṁ kriṇavad dhārayach cha |*

"May he who with his mind *fashioned* for you (Mitra and Varuṇa) this car, make and sustain the lofty hymn." (The same expression *ūrddhvā dhītiḥ* occurs in R.V. i. 119, 2.)

viii. 6, 33. *Uta brahmaṇyā vayaṁ tubhyam pravṛiddha vajrivo viprāḥ atakshma jīvase |*

"O mighty thunderer, we, who are sage, have *fabricated* prayers for thee, that we may live."

x. 39, 14. *Etaṁ vāṁ stomam Aśvināv akarma atakshāma Bhṛigavo na ratham | ni amṛikshāma yoshaṇāṁ na maryye nityaṁ na sūnuṁ tanayaṁ dadhānāḥ |*

"This hymn, Aśvins, we have *made* for you; we have *fabricated* it

[18] On the sense of *āsā* see Prof. Müller's article in the Journal of Roy. As. Soc. for 1867, p. 232 f.; and Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, *s.v.*

as the Bhrigus [constructed] a car; we have decorated it, as a bride for her husband, continuing the series [of our praises] like an unbroken line of descendants." (See iv. 16, 20, above, p. 233.)

(The following is Sāyaṇa's comment on this passage, for a copy of which I am indebted to Professor Müller: *He Aśvinau vāṁ yuvayor etaṁ yathoktaṁ stomaṁ stotram akarma akurma | Tad etad āha | Bhṛigavo na Bhṛigavaḥ iva ratham atakshāma vayaṁ stotram saṁskṛitavantaḥ | karmayogād Ṛibhavo Bhṛigavaḥ uchyante | athavā rathakārāḥ Bhṛigavaḥ | kincha vayaṁ nityaṁ śāśvataṁ tanayaṁ yāgādīnāṁ karmaṇāṁ tanitāraṁ sūnuṁ na aurasam putram iva stotraṁ dadhānāḥ dhārayanto martye manushye nyamṛikshāma yuvayoḥ stutiṁ nitarāṁ saṁskṛitavantaḥ* | "Aśvins, we have made this preceding hymn or praise of you. He means to say this. Like the Bhṛigus, we have made a car, we have carefully constructed a hymn. The Ribhus are, in this passage, ... styled Bhṛigus; or Bhṛigus are chariot-makers. Moreover, maintaining praise as a constant perpetuator (like a legitimate son) of sacrifice and other rites, we have polished, *i.e.* carefully composed a celebration of you among men [?]." In this comment the word *yoshaṇā* is left unexplained. In verse 12 of this hymn the Aśvins are supplicated to come in a car fleeter than thought, constructed for them by the Ṛibhus—*ā tena yātam manaso javīyasā rathaṁ yaṁ vām Ṛibhavaś chakrur Aśvinā* |.)

x. 80, 7. *Agnaye brahma Ṛibhavas tatakshuḥ* |

"The Ṛibhus [or the wise] *fabricated* a hymn for Agni.

III. I next quote some texts in which the hymns are spoken of as being *generated* by the rishis. (Comp. R.V. vii. 93, 1, in p. 228.)

iii. 2, 1. *Vaiśvānarāya dhishaṇām ṛitāvṛidhe ghṛitaṁ na pūtam Agnaye janāmasi* |

"We *generate* a hymn, like pure butter, for Agni Vaiśvānara, who promotes our sacred rites."

vii. 15, 4. *Navaṁ nu stomam Agnaye divaḥ śyenāya jījanam* | *vasvaḥ kuvid vanāti naḥ* |

"I have *generated* a new hymn to Agni, the falcon of the sky; will he not bestow on us wealth in abundance?"

vii. 22, 9. *Ye cha pūrve ṛishayo ye cha nūtnāḥ Indra brahmāṇi janayanta viprāḥ* |

"Indra, the wise rishis, both ancient and modern, have *generated* prayers."

vii. 26, 1. *Na somaḥ Indram asuto mamāda na abrahmāṇo maghavānaṁ sutāsaḥ | tasmai ukthaṁ janaye yaj jujoshad nṛivad navīyaḥ śṛiṇavad yathā naḥ |*

"The soma exhilarates not Indra unless it be poured out; nor do libations [gratify] Maghavan when offered without a prayer. To him I *generate* a hymn such as may please him, that, after the manner of men, he may hear our new [production]."

vii. 31, 11. . . . . *Suvṛiktim Indrāya brahma janayanta viprāḥ |*

"The sages *generated* an efficacious production and a prayer for Indra."

vii. 94, 1, 2 (=S.V. ii. 266). *Iyaṁ vām asya manmanaḥ Indrāgnī pūrvya-stutir abhrād vṛishṭir iva ajani | śṛiṇutaṁ jaritur havam ityādi |*

"This excellent praise has been *generated* for you, Indra and Agni, from the soul of this [your worshipper], like rain from a cloud. Hear the invocation of your encomiast." (Benfey thinks *manman*, "spirit," is to be understood of Soma, whose hymn, *i.e.* the sound of his dropping, resembles the falling of rain. The scholiast of the S.V. makes *manman* = *stotṛi*, "worshipper".)

viii. 43, 2. *Asmai te pratiharyate Jātavedo vicharshaṇe Agne janāmi sushṭutim |*

"Wise Agni Jātavedas, I *generate* a hymn for thee, who receivest it with favour."

viii. 77, 4. *Ā tvā ayam arkaḥ ūtaye vavarttati yaṁ Gotamāḥ ajījanan |*

"This hymn which the Gotamas have *generated*, incites thee to succour us."

viii. 84, 4, 5. *S'rudhi havaṁ Tiraśchyāḥ Indra yas tvā saparyati suvīryasya gomato rāyaḥ pūrdhi mahān asi | Indra yas te navīyasīṁ giram mandrām ajījanat chikitvin-manasaṁ dhiyam pratnām ṛitasya pipyushīm |*

"Hear, Indra, the invocation of Tiraśchī, thy worshipper; replenish him with wealth in strong men and in cattle, for thou art great. Indra (do this for him] who has *generated* for thee the *newest* exhilarating hymn, springing from an intelligent mind, an *ancient* mental product, full of sacred truth."

(These verses occur also in the Sāma-veda ii. 233, 234, and are translated by Professor Benfey, at pp. 230 and 250 of his edition. The hymn referred to in this passage is apparently designated as both

new and old. How can it be both? It may have been an old hymn re-written and embellished; ancient in substance, though new in expression.[19] Compare St. John's Gospel, xiii. 34, and the First Epistle of St. John, ii. 7, 8, and iii. 11.)

ix. 73, 2. . . . . *madhor dhārābhir janayanto arkam it priyām Indrasya tanvam avīvṛidhan* |

"*Generating* the hymn, they have augmented the beloved body of Indra with the honied streams."

ix. 95, 1 (=S.V. i. 530). . . . . *ato matīr janayata svadhābhiḥ* |

"Wherefore *generate* hymns with the oblations." (Professor Benfey makes *janayata* the 3rd person singular of the imperfect middle, and applies it to Soma.)

x. 7, 2. *Imāḥ Agne matayas tubhyaṁ jātāḥ gobhir aśvair abhi gṛiṇanti rādhaḥ* |

"These hymns, Agni, *generated* for thee, celebrate thy bounty in cows and horses."

x. 23, 5, 6, 7. *Yo vāchā vivācho mṛidhravāchaḥ purū sahasrā aśivā jaghāna* | *Tat tad id asya pauṁsyaṁ gṛiṇīmasi pitā iva yas tavishīṁ vāvṛidhe śavah* | 6. *Stomaṁ te Indra Vimadāḥ ajījanann apūrvyam purutamaṁ sudānave* | *Vidma hi asya bhojanam inasya yad ā paśuṁ na gopāḥ karāmahe* | 7. *Mā kir naḥ enā sakhyā viyaushus tava cha Indra Vimadasya cha risheḥ* | *Vidma hi te pramatiṁ deva jāmi-vad asme te santu sakhyā śivāni* |

"5. Who (Indra) with his voice slew many thousands of the wicked uttering confused and hostile cries. We laud his several acts of valour, who, like a father, grew in vigour and strength. 6. For thee, o Indra, who art bountiful, the Vimadas have *generated* a copious hymn, which never before existed (*apūrvya*); for we know that it is gratifying to this mighty god, when we attract him hither as a cowherd drives his cattle. 7. Indra, may that friendship of ours never be dissolved, which exists between thee and the rishi Vimada: for we know thy wisdom, o god; may thy friendship be favourable to us, like that of a kinsman."

x. 67, 1. *Imām dhiyaṁ sapta-śīrshṇīm pitā naḥ ṛitaprajātām bṛihatīm avindat* | *turīyaṁ svij janayad viśvajanyo Ayāsyaḥ uktham Indrāya śansan* |

[19] As Prof. Aufrecht expresses it: "*Gir* is opposed to *dhī*, as form to substance a new utterance, but a primordial homage."

"Our father hath discovered [or invented] this great, seven-headed hymn, born of sacred truth; Ayāsya, friend of all men, celebrating Indra, has *generated* the fourth song of praise." (In his Lexicon, Roth gives Ayāsya as a proper name; but says it may also be an adjective with the sense of "unwearied.")

x. 91, 14. *Kīlāla-pe soma-prishṭāya vedhase hṛidā matiṁ janaye chārum Agnaye* |

"With my heart I *generate* a beautiful hymn for Agni, the drinker of nectar, the soma-sprinkled, the wise." (See also R.V. i. 109, 1, 2, which will be quoted below.)

IV. In the following texts the verbal root *ṛi*, "to move, send forth," etc., used with or without a preposition, is applied to the utterance or (it may even mean) the production of hymns.

i. 116, 1. *Nāsatyābhyām barhir iva pravṛinje stomān iyarmi abhriyā iva vātaḥ | yāv arbhagāya Vimadāya jāyāṁ senājuvā ni ūhatuḥ rathena* |

"In like manner as I spread the sacrificial grass to the Nāsatyas (Aśvins), so do I *send forth* to them hymns, as the wind [drives] the clouds; to them (I say), who bore off to the youthful Vimada his bride in a chariot swift as an arrow."

vii. 61, 2. *Pra vāṁ sa Mitrā-Varuṇau ṛitāvā vipro manmāni dīrgha-śrud iyartti | Yasya brahmāṇi sukratū avāthaḥ ā yat kratvā na śaradaḥ pṛiṇaithe* |

"The devout sage, heard afar off, *sends forth* his hymns to you, o Mitra and Varuna. Do you, mighty gods, receive his prayers with favour, so that for (many) autumns ye may not be satiated with his fervour." (See Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, *s.v.* *ā* + *pṛi.*)

viii. 12, 31. *Imāṁ te Indra sushṭutiṁ vipraḥ iyartti dhītibhiḥ | jāmim padā iva pipratīm pra adhvare* |

"In the sacrifice the sage, with praises, *sends forth* to thee this hymn, which is of kin to thee, and, as it were, supplies the places (of others?)

viii. 13, 26. .... *Ṛitād iyarmi te dhiyam manoyujam* |

".... From the sacred ceremony I *send forth* a prayer which will attract thy heart."

x. 116, 9. *Pra Indrāgnibhyāṁ suvachasyām iyarmi sindhāv iva prerayaṁ nāvam arkaiḥ* |

"I *send forth* a [hymn] with beautiful words to Indra and Agni; with my praises I have, as it were, launched a ship on the sea."

(Compare R.V. ii. 42, 1, spoken of Indra in the form of the bird called Kapinjala, a sort of partridge: *Iyartti vācham ariteva nāvam* | "It sends forth a voice, as a rower propels a boat." See also R.V. x. 101, 2, quoted above, p. 234.)

x. 4, 1. *Pra te yakshi pra te iyarmi manma bhuvo yathā vandyo no haveshu* | *dhanvann iva prapā asi tvam Agne iyakshave pūrave pratna rājan* |

"I offer thee worship, I send forth to thee a meditation, that thou mayest be accessible to adoration in our invocations. For thou, Agni, ancient king, art like a trough of water in the desert to the man who longs for thee."

V. In the following passages other verbs are employed to denote the composition or presentation of hymns:

i. 61. 2. *Indrāya hṛidā manasā manīshā pratnāya patye dhiyo marjayanta* |

"To Indra, the ancient lord, they *prepared* [or polished] hymns [or ceremonies] with the heart, mind, and understanding."

i. 61, 4. *Asmai id u stomaṁ saṁhinomi rathaṁ na tashṭā iva ityādi* |

"To him (Indra) I *send forth* a hymn, as a carpenter a car," etc.

i. 94, 1 (= S.V. i. 66). *Imaṁ stomaṁ arhate Jātavedase ratham iva sam mahema manīshayā* | *bhadrā hi naḥ pramatir asya saṁsadi Agne sakhye mā rishāma vayaṁ tava* |

"Let us with our intellect *construct* (or, *send forth*) this hymn for the adorable Jātavedas like a car, for his wisdom is favourable to us in the assembly. Agni, in thy friendship may we never suffer." (The root *mah* means to honour or worship.[20] The reader may compare Benfey's translation.)

There is to be found in the hymns a great multitude of passages in which the rishi speaks of presenting his hymns and prayers to the various deities who are the objects of his worship, without directly claiming for himself the authorship of those compositions. The natural inference to be drawn from the expressions which we shall find to be employed in most of the cases to which I refer, would, I think, be that the personality of the rishi himself was uppermost in his mind, and that he was not conscious that the praises which he was uttering to

[20] See, however, the various reading suggested by Böthlingk and Roth *s.v. mah* + *sam* and *ah* + *sam.*

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the gods proceeded from any other source than his own unaided faculties. Of this description are the following texts, which represent a manner of thinking and speaking very prevalent in the hymns:

i. 60, 5. *Tam tvā vayam patim Agne rayīṇām praśamsāmo matibhir Gotamāsaḥ* |

"We, the Gotamas, praise with hymns thee, Agni, the lord of riches."

i. 77, 5. *Eva Agnir Gotamebhir ṛitāvā viprebhir astoshṭa jātavedaḥ* |

"Thus has the holy Agni Jātavedas been celebrated by the sage Gotamas."

i. 78, 5. *Avochāma Rahūgaṇāḥ Agnaye madhumad vachaḥ* | *dyumnair abhi pra nonumaḥ* |

"We, the Rahūgaṇas, have uttered to Agni honied speech; we incessantly laud him with eulogies."

i. 91, 11. *Soma gīrbhis tvā vayaṁ vardhayāmo vacho-vidaḥ* | *sumṛilīko naḥ āviśa* |

"Soma, we who are skilled in speech magnify thee with praises; do thou enter into us, full of kindness."

i. 102, 1. *Imāṁ te dhiyam prabhare maho mahīm* . . . .

"I present to thee joyfully this great hymn . . . .

i. 183, 6. *Atārishma tamasas pāram asya prati vāṁ stomo Aśvināv adhāyi* |

"We have crossed over this darkness; a hymn, o Aśvins, has been addressed to you."

iii. 53, 2. *Pitur na putraḥ sicham ā rabhe te Indra svādishṭhayā girā śachīvaḥ* |

"Powerful Indra, I lay hold of thy skirt (as a son does that of his father), with a very sweet hymn."

iv. 3, 16. *Etā viśvā vidushe tubhyaṁ vedho nīthāni Agne niṇyā vachāṁsi* | *nivachanā kavaye kāvyāni aśaṁsisham matibhir vipraḥ ukthaiḥ* |

"Intelligent Agni, to thee, who knowest, [have I uttered] all these songs and mysterious words; to thee, who art a bard, have I, a sage, uttered these hymns, these poems, with meditations and praises."

iv. 32, 12. *Avīvṛidhanta Gotamāḥ Indra tve stoma-vāhasaḥ* |

"The Gotamas, Indra, bringing hymns to thee, have magnified thee."

v. 11, 5. *Tubhya idam Agne madhumattamaṁ vachas tubhyam manīshā iyam astu śaṁ hṛide* | *Tvāṁ giraḥ sindhum iva avanīr mahīr ā priṇanti śavasā vardhayanti cha* |

"Agni, may this sweetest of prayers, may this mental production be pleasant to thy heart. As great rivers fill the ocean, so do the words of praise fill thee, and augment thee with strength."

v. 22, 4. *Agne chikiddhi asya naḥ idaṁ vachaḥ sahasya | Taṁ tvā suśipra dampate stomair vardhanti Atrayo gīrbhiḥ śumbhanti Atrayaḥ* |

"Vigorous Agni, observe these our words; thee, with the beautiful nose, the lord of the house, the Atris magnify with praises, the Atris decorate with hymns."

v. 45, 4. *Sūktebhir vo vachobhir deva-jushtair Indrā nu Agnī avase huvadhyai* |

"Let me invoke you for help, o Indra and Agni, with well-spoken words, such as are acceptable to the gods.

vi. 38, 3. *Taṁ vo dhiyā paramayā purājām ajaram Indram abhi anūshi arkaiḥ ityādi* |

"I adore thee, the ancient, imperishable Indra with an excellent hymn and with praises."

vii. 67, 5. *Prāchīṃ ū devā Aśvinā dhiyam me amṛidhrāṁ sātaye kṛitaṁ vasūyum* |

"O divine Aśvins, bring to fulfilment my unwearied prayer which supplicates wealth."

vii. 85, 1. *Punīshe vām arakshasam manīshām somam Indrāya Varuṇāya juhvat | ghṛita-pratīkām Ushasaṁ na devīm ityādi* |

"Offering soma to Indra and Varuna, I prepare for you twain the sincere hymn, like the goddess Ushas, with glittering face."[21]

viii. 5, 18. *Asmākam adya vām ayaṁ stomo vāhishṭho antamaḥ | yuvābhyaṁ bhūtu Aśvinā* |

"May this hymn of ours approach near to you, to-day, o Aśvins, and be effectual in bearing you hither."

viii. 8, 8. *Kim anye paryāsate asmat stomebhir Aśvinā | putraḥ Kaṇvasya vām ṛishir gīrbhir Vatso avīvṛidhat* |

"Aśvins, do others than we sit round you with songs? Vatsa, the son of Kaṇva, has magnified you by his hymns."

viii. 27, 8. *Ā pra yāta Maruto Vishṇo Aśvinā Pūshan mākīnayā dhiyā* | 11. *Idā hi vaḥ upastutim idā vāmasya bhaktaye upa vo viśvavedaso namasyur āsṛikshi* |

[21] Compare vi. 8, 1. *Vaiśvānarāya matir navyasī śuchiḥ somaḥ iva pavate chārur Agnaye* | "A new and bright hymn is purified, like beautiful soma, for Agni Vaiśvānara."

"8. Come, o Maruts, Vishṇu, Aśvins, Pūshan, at my hymn. 11. For now, possessors of all riches, now, in order to obtain wealth, have I, full of reverence, sent forth to you a hymn."

viii. 44, 2. *Agne stomaṁ jushasva me vardhasva anena manmanā* | *prati sūktāni harya naḥ* | 22. *Uta tvā dhītayo mama giro varddhantu viśvahā* | *Agne sakhyasya bodhi naḥ* | 26. *Yuvānaṁ viśpatiṁ kaviṁ viśvādam puru-vepasam* | *Agniṁ śumbhāmi manmabhiḥ* |

"2. Agni, receive my hymn: grow by this product of my thought: rejoice in our beautiful words. 22. And may my thoughts and words always augment thee; Agni, think of our friendship. 26. With my mental productions I adorn Agni, the young, the lord of the people, the sage, the all-devouring, the very restless."

x. 42, 1. *Astā iva suprataraṁ lāyam asyan bhūshann iva prabhara stomam asmai* | *vāchā viprās tarata vācham aryo niramaya jaritaḥ some Indram* |

"Like an archer discharging his far-shooting arrow, with zeal present the hymn to Indra. Sages, by your song, overcome the song of the enemy; worshipper, arrest Indra at the soma."

x. 63, 17. *Eva Plateḥ sūnur avīvṛidhad vo viśve Ādityāḥ Adite manīshī* | *īśānāso naro amartyena astāvi jano divyo Gayena* |

"Thus, all ye Ādityas, Aditi, and ye ruling powers, has the wise son of Plati magnified you. The celestial race has been lauded by the immortal Gaya."

x. 111, 1. *Manīshiṇaḥ prabharadhvam manīshām yathā yathā matayaḥ santi nṛiṇam* | *Indraṁ satyair ā īrayāma kṛitebhiḥ sa hi vīro girvaṇasyur vidānaḥ* |

"Sages, present the prayer, according as are the various thoughts of men. Let us by our sincere rites stimulate Indra, for he is a hero, he is wise and loves our songs."

In the following verse, from a hymn in praise of liberality, it is said, though no doubt only figuratively, that the *true rishi* is the prince who is bountiful to the priesthood.

x. 107, 6. *Tam eva ṛishiṁ tam ū brahmāṇam āhur yajnanyaṁ sāmagām ukthaśasam* | *sa śukrasya tanvo veda tisro yaḥ prathamo dakshiṇayā rarādha* |

"He it is whom they call a rishi, a priest, a pious sacrificer, a chaunter of prayers, a reciter of hymns; he it is who knows the three bodies of the brilliant (Agni),—the man who is most prominent in bestowing gifts."

SECT. IV.—*Passages of the Rig-veda in which a supernatural character is ascribed to the rishis or the hymns.*

In the present section I propose to collect the most distinct indications which I have noticed in the Vedic hymns of any supernatural attributes attaching, in the opinion of the authors, either to the rishis themselves, or to their compositions. We shall see in the course of this enquiry (1) that a certain superhuman character was ascribed by the later rishis, who composed the hymns, to some of their predecessors; (2) that expressions are occasionally employed by the rishis which appear to ascribe their compositions to a divine influence generally; while there is a still more numerous set of texts in which the hymns are attributed in various forms of phraseology to the agency of one or more particular and specified deities; and (3) that there is a considerable number of passages in which a mysterious or magical power is ascribed to the hymns or metres.

I proceed to furnish specimens of these several classes of quotations.

I. I adduce some passages which ascribe a superhuman character or supernatural faculties to the earlier rishis.[22] These are the following:

R.V. i. 179, 2. *Ye chid hi pūrve ṛitasāpaḥ āsan sākam devebhir avadann ṛitāni | te chid avāsur ityādi |*

"The pious sages who lived of old, and who conversed about sacred truths with the gods, led a conjugal life," etc.

vii. 76, 4. *Te id devānām sadhamādaḥ āsann ṛitāvānaḥ kavayaḥ pūrvyāsaḥ | gūḷham jyotiḥ pitaro anvavindan satyamantrāḥ ajanayann ushāsam |*

"They were the associates of the gods, those ancient pious sages. The fathers found out the hidden light; with true hymns they generated the dawn."

x. 14, 15. *Yamāya madhumattamam rājne havyam juhotana | idam namaḥ ṛishibhyaḥ pūrvajebhyaḥ pūrvebhyaḥ pathikṛidbhyaḥ |*

"Offer to king Yama a most sweet oblation. (Let) this reverence (be paid) to the rishis born of old, who were the earliest guides."

[22] Compare A.V. x. 7, 14, quoted above in p. 3.

The sixty-second hymn of the tenth Maṇḍala contains the following passage regarding the Angirases (see above, p. 223):

1. *The Angirases.*—x. 62, 1, 3. *Ye yajnena dakshiṇayā samaktāḥ Indrasya sakhyam amṛitatvam ānaśa | tebhyo bhadram Angiraso vaḥ astu prati gribhṇīta mānavaṁ sumedhasaḥ* | 3. *Ye ṛitena sūryam arohayan divi aprathayan pṛithivīm mātaram vi ityādi* |

"1. Blessings be on you, Angirases, who, sanctified by sacrifice and liberality, attained the friendship of Indra and immortality. Do ye, o sages, graciously receive the man (who addresses you). 3. Ye who by sacrifice caused the sun to ascend the sky; and spread out our mother earth," etc.

This is succeeded by the following verses:

x. 62, 4. *Ayaṁ Nābhā vadati valguvo gṛihe deva-putrāḥ ṛishayas tat śṛiṇotana* . . . | 5. *Virūpāsaḥ id ṛishayas te id gambhīra-vepasaḥ* | *Angirasaḥ sūnavas te-Agneḥ pari jajnire* |

"This Nābhan addresses you, brilliant beings, within the house. Hear this, ye rishis, sons of the gods. . . . 5. The Virūpas are rishis, profound in emotion; they are the sons of Angiras; they have been born from Agni."

(The fifth verse is quoted in the Nirukta, xi. 17. See Roth's illustrations of the passage.)[23]

2. *Vasishṭha.*—A supernatural character is attributed to Vasishṭha also in the following passage (which has been already quoted and illustrated in Vol. I. pp. 318 ff.).

vii. 33, 7 ff. *Trayaḥ kṛiṇvanti bhuvanasya retas tisraḥ prajāḥ āryāḥ jyotir-agrāḥ | trayo gharmāsaḥ ushasaṁ sachante sarvān it tān anu vidur Vasishṭhāḥ* | 8. *Sūryasyeva vakshatho jyotir eshāṁ samudrasyeva mahimā gabhīraḥ | vātasyeva prajavo na anyena stomo Vasishṭhāḥ anu etave vaḥ* |

[23] The next verse (which, with the sequel, is quoted in my article "On the relations of the priests to the other classes of Indian society in the Vedic age," Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, p. 276) is as follows: 6. *Ye Agneḥ pari jajnire Virūpāso divas pari | Navagvo nu Dasagvo Angirastamaḥ sachā deveshu maṁhate* | "The Virūpas who were produced from Agni, from Dyaus,—the Navagva, the Daśagva, who is a most eminent Angiras, lavishes gifts along with the gods." Here the Virūpas would seem rather to be princes than rishis: and the same is the case in the following passage also: iii. 53, 6. *Ime bhojāḥ Angiraso Virūpāḥ divas putrāso asurasya vīrāḥ | Viśvāmitrāya dadato maghāni sahasrasāve pra tiranta āyuḥ* | "These liberal Virūpas of the race of Angiras, heroic sons of the divine Dyaus (the sky), bestowing gifts on Viśvāmitra at the ceremony with a thousand libations, have prolonged their lives." (See Vol. I. p. 341 f.)

9. *Te id ninyam hridayasya praketaiḥ sahasra-valśam abhi sancharanti* | *yamena tatam paridhim vayantaḥ apsarasaḥ upa sedur Vasishṭhāḥ* | 10. *Vidyuto jyotiḥ parisanjihānam Mitrā-Varuṇā yad apaśyatām tvā* | *tat te janma uta ekam Vasishṭha Agastyo yat tvā viśaḥ ājabhāra* | 11. *Utāsi Maitrāvaruṇo Vasishṭha Urvaśyāḥ brahman manaso 'dhi jātaḥ* | *drapsam skannam brahmaṇā daivyena viśve devāḥ pushkare tvā adadanta* | 12. *Sa praketaḥ ubhayasya pravidvān sahasra-dānaḥ uta vā sadānaḥ* | *yamena tatam paridhim vayishyan apsarasaḥ pari jajne Vasishṭhaḥ* | 13. *Satre ha jātāv ishitā namobhiḥ kumbhe retaḥ sisichituḥ samānam* | *tato ha Mānaḥ udiyāya madhyāt tato jātam rishim āhur Vasishṭham* |

"7. Three [gods] create the fecundating principle in (all) existences; [there exist] three excellent productions of which light is the first: three fires attend upon the dawn: all these the Vasishṭhas know. 8. The splendour of these [sages] is like the full glory of the sun; their grandeur is profound as that of the ocean; like the swiftness of the wind, your hymns, o Vasishṭhas, cannot be followed by any other bard. 9. Through the intuitions of their hearts they seek out the mystery with a thousand branches. Weaving the envelopment extended by Yama [Agni? see R.V. i. 66, 4] the Vasishṭhas sat near the Apsaras. 10. When Mitra and Varuṇa saw thee quitting the gleam of the lightning, that was thy birth, Vasishṭha, and [thou hadst] one [other], when Agastya brought thee to the people. 11. And, Vasishṭha, thou art the son of Mitra and Varuṇa, born, o priest, from the mind of Urvaśī; all the gods placed thee—the drop fallen through divine contemplation—in the vessel. 12. He the wise, knowing both [worlds?], with a thousand gifts, or with gifts, Vasishṭha, being about to weave the envelopment extended by Yama, was produced from the Apsaras. 13. Born at the sacrifice, and impelled by adorations, they [Mitra and Varuṇa] let the same equal procreative energy fall into the jar; from the midst of this Māna (Agastya) issued forth; from this men say the rishi Vasishṭha was produced."

Two of these verses are quoted in the Nirukta, verse 8, in xi. 20, and verse 11, in v. 14. See also Prof. Roth's Illustrations of that work, p. 64, where he states his opinion that the foregoing verses which describe the miraculous birth of Vasishṭha in the style of the epic mythology, are a later addition to an older hymn. See the note in p. 321 of the First Volume of this work.

The two following passages also have reference to knowledge supernaturally communicated, or favours divinely conferred on Vasishṭha. See Vol. I. p. 325 ff.

vii. 87, 4. *Uvācha me Varuṇo medhirāya triḥ sapta nāma aghnyā bibhartti | vidvān padasya guhyā na vochad yugāya vipraḥ uparāya śikshan |*

"Varuṇa said to me, the intelligent, 'the cow has thrice seven names.' The wise [god], though he knows them, has not declared the mysteries of the word, which he desires to reveal to a later generation."

vii. 88, 4. *Vasishṭhaṁ ha Varuṇo nāvi ā adhād ṛishiṁ chakāra svapāḥ mahobhiḥ | stotāram vipraḥ sudinatve ahnāṁ yād nu dyāvas tatanan yād ushasaḥ |*

"Varuṇa took Vasishṭha into the boat; by his mighty acts, working skilfully he (Varuṇa) has made him a rishi; the wise (god) has made him to utter praises in an auspicious time, that his days and dawns may be prolonged." (See Vol. I. p. 325 f.; and compare R.V. x. 101, 2, and x. 116, 9, in pp. 234 and 240, above.)

3. *Viśvāmitra.*—In one or more of the texts which I shall next produce, a superhuman character is ascribed to Viśvāmitra, if not to the Kuśikas.

iii. 29, 15. *Amitrāyudho marutām iva prayāḥ prathamajāḥ brahmaṇo viśvam id viduḥ | dyumnavad brahma Kuśikāsaḥ erire ekaḥ eko dame Agniṁ samīdhire |*

"Combating their foes, like hosts of Maruts, (the sages) the first-born of prayer are masters of all knowlege; the Kuśikas have uttered an enthusiastic prayer; each of them has kindled Agni in his house." (See Vol. I. p. 347.)

iii. 43, 5. *Kuvid mā gopāṁ karase janasya kuvid rājānam Maghavann ṛijīshan | kuvid mā ṛishim papivāṁsaṁ sutasya kuvid me vasvaḥ amṛitasya śikshāḥ |*

"Dost thou not make me a shepherd of the people? dost thou not make me a king, o impetuous Maghavan? dost thou not make me a rishi, a drinker of the soma? wilt thou not bestow upon me imperishable wealth?" (See Vol. I. p. 344.)

iii. 53, 9. *Māhan ṛishir devajāḥ devajūtaḥ astabhnāt sindhum arṇavaṁ nṛichakshāḥ | Viśvāmitro yad avahat Sudāsam apriyāyata Kuśikebhir Indraḥ |*

"The great rishi (Viśvāmitra), leader of men, god-born, god-impelled, stemmed the watery current. When Viśvāmitra conducted Sudās, Indra was propitiated through the Kuśikas." (See Vol. I. pp. 342. Indra himself is called a Kauśika in R.V. i. 10, 11. See Vol. I. p. 347.)

According to ix. 87, 3, of which Uśanas is the traditional rishi, certain mysterious knowledge is said to have been possessed by that personage:

Ṛishir vipraḥ pura-etā janānām ṛibhur dhīraḥ Uśanā kāvyena | sa chid viveda nihitam̐ yad āsām apīchyam̐ guhyam̐ nāma gonām |

"A wise rishi, a leader of men, skilful, and prudent, is Uśanas, through his insight as a seer; he has known the hidden mysterious name applied to these cows."

Again in ix. 97, 7, it is said: *Pra kāvyam Uśaneva bruvāno devo devānām̐ janimā vivakti |*

"Uttering, like Uśanas, the wisdom of a sage, the god (Soma) declares the births of the gods."

In a hymn of the tenth Maṇḍala, the rishis are spoken of as "seeing" the objects of their contemplation in a way which seems to imply a supernatural insight (see above, pp. 116, 118, 125 ff.); in this hymn, x. 72, 1, 2, it is said:

Devānām̐ nu vayam̐ jānā pravochāma vipanyayā | uktheshu śasyamāneshu yaḥ paśyād uttare yuge | Brahmaṇaspatir etā sam̐ karmāraḥ iva adhamat | devānām pūrvye yuge asataḥ sad ajāyata |

"Let us, from the love of praise, celebrate in recited hymns the births of the gods,—any one of us who in this later age may *see* them. Brahmaṇaspati has kindled these births, as a blacksmith [blows a flame]: in the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent." [24] (See Vol. I. p. 46.)

Another not less decided instance of this use of the verb *to see*, in the sense of supernatural insight, may be found in the verse of the Vālakhilya already quoted in Vol. II. p. 220, which will be cited below. See also x. 130, 6, which will be quoted further on.

The next two passages speak of the *radiance* of the rishis.

viii. 3, 3 (= S.V. i. 250, and Vāj. S. 33, 81). *Imāḥ u tvā purūvaso*

[24] The first of these verses is translated by Prof. Benfey in his Glossary to the Sāma-veda, p. 154.

giro vardhantu yāḥ mama | pāvaka-varṇāḥ śuchayo vipaśchitaḥ abhi stomair anūshata |

"Lord of abundant wealth, may these prayers of mine magnify thee! Pure sages of radiant appearance have celebrated thee with hymns."

viii. 6, 10. *Aham id hi pituḥ pari medhām ṛitasya jagrabha | aham sūryaḥ iva ajani |*

"I have acquired knowledge of the ceremonial from [my] father; I have become like the sun." (Is Indra the father here referred to?)

The following texts, which occur in the last book of the Rig-veda, speak of *tapas* ("fervour" or "austerity") being practised by the rishis much in the same way as the later epic literature does. This use of the word is not known in the earlier books of the R.V. (See Boehtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, under the word *tapas*.)

x. 109, 4. *Devāḥ etasyām avadanta pūrve sapta ṛishayas tapase ye nisheduḥ |*

"The ancient gods spoke of her, the seven rishis who sat down for austere-fervour." (See my article "On the priests of the Vedic age" in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1866, p. 270.)

x. 154, 2. *Tapasā ye anādhṛiśyās tapasā ye svar yayuḥ | tapo ye chakrire mahas tāṁs chid eva api gachchhatāt* | 5. *Sahasra-nīthāḥ kavayo ye gopāyanti sūryam ṛishīṁs tapasvato Yama tapojān api gachhatāt |*

"Let him (the deceased) go to those who through austere-fervour are invincible, who by austere-fervour have gone to heaven, who have performed great austerity. 5. Let him go, Yama, to the sages of a thousand songs who guard the sun (see Wilson, Vish. Pur. vol. ii. pp. 284 ff.), to the devout rishis, born from fervour." (See my article "On Yama" in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc.)

x. 190, 1. *Ṛitaṁ cha satyaṁ cha abhīddhāt tapaso adhyajāyata | tato rātrī ajāyata tataḥ samudraḥ arṇavaḥ |*

"Right and truth sprang from kindled austerity; thence sprang night, thence the watery ocean."

In x. 167, 1, it is even said that Indra attained heaven by austerity: *Tvaṁ tapaḥ paritapya ajayaḥ svaḥ |*

"By performing austerity thou didst conquer heaven."

In some places the gods are said to possess in the most eminent degree the qualities of *rishis*, or *kavis*. This may possibly imply, *e converso*, that the rishis were conscious of a certain affinity with the divine

nature, and conceived themselves to participate in some degree in the superior wisdom and knowledge of the deities.

R.V. i. 31, 1. *Tvam Agne prathamo Angirāḥ ṛishir devo devāṇām abhavaḥ śivaḥ sakhā ityādi* | 2. *Tvam Agne prathamo Angirastamaḥ kavir devānām paribhūshasi vratam* |

"1. Thou, Agni, the earliest *rishi* Angiras, a god, hast been the auspicious friend of the gods. . . . . 2. Thou, Agni, the earliest and most Angiras-like sage, administerest the ceremonial of the gods."

i. 66, 2. . . . *Ṛishir na stubhvā vikshu praśastaḥ ityādi* |

"Like a *rishi*, who praises [the gods], he (Agni) is famous among the people," etc.

iii. 21, 3. . . . *Ṛishiḥ śreshṭhaḥ samidhyase yajnasya pra avitā bhava* |

"Thou, Agni, the most eminent *rishi*, art kindled; be the protector of the sacrifice."

v. 29, 1. . . . *Archanti tvā marutaḥ pūta-dakshās tvam eshām ṛishir Indra asi dhīraḥ* |

"The Maruts, endowed with pure dispositions, worship thee; thou, Indra, art their wise *rishi*." (Sāyaṇa, however, here renders *ṛishi* by *drashṭā*, "beholder.")

vi. 14, 2. *Agnir id hi prachetāḥ Agnir vedhastamaḥ ṛishiḥ* |

"Agni is wise; Agni is a most sage *rishi*."

viii. 6, 41. *Ṛishir hi pūrvajā asi ekaḥ īśanaḥ ojasā* | *Indra choshkūyase vasu* |

"Thou art an anciently-born *rishi*, who alone rulest by thy might; Indra thou lavishest riches."

viii. 16, 7. *Indro brahmā Indraḥ ṛishir Indraḥ puru puru-hūtaḥ* | *mahān mahībhiḥ śachībhiḥ* |

"Indra is a priest, Indra is a *rishi*, Indra is much invoked; he is great through his great powers."

ix. 96, 18 (= S.V. ii. 526). *Ṛishi-manā yaḥ ṛishi-kṛit svarshāḥ sahasranīthaḥ padavīḥ kavīnām* |

"Soma, *rishi-minded*, *rishi-maker*, bestower of good, master of a thousand songs, the leader of sages," etc.

ix. 107, 7. . . . *Ṛishir vipro vichakshaṇaḥ* | *tvaṁ kavir abhavo devavītamaḥ ityādi* |

"A *rishi*, a sage, intelligent, thou (Soma) wast a poet, most agreeable to the gods," etc.

x. 27, 22. . . . *Indrāya sunvad ṛishaye cha śikshat* |

". . . Let [men] present libations to Indra, and offerings to the *rishi*."

x. 112. 9. *Ni shu sīda gaṇapate gaṇeshu tvām āhur vipratamaṁ kavīnām | na ṛite tvat kriyate kinchana āre mahām arkam Maghavanś chitram archa* |

"Sit, lord of multitudes, among our multitudes; they call thee the greatest of sages [or poets]; nothing is done without, or apart from, thee; sing, Maghavan, a great and beautiful hymn."

x. 115, 5. *Agniḥ kaṇvatamaḥ kaṇva-sakhā ityādi* |

"Agni is the greatest of the Kaṇvas, the friend of Kaṇva," etc.

II. The Vedic rishis, as we have seen, expected to receive from their gods every variety of temporal blessings, strength, long life, offspring, riches, cattle, rain, food, and victory, and they also looked for forgiveness of their offences, and sometimes for exaltation to paradise, to the same benefactors. Hence it would be nothing more than we might have anticipated, if we should further find them asking their different deities to enlighten their minds, to direct their ceremonies, to stimulate their devotion, to augment their powers of poetical expression, and to inspire them with religious fervour for the composition of their hymns. I think the following passages will justify this expectation by showing that the rishis (though, as we have seen, they frequently speak of the hymns as their own work) did also sometimes entertain the idea that their prayers, praises, and ceremonies generally, were supernaturally suggested and directed. One of the modes (if not the most important) in which this idea is expressed is, as we shall discover, the personification of speech under different appellations. The following are the passages to which I refer: they are—

First, such as refer to the gods generally:

R.V. i. 37, 4. *Pra vaḥ śardhāya ghṛishvaye tvesha-dyumnāya śushmiṇe | brahma devattaṁ gāyata* |

"To your vigorous, overpowering, energetic, host [of Maruts] sing the *god-given* prayer."

S.V. i. 299. *Tvashṭā no daivyaṁ vachaḥ Parjanyo Brahmaṇaspatiḥ | putrair bhrātṛibhir Aditir nu pātu no dushṭaram trāmaṇaṁ vachaḥ* |

"May Tvashṭri, Parjanya, and Brahmaṇaspati [prosper] our *divine* utterance: may Aditi with her [?] sons and brothers prosper our invincible and protective utterance."

In the next passage, the hymn or prayer is spoken of as *inconceivable.*

R.V. i. 152, 5. *Achittam brahma jujushur yuvānaḥ ityādi* |

"The youths received with joy the incomprehensible prayer," etc.

In R.V. x. 20, 10, Vimada, a rishi, is connected with the immortals:

Agne Vimado manīshām ūrjonāpād amṛitebhiḥ sajoshāḥ giraḥ āvakshat sumatīr iyānaḥ ityādi |

"O Agni, son of strength, Vimada, united with the immortals, hastening, has brought to thee a product of thought, and beautiful hymns."

In the two following texts the gods are said to have *generated* the hymn or prayer:

x. 61, 7. . . . *Svādhyo ajanayan brahma devāh Vāstoshpatim vratapām niratakshan* |

"The thoughtful gods *generated* prayer: they fashioned Vastoshpati the protector of sacred rites."

x. 88, 8. *Sūkta-vākam prathamam ād id Agnim ād id havir ajanayanta devāḥ* | *sa eshām yajno abhavat tanūpāḥ tam dyaur veda tam pṛithivī tam āpaḥ* |

"The gods first *generated* the hymn, then Agni, then the oblation. He was their sacrifice, the protector of their life. Him the Sky, the Earth, and the Waters know."

In the latter of the two following verses, *Vāch* (speech) is said to be divine, and to have been *generated* by the gods. Though speech is here spoken of generally, and nothing is said of the hymns, still these may have already come to be connected with her in the minds of the Vedic bards, as they were afterwards regarded as her most solemn and important expression.

R.V. viii. 89, 10. *Yad vāg vadantī avichetanāni rāshṭrī devānām nishasāda mandrā* | *chatasraḥ ūrjam duduhe payāṁsi kva svid asyāḥ paramam jagāma* | 11. *Devīm vācham ajanayanta devās tām viśvarūpāḥ paśavo vadanti* | *sā no mandrā isham ūrjam duhānā dhenur vāg asmān upa sushṭutā ā etu* |

"When Vāch, speaking unintelligible things, queen of the gods, sat down, melodious, she milked forth sustenance and waters towards the four quarters: whither has her highest element departed? The gods *generated* the divine Vāch; animals of all kinds utter her; may this melodious cow Vāch, who yields us nourishment and sustenance,—approach us, when we celebrate her praises.

The last verse (as well as R.V. viii. 90, 16, which will be quoted below), derives some illustration from the following passage of the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, p. 982 (p. 251 English transl.), in which also Vāch is designated as a cow:

Vācham dhenum upāsīta | tasyāś chatvāraḥ stanāḥ svāhā-kāro vashaṭ-kāro hanta-kāraḥ svadhā-kāraḥ | tasyāḥ dvau stanau devāḥ upajīvanti svāhā-kāram cha vashaṭ-kāram cha hanta-kāram manushyāḥ svadhā-kāram pitaraḥ | tasyāḥ prāṇaḥ ṛishabho mano vatsaḥ |

"Let a man worship the cow Vāch. She has four udders, the formulæ *svāhā*, *vashaṭ*, *hanta*, and *svadhā*. The gods live upon her two udders, *svāhā* and *vashaṭ;* men upon *hanta;* and the fathers upon *svadhā*. Breath is her bull; the mind, her calf."

The two verses, R.V. viii. 89, 10, and 11, occur in the Nirukta, xi. 28, 29. Roth (in his Illustrations of that work), p. 152, says the unintelligible utterance of Vāch in verse 10, means thunder. Whether this be the case, or not, the word appears to have a more general signification in the next verse, and to refer to speech in general, personified as a divine being. The speech which all the animals utter cannot of course be thunder.

In some of the preceding verses of this hymn there is a curious reference made to some sceptical doubts regarding the existence of Indra; which I quote here, though unconnected with the present subject.

R.V. viii. 89, 3, 4. *Pra su stomam bharata vājayantam Indrāya satyam yadi satyam asti | na Indro asti iti nemaḥ u tvaḥ āha kaḥ īm dadarśa kam abhi stavāma | Ayam asmi jaritaḥ paśya mā iha viśvā jātāni abhi asmi mahnā | ṛitasya mā pradiśo varddhayanti ādardiro bhuvanā dardarīmi |*

"Present to Indra a hymn soliciting food, a true [hymn] if he truly exists. 'Indra does not exist,' says some one: 'who has seen him? whom shall we praise?' 'I am here, worshipper' [answers Indra]; 'behold me, I surpass all creatures in greatness; the directors of the sacrifice augment me; crushing, I destroy the worlds.'"

Second: the next set of passages which I shall bring forward either refer to Sarasvatī, Vāch, etc. (various names of the goddess of speech, or different personifications of speech, or of prayer), or at least speak of prayer as *divine.*

R.V. i. 3, 11, 12. *Chodayitrī sūnṛitānām chetantī sumatīnām | yajnam dadhe Sarasvatī | . . . . dhiyo viśvā virājati |*

"Sarasvatī, who furthers our hymns, and who is cognizant of our prayers, has sustained our sacrifice. . . . . She enlightens all intellects."

i. 22, 10. *Ā gnāḥ Agne iha avase Hotrām yavishṭha Bhāratīm | Varūtrīm Dhishaṇām vaha |*

"Bring here, youthful Agni, to our help, the wives [of the gods], Hotrā, Bhāratī, Varūtrī, and Dhishaṇā."

(*Varūtrī*, "the eligible," may be merely an epithet of Dhishaṇā which, according to Sāyaṇa, at least, is = *vāg-devī*, "the goddess of speech.")

i. 31, 11. *Iḷām akriṇvan manushasya śāsanīm ityādi |*

"The gods made Iḷā to be the instructress of men." (See Professor Wilson's note on this passage, p. 82 of his translation of the R.V. vol. i.)

ii. 3, 8. *Sarasvatī sādhayantī dhiyam naḥ Iḷā devī Bhāratī viśvatūrttiḥ | Tisro devīḥ svadhayā barhir edam achhidram pāntu śaraṇam nishadya |*

"May Sarasvatī, perfecting our hymn, may the divine Iḷā, and the all-pervading Bhāratī; may these three goddesses, seated on the place of sacrifice, preserve by their power the sacrificial grass uninjured." (See Prof. Müller's translation of part of the verse in the Journ. Roy. As. Soc. for 1867, vol. iii. p. 224.)

iii. 18, 3. . . . . *Yāvad īśe brahmaṇā vandamānaḥ imām dhiyam śataseyāya devīm |*

"Worshipping thee with a prayer according to the best of my power, in this *divine* hymn, to obtain unbounded wealth."

iv. 43, 1. *Ka u śravat katamo yajniyānām vandāru devaḥ katamo jushāte | kasya imām devīm amriteshu preshṭhām hṛidi śreshyāma sushṭutim suhavyām |*

"Who will hear us? which of all the objects of adoration? which of all the gods will be gratified by our praises? In the heart of whom among the immortals can we lodge this our *divine* and dearest hymn of praise and invocation?"

vii. 34, 1. *Pra śukrā etu devī manīshā asmat sutashṭo ratho na vājī |*

"May prayer, brilliant and *divine*, proceed from us, like a well-fabricated chariot drawn by steeds."

vii. 34, 9. *Abhi vo devīm dhiyam*[25] *dadidhvam pra vo devatrā vācham kriṇudhvam |*

[25] Compare the same phrase *dhiyam devīm* in A.V. iii. 15, 3, and *daivyā vāchā* in A.V. viii. 1, 3.

"Receive towards you the *divine* hymn; proclaim the song for yourselves among the gods."

viii. 27, 13. *Devaṁ devaṁ huvema vājasātaye gṛiṇanto devyā dhiyā* |

"Let us invoke each of the gods to bestow riches, praising them with a *divine* hymn."

viii. 90, 16. *Vacho-vidaṁ vācham udīrayantīṁ viśvābhir dhībhir upatishṭhamānām* | *devīṁ devebhyaḥ pari eyushīṁ gām ā mā avṛikta marttyo dabhrachetāḥ* |

"Let not any mortal of little intelligence do violence to the cow, the *divine* Vāch, who is skilled in praise, who utters her voice aloud, who arrives with all the hymns, and who has come from the gods."

ix. 33, 5. *Abhi brahmīr anūshata yahvīr ṛitasya mātaro marmṛijyante divaḥ śiśum* |

"The great and sacred mothers of the sacrifice have uttered praise: they decorate the child of the sky."

x. 71, 1. *Bṛihaspate prathamaṁ vācho agraṁ yat prairata nāmadheyaṁ dadhānāḥ* | *yad eshāṁ śreshṭhaṁ yad aripram āsīt preṇā tad eshāṁ nihitaṁ guhā āviḥ* | 2. *Saktum iva titaunā punanto yatra dhīrāḥ manasā vācham akrata* | *atra sakhāyaḥ sakhyāni jānate bhadrā eshāṁ lakshmīr nihitā adhi vāchi* | 3. *Yajnena vāchaḥ padavīyam āyan tām anvavindann ṛishishu pravishṭām* | *tām ābhṛitya vyadadhuḥ purutrā tāṁ sapta rebhāḥ abhi sannavante* | 4. *Uta tvaḥ paśyan na dadarśa vācham uta tvaḥ śṛiṇvan na śṛiṇoti enām* | *uto tvasmai tanvaṁ visasre jāyeva patye uśatī suvāsāḥ* | 5. *Uta tvaṁ sakhye sthirapītam āhur nainaṁ hinvanty api vājineshu* | *adhenvā charati māyayā esha vāchaṁ śuśruvān aphalām apushpām* | 6. *Yas tityāja sachi-vidaṁ sakhāyaṁ na tasya vāchi api bhāgo asti* | *yad īṁ śṛiṇoti alakaṁ śṛiṇoti na hi praveda sukṛitasya panthām* |

"1. When, o Bṛihaspati, men sent forth the first and earliest utterance of Vāch (speech), giving a name (to things), then all which was treasured within them, the most excellent and spotless, was disclosed through love. 2. Wherever the wise,—cleansing, as it were, meal with a sieve,—have uttered speech with intelligence, there friends recognize [their] friendly acts; an auspicious fortune is impressed upon their speech. 3. Through sacrifice they followed the track of Vāch, and found her entered into the rishis:[26] taking, they divided her into many portions: her the seven poets celebrate. 4. One man, seeing, sees not

[26] See the use made by S'ankara of this text, above, p. 105.

Vāch; another, hearing, hears her not; to another she discloses her form, as an elegantly attired and loving wife displays her person to her husband. 5. They say that one man has a sure defence in [her] friendship; men cannot overwhelm him even in the conflicts (of discussion); but that man consorts with an unprofitable delusion who has [only] heard speech [Vāch] which is [to him] without fruit or flower. 6. He who has abandoned his discerning friend, has no portion in Vāch; whatever he hears he hears in vain; he knows not the path of virtue."

The second, fourth, and fifth verses of this obscure hymn are quoted in the Nirukta, iv. 10; i. 19, 20; and are explained in Professor Roth's Illustrations. Verses 2 and 4 are also quoted and interpreted in the Mahābhāshya; see pp. 30 and 31 of Dr. Ballantyne's edition. The verse which is of most importance for my present purpose, is, however, the third, which speaks of Vāch having "entered into the rishis." See the First Volume of this work, pp. 254 f. The idea of Vāch being divided into many portions will be found again below in R.V. x. 125, 3.

x. 110, 8 (=Vāj. S. 29, 33). *Ā no yajnam Bhāratī tūyam etu Iḷā manushvad iha chetayantī | tisro devīr barhir ā idam syonaṁ Sarasvatī svapasaḥ sadantu |*

"Let Bhāratī come quickly here to our sacrifice, with Iḷā, who instructs us like Manush [or like a man], and with Sarasvatī: let these three goddesses, skilful in rites, sit down upon this beautiful sacrificial grass."

x. 125, 3. *Ahaṁ rāshṭrī sangamanī vasūnāṁ chikitushī prathamā yajniyānām | tām mā devā vyadadhuḥ purutrā bhūristhātrām bhūri āveśayantīm* | 4. *Mayā so annam atti yo vipaśyati yaḥ prāṇiti ya īṁ śṛiṇoti uktam | amantavo māṁ te upa kshiyanti śrudhi śruta śraddhivaṁ te vadāmi* | 5. *Aham eva svayam idaṁ vadāmi jushṭaṁ devebhir uta mānushebhiḥ | yaṁ kāmaye taṁ tam ugraṁ kṛiṇomi tam brahmāṇaṁ tam ṛishiṁ taṁ sumedhām |*

"3. I am the queen, the centre of riches, intelligent, the first of the objects of adoration: the gods have separated me into many portions, have assigned me many abodes, and made me widely pervading. 4. He who has insight, he who lives, he who hears [my] sayings, eats food through me. These men dwell in my vicinity, devoid of understanding. Listen, thou who art learned, I declare to thee what is worthy of belief. 5. It is even I myself who make known this which is agreeable

both to gods and men. Him whom I love I make terrible, [I make] him a priest, [I make] *him a rishi*, [I make] him intelligent." [27]

x. 176, 2. *Pra devaṁ devyā dhiyā bharata Jātavedasam havyā no vakshad ānushak* |

"By *divine prayer* bring hither Jātavedas: may he present our oblations in order."

x. 177, 1. *Patangam aktam asurasya māyayā hṛidā paśyanti manasā vipaśchitaḥ* | *samudre antaḥ kavayo vichakshate marīchīnām padam ichhanti vedhasaḥ* | 2. *Patango vācham manasā bibharti tāṁ Gandharvo avadad garbhe antaḥ* | *tāṁ dyotamānāṁ svaryam manīshām ṛitasya pade kavayo nipānti* |

"1. Sages behold with the heart and mind the Bird illuminated by the wisdom of the Asura: the wise perceive him in the (aerial) ocean: the intelligent seek after the abode of his rays. 2. The Bird cherishes speech with his mind: the Gandharva hath uttered her in the womb: the bards preserve in the place of sacred rites this shining and celestial intellect." (See also x. 189, 3, *vāk patangāya dhīyate.*)

Third: I shall now adduce the passages in which other Vedic deities, whether singly or in concert, are spoken of as concerned in the production of the hymns:

Aditi.—In R.V. viii. 12, 14, Aditi is mentioned as fulfilling this function:

Yad uta svarāje Aditiḥ stomam Indrāya jījanat puru-praśastam ūtaye ityādi |

"When Aditi *generated* for the self-resplendent Indra a hymn abounding in praises, to supplicate succour," etc.

Agni.—R.V. i. 18, 6, 7.—*Sadasaspatim adbhutam priyam Indrasya kāmyam* | *sanim medhām ayāsisham* | *yasmād ṛite na siddhyati yajno vipaśchitaś chana* | *sa dhīnāṁ yogam invati* |

"6. I have resorted, for wisdom, to Sadasaspati (Agni), the wonderful, the dear, the beloved of Indra, the beneficent; (7) without whom

[27] This passage, which is commonly understood of Vāch, occurs also in the Atharvaveda, iv. 30, 2 ff., but with some various readings, as *āveśayantaḥ* for *āveśayantīm*, and *śraddheyam* for *śraddhivam*, etc. The hymn is translated by Mr. Colebrooke, Ess. i. 32, or p. 16 of Williams and Norgate's edition. Professor Whitney, as I learn from a private communication with which he has favoured me, is of opinion that there is nothing in the language of the hymn which is specially appropriate to Vāch, so as to justify the ascription of it to her as the supposed utterer.

the sacrifice of the wise does not succeed: he promotes the course of our hymns."

iv. 5, 3. *Sāma dvi-barhāḥ mahi tigma-bhṛishṭiḥ sahasra-retāḥ vṛishabhas tuvishmān | padaṁ na gor apagūḷhaṁ vividvān Agnir mahyaṁ pra id u vochad manīshām | 6. Idam me Agne kiyate pāvaka aminate gurum bhāraṁ na manma | Bṛihad dadhātha dhṛishatā gabhīraṁ yahvam pṛishṭham prayasā saptadhātu |*

"Agni occupying two positions, the fierce-flaming, the infinitely prolific, the vigorous, the powerful, who knows the great hymn, mysterious as the track of a [missing] cow, has declared to me the knowledge [of it]. 6. To me who am feeble, though innoxious, thou, o Agni, the luminous, hast given, as a heavy load, this great, profound, and extensive Pṛishṭha hymn, of seven elements, with efficacious oblations."

iv. 6, 1. *Tvaṁ hi viśvam abhi asi manma pra vedhasaś chit tirasi manīshām |*

"Thou presidest over all thoughts [or prayers]; thou augmentest the intelligence of the sage."

iv. 11, 3. *Tvād Agne kāvyā tvad manīshās tvad ukthā jāyante rādhyāni |*

"From thee, Agni, are *generated* poetic thoughts; from thee the products of the mind; from thee effective hymns."

x. 21, 5. *Agnir jāto Atharvaṇā vidad viśvāni kāvyā |*

"Agni, generated by Atharvan, is acquainted with all wisdom."

x. 91, 8. . . . . *Medhākāraṁ vidathasya prasādhanam Agnim ityādi |*

"Agni, the giver of understanding, the accomplisher of sacrifice."

x. 4, 5. *Yad vo vayam pramināmo vratāni vidushāṁ devāḥ avidustarāsaḥ | Agnis tad viśvam āpriṇāti vidvān yebhir devān ṛitubhiḥ kalpayāti | Yat pākatrā manasā dīna-dakshāḥ na yajnasya manvate martyāsaḥ | Agnis tad hotā kratuvid vijānan yajishṭho devān ṛituśo yajāti |*

"When, o [ye] gods, we, the most unwise among the wise, transgress the ordinances of your worship, the wise Agni completes them all, at the stated seasons which he assigns to the gods. When men, devoted to sacrifice, do not, from their ignorance, rightly comprehend the mode of worship, Agni, the skilful sacrificer, and most eminent of priests, knowing the ceremonial, worships the gods at the proper seasons."

(As rites and hymns were closely united in the practice of the early Indians, the latter finding their application at the former; if Agni was

supposed to be the director of the one, viz., the oblations, he might easily come to be also regarded as aiding in the production of the other—the hymns. Verse 4 occurs also in the A.V. xix. 59, 1, 2, where, however, *āpriṇātu* is read instead of *āpriṇāti*, and in place of the words *yebhir devān*, etc., at the close of the verse, we have, *somaś cha yo brāhmaṇān ā viveśa* | "and Soma, who entered into the priests.")

Brahmaṇaspati.—R.V. i. 40, 5, 6. *Pra nūnam Brahmaṇaspatir mantraṁ vadati ukthyam | yasminn Indro Varuṇo Mitraḥ Aryamā devāḥ okāṁsi chakrire | Tam id vochema vidatheshu śambhuvam mantraṁ devāḥ anehasam ityādi* |

"Brahmaṇaspati (abiding in the worshipper's mouth, according to the scholiast) utters the hymn accompanied with praise, in which the gods, Indra, Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman, have made their abode. Let us utter, gods, at sacrifices, that spotless hymn, conferring felicity." (Roth in his Lexicon considers *okas* to mean "good pleasure," "satisfaction." See also his Essay on Brahma and the Brāhmans, Journal of the Germ. Or. Soc. i. 74.)

Bṛihaspati.—R.V. ii. 23, 2. *Usrāḥ iva sūryo jyotishā maho viśveshām ij janitā brahmaṇām asi* |

"As the sun by his lustre instantly generates rays, so art thou (Bṛihaspati) the *generator* of all prayers."

x. 36, 5. *Ā Indro barhiḥ sīdatu pinvatām Iḷā Bṛihaspatiḥ sāmabhir ṛikvo archatu* |

"Let Indra sit upon the sacred grass; let Iḷā abound in her gifts; let the bard Bṛihaspati offer praise with hymns."

Gandharva.—According to Professor Roth (see under the word in his Lexicon) the Gandharva is represented in the Veda as a deity who knows and reveals the secrets of heaven, and divine truths in general; in proof of which he quotes the following texts:

R.V. x. 139, 5. *Viśvāvasur abhi tad no griṇātu divyo Gandharvo rajaso vimānaḥ | Yad vā ghā satyam uta yad na vidma dhiyo hinvāno dhiyaḥ id naḥ avyāḥ*

"May the celestial Gandharva Viśvāvasu, who is the measurer of the atmosphere, declare to us that which is true, or which we know not. May he stimulate our hymns, and may he prosper our hymns.

A.V. ii. 1, 2. *Pra tad voched amṛitasya vidvān Gandharvo dhāma paramaṁ guhā yat* |

"May the Gandharva, who knows the (secret of) immortality, declare to us that supreme and mysterious abode."

Indra.—R.V. iii. 54, 17. *Mahat tad vaḥ kavayaś chāru nāma yad ha devāḥ bhavatha viśve Indre | sakhā Ṛibhubhiḥ puruhūta priyebhir imāṁ dhiyaṁ sātaye takshata naḥ |*

"Great, o sage deities, is that cherished distinction of yours, that ye are all associated with Indra. Do thou, much invoked (Indra), our friend, with the beloved Ribhus, *fabricate* (or dispose) this hymn for our welfare." (This may merely mean that Indra was asked to give a favourable issue to the prayer of the worshipper, not to *compose* his hymn for him. See Roth's Lexicon, under the word *taksh*, 3.)

vi. 62, 3. *Tvaṁ kaviṁ chodayaḥ arkasātāv ityādi* |

"Thou (Indra) didst stimulate the poet in the composition of his hymns," etc. (Sāyaṇa renders *arkasātau*, "for the sake of finding food.")

vi. 18, 15. *Kṛishva kṛitno akṛitaṁ yat te asti ukthaṁ navīyo janayasva yajnaiḥ* |

"Energetic (Indra), do what thou hast never yet done; *generate* a new hymn with the sacrifices."

vi. 34, 1. *Saṁ cha tve jagmur giraḥ Indra pūrvīr vi cha tvad yanti vibhvo manīshāḥ* |

"Many hymns are congregated in thee, o Indra, and numerous products of the mind issue from thee." (This half-verse has been already quoted in p. 227.)

vi. 47, 10. *Indra mṛiḷa mahyaṁ jīvātum ichcha chodāya dhiyam ayaso na dhārām | Yat kincha ahaṁ tvāyur idaṁ vadāmi taj jushasva kṛidhi mā devavantam* |

"O Indra, gladden me, decree life for me, *sharpen my intellect* like the edge of an iron instrument. Whatever I, longing for thee, now utter, do thou accept; give me divine protection." (Compare with the word *chodaya* the use of the word *prachodayāt* in the Gāyatrī, R.V. iii. 62, 10, which will be given below.)

vii. 97, 3. *Tam u namasā havirbhiḥ suśevam Brahmaṇaspatiṁ gṛiṇīshe | Indraṁ śloko mahi daivyaḥ sishaktu yo brahmaṇo devakṛitasya rājā* | 5. *Tam ā no arkam amṛitāya jushṭam ime dhāsur amṛitāsaḥ purājāḥ ityādi* |

"3. I invoke with reverence and with offerings the beneficent Brahmaṇaspati. Let a great and *divine* song celebrate Indra, who is king

of the prayer *made by the gods.* 5. May these ancient immortals make this our hymn acceptable to the immortal," etc.

viii. 13, 7. *Pratna-vaj janaya girah srinudhi jaritur havam* |

"As of old, *generate* hymns; hear the invocation of thy worshipper."

viii. 52, 4. *Sa pratnathā kavi-vridhaḥ Indro vākasya vakshaṇiḥ* |

"Indra was of old the promoter of the poet, and the augmenter of the song."

viii. 78, 6. *Yaj jāyathā apūrvya Maghavan Vṛittra-hatyāya* | *tat prithivīm aprathayas tad astabhnāḥ uta dyām* | 7. *Tat te yajno ajāyata tad arkaḥ uta haskṛitiḥ* | *tad viśvam abhibhūr asi yaj jātam yach cha jantvam* |

"When, o unparalleled Maghavan, thou wast born to slay Vṛittra, thou didst then spread out the earth (the broad one) and sustain the sky: then thy sacrifice was produced, *then the hymn,* and the haskṛiti: (since) then thou surpassest everything that has been, or shall be, born."

Here therefore the hymn is asserted to be as old as Indra; though nothing more need be meant than that hymns then began to be produced. The hymn in which this verse occurs is not necessarily meant.

x. 112, 9. *Ni shu sīda gaṇapate gaṇeshu tvām āhur vipratamam kavīnām* | *na rite tvat kriyate kinchana āre mahām arkam Maghavan chitram archa* |

"Lord of assemblies, sit amid our multitudes; they call thee the wisest of poets. *Nothing is done without, or apart from thee;* sing, o Maghavan, a great and beautiful hymn." (Already quoted in p. 252.)

Indra and Vishṇu.—R.V. vi. 69, 2. *Yā viśvāsām janitārā matīnām Indrā-Vishṇū kalaśā soma-dhānā* | *Pra vām giraḥ śasyamānāḥ avantu pra stomāso gīyamānāsaḥ arkaiḥ* |

"Indra and Vishṇu, ye who are the *generators* of all hymns, who are the vessels into which soma is poured, may the praises which are now recited gratify you, and the songs which are chaunted with encomiums."

Indra and Varuṇa.—The following passage is not, properly speaking, a portion of the Rig-veda, as it is part of one of the Vālakhilyas or apocryphal additions (described in Vol. II. p. 210), which are found inserted between the 48th and 49th hymns of the 8th Maṇḍala. From its style, however, it appears to be nearly as old as some parts of the R.V.

xi. 6. *Indrāvaruṇā yad ṛishibhyo manīshām vācho matim śrutam adattam agre* | *yāni sthānāny asṛijanta dhīrāḥ yajnam tanvānās tapasā 'bhyapaśyam* |

"Indra and Varuṇa, I have *seen* through austere-fervour that which *ye formerly gave* to the rishis, wisdom, understanding of speech, sacred lore, and all the places which the sages created, when performing sacrifice." (See Vol. II. p. 220.)

The Maruts.—R.V. viii. 78, 3. *Pra vaḥ Indrāya bṛihate Maruto brahma archata* |

"Sing, Maruts, your hymn to the great Indra." (Compare verse 1, of the same hymn, and the words *brahmakṛitā Mārutena gaṇena* in iii. 32, 2.)

Pūshan.—R.V. x. 26, 4. *Maṁsīmahi tvā vayam asmākaṁ deva Pūshan matīnāṁ cha sādhanam viprāṇāṁ cha ādhavam* |

"We have called thee to mind, divine Pūshan, the accomplisher of our hymns, and the stimulator of sages." (The first clause of this, however, may merely mean that the god gives effect to the wishes expressed in the hymns. Compare vi. 56, 4: *Yad adya tvā purushṭuta bravāma dasra mantumaḥ* | *tat su no manma sādhaya* | "Accomplish for us the (objects of the) hymn, which we utter to thee to-day, o powerful and wise god."

Savitṛi.—R.V. iii. 62 (= S.V. ii. 812, and Vāj. S. iii. 35). *Tat Savitur vareṇyam bhargo devasya dhīmahi* | *dhiyo yo naḥ prachodayāt* |

"We have received that excellent glory of the divine Savitṛi; may he stimulate our understandings [or hymns, or rites]."

(This is the celebrated Gāyatrī, the most sacred of all the texts in the Veda. See Colebrooke's Misc. Ess. i. pp. 29, 30, 127, and 175; or pp. 14, 15, 78, and 109 of Williams and Norgate's ed. Benfey (S.V. p. 277) translates the Gāyatrī thus: "May we receive the glorious brightness of this, the generator, of the god who shall prosper our works." On the root from which the word *dhīmahi* is derived, and its sense, see also Böhtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, *s.vv.* *dhā* and *dhī*; and compare my article "On the Interpretation of the Veda," Journ. Roy. As. Soc. p. 372.

The Linga Purāṇa (Part II. sec. 48, 5 ff., Bombay lithographed ed.) gives the following "varieties" of the Gāyatrī, adapted to modern S'aiva worship:

Gāyatrī-bhedāḥ | *Tatpurushāya vidmahe vāg-viśuddhāya dhīmahi* | *Tan naḥ S'ivaḥ prachodayāt* | *Gaṇāmbikāyai vidmahe karma-siddhyai cha dhīmahi* | *Tan no Gaurī prachodayāt* | *Tatpurushāya vidmahe Mahā-*

devāya dhīmahi | Tan no Rudraḥ prachodayāt | Tatpurushāya vidmahe Vaktratuṇḍāya dhīmahi | Tan no Dantiḥ prachodayāt | Mahāsenāya vidmahe vāg-viśuddhāya dhīmahi | Tan naḥ Skandaḥ prachodayāt | Tīkshnaśṛingāya vidmahe Vedapādāya dhīmahi | Tan no Vṛishaḥ prachodayād ityādi |

"1. We contemplate That Purusha, we meditate [28] him who is pure in speech; may That S'iva stimulate us. 2. We contemplate Gaṇāmbikā, and we meditate Karmasiddhi (the accomplishment of works); may That Gaurī stimulate us. 3. We contemplate That Purusha, and we meditate Mahādeva; may that Rudra stimulate us. 4. We contemplate That Purusha, and we meditate Vaktratuṇḍa (Ganeśa); may That Danti (the elephant) stimulate us. 5. We contemplate Mahāsena (Kārtikeya, and we meditate him who is pure in speech; may That Skanda stimulate us. 6. We contemplate Tīkshṇaśṛinga (the sharp-horned), and we meditate the Veda-footed; may Vṛisha (the bull) stimulate us."

Soma.—R.V. vi. 47, 3. *Ayam me pītaḥ udiyartti vācham ayam manīshām uśatīm ajīgaḥ |*

"This [soma], when drunk, stimulates my speech [or hymn]; this called forth the ardent thought."

It may be said that this and the other following texts relating to Soma, should not be quoted as proofs that any idea of divine inspiration was entertained by the ancient Indian bards, as they can mean nothing more than that the rishis were sensible of a stimulating effect on their thoughts and powers of expression, produced by the exhilarating draughts of the juice of that plant in which they indulged. But the rishis had come to regard Soma as a god, and apparently to be passionately devoted to his worship. See the Second Volume of this work, pp. 470 ff., and especially pp. 474, 475; and my account of this deity in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1865, pp. 135 ff.

Compare what is said of the god Dionysus (or Bacchus) in the Bacchæ of Euripides, 294:

Μάντις δ'ὁ δαίμων ὅδε· τὸ γὰρ βακχεύσιμον
Καὶ τὸ μανιῶδες μαντικὴν πολλὴν ἔχει.
Ὅταν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς 'εις τὸ σῶμ' ἔλθῃ πολύς,
Λέγειν τὸ μέλλον τοὺς μεμηνότας ποιει.

[28] I retain here this sense of the word, which is probably the most commonly received.

"And this deity is a prophet. For Bacchic excitement and raving have in them much prophetic power. For when this god enters in force into the body, he causes those who rave to foretell the future."

R.V. viii. 48, 3. *Apāma somam amṛitāḥ abhūma aganma jyotir avidāma devān | kiṁ nūnam asmān kṛiṇavad arātiḥ kim u dhūrttir amṛita martyasya* |

"We have drunk the soma, we have become immortal, we have entered into light, we have known the gods; what can an enemy now do to us? what can the malice of any mortal effect, o immortal god?"[29]

(This passage is quoted in the commentary of Gauḍapāda on the Sāṅkhya Kārikā, verse 2, and is translated (incorrectly as regards the last clause), by Prof. Wilson, in p. 13 of his English version.)

A curious parallel to this last Vedic text is to be found in the satirical drama of Euripides, the Cyclops, 578 ff.; though there, of course, the object is merely to depict the drunken elevation of the monster Polyphemus:

Ὁ δ' οὐρανός μοι συμμεμιγμένος δοκεῖ
Τῇ γῇ φέρεσθαι, τοῦ Διός τε τὸν θρόνον
Λεύσσω τὸ πᾶν τε δαιμόνων ἁγνὸν σέβας

"The sky, commingled with the earth, appears
To whirl around; I see the throne of Jove,
And all the awful glory of the gods."

R.V. ix. 25, 5. *Arusho janayan giraḥ Somaḥ pavate āyushag Indraṁ gachchan kavikratuḥ* |

"The ruddy Soma, *generating hymns*, with the powers of a poet (or with the understanding of a sage), united with men, is purified, resorting to Indra."

ix. 76, 4. . . . . *Pitā matīnām asamashṭa-kāvyaḥ* |

"[Soma] father of our hymns, of incomparable wisdom."

ix. 95, 2. *Hariḥ sṛijānaḥ pathyām ṛitasya iyartti vācham ariteva nāvam | devo devānāṁ guhyāni nāma āvishkṛiṇoti barhishi pravāche* |

[29] This text may be versified as follows:

We've quaffed the soma bright,
And are immortal grown;
We've entered into light,
And all the gods have known.
What foeman now can harm,
Or mortal vex us, more?
Through thee, beyond alarm,
Immortal god, we soar.

"The golden [Soma] when poured out along the path of the ceremony, sends forth his voice, as a rower propels a boat. A god, he reveals the mysterious natures of the gods to the bard upon the sacred grass." (See R.V. ii. 42, 1, and x. 116, 9, quoted in p. 240.)

ix. 96, 5 (= S.V. ii. 293–5). *Somaḥ pavate janitā matīnām janitā divo janitā prithivyāḥ | janitā Agner janitā sūryasya janitā Indrasya janitā uta Vishṇoḥ* | 6. *Brahmā devānām padavīḥ kavīnām rishir viprāṇām mahisho mrigāṇām | śyeno gridhrāṇām svadhitir vanānām Somaḥ pavitram ati eti rebhan* | 7. *Prāvīvipad vāchaḥ ūrmim na sindhur giraḥ somaḥ pavamāno manīshāḥ ityādi* |

"Soma is purified, he who is the *generator* of hymns, of Dyaus, of Prithivī, of Agni, of Sūrya, of Indra, and of Vishṇu. 6. Soma, who is a brăhmăn-priest among the gods (or priests),[30] a leader among the poets, a rishi among sages, a buffalo among wild beasts, a falcon among vultures, an axe amid the forests, advances to the filter with a sound. The purified Soma, like the sea rolling its waves, has poured forth songs, hymns, and thoughts," etc. (See Benfey's translation of this passage in his Sāma-veda, pp. 238 and 253; and Nirukta-pariśishṭa, ii. 12, 13.)

Varuṇa.—R.V. viii. 41, 5, 6. *Yo dharttā bhuvanānām yaḥ usrāṇām apīchyā veda nāmāni guhyā | sa kaviḥ kāvyā puru rūpam dyaur iva pushyati . . . . | Yasmin viśvāni kāvyā chakre nābhir ivi śritā ityādi* |

"He who is the upholder of the worlds (Varuṇa), who knows the secret and mysterious natures of the cows, he, a sage [or poet], manifests sage [or poetical] works, as the sky does many forms. . . . . In him all sage works abide, as the nave within a wheel," etc. (See R.V. vii. 87, 4, in p. 248, and ix. 95, 2, above, in this page.)

Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman.—R.V. vii. 66, 11. *Vi ye dadhuḥ śaradam māsam ād ahar yajnam aktum cha ād richam | anāpyam Varuṇo Mitraḥ Aryamā kshatram rājānaḥ āśata* |

"The kings, Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman, who made the autumn, the month, and then the day, the sacrifice, night, and then the Ṛich, possess an unrivalled power."[31]

[30] It appears from Prof. Benfey's note on S.V. ii. 294 (=R.V. ix. 96, 6, quoted here), that the scholiast on that passage makes *devānām* = *ritvijām*, "priests."

[31] As this verse ascribes the formation of the Ṛich to the gods who are named in it, my remark, in p. 3 above, that the Purusha Sūkta contains "the only passage in

The following passage of the Rig-veda has (as we have seen above, p. 69, note 79, and p. 75) been quoted by Indian commentators and aphorists to prove the eternity of the Veda, on its own authority:

R.V. viii. 64, 6. *Tasmai nūnam abhidyave vāchā Virūpa nityayā* | *vṛishṇe chodasva sushṭutim* |

"Send forth praises, Virūpa, to this heaven-aspiring and prolific Agni, *with perpetual voice.*" (See i. 45, 3, etc., quoted above, p. 220.)

There is, however, no reason whatever to suppose that the words *nityayā vāchā* mean anything more than *perpetual voice.* There is no ground for imagining that the rishi entertained any such conception as became current among the systematic theologians of later times, that his words were eternal. The word *nitya* is used in the same sense "perpetual" in R.V. ix. 12, 7 (= S.V. ii. 55, 2), where it is said of Soma: *nitya-stotro vanaspatir dhīnām antar ityādi* | "The monarch of the woods, *continually-praised,* among the hymns," etc., as well as in the two following texts:

R.V. ix. 92, 3.—*Somaḥ punānaḥ sadaḥ eti nityam ityādi* |

"The pure Soma comes to his *perpetual* abode [or to his abode *continually*], etc.

x. 39, 14 (quoted above, p. 236). *Nityāṁ na sūnuṁ tanayaṁ dadhānāḥ* |

"Continuing the series like an *unbroken* line of descendants.'

The tenor of the numerous texts adduced in this Section seems clearly to establish the fact that some at least of the ancient Indian rishis conceived themselves to be prompted and directed, in the composition of their hymns and prayers, by supernatural aid, derived from various deities of their pantheon. It may add force to the proof derived from these texts, and show that I am the less likely to have misunderstood their purport and spirit, if I adduce some evidence that a similar conception was not unknown in another region of the ancient Indo-European world, and that the expressions in which the early Grecian bards laid claim to an inspiration emanating from the Muses, or from Apollo, were not mere figures of speech, but significant, originally, of a popular belief. Most of the following passages, from Hesiod

the hymns of the R.V. in which the creation of the Vedas is described," requires some qualification.

and Homer, in which this idea is enunciated, are referred to in Mr. Grote's History of Greece, i. 478.

Hesiod, Theogony, 22:

Αἵ νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδὴν
Ἄρνας ποιμαίνονθ' Ἑλικῶνος ὕπο ζαθέοιο.
Τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπαν,
Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο.
Ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
Ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
Ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα μυθήσασθαι.
Ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι·
Καί μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον, δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὄζον,
Δρέψασαι θηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν
Θείην, ὡς κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ' ἐόντα,
Καί με κέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
Σφᾶς τ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστερον αἰὲν ἀείδειν.

"The Muses once conferred the dower
On Hesiod of poetic power,
As underneath the sacred steep
Of Helicon he fed his sheep.
And thus they spake, 'Inglorious race
Of rustic shepherds, gluttons base,
Full many fictions we can weave
Which by their truthlike air deceive;
But, know, we also have the skill
True tales to tell, whene'er we will.'
They spake, and gave into my hand
A fair luxuriant laurel wand;
And breathed into me speech divine,
That two-fold science might be mine;
That future scenes I might unveil,
And of the past unfold the tale.
They bade me hymn the race on high
Of blessed gods who never die;
And evermore begin my lays,
And end them, with the Muses' praise"

Hesiod, Theogony, 94:

Ἐκ γὰρ Μουσάων καὶ ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος
Ἄνδρες ἀοιδοὶ ἔασιν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταί,
Ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες.

"The bards who strike the lyre and sing,
From Phœbus and the Muses spring:
From Jove's high race descends the king."

The following are the words in which the author of the Iliad invokes the aid of the Muses, to qualify him for enumerating the generals of the Grecian host (Iliad, ii. 484):

Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,
Ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε πάρεστέ τε ἴστε τε πάντα,
Ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν.

"Tell me the truth, ye Muses, tell,
Ye who on high Olympus dwell;
For, omnipresent, ye can scan
Whate'ever on earth is done by man,
Whilst we vague rumours only learn
And nothing certain can discern."

But the Muses could also take away, as well as impart, the gift of song, as appears from Iliad, ii. 594 ff.:

Ἔνθα τε Μοῦσαι
Ἀντόμεναι Θάμυριν τὸν Θρήϊκα παῦσαν ἀοιδῆς·
Στεῦτο γὰρ εὐχόμενος νικησέμεν, εἴπερ ἂν αὐταὶ
Μοῦσαι ἀείδοιεν, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο.
Αἱ δὲ χολωσάμεναι πηρὸν θέσαν, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὴν
Θεσπεσίην ἀφέλοντο, καὶ ἐκλέλαθον κιθαριστύν.

"'Twas there the Muses, we are told,
Encountered Thamyris of old.
He boasted that the minstrel throng
To him must yield the prize of song;
Yes, even although, among the rest,
The Muses should the palm contest.
Aware of his presumption, they
Both took his skill in song away,
And power to wake the tuneful lyre;—
And struck him blind, in vengeful ire."

The following passages from the Odyssey refer to Demodocus, the bard who sang at the court of Alcinous, King of the Phæacians (Odyssey, viii. 43 ff.):

Καλέσασθε δὲ θεῖον ἀοιδόν,
Δημόδοκον· τῷ γάρ ῥα θεὸς πέρι δῶκεν ἀοιδήν,
Τέρπειν, ὅππη θυμὸς ἐποτρύνῃσιν ἀείδειν.

"And go, the bard divine invite:—
The god hath given him skill
By song all others to delight,
Whenever he may will.

Odyssey, viii. 62 ff.:

Κῆρυξ δ' ἐγγύθεν ἦλθεν ἄγων ἐρίηρον ἀοιδόν·
Τὸν πέρι Μοῦσ' ἐφίλησε δίδου δ' ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε,
Ὀφθαλμῶν μὲν ἄμερσε δίδου δ' ἡδεῖαν ἀοιδήν.

"The herald came, and within him brought
The bard whom all with longing sought.
The Muse's darling, he had good
As well as ill from her received;
With power of dulcet song endued,
But of his eyesight too bereaved."

Here the Muse is described as the arbitress of the bard's destiny in other points besides the gift and withdrawal of song.

Odyssey, viii. 73:

Μοῦσ' ἄρ' ἀοιδὸν ἀνῆκεν ἀειδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν κ.τ.λ.

"Stirr'd by the Muse the bard extoll'd
In song the deeds of warriors bold."

A little further on, Ulysses says of Demodocus (Odyssey, viii. 479 ff.):

Πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἀοιδοὶ
Τιμῆς ἔμμοροί εἰσι καὶ αἰδοῦς, οὕνεκ' ἄρα σφέας
Οἴμας Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, φίλησε δὲ φῦλον ἀοιδῶν.

"All mortal men with awe regard,
And honourably treat, the bard;
Because the Muse has taught him lays,
And dearly loves his tuneful race."

And again he addresses him thus (Odyssey, viii. 487):

Δημόδοκ', ἔξοχα δή σε βροτῶν αἰνίζομ' ἁπάντων.
Ἤ σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε Διὸς πάϊς, ἢ σέ γ' Ἀπόλλων.
Λίην γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν οἶτον ἀείδεις, κ.τ.λ.

"Demodocus, beyond the rest
Of mortals I esteem thee blest.
For thee, the Muse, Jove's child, has taught,
Or Phœbus in thee skill has wrought;
So perfectly thou dost relate
The story of the Argives' fate."[33]

Phemius, the Ithacan minstrel, thus supplicates Ulysses to spare his life (Odyssey, xxii. 345 ff.):

Αὐτῷ τοι μετόπισθ' ἄχος ἔσσεται, εἴκεν ἀοιδὸν
Πέφνῃς, ὅς τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀείδω.
Αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἴμας
Παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν.

"Thou soon wilt grieve, if thou the bard shouldst slay,
To gods as well as men who pours his lay.
Self-taught I am; and yet within my mind
A god hath gendered strains of every kind."

[33] "That is," says Mr. Grote, "Demodocus has either been inspired as a poet by the muse, or as a prophet by Apollo, for the Homeric Apollo is not the god of song. Kalchas, the prophet, receives his inspiration from Apollo, who confers upon him the same knowledge, both of past and future, as the Muses give to Hesiod." But does not this passage (Odyssey viii. 488) rather show that the Homeric Apollo was the god of song, as well as the bestower of prophetic intuition; and do we not learn the same from Iliad, i. 603? In any case, it is quite clear from Theog. 94, quoted above, that Hesiod regarded Apollo in this character.

The early Greeks believed that the gift of prophecy also, as well as that of song, was imparted by the gods to mortals. This appears both from Hesiod, as already quoted, and from the following passage of Homer (Iliad, i. 69):

> Κάλχας Θεστορίδης, οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ' ἄριστος,
> Ὃς ᾔδη τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ' ἐόντα,
> Καὶ νήεσσ' ἡγήσατ' Ἀχαιῶν Ἴλιον εἴσω,
> Ἣν διὰ μαντοσύνην, τήν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.

> "Of augurs wisest, Calchas knew
> Things present, past, and future too.
> By force of that divining skill,
> Vouchsafed to him by Phœbus' will,
> The Grecian fleet he safely bore
> From Aulis' bay to Ilion's shore."

It is thus argued by Mr. Grote that the early Greeks really believed in the inspiration of their bards by the Muses (History of Greece, i. 477 ff.):

"His [the early Greek's] faith is ready, literal and uninquiring, apart from all thought of discriminating fact from fiction, or of detecting hidden and symbolized meaning: it is enough that what he hears be intrinsically plausible and seductive, and that there be no special cause to provoke doubt. And if indeed there were, the poet overrules such doubts by the holy and all-sufficient authority of the Muse, whose omniscience is the warrant for his recital, as her inspiration is the cause of his success. The state of mind, and the relation of speaker to hearers, thus depicted, stand clearly marked in the terms and tenor of the ancient epic, if we only put a plain meaning upon what we read. The poet—like the prophet, whom he so much resembles—sings under heavenly guidance, inspired by the goddess to whom he has prayed for her assisting impulse. She puts the words into his mouth and the incidents into his mind; he is a privileged man, chosen as her organ, and speaking from her revelations. As the Muse grants the gift of song to whom she will, so she sometimes in her anger snatches it away, and the most consummate human genius is then left silent and helpless. It is true that these expressions, of the Muse inspiring and the poet singing a tale of past times, have passed from the ancient epic to compositions produced under very different circumstances, and have now degenerated into unmeaning forms of speech; but they gained currency originally in their genuine and literal acceptation. If poets had from

the beginning written or recited, the predicate of singing would never have been ascribed to them; nor would it ever have become customary to employ the name of the Muse as a die to be stamped on licensed fiction, unless the practice had begun when her agency was invoked and hailed in perfect good faith. Belief, the fruit of deliberate inquiry, and a rational scrutiny of evidence, is in such an age unknown; the simple faith of the time slides in unconsciously, when the imagination and feeling are exalted; and inspired authority is at once understood, easily admitted, and implicitly confided in."

If we extend our researches over the pages of Homer, we shall speedily discover numerous other instances of a belief in divine interference in human affairs, not merely (1) in the general government of the world, in the distribution of good and evil, and the allotment of the diversified gifts, intellectual, moral, and physical, which constitute the innumerable varieties of human condition, but also (2) in the way of special suggestion, guidance, encouragement, and protection, afforded to individuals.

Illustrations of the general control exercised by the gods over the fortunes of mankind may be found in the following passages of the Iliad,—xiii. 730 ff., and of the Odyssey,—i. 347 f.; iv. 236 f.; vi. 188 f.; viii. 167–175; xvii. 218, 485 ff.

The following are illustrations of the special interference of the gods on behalf of their favourites: Iliad, i. 194 ff., 218; iii. 380 ff.; v. 1 ff.; vii. 272; xiii. 60 f., 435; xvi. 788 ff.:—Odyssey, i. 319 ff.; iii. 26 ff.; xiv. 216 f., 227; xvi. 159 ff.[33] Of the latter class of passages, I quote two specimens.

Odyssey, i. 319 ff.:

> Ἡ μὲν ἄρ ὣς εἰποῦσ' ἀπέβη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,
> Ὄρνις δ' ὣς ἀνοπαῖα διέπτατο· τῷ δ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ
> Θῆκε μένος καὶ θάρσος, ὑπέμνησέν τέ ἑ πατρὸς
> Μᾶλλον ἔτ' ἢ τὸ πάροιθεν· ὁ δὲ φρεσὶν ᾗσι νοήσας
> Θάμβησεν κατὰ θυμόν, ὀΐσατο γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι.

> "As thus she spake, Athene flew
> Aloft, and soared beyond his view.
> His soul she filled with force and fire,
> And stronger memory of his sire.
> Amazed, he felt the inward force,
> And deemed a god must be its source."

[33] Compare Prof. Blackie's dissertation on the theology of Homer in the "Classical Museum," vol. vii. pp. 414 ff.

When Telemachus urges his youth and inexperience as a reason for diffidence in approaching Nestor, Minerva says to him (Odyssey, iii. 26):

Τηλέμαχ', ἄλλα μὲν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ σῇσι νοήσεις,
Ἄλλα δὲ καὶ δαίμων ὑποθήσεται· ὀυ γὰρ οΐω
Ὄυ σε θεῶν ἀέκητι γενέσθαι τε τραφέμεν τε.

"Some things thy mind itself shall reach,
And other things a god shall teach;
For born and bred thou ne'er hadst been
Unless they gods had will'd, I ween.

These passages, however, afford only one exemplification of the idea which runs through, and in fact created, the entire mythology of the Greeks, viz. that all the departments of life and of nature were animated, controlled, and governed by particular deities, by whom they were represented, and in whom they were personified.

The Indian mythology,—as is evident to every reader of the Vedas, as well as (to some extent) to the student of the Purāṇas,—is distinguished by the same tendency as the Grecian. Indra, Agni, Vāyu, Savitṛi, Sūrya, and many other gods are nothing else than personifications of the elements, while Vāch or Sarasvatī and some other deities, represent either the divine reason by which the more gifted men were supposed to be inspired, or some mental function, or ceremonial abstraction.

In the later religious history, however, of the two races, the Hellenic and the Indian, there is in one respect a remarkable divergence. Though the priestesses of the different oracles, and perhaps some other pretenders to prophetical intuition, were popularly regarded as speaking under a divine impulse,[34] the idea of inspiration as attaching to poems or other compositions of a religious, didactic, or philosophical character, very soon became extinct. The Greeks had no sacred Scriptures. Although a supernatural character was popularly ascribed to Pythagoras, Epimenides, and Empedocles, the Hellenic philosophers in general spoke and wrote in dependance on their own reason alone. They rarely professed to be guided by any supernatural assistance, or claimed any divine authority for their dogmas.[35] Nor (unless such

[34] See Nägelsbach's Nachhomerische Theologie, pp. 173 ff., and Dr. Karl Köhler's Prophetismus der Hebræer und die Mantik der Griechen in ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältniss, (Darmstadt, 1860), pp. 39 ff.

[35] I express myself cautiously here, as a learned friend profoundly versed in the study of Plato is of opinion that there are traces in the writings of that author of a

may have been the case at a very late period) was any infallibility claimed for any of them by their successors.

In India, on the other hand, the indistinct, and perhaps hesitating, belief which some of the ancient rishis seem to have entertained in their own inspiration was not suffered to die out in the minds of later generations. On the contrary this belief grew up (as we have seen above, pp. 57–138, and 207 ff.) by degrees into a fixed persuasion that all the literary productions of those early sages had not only resulted from a supernatural impulse, but were infallible, divine, and even eternal. These works have become the sacred Scriptures of India. And in the popular opinion, if not in the estimation of the learned, most Indian works of any importance, of a religious, scientific, or philosophical kind, which were produced at a later period, have come to be regarded as inspired, as soon as the lapse of ages had removed the writers beyond familiar or traditional knowledge, and invested their names with a halo of reverence.

To return from this digression to the inquiry which was being pursued regarding the opinions of the ancient Vedic rishis on the subject of their own inspiration:

How, it will be asked, are we to reconcile this impression which the rishis manifest of being prompted by supernatural aid, with the circumstance, which seems to be no less distinctly proved by the citations made in the preceding section (pp. 232 ff.), that they frequently speak of themselves as having *made*, *fabricated*, or *generated* the hymns, without apparently betraying any consciousness that in this process they were inspired or guided by any extraneous assistance?

In reply to this I will only suggest (1) that possibly the idea of inspiration may not have been held by the earliest rishis, but may have grown up among their successors; or (2) that it may have been entertained by some rishis, and not by others; or again (3), if both ideas

claim to supernatural guidance, though by no means to infallibility. See also the mention made of the inspiration ascribed to Pythagoras, in Mr. Grote's Greece, iv. 528, 530; and the notices of Epimenides and Empedocles given by the same author, vol. iii. 112 ff., vol. vii. p. 174, and vol. viii. 465 f.; and compare on the same subjects Bp. Thirlwall's Hist. of Greece, ii. 32 ff., and 155 ff.; and Plato, Legg. i. p. 642. See also Prof. Geddes's Phædo, note P. p. 251, and the passages there referred to; and the Tract of Dr. Köhler, above cited, pp. 60 and 64.

can be traced to the same author, we may suppose that the one notion was uppermost in his mind at one moment, and the other at another; or (4) that he had no very clearly defined ideas of inspiration, and might conceive that the divine assistance of which he was conscious, or which at least he implored, did not render his hymn the less truly the production of his own mind; that, in short, the existence of a human, was not incompatible with that of a superhuman, element in its composition.

The first of these suppositions is, however, attended with this difficulty, that both conceptions, viz., that of independent unassisted composition, and that of inspiration, appear to be discoverable in all parts of the Rig-veda. As regards the second supposition, it might not be easy (in the uncertainty attaching to the Vedic tradition contained in the Anukramaṇī or Vedic index) to show that such and such hymns were written by such and such rishis, rather than by any others. It may, however, become possible by continued and careful comparison of the Vedic hymns, to arrive at some probable conclusions in regard to their authorship, so far at least as to determine that particular hymns should probably be assigned to particular eras, or families, rather than to others. I must, however, leave such investigations to be worked out, and the results applied to the present subject, by more competent scholars than myself.

III. While in many passages of the Veda, an efficacy is ascribed to the hymns, which is perhaps nothing greater than natural religion teaches all men to attribute to their devotions, in other texts a mystical, magical, or supernatural power is represented as residing in the prayers and metres. (See Weber's Vājasaneyi-Sanhitæ specimen, p. 61; and Vol. I. of this work, p. 242.) Some of the following texts are of the latter kind.

Thus in R.V. i. 67, 3, it is said:

Ajo na kshāṁ dadhāra prithivīṁ tastambha dyām mantrebhiḥ satyaiḥ |

"(Agni) who like the unborn, supported the broad earth, and upheld the sky by true prayers."

The following is part of Sāyaṇa's annotation on this verse:

Mantrair divo dhāraṇaṁ Taittirīye samāmnātaṁ | "*devāḥ vai ādityasya svarga-lokasya parācho 'tipātād abibhayuḥ* | *taṁ chhandobhir adṛihan dhṛityā*" *iti* | *yadvā satyair mantraiḥ stūyamāno 'gnir dyāṁ tastambha iti* |

"The supporting of the sky by mantras is thus recorded in the Taittirīya: 'The gods feared lest the sun should fall down from the heaven; they propped it up by metres.' Or the verse may mean that Agni, being lauded by true mantras, upheld the sky."

See also R.V. i. 96, 2, quoted above, in p. 225, and Ait. Br. ii. 33, cited in the First Volume of this work, p. 180.

i. 164, 25. *Jagatā sindhuṁ divi astabhāyad rathantare sūryam pari apaśyat | gāyatrasya samidhas tisraḥ āhus tato mahnā pra ririche mahitvā |*

"By the Jagatī metre he fixed the waters in the sky; he beheld the sun in the Rathantara (a portion of the Sāma-veda): there are said to be three divisions of the Gāyatra; hence it surpasses [all others] in power and grandeur."

iii. 53, 12. *Viśvāmitrasya rakshati brahma idam Bhāratam janam |*

"The prayer of Viśvāmitra protects this tribe of the Bharatas." (See Vol. I. pp. 242 and 342.)

v. 31, 4. *Brahmāṇaḥ Indram mahayanto arkair avardhayan Ahaye hantavai u |*

"The priests magnifying Indra by their praises, have fortified him for slaying Agni."

Compare the following texts already quoted, iii. 32, 13, p. 226; vi. 44, 13, p. 227; viii. 6, 11, p. 228; viii. 8, 8, p. 243; viii. 44, 12, p. 230; viii. 63, 8, p. 230; x. 67, 13, p. 244; and also i. 10, 5; ii. 11, 2; ii. 12, 14; iii. 34, 1, 2; v. 31, 10; viii. 6, 1, 21, 31, 35; viii. 13, 16; viii. 14, 5, 11; viii. 82, 27; and viii. 87, 8, where a similar power of augmenting, or strengthening, the gods is attributed to the hymns.

v. 40, 6. . . . . *Gūḷham sūryaṁ tamasā apavratena turīyeṇa brahmaṇā avindad Atriḥ* | 8. . . . . *Atriḥ sūryasya divi chakshur ādhāt svarbhānor apa māyāḥ aghukshat* | 9. *Yaṁ vai sūryaṁ svarbhānus tamasā avidhyad āsurah | Atrayas tam anvavindan na hi anye aśaknuvan |*

"Atri, by his fourth prayer, discovered the sun which had been concealed by the hostile darkness. 8. . . . . Atri placed the eye of the sun in the sky, and dispelled the illusions of Svarbhānu. 9. The Atris discovered the sun, which Svarbhānu, of the Asura race, had pierced with darkness; no other could [effect this]." (See Vol. I. of this work, pp. 242 and 469.)

vi. 75, 19. . . . . *Devās tam sarve dhūrvantu brahma varma mamāntaram* |

"May all the gods destroy him; the prayer is my protecting armour."

vii. 19, 11. *Nu Indra śūra stavamānaḥ ūtī brahma-jūtas tanvā vavṛidhasva ityādi* |

"Heroic Indra, lauded, and impelled by our prayers, grow in body through (our) aid [or longing]," etc. (Compare viii. 13, 17, 25.)

vii. 33, 3. . . . . *Even nu kam dāśarājne Sudāsam prāvad Indro brahmaṇā vo Vasishṭhāḥ* | 5. . . . . *Vasishṭhasya stuvataḥ Indraḥ aśrod urum Tṛitsubhyaḥ akṛiṇod u lokam* |

"Indra has delivered Sūdas in the combat of the ten kings through your prayer, o Vasishṭhas. 5. Indra heard Vasishṭha when he praised, and opened a wide place for the Tritsus." (See Vol. I. pp. 242 and 319.)

viii. 49, 9. *Pāhi naḥ Agne ekayā pāhi uta dvitīyayā* | *pāhi gīrbhis tisṛibhir ūrjāmpate pāhi chatasṛibhir vaso* |

"Protect us, Agni, through the first, protect us through the second, protect us, lord of power, through three hymns, protect us through four, thou bright god."

The following passage celebrates the numbers of the metres:

x. 114, 8, 9. *Sahasradhā panchadaśāni ukthā yāvad dyāvā-pṛithivī tāvad it tat* | *Sahasradhā mahimānaḥ sahasram yāvad brahma vishṭhitam tāvatī vāk* | 9. *Kaś chhandasām yogam āveda dhīraḥ ko dhishṇyām prati vācham papāda* | *kam ṛitvijām ashṭamam śūram āhur harī Indrasya ni chikāya kaḥ svit* |

8. "There are a thousand times fifteen *ukthas*; that extends as far as heaven and earth. A thousand times a thousand are their glorious manifestations; speech is commensurate with devotion. 9. What sage knows the [whole] series [or application] of the metres? Who has attained devotional speech? Whom do they call the eighth hero among priests? Who has perceived the two steeds of Indra?"

(The word *dhishṇya* is said by Yāska, Nirukta, viii. 3, to be = to *dhishaṇya*, and that again to be = to *dhishaṇā-bhava*, "springing" from *dhishaṇā*, "speech," or "sacred speech."

I conclude the series of texts relating to the power of the mantras by quoting the whole of the 130th hymn of the 10th Maṇḍala of the Rig-veda:

1. *Yo yajno viśvatas tantubhis tataḥ ekaśatam deva-karmebhir āyataḥ* |

ime vayanti pitaro ye āyayuḥ pra vaya apa vaya āsate tate | 2. *Pumān enam tanute utkriṇatti pumān vi tatne adhi nāke asmin* | *ime mayūkhāḥ upa shedur ū sadaḥ sāmāni chakrus tasarāṇi otave* | 3. *Kā āsīt pramā pratimā kim nidānam ājyam kim āsīt paridhiḥ kaḥ āsīt* | *chhandaḥ kim āsīt prāugam kim uktham yad devāḥ devam ayajanta viśve* | 4. *Agner gāyatrī abhavat sayugvā ushṇihayā Savitā sambabhūva* | *anushṭubhā Somaḥ ukthair mahasvān Bṛihaspater bṛihatī vācham āvat* | 5. *Virāṇ Mitrāvaruṇayor abhiśrīr Indrasya trishṭub iha bhāgaḥ ahnaḥ* | *Viśvān devān jagatī āviveśa tena chākḷripre ṛishayo manushyāḥ* | 6. *Chākḷripre tena ṛishayo manushyāḥ yajne jāte pitaraḥ naḥ purāṇe* | *paśyan manye manasā chakshasā tān ye imam yajnam ayajanta pūrve* | 7. *Saha-stomāḥ saha-chhandasaḥ āvṛitaḥ saha-pramāḥ ṛishayaḥ sapta daivyāḥ* | *pūrveshām panthām anudriśya dhīrāḥ anvālebhire rathyo na raśmīn* |

"1. The [web of] sacrifice which is stretched on every side with threads,[26] which is extended with one hundred [threads], the work of the gods,—these fathers who have arrived weave it; they sit where it is extended, [saying] 'weave forwards, weave backwards.' 2. The Man stretches it out and spins it, the Man has extended it over this sky. These rays approached the place of sacrifice; they made the Sāma verses the shuttles for the woof. 3. What was the measure [of the ceremonial], what the form, what the type, what the oblation, what the enclosing fuel, what the metre, what the *prāuga*, and what the *uktha*, when all the gods sacrificed to the god? 4. The gāyatrī was associated with Āgni; Savitṛi was conjoined with the ushṇihā; and Soma, gladdening (us) through hymns (*ukthas*), with the anushṭubh; the bṛihatī attached itself to the speech of Bṛihaspati. 5. The virāj adhered to Mitra and Varuṇa; the trishṭubh, a portion of the day (?), [accompanied] Indra. The jagatī entered into the Viśvedevas. By this means human rishis were successful. 6. By this means our human fathers the rishis were successful, when this ancient sacrifice

[26] In R.V. x. 57, 2, we find the same word *tantu* occurring: *Yo yajnasya prasādhanas tantur deveshu ātatas tam āhutam naśīmahi* | "May we obtain him [Agni] who is offered, who is the fulfiller of sacrifice, who is the thread stretched to the gods." (Comp. the versions given by Prof. Müller in the Journ. R. A. S. for 1866, pp. 449, and 457.) Prof. Roth quotes under the word *tantu* the following text from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, ii. 4, 2, 6: *Ā tantum Agnir divyam tatāna* | *tvam nas tantur uta setur Agne tvam panthāḥ bhavasi deva-yānaḥ* | "Agni has stretched the divine thread. Thou, Agni, art our thread and bridge; thou art the path leading to the gods."

was celebrated. I believe that I behold with my mind, [as] with an eye, those ancients who performed this sacrifice. 7. The seven wise and divine rishis, with hymns, with metres, [with] ritual forms, and according to the prescribed measures, contemplating the path of the ancients, have followed it, like charioteers seizing the reins."

I shall not attempt to explain the meaning and purport of this obscure and mystical hymn, which has been translated by Mr. Colebrooke (Essays, i. 34, 35, or p. 18 of Williams and Norgate's ed.). My object in quoting the verses is to show how the various metres are associated with the different deities, in this primeval and mysterious rite, and how a certain sanctity is thus imparted to them. In verse 7, it will be observed, the rishis are spoken of as seven in number, and as divine. The Atharva-veda (x. 7, 43, 44) gives the second verse somewhat differently from the Rig-veda, as follows: *Pumān enad vayati udgriṇatti pumān enad vi jabhāra adhi nāke | ime mayūkhāḥ upa tastabhur divaṁ sāmāni chakrus tasarāṇi vātave |* "The Man weaves and spins this: the Man has spread this over the sky. These rays have propped up the sky; they have made the Sāma-verses shuttles for the woof."

IV. But whatever may have been the nature or the source of the supernal illumination to which the rishis laid claim, it is quite clear that some among them at least made no pretensions to anything like a perfect knowledge of all subjects, human and divine, as they occasionally confess their ignorance of matters in which they felt a deep interest and curiosity. This is shown in the following texts:

R.V. i. 164, 5. *Pākaḥ prichchhāmi manasā avijānan devānām enā nihitā padāni | vatse bashkaye adhi sapta tantūn vi tatnire kavayaḥ otavai u |* 6. *Achikitvān chikitasaś chid atra kavīn prichchhāmi vidmane na vidvān | vi yas tastambha shaḷ imā rajāṁsi ajasya rūpe kim api svid ekam |* 37. *Na vi jānāmi yad iva idam asmi niṇyaḥ sannaddho manasā charāmi | yadā mā āgan prathamajāḥ ritasya ād id vāchaḥ aśnuve bhāgam asyāḥ |*

"5. Ignorant, not knowing in my mind, I enquire after these hidden abodes of the gods; the sages have stretched out seven threads for a woof over the yearling calf [or over the sun, the abode of all things]. 6. Not comprehending, I ask those sages who comprehend this matter; unknowing, [I ask] that I may know; what is the one thing, in the form of the uncreated one, who has upheld these six

worlds? 37. I do not recognize if I am like this; I go on perplexed and bound in mind. When the first-born sons of sacrifice [or truth] come to me, then I enjoy a share of that word."

I do not attempt to explain the proper sense of these dark and mystical verses. It is sufficient for my purpose that they clearly express ignorance on the part of the speaker. Prof. Wilson's translation of the passages may be compared. Prof. Müller, Anc. Ind. Lit. p. 567, renders verse 37 as follows: "I know not what this is that I am like; turned inward I walk, chained in my mind. When the first-born of time comes near me, then I obtain the portion of this speech."

x. 31, 7. *Kiṁ svid vanaṁ kaḥ u sa vṛikshaḥ āsa yato dyāvā-pṛithivī nishṭatakshuḥ | santasthāne ajare itaūtī ahāni pūrvīr ushaso jaranta* |

"What was the forest, what the tree, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth, which continue to exist undecaying, whilst days, and many dawns have passed away?"

Compare x. 81, 4, where the first of these lines is repeated and is followed by the words: *Manīshiṇo manasā pṛichhata id u tad yad adhyatishṭhad bhuvanāni dhārayan* | "Ask in your minds, ye intelligent, what that was on which he took his stand when upholding the worlds;" and see verse 2 of the same hymn.

i. 185, 1. *Katarā pūrvā katarā aparā ayoḥ kathā jāte kavayo ko vi veda* |

"Which of these two (Heaven and Earth) is the first? which is the last? How were they produced? Who, o sages, knows?"

x. 88, 18. *Kati agnayaḥ kati sūryāsaḥ kati ushasaḥ kati u svid āpaḥ* | *na upaspijaṁ vaḥ pitaro vadāmi pṛichchhāmi vaḥ kavayo vidmane kam* |

"How many fires are there? how many suns? how many dawns? how many waters? I do not, fathers, say this to you in jest; I really ask you, sages, in order that I may know."

Compare x. 114, 9, above, p. 227.

x. 129, 5. *Tiraśchīno vitato raśmir eshām adhaḥ svid āsīd upari svid āsīt | retodhāḥ āsan mahimānaḥ āsan svadhā avastat prayatiḥ parastāt* | 6. *Kaḥ addha veda kaḥ iha pravochat kutaḥ ājātā kutaḥ iyaṁ visṛishtiḥ* | *arvāg devāḥ asya visarjanena atha ko veda yataḥ ābabhūva* | 7. *Iyaṁ visṛishṭir yataḥ ābabhūva yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na* | *yaḥ asya adhyakshaḥ parame vyoman sa anga veda yadi vā na veda* |

5. "Their ray [or cord], obliquely extended, was it below, or was it above? There were generative sources. and there were great powers,

svadhā (a self-supporting principle) below, and effort above. 6. Who knows, who hath here declared, whence this creation was produced, whence [it came]? The gods were subsequent to the creation of this universe; who then knows whence it sprang? 7. Whence this creation sprang, whether any one formed it or not,—he who, in the highest heavens, is the overseer of this universe,—he indeed knows, or he does not know."

See the translation of the whole hymn by Mr. Colebrooke in his Essays, i. 33, 34, or p. 17 of Williams and Norgate's ed. See also Prof. Müller's version and comment in pp. 559–564 of his History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature; and my own rendering in the article on the "progress of the Vedic religion towards abstract conceptions of the Deity," in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1865, pp. 345 f.

We have seen (above, p. 62) that a claim is set up (by some unspecified writer quoted by Sāyaṇa) on behalf of the Veda that it can impart an understanding of all things, past and future, subtile, proximate, and remote; and that according to S'ankara Āchāryya (on the Brahma-sūtras, i. 1, 3) as cited above, p. 106, the knowledge which it manifests, approaches to omniscience. All such proud pretensions are, however, plainly enough disavowed by the rishis who uttered the complaints of ignorance which I have just adduced. It is indeed urged by Sāyaṇa (see above, p. 64) in answer to the objection, that passages like R.V. x. 129, 5, 6, can possess no authority as sources of knowledge, since they express doubt,—that this is not their object, but that their intention is to intimate by a figure of speech the extreme profundity of the divine essence, and the great difficulty which any persons not well versed in the sacred writings must experience in comprehending it. There can, however, be little doubt that the authors of the passages I have cited did feel their own ignorance, and intended to give utterance to this feeling. As, however, such confessions of ignorance on the part of the rishis, if admitted, would have been incompatible with the doctrine that the Veda was an infallible source of divine knowledge, it became necessary for the later theologians who held that doctrine to explain away the plain sense of those expressions.

It should, however, be noticed that these confessions of ignorance and fallibility are by no means inconsistent with the supposition that the rishis may have conceived themselves to be animated and directed in

the composition of their hymns by a divine impulse. But although the two rivals, Vasishṭha and Viśvāmitra, whether in the belief of their own superhuman insight, or to enhance their own importance, and recommend themselves to their royal patrons, talk proudly about the wide range of their knowledge (see above, pp. 246 ff.), it is not necessary to imagine that, either in their idea or in that of the other ancient Indian sages, inspiration and infallibility were convertible or co-extensive terms. The rishis may have believed that the supernatural aid which they had received enabled them to perform what they must otherwise have left unattempted, but that after all it communicated only a partial illumination, and left them still liable to mistake and doubt.

I must also remark that this belief in their own inspiration which I imagine some of the rishis to have held, falls very far short of the conceptions which most of the later writers, whether Vaiśeshika, Mīmānsaka, or Vedāntist, entertain in regard to the supernatural origin and authority of the Veda. The gods from whom the ṛishis supposed that they derived their illumination, at least Agni, Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Soma, Pūshan, etc., would all fall under the category of productions, or divinities created in time. This is clearly shown by the comments of S'ankara on the Brahma Sūtras, i. 3, 28, (above, pp. 101 ff.); and is otherwise notorious (see my "Contributions to a knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology" in the Jl. R. A. S. for 1864, p. 63). But if these gods were themselves created, and even (as we are told in the Rig-veda itself, x. 129, 6, cited in p. 280) produced subsequently to some other parts of the creation, the hymns with which they inspired the rishis, could not have been eternal. The only one of the deities referred to in the Rig-veda as sources of illumination, to whom this remark would perhaps not apply, is Vāch or Sarasvatī, who is identified with the supreme Brahma in the passage of the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad quoted above (p. 208, note 179); though this idea no doubt originated subsequently to the era of the hymns. But it is not to created gods, like Agni, Indra, and others of the same class, that the origin of the Veda is referred by the Vaiśeshikas, Mīmānsakas, or Vedantists. The Vaiśeshikas represent the eternal Īśvara as the author of the Veda (see the passages which I have quoted in pp. 118 ff. and 209). The Mīmānsakas and Vedantists, as we have seen (pp. 70 ff., 99 ff. and 208),

either affirm that it is uncreated, or derive it from the eternal Brahma. And even those writers who may attribute the composition of the Veda to the personal and created Brahmā (see pp. 69, 105 f. and 208), with the Naiyāyikas who merely describe it as the work of a competent author (see pp. 116 f. and 209), and the Sānkhyas (see pp. 135 and 208), concur with the other schools in affirming its absolute infallibility. Their view, consequently (unless we admit an exception in reference to Vāch), differs from that of the Vedic rishis themselves, who do not seem to have had any idea, either of their hymns being uncreated, or derived from the eternal Brahma, or of their being infallible.

As regards the relation of the rishis to deities like Indra, it is also deserving of notice that later mythologists represent the former, not only as quite independent of the latter, and as gifted with an inherent capacity of raising themselves by their own austerities to the enjoyment of various superhuman faculties, but even as possessing the power of rivalling the gods themselves, and taking possession of their thrones. See the stories of Nahusha and Viśvāmitra in the First Volume of this work, particularly pp. 310 ff. and 404. Compare also the passages from the Rig-veda, x. 154, 2, and x. 167, 1, quoted above, p. 250, where the rishis are said to have attained to heaven, and Indra to have conquered it, by austere-fervour (*tapas*).

SECT. V.—*Texts from the Upanishads, showing the opinions of the authors regarding their own inspiration, or that of their predecessors.*

I shall now adduce some passages from different Upanishads, to show what opinions their authors entertained either in regard to their own inspiration, or that of the earlier sages, from whom they assert that their doctrine was derived by tradition.

I. S'vetāśvatara Up. v. 2 (already quoted above, p. 184). *Yo yonim yonim adhitishṭhaty eko viśvāni rūpāṇi yonīś cha sarvāḥ | ṛishim pra sūtam Kapilam yas tam agre jnānair bibhartti jāyamānam cha paśyet |*

"He who alone presides over every place of production, over all forms, and all sources of birth, who formerly nourished with various knowledge that rishi Kapila, who had been born, and beheld him at his birth."

II. S'vetāśvatara Up. vi. 21. *Tapaḥ-prabhāvād veda-prasādāch cha Brahma ha S'vetāśvataro 'tha vidvān | atyāśramibhyaḥ paramam pavitram provācha samyag ṛishi-sangha-jushṭam |*

"By the power of austere-fervour, and by the grace of the Veda, the wise S'vetāśvatara declared perfectly to the men in the highest of the four orders, the supreme and holy Brahma, who is sought after by the company of rishis." (Dr. Röer's translation, p. 68, follows the commentator in rendering the first words of the verse thus: "By the power of his austerity, and the grace of God." This, however, is not the proper meaning of the words *veda-prasādāch cha*, if the correctess of that reading, which is given both in the text and commentary (Bibl. Ind. p. 372), be maintained. S'ankara interprets the words thus: "*Veda-prasādāch cha*" | *kaivalyam uddiśya tad-adhikāra-siddhaye bahujanmasu samyag ārādhita-parameśvarasya prasādāch cha* | "'By the grace of the Veda:' by the grace of the supreme God who had been perfectly adored by him during many births in order to acquire the prerogative of (studying) it (the Veda) in reference to *kaivalya* (isolation from mundane existence);" and thus appears to recognize this reading.

In the 18th verse of the same section of this Upanishad the Vedas are said to have been given by the supreme God to Brahmā:

Yo Brahmāṇaṁ vidadhāti pūrvaṁ yo vai vedāṁś cha prahiṇoti tasmai | taṁ ha devam ātma-buddhi-prakāśam mumukshur vai śaraṇam aham prapadye |

"Seeking after final liberation, I take refuge with that God, the manifester of the knowledge of himself, who at first created Brahmā and gave him the Vedas."

III. Muṇḍaka Up. i. 1 ff. (quoted above, p. 30, more at length). *Brahmā devānām prathamaḥ sambabhūva viśvasya karttā bhuvanasya goptā | Sa brahma-vidyāṁ sarva-vidyā-pratishṭhām Atharvāya jyeshṭha-putrāya prāha |*

"Brahmā was born the first of the gods, he who is the maker of the universe and the supporter of the world. He declared the science of Brahma, the foundation of all the sciences, to Atharva, his eldest son."

IV. The Chhāndogya Up. viii. 15, 1, p. 625 ff. concludes as follows: *Tad ha etad Brahmā Prajāpataye uvācha Prajāpatir Manave Manuḥ prajābhyaḥ | āchāryya-kulād vedam adhītya yathā vidhānaṁ guroḥ karmātiśeshena abhisamāvṛitya kuṭumbe śuchau deśe svādhyāyam adhīyāno*

dhārmikān vidadhad ātmani sarvendriyāṇi sampratishṭhāpya ahiṁsan sarva-bhūtāni anyatra tīrthebhyaḥ sa khalv evaṁ varttayan yavad-āyu-sham Brahma-lokam abhisampadyate na cha punar āvarttate na cha punar āvarttate |

"This [doctrine] Brahmā declared to Prajāpati, Prajāpati declared it to Manu, and Manu to his descendants. Having received instruction in the Veda from the family of his religious teacher in the prescribed manner, and in the time which remains after performing his duty to his preceptor; and when he has ceased from this, continuing his Vedic studies at home, in his family, in a pure spot, communicating a knowledge of duty [to his pupils], withdrawing all his senses into himself, doing injury to no living creature, away from holy places,—thus passing all his days, a man attains to the world of Brahma, and does not return again, and does not return again [*i.e.* is not subjected to any future births]."

I quote the commencement of S'ankara's comment on this passage:

Tad ha etad ātma-jnānaṁ sopakaraṇam om ity etad aksharam ity-ādyaiḥ saha upāsanais tad-vāchakena granthena ashṭādhyāya-lakshaṇena saha Brahmā Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ Parameśvaro vā tad-dvāreṇa Prajāpataye Kaś-yapāya uvācha | *asāv api Manave sva-putrāya* | *Manuḥ prajābhyaḥ* | *ity evam śruty-artha-sampradāya-paramparayā āgatam upanishad-vijnānam adyāpi vidvatsv avagamyate* |

"This knowledge of soul, with its instruments, with the sacred monosyllable *Om* and other formulæ of devotion, and with the book distinguished as containing eight chapters, which sets forth all these topics, [viz. the Chhāndogya Upanishad itself] was declared by Brahmā Hiraṇyagarbha, or by Parameśvara (the supreme God), through his agency, to the Prajāpati Kaśyapa. The latter in his turn declared it to his son Manu, and Manu to his descendants. In this manner the sacred knowledge contained in the Upanishads, having been received through successive transmission of the sense of the Veda from generation to generation, is to this day understood among learned men."

In an earlier passage of the same Upanishad iii. 11, 3 f. (partly quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 195), we find a similar statement in reference to a particular branch of sacred knowledge (the *madhu-jnāna*):

3. *Na ha vai asmai udeti na nimlochati sakṛid divā ha eva asmai bha-*

vati yaḥ etām evam brahmopanishadaṁ veda | 4. *Tad ha etad Brahmā Prajāpataye uvācha Prajāpatir Manave Manuḥ prajābhyaḥ* | *tad etad Uddālakāya Āruṇaye jyeshṭhāya puttrāya pitā brahma uvācha* | 5. *Idaṁ vāva taj-jyeshṭhāya puttrāya pitā brahma prabrūyāt prāṇāyyāya vā antavāsine* (6) *na anyasmai kasmaichana* | *yadyapy asmai imām adbhiḥ parigṛihītāṁ dhanasya pūrṇāṁ dadyāt etad eva tato bhūyaḥ ity etad eva tato bhūyaḥ iti* |

"3. For him who thus knows this sacred mystery, the sun neither rises nor sets, but one day perpetually lasts. 4. This (*Madhu-jnāna*) was declared by Brahmā to Prajāpati, by Prajāpati to Manu, and by Manu to his descendants. This sacred knowledge was further declared to Uddālaka Āruṇi by his father. 5. Let a father expound it to his eldest son, or to a capable pupil, but to no one else. 6. If any one were to give him this entire earth, which is surrounded by water, full of wealth, this sacred knowledge would be more than that, yes, would be more than that."

Compare Manu, xi. 243, where that Code is said to have been created by Prajāpati (First Volume of this work, p. 394); and Bhagavad Gītā iv. 1, where the doctrine of that treatise is said to have been declared by Kṛishṇa to Vivasvat (the Sun), by Vivasvat to Manu, by him to Ikshvāku, and then handed down by tradition from one royal rishi to another (Vol. I. p. 508).

APPENDIX.

Page 4, line 5.

I have omitted here the verse from the Atharva-veda, xi. 7, 24 (quoted by Professor Goldstücker in his Panini, p. 70): *Richaḥ sāmāni chhandāṁsi purāṇaṁ yajushā saha | uchchhishṭāj jajnire sarve divi devāḥ diviśritāḥ* | "From the leavings of the sacrifice sprang the Rich- and Sāman-verses, the metres, the Purāṇa with the Yajush, and all the gods who dwell in the sky."

Professor Aufrecht has favoured me with the following amendments in my translations in pp. 7 and 8:

Page 7, line 13.

For "the text called *sāvitrī* [or *gāyatrī*]" he would substitute "the verse dedicated to Savitṛi."

Page 7, line 16.

For "the mouth of Brahma" he proposes "the beginning of the Veda." (Sir W. Jones translates "the mouth, or *principal part* of the *Veda*.")

Page 8, line 8.

For "from Vāch (speech) as their world" he proposes "out of the sphere (or compass) of speech."

Page 8, line 8

For "Vāch was his: she was created" he proposes "For in creating the Vedas, he had also created Vāch."

Page 8, line 13.

For "He gave it an impulse" he proposes "He touched it."

Page 8, *line* 16.

For "Moreover it was sacred knowledge, which was created from that Male in front" he proposes "For even from that Male (not only from the waters) Brahma was created first."

Page 9, *line* 16.

This passage of the Bṛihad Âraṇyaka Upanishad corresponds to S'atapatha Brahmaṇa x. 6, 5, 5.

Page 10, *line* 2.

"May the brilliant deity," etc., Professor Aufrecht would prefer to translate the second line of the verse, beginning *sudevaḥ* (p. 9, l. 6 from the foot), "Goodness (the good god) only knows where they put the earth which was thrown up (*nirvapaṇa*)."

Page 20, *line* 17.

See Âśvalâyanas Gṛihya Sūtras, pp. 155, and 157 ff.

Page 22, *line* 13, *note* 25.

I quote two verses from Manu, of which the second confirms the correctness of the rendering I have given of the words *ā ha eva sa nakhāgrebhyas tapyate,* and the first illustrates the text of the Taittirīya Âraṇyaka cited in the note: Manu ii. 166. *Vedam eva sadā 'bhyasyet tapas tapsyan dvijottamaḥ | vedābhyāso hi viprasya tapaḥ param ihochyate |* 167. *"Ā haiva sa nakhāgrebhyaḥ" paranaṁ "tapyate" tapaḥ | yaḥ sragvy api dvijo 'dhīte svādhyāyaṁ śaktito 'nvaham |* "Let a good Brāhman who desires to perform tapas constantly study the Veda; for such study is a Brāhman's highest tapas. 167. That twice-born man who daily studies the Veda to the utmost of his power, even though (luxuriously) wearing a garland of flowers (really) performs the highest tapas to the very extremities of his nails." This verse, it will be observed, quotes verbatim one of the phrases of the Brāhmaṇa, and gives definiteness to its sense by adding the words *paramaṁ tapaḥ*. Verses 165 ff. of the same book of Manu prescribe the abstemious mode of life which the student (*brahmachārin*) is to follow whilst living in his teacher's house. The Mahābhārata, Udyoga-parvan, 1537, thus states the conditions of successful study in general; *Sukhārthinaḥ kuto vidyā nāsti vidyārthinaḥ sukham |*

sukhārthī vā tyajed vidyāṁ vidyārthī vā tyajet sukham | "How can one who seeks ease acquire science? Ease does not belong to him who pursues science. Either let the seeker of ease abandon science, or the seeker of science abandon ease."

Page 30, *line* 17.

Compare the lines quoted by the Commentator on Śāṇḍilya's Bhakti-sūtra, 83, p. 60, from the Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, Moksha-dharma, verses 13,551 ff.: *Sahopanishado vedān ye viprāḥ samyag āsthitāḥ* | *paṭhanti vidhim āsthāya ye chāpi yati-dharmiṇaḥ* | *tato viśishṭāṁ jānāmi gatim ekāntināṁ nṛiṇām* | "I regard the destination of Ekāntins (persons devoted to the One as their end) as superior to that of Brāhmans who perfectly study the Vedas, including the Upanishads, according to rule, as well as to that of those who follow the practices of ascetics (*yatis*)."

Page 34, *line* 1.

Perhaps this was scarcely a suitable passage to be quoted as depreciatory of the Veda, as in such a stage of transcendental absorption as is here described all the ordinary standards of estimation have ceased to be recognized.

Page 43, *line* 10.

With the expression *hṛid-akāśa*, "the æther of the heart," compare the passage quoted from the Veda in Śankara's commentary on Brahma Sūtra iii. 2, 35 (p. 873): "*Yo 'yaṁ vahirdhā purushād ākāśo yo 'yam antaḥ-purushe ākāśo yo 'yam antar-hṛidaye ākāśaḥ* | "This æther which is external to a man, this æther which is within a man, and this æther which is within the heart." See also the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad ii. 5, 10 and iii. 7, 12.

Page 44, *line* 1.

See the Yoga aphorisms i. 2 ff. as cited and explained by Dr. Ballantyne.[1] The second aphorism defines *yoga* to be "a stoppage of the functions of the mind" (*Yogaś chitta-vṛitti-nirodhaḥ*). "The mind then abides in the state of the spectator, *i.e.* the Soul" (*tadā drashṭuḥ svarūpe'vasthānam*—Aph. 3). "At other times it takes the form of the

[1] Two fasciculi only, containing two Pādas and 106 Sūtras, were published at Allahabad in 1852 and 1853; but a continuation of Dr. B.'s work has been commenced in the "Pandit" for Sept. 1868.

functions" (*vritti-sārūpyam itaratra*—Aph. 4). These functions, or modifications (as Dr. Ballantyne translates) are fivefold, and either painful, or devoid of pain, viz. proof, or right notion (*pramāṇa*), mistake (*viparyyaya*), groundless imagination (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidrā*), recollection (*smriti*) — Aphorisms 5–11. See also Dr. Ballantyne's Sānkhya Aphorisms, iii. 31 ff.

Page 57, *note* 61.

With the subject of this note compare the remarks in p. 108, and the quotations from Dr. Roer and Professor Müller in pp. 173, 175, and 193.

Page 62, *note* 65.

Professor Cowell does not think that the text is corrupt. He would translate it, "the other *pramāṇas*, beside *śabda*, (scil. perception and inference), cannot be even supposed in a case like this" (which refers to such a transcendental object as the existence of an eternal Veda). Sāyaṇa, in his reply to the objector, recapitulates the applicable proofs as *śruti*, *smriti*, and *loka-prasiddhi*,—all three only different kinds of testimony, *śabda*.

Page 63, *lines* 11 f., *and note* 68.

Compare pp. 322 f., 329 f., 334 f., and 337 of my article "On the Interpretation of the Veda," in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1866.

Page 84, *note* 89, *and page* 180, *line* 7.

I have been favoured by Professor Cowell with the following note on *kālātyayāpadishṭa*:

"My Calcutta Pandit considered this fallacy to be the same as that more usually called *bādha* (cf. too Bhāshāparichchheda, śl. 70, 77, and the Bengali translation, p. 65). Its definition is *pakshe sādhyābhāvaḥ*. The Tarka-sangraha defines a *hetu* as *bādhita*, 'when the absence of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof,' as in the argument *vahnir anushṇo dravyatvāt*. The essence of this fallacy is that you deny the *major*, and therefore it does not matter whether you accept the middle term in itself or not. It is involved in the overthrow of the major term. I should translate it the 'precluded argument,' — it might have been plausible if it had not been put out of court by something which settles

the point,—it is advanced too late (the *pre* in '*pre*cluded' expresses the *kālātīta* of the old name). This corresponds to the account in the Nyāya-sūtra-vṛitti: *Kālasya sādhana-kālasyātyaye 'bhāve 'padishṭaḥ prayukto hetur | etena sādhyābhāvapramālakshaṇārtha iti sūchitam | sādhyābhāvanirṇaye sādhanāsambhavāt | Ayam eva bādhitasādhyaka iti gīyate.* The Vṛitti goes on to say that you need not prove *vyabhichāra* (*i.e.* that your opponent's *hetu* or middle term goes too far, as in *parvato dhumavān vahneḥ* where *vahni* is a *savyabhichāro hetuḥ*) in order to establish the *bādha.* I should therefore prefer to translate the passage from the Vedārtha-prakāśa, p. 84, 'your alleged middle-term *vākyatva,* the possessing the properties of a common sentence, is liable to two objections,—(1) it is opposed by the fact that no author was ever perceived, and (2) it also is precluded by weighty evidence (which proves that your proposed major term is irrelevant).' Sāyaṇa then adds his reasons for each objection,—for the *first,* in the words from *yathā Vyāsa* down to *upalabdhaḥ*; for the *second,* in the fact that *smṛiti* and *śruti* agree in the eternity of the Veda (the *pūrvam* I suppose refers to p. 3 of the Calcutta printed text), and that even if the Supreme Spirit be the author he is not *purushaḥ* in the sense in which the objector uses the term. Either way, the major term of the objector's syllogism *paurusheya* is precluded, *bādhita;* or, in the technical language of the Nyāya, Sāyaṇa establishes an absence from the minor term (*paksha*) of the alleged major term (*sādhya*); and hence no conclusion can be drawn from the proposed syllogism. I may add that I have also looked into Vātsyāyana, but his explanation seems to me an instance of what my Pandit used so often to impress on me, that the modern logic (which such a late mediæval writer as Sāyaṇa follows) is not always that of the Nyāyabhāshya. He makes the error lie in the example, *i.e.* in the induction; and it is therefore, as Professor Goldstücker says, a 'vicious generalization.'"

Page 88, *note* 95.

Professor Cowell disagrees with the explanation I have hazarded of the object of the sentence in the text to which this note refers. He thinks that its purport, as shewn by the word *vyabhichārāt,* is to intimate that the former of the two alternative suppositions would prove too much, as it would also apply to such detached stanzas as the one

referred to, of which the author, although unknown to some persons, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his contemporaries no doubt knew who wrote it, and his descendants, as well as others, might perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the origin, but which nevertheless was not superhuman (*apaurusheya*). This is no doubt the correct explanation.

Page 99, *line* 1.

The argument in proof of the incompetence of the S'ūdras for the acquisition of the highest divine knowledge is contained in Brahma Sūtras i. 3, 34–38. As the subject may possess an interest for any educated persons of this class into whose hands this book may fall in India, I extract the entire discussion of the question:

34. "*S'ug asya tad-anādara-śravaṇāt tad-ādravaṇāt sūchyate hi*" | *yathā manushyādhikāra-niyamam apodya devādīnām api vidyāsv adhikāraḥ uktas tathaiva dvijāty-adhikāra-niyamāpavādena śūdrasya apy adhikāraḥ syād ity etām āśankām nivarttayitum idam adhikaraṇam ārabhyate* | *tattra śūdrasya apy adhikāraḥ syād iti tāvat prāptam arthitvasāmarthyayoḥ sambhavāt* | *tasmāch* "*chhūdro yajne 'navakḷriptaḥ*" *itivach chhūdro vidyāyām anavakḷriptaḥ iti nishedhāśravaṇāt* | *yach cha karmasv anadhikāra-kāraṇaṁ śūdrasya anagnitvaṁ na tad vidyāsv adhikārasya apavādakam* | *na hy āhavanīyādi-rahitena vidyā vedituṁ na śakyate* | *bhavati cha lingaṁ śūdrādhikārasya upodbalakam* | *saṁvarga-vidyāyāṁ hi Jānaśrutim Pautrāyaṇaṁ śuśrūshuṁ śūdra-śabdena parāmṛiśati* "*aha hāre tvā śūdra tava eva saha gobhir astv*" *iti* | *Vidura-prabhritayaś cha śūdra-yoni-prabhavāḥ api viśishṭa-vijnāna-sampannāḥ smaryyante* | *tasmād adhikṛiyate śūdro vidyāsu* | *ity evam prāpte brūmaḥ* | *na śūdrasya adhikāro vedādhyayanābhāvāt* | *adhīta-vedo hi vidita-vedārtho vedārtheshv adhikriyate* | *na cha śūdrasya vedādhyayanam asty upanayana-pūrvakatvād vedādhyayanasya upanayanasya cha varṇa-traya-vishayatvāt* | *yat tv arthitvaṁ na tad asati sāmarthye 'dhikāra-kāraṇam bhavati* | *sāmarthyam api na laukikaṁ kevalam adhikāra-kāraṇam bhavati śāstrīye 'rthe śāstrīyasya sāmarthyasya apekshitatvāt śāstrīyasya cha sāmarthyasya adhyayana-nirākaraṇena nirākṛitatvāt* | *yach cha idaṁ śūdro yajne 'navakḷriptaḥ iti tad nyāya-pūrvakatvād vidyāyām apy anavakḷriptatvaṁ dyotayati nyāyasya sādhāraṇatvāt* | *yat punaḥ saṁvarga-vidyāyāṁ śūdra-*

śabda-śravaṉaṁ lingam manyase na tal lingaṁ nyāyābhāvāt | nyāyokter hi linga-darśanaṁ dyotakam bhavati na cha attra nyāyo 'sti | kāmaṁ cha ayaṁ śūdra-śabdaḥ saṁvarga-vidyāyām eva ekasyāṁ śūdram adhikuryyāt tad-vishayatvād na sarvāsu vidyāsu | arthavāda-sthatvāt na tu kvachid apy ayaṁ śūdram adhikarttum utsahate | śakyate cha ayaṁ śudra-śabdo 'dhikṛita-vishaye yojayitum | katham iti | uchyate | " 'kam u are enam etat santaṁ sayugvānam iva Rainkam āttha' (Chāndogya Upanishad, iv. 1, 3.) *ity asmād haṁsa-vākyād ātmano 'nādaraṁ śrutavato Jānaśruteḥ Pautrāyaṉasya śug utpede tām ṛishī Rainkaḥ śūdra-śabdena anena sūchayāmbabhūva ātmanaḥ paroksha-jnānasya khyāpanāya iti gamyate jāti-śūdrasya anadhikārāt | katham punaḥ śūdra-śabdena śug utpannā sūchyate iti | uchyate | tad-ādravaṉāt śucham abhidudrāva śuchā vā 'bhidudruve śuchā vā Rainkam abhidudrāva iti śūdrāvayavārtha-sambhavād rūḍhārthasya cha asambhavāt | dṛiśyate cha ayam artho 'syām ākhyāyikāyām |*

35. "*Kshattriyatva-gateś cha uttarattra Chaitrarathena lingāt*" | *Itaś cha na jāti-śūdro Jānaśrutir yat-kāraṉam prakaraṉa-nirūpaneṉa kshattriyatvam asya uttarattra Chaitrarathena Abhipratāriṉā kshattriyeṉa samabhivyāhārāl lingād gamyate | uttarattra hi saṁvarga-vidyā-vākyaśeshe Chaitrarathir Abhipratārī kshattriyaḥ sankīrttyate | "atha ha S'aunakaṁ cha Kāpeyam Abhipratāriṉaṁ cha Kākshaseniṁ sūdena pariviśyamānau brahmachārī bibhikshe"* (Chh. Up. iv. 3, 5) *iti | Chaitrarathitvaṁ cha Abhipratāriṉaḥ Kāpeya-yogād avagantavyam | Kāpeyayogo hi Chaitrarathasya avagataḥ | "etena vai Chaitrarathaṁ Kāpeyāḥ ayājayann" iti samānānvaya-yājināṁ cha prāyeṉa samānānvayāḥ yājakāḥ bhavanti | tasmāch "Chaitrarathir nāma ekaḥ kshattra-patir ajāyata" iti cha kshattra-jātitvāvagamāt kshattriyatvam asya avagantavyam | tena kshattriyeṉa Abhipratāriṉā saha samānāyaṁ vidyāyāṁ sankīrttanaṁ Jānaśruter api kshattriyatvaṁ sūchayati | samānānāṁ eva hi prāyeṉa samabhivyāhārāḥ bhavanti | kshattṛi-preshaṉādy-aiśvaryya-yogāch cha Jānaśruteḥ kshattriyatvāvagatiḥ | ato na śūdrasya adhikāraḥ |*

36. "*Saṁskāra-parāmarśāt tad-abhāvābhilāpāch cha*" | *itaś cha na śūdrasyā adhikāro yad vidyā-pradeśeshu upanayanādayaḥ saṁskārāḥ parāmṛiśyante "taṁ ha upaninye" | " 'adhīhi bhagavaḥ' iti ha upasasāda" | "brahma-parāḥ brahma-nishṭhāḥ param Brahma anveshamāṉāḥ 'esha ha vai tat sarvaṁ vakshyati' iti te ha samit-pāṉayo bhagavantam Pippalādam upasannāḥ" iti cha "tān ha anupanīya eva" ity api pradarśitā eva upanayana-prāptir bhavati | śūdrasya cha saṁskārābhāvo*

'bhilapyate "śūdraś chaturtho varnaḥ ekajātir" ity ekajātitva-smaraṇena "na śūdre pātakaṁ kinchid na cha saṁskāram arhati" ity-ādibhiś cha |

37. "*Tad-abhāva-nirdhāraṇe cha pravṛitteḥ*" | *Itaś cha na śūdrasya adhikāro yat satya-vachanena śūdratvābhāve nirdhārite Jābālaṁ Gautamaḥ upanetum anuśāsituṁ cha pravavṛite "na etad abrāhmaṇo vivaktum arhati | samidham somya āhara upa tvā neshye na satyād agāḥ"* (Chh. Up. iv. 4, 5) *iti śruti-lingāt* |

38. "*S'ravaṇādhyayanārtha-pratishedhāt smṛiteś cha*" | *Itaś cha na śūdrasya adhikāro yad asya smṛiteḥ śravaṇādhyayanārtha-pratishedho bhavati | veda-śravaṇa-pratishedho vedādhayana-pratishedhas tad-artha-jnānānushṭhānayoś cha pratishedhaḥ śūdrasya smaryyate | śravaṇa-pratishedhas tāvad atha asya "vedam upaśṛiṇvatas trapu-jatubhyāṁ śrotra-pratipūraṇam" iti "padyu ha vai etat śmaśānaṁ yat śūdras tasmāt śūdrasamīpe na adhyetavyam" iti cha | ataḥ eva adhyayana-pratishedhaḥ | yasya hi samīpe 'pi na adhyetavyam bhavati sa kathaṁ śrutim adhīyīyata | bhavati cha uchchāraṇe jihvā-chhedo dhāraṇe śarīra-bhedaḥ iti | ataḥ eva cha arthād artha-jnānānushṭhānayoḥ pratishedho bhavati | "na śūdrāya matiṁ dadyād" iti "dvijātīnām adhyayanaṁ ijyā dānam" iti cha | yeshām punaḥ pūrva-kṛita-saṁskāra-vaśād Vidura-dharma-vyādha-prabhṛitīnām jnānotpattis teshāṁ na śakyate phala-prāptiḥ pratibaddhuṁ jnānasya ekāntika-phalatvāt | "śrāvayech chaturo varṇān" iti cha itihāsa-purāṇādhigame chāturvarṇyādhikāra-smaraṇāt | veda-pūrvakas tu nāsty adhikāraḥ śūdrāṇām iti sthitam* |

34. "In the word 'S'ūdra' reference is made to his vexation on hearing that disrespectful expression, and to his running up."

"This section is commenced to silence the doubt whether in the same way as it had been denied (above) that the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge is restricted to men, and affirmed that it extends to the gods, etc., also, the limitation of the same prerogative to twice-born men may not also be questioned, and its extension to S'ūdras maintained. The grounds alleged in favour of the S'ūdra having this prerogative are that he may reasonably be supposed to have both (*a*) the desire and (*b*) the power of acquiring knowledge, and that accordingly (*c*) the Veda contains no text affirming his incapacity for knowledge, as it confessedly has texts directing his exclusion from sacrifice: and further (*d*) that the fact of the S'ūdra's not keeping up any sacred fire, which is the cause of his incapacity for sacrifice, affords no reason

for denying to him the prerogative of gaining knowledge; since it cannot be maintained that it is impossible for a man who is destitute of the âhavanīya and other fires to acquire knowledge. There is also (*e*) in a Vedic text a sign which confirms the S'ūdra's prerogative. For in the passage which treats of the knowledge of the Saṁvarga (Chhāndogya Upanishad, chapter iv. section 1–3) a speaker designates Jānaśruti, descendant of Janaśruta in the third generation, who was desirous of performing service, by the term S'ūdra: 'Keep to thyself, o S'ūdra, thy necklace and chariot[2] with thy cattle.' (Chh. Up. iv. 2, 2.) And further (*f*) Vidura and others are spoken of in the Smṛiti as possessed of distinguished knowledge, although they were of S'ūdra descent. Consequently the S'ūdra enjoys the prerogative of acquiring various sorts of divine knowlege. To this we reply: The S'ūdra has no such prerogative, because he cannot study the Veda. For it is the man that studies the Veda, and obtains a knowledge of its contents, who enjoys the prerogative of [access to] those contents. But a S'ūdra does not study the Veda, for such study must be preceded by initiation, which again is confined to the three upper castes. As regards (*a*) the desire of knowledge,—that, in the absence of power, confers no prerogative. And (*b*) mere secular power does not suffice for the purpose; since scriptural power is necessary in a matter connected with Scripture; and such scriptural power is debarred by the debarring of study. And (*c*) the passage which declares that a 'S'ūdra is incapacitated for sacrifice,' demonstrates his incapacity for knowledge also; since that follows

[2] Such is the sense given to *hāretvā* by the Commentators, who make it out to be a compound of the words *hāra*, "necklace," and *itvā*, "a chariot;" but although *itvā* might be the nominative of *itvan*, "going," no such word appears in the lexicons with the sense of "chariot." Besides, the compound seems a very awkward one. Perhaps the word should be separated into *ha are tvā;* but then there would be no nominative to *astu*, and it would be difficult to construe *tvā*, "thee."—Since the above was written, I have been favoured with a note on the passage by Professor Goldstücker. He conjectures that the words should be divided as follows: *ahaha are tvā S'ūdra tava eva saha gobhir astu*; that *tvā* may be the nominative singular feminine of the Vedic pronoun *tva*, meaning "some one," and then the sense might be as follows: "O, friend, some woman belongs to thee, S'ūdra! Let her be (*i.e.* come) along with the cows." And Jānaśruti would appear to have understood the word *tvā* in this sense here supposed, for we find that on hearing the reply of Raikva, he took his *daughter* to the latter, along with four hundred additional cows and the other gifts; and that on seeing the damsel, Raikva expressed his satisfaction and acceded to the request of her father.—The author of these puzzling words, it seems, intended a pun; and S'ankara perhaps gave only one solution of it.

from the rule, which is of general application. As regards the circumstance that in the Vedic text regarding the knowledge of the Saṁvarga, the word S'ūdra occurs, which you regard as a sign in favour of your view; it is (*d*) no sign; because in that passage no rule is laid down. For the discovery of a sign indicates that a rule has been laid down; but in the passage in question there is no such rule. And although it were conceded that [if it were found in a precept regarding the Saṁvarga] the word S'ūdra would confer on a man of that caste a prerogative in regard to that particular knowledge alone, (from its being intended for him), although not to all sorts of knowledge, yet as the word occurs [not in precept, but] in an illustrative narrative (*arthavāda*) it cannot confer on him a prerogative in regard to any knowledge whatever. And in fact this word S'ūdra can be applied to a person [of a higher caste] who possessed the prerogative. How? I explain: Vexation (*śuk*) arose in the mind of Jānaśruti when he heard himself disrespectfully spoken of in these words of the swan: 'Who is this that thou speakest of as if he were Rainka yoked to the chariot?'[3] (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 3). And since a S'ūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring knowledge, we conclude that it is to this vexation (*śuk*) that the rishi Rainka referred, for the purpose of shewing his own knowledge of things imperceptible by sense, when he made use of this word S'ūdra (Chh. Up. iv. 2, 2, see above). But again, how is it indicated by the word S'ūdra that vexation (*śuk*) arose in his mind? We reply: by 'the running to it [or him]" (*tad-ādravaṇāt*); *i.e.* either 'he ran to vexation,' or 'he was assailed by vexation,' or 'in his vexation he resorted to Rainka.' We conclude thus because the sense afforded by the component parts of the word S'ūdra is the probable one,[4] whilst the conventional sense of the word S'ūdra is here inapplicable. And this is seen to be the meaning in this story.

[3] This appears to allude to the person referred to being found sitting under a chariot (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 8). See p. 67 of Babu Rājendralāl Mittra's translation. This story is alluded to by Professor Weber in his Ind. Stud. ix. 45, note, where he treats Sayugvan as a proper name, and remarks "The Vedānta Sūtras (i. 3, 34, 35), indeed, try to explain away this" (the circumstance of Jānaśruti being called a S'ūdra) and of course S'ankara in his commentary on them does the same, as well in his explanation of the Chhāndogya Upanishad." I am not, however, by any means certain that the epithet "S'ūdra," applied to Jānaśruti by Rainka, is not merely meant as a term of abuse.

[4] The meaning of this is that the word S'ūdra is derived from *śuch*, "vexation,"

Sūtra 35. "And that Jānaśruti was a Kshattriya is afterwards indicated by what is said of Abhipratārin of the race of Chaitraratha."

"That Jānaśruti was not a S'ūdra appears also from this, that by examining the context he is afterwards found to be a Kshattriya by the sign that he is mentioned along with Abhipratārin of the family of Chaitraratha. For in the sequel of the passage regarding the knowledge of the Saṁvarga mention is made in these words of Abhipratārin Chaitrarathi, a Kshattriya: 'Now a Brahmachārin asked alms of S'aunaka of the race of Kapi, and Abhipratārin the son of Kakshasena who were being served at a meal' (Chh. Up. iv. 3, 5). And that Abhipratārin belonged to the family of Chaitraratha is to be gathered from his connection with the Kāpeyas; for the connection of Chaitraratha with the latter has been ascertained by the text: 'The Kāpeyas performed sacrifice for Chaitraratha." Priests of the same family in general officiate for worshippers belonging to the same family. From this, as well as from the text: 'From him a lord of Kshat-

and *dru*, "to run." (See the First Volume of this work, p. 97, note 192.) Even the great S'ankara, it seems, was unable to perceive the absurdity of such etymologies. In his commentary on the Chhāndogya Upanishad the same writer tells us that various explanations had been given of the employment of the word S'ūdra in this passage: *Nanu rājā 'sau kshattṛi-sambandhāt* | "*Sa ha kshattāram uvācha*" (iv. 1, 5) *ity uktam* | *vidyā-grahaṇāya cha brāhmaṇa-samīpopagamāt* | *śūdrasya cha anadhikārāt* | *katham idam ananurūpaṁ Raikveṇa uchyate* "*śūdra*" *iti* | *tattra āhur āchāryyāḥ* | *haṁsa-vachana-śravaṇāt śug enam āviveśa* | *tena asau śuchā śrutvā Raikvasya mahimānaṁ vā dravati iti* | *ṛishir ātmanaḥ parokshajnatāṁ darśayan* "*śūdra*" *ity āha* | *śūdra-vad bādhanena eva enam vidyā-grahaṇāya upajagāma na śuśrūshayā* | *na tu jātyā eva śūdraḥ iti* | *apare punar āhur alpaṁ dhanam āhṛitam iti rushā eva enam uktavān* "*śūdra*" *iti* | "But is not Jānaśruti shewn to have been a king, (*a*) from his name being connected with a charioteer in the passage 'He said to his charioteer,' (*b*) from his resorting to a Brāhman to obtain knowledge, and (*c*) from a S'ūdra possessing no such prerogative? How then did Raikva address to him an appellation inconsistent with this in the words 'o S'ūdra?' Learned teachers reply: 'Vexation (*śuk*) took possession of him on hearing the words of the swan: in consequence of which, or of hearing (*śrutvā*) of the greatness of Raikva, he ran up [S'ūdra is here derived either from *śuchā* + *dravati*, or from *śrutvā* + *dravati*]; and the rishi, to shew his knowledge of things beyond the reach of the senses, called him S'ūdra. He had approached to obtain knowledge from the rishi by annoying him like a S'ūdra, and not by rendering him service; while yet he was not by birth a S'ūdra. Others again say that the rishi angrily called him a S'ūdra because he had brought him so little property." This passage is also translated by Bābu Rājendralāl (Chh. Up. p. 68, note), who renders *bādhanena* (which I have taken to mean "annoying") by "paying" for instruction; but I cannot find any authority for this sense of the word.

triyas named Chaitrarathi was descended,' which proves that his family were Kshattriyas, we may gather that Abhipratārin belonged to this class. And the circumstance that Jānaśruti is mentioned in connection with the same branch of knowledge as Abhipratārin, the Kshattriya, shews that the former also was a Kshattriya. For it is in general men of the same class who are mentioned together. And from the fact of Jānaśruti sending a charioteer (Chh. Up. iv. 1, 5–7), and his other acts of sovereignty also, we learn that he was a Kshattriya. Hence (we conclude that) a S'ūdra does not possess the prerogative of divine knowledge.

Sūtra 36. "From reference being made to initiation, and from a S'ūdra being declared to be excluded from it."

"And that a S'ūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge, may be further inferred from the fact that investiture with the sacred cord and other rites are referred to in passages where science is the subject in question. For the fact that the seekers after such knowledge obtained initiation, is shewn by such passages as the following: 'He invested him;' 'He came to him, saying, teach me, Sir' (Chh. Up. vii. 1, 1?); 'Devoted to Brahma, resting in Brahma, seeking after the highest Brahma, they approached the venerable Pippalāda with firewood in their hands, (saying) 'he will declare all this' (Praśna Up. i. 1); and 'having invested them,' etc. And that a S'ūdra receives no initiation is shewn by the text of the Smṛiti which pronounces him to be but once-born, viz. 'the S'ūdra is the fourth class, and once-born;' and by such other passages as this: 'There is no sin in a S'ūdra, and he is not entitled to initiation.'"[5]

Sūtra 37. "And because he acted after ascertaining that it was not a S'ūdra [who had come to him]."

"That a S'ūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring knowledge appears also from this that [according to the Chhāndogya Upanishad] Gautama proceeded to invest and instruct Jābāla after ascertaining by his truth-speaking that he was not a S'ūdra: 'None but a Brāhman could distinctly declare this: bring, o fair youth, a piece of fuel; I will invest thee; thou hast not departed from the truth' (Chh. Up. iv. 4, 5).[6]

[5] This last verse has been already quoted in Vol. I. p. 138, note 244.

[6] I shall quote in full the earlier part of the passage from which these words are

Sūtra 38. "And because, according to the Smṛiti, a S'ūdra is forbidden to hear, or read, or learn the sense."

"And that a S'ūdra does not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge, appears from this that, according to the Smṛiti, he is forbidden to hear it, or read it, or learn its sense: *i.e.* it is declared in the Smṛiti that he is forbidden either to hear the Veda, or read the Veda, or to learn it contents, or to practise its injunctions. Hearing is forbidden to him in these texts: 'If he listens to the reading of the Veda, his ears are to be filled with [melted] lead and lac;' and 'The S'ūdra is a walking cemetery; therefore no one must read in his vicinity.' And consequently the reading of it is prohibited to him: for

taken, both for the sake of explaining the allusion, and for the illustration which it affords of ancient Indian manners: Chh. Up. iv. 4, 1. *Satyakāmo ha Jābālo Jabālām mātaram āmantrayānchakre "brahmacharyyam bhavati vivatsyāmi kiṁ-gotro nv aham asmi" iti* | 2. *Sā ha enam uvācha "na aham etad veda tāta yad-gotras tvam asi | bahv ahaṁ charantī parichāriṇī yauvane tvām alabhe | sā 'ham etad na veda yad-gottras tvam asi | Jabālā tu nāma aham asmi Satyakāmo nāma tvam asi | sa Satyakāmaḥ eva Jābālo 'bravīthāḥ" iti* | "Satyakāma, the son of Jabālā, addressed his mother Jabālā, saying, 'I wish, mother, to enter on the life of a religious student. To what family (*gottra*: see Müller's Anc. Sansk. Lit. pp. 378 ff.) do I belong?' 2. She answered, 'I do not know, my son, to what family thou belongest. Much consorting [with lovers] and roving (or serving), in my youth, I got thee. I know not of what family thou art. But my name is Jabālā, and thine Satyakāma. Say, 'I am Satyakāma son of Jabālā.'" He accordingly goes to Hāridrumata of the race of Gotama, and asks to be received as a student. The teacher enquires to what family he belongs, and the youth repeats verbatim the answer he had received from his mother, and says he is Satyakāma the son of Jabālā. The teacher replies in the words quoted by S'ankara "No one other than a Brāhman could distinctly declare this," etc. The interpretation of paragraph 2, above given, seems to convey its correct sense. Jabālā apparently means to confess that her son was *nullius filius*: and that he must be content to call himself her son, as she did not know who his father was. The explanation of the words *bahv ahaṁ charantī parichāriṇī yauvane tvām alabhe* given by the Commentators and followed by Bābu Rājendralāl Mittra, that she was so much occupied with attending to guests in her husband's house, and so modest that she never thought of enquiring about her son's *gottra*, and that her husband died early, is founded mainly on the word *parichāriṇī*, and would not account for Jabālā's ignorance of her husband's name (which she does not mention) or even of her husband's lineage. In regard to the sense of *charantī* see the passage from the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, ii. 5, 2, 20, quoted in the First Volume of this work, p. 136, note 242. S'ankara was either ignorant of the laxity of ancient morals, or wished to throw a veil over the spurious origin of a sage like Satyakāma who had attained divine knowledge and become a teacher of it (see Chh. Up. iv. 10, 1). In his preface, however, p. 30, as I observe, Bābu Rājendralāl speaks of Satyakāma as a natural son in these words: "Although a natural born son whose father was unknown, and recognized by the contemptuous soubriquet of Jābāla from the designation of his mother Jabālā," etc.

how can he, in whose neighbourhood even the Veda is forbidden to be read, read it himself? And if he utters it, his tongue is to be cut; and if he retains it in his memory, his body is to be slit. And it results from the meaning of the terms that he is prohibited from learning its contents, or practising its injunctions, according to the texts, 'Let no one impart intelligence to a S'ūdra;' and 'reading, sacrifice, and liberality are the duties of twice-born men.' As regards (*f*) Vidura, Dharma, Vyādha, and others in whom knowledge was produced in consequence of their recollection of acts performed in a former birth, their enjoyment of its results cannot be prevented, from the transcendent character of the effects of knowledge; and because in the text 'Let the four castes be made to hear them,' the Smṛiti declares that the four castes possess the prerogative of learning the Itihāsas and Purāṇas [by means of which S'ūdras may attain perfection]. But it has been established that S'ūdras do not possess the prerogative of acquiring divine knowledge derived [directly] from [the study of] the Veda."

The Bhagavad Gītā affirms a different doctrine in the following verses, x. 32 f., where Kṛishṇa says:

Māṁ hi Pārtha vyapāśritya ye'pi syuḥ pāpa-yonayaḥ | *striyo vaiśyās tathā śūdras te'pi yānti parāṁ gatim* | 33. *Kim punar brāhmaṇāḥ puṇyāḥ bhaktāḥ rājarshayas tathā* |

"Those who have faith in me, even though they be of base origin, women, Vaiśyas, and S'ūdras, attain to the most transcendent state. How much more pure Brāhmans and devout royal rishis."

S'ankara could scarcely have been ignorant that his principle was not in harmony with this text; but he has thought proper to ignore this discrepance of views, as he probably shrank from directly contradicting a work held in such high estimation.

See also the account of the views entertained on the same subject by S'āṇḍilya which I have stated above, p. 178.

Page 105, *line* 24.

The following quotation continues the discussion of this subject; and will also serve to illustrate pp. 6 and 16, above, as well as p. 60 of the First Volume:

Brahma Sūtra i. 3, 30. "*Samāna-nāma-rūpatvāch cha āvṛittāv apy*

avirodho darśanat smṛiteś cha" | *athāpi syāt* | *yadi paśv-ādi-vad deva-vyaktayo 'pi santatyā eva utpadyeran nirudhyeraṁś cha tato 'bhidhānā-bhidheyābhidhātṛi-vyavahārāvichhedāt sambandha-nityatvena virodhaḥ śabde parihriyeta* | *yadā tu khalu sakalaṁ trailokyam parityakta-nāma-rūpaṁ nirlepam pralīyate prabhavati cha abhinavam iti śruti-smṛiti-vādāḥ vadanti tadā katham avirodhaḥ iti* | *tattra idam abhidhīyate* "*samāna-nāma-rūpatvād*" *iti* | *tadā 'pi saṁsārasya anāditvaṁ tāvad abhyupagan-tavyam* | *pratipādayishyati cha āchāryyaḥ saṁsārasya anāditvam* "*upa-padyate cha apy upalabhyate cha*" *iti* (Brahma Sūtra ii. 1, 36) | *anādau cha saṁsāre yathā svāpa-prabodhayoḥ pralaya-prabhava-śravaṇe 'pi pūrva-prabodha-vad uttara-prabodhe 'pi vyavahārād na kaśchid virodhaḥ* | *evaṁ kalpāntara-prabhava-pralayayor api iti drashṭavyam* | *svāpa-prabodhayoś cha pralaya-prabhavau śrūyete* | "*yadā suptaḥ svapnaṁ na kanchana paśyaty atha asmin prāṇaḥ eva ekadhā bhavati tadā enaṁ vāk sarvair nāmabhiḥ saha apyeti chakshuḥ sarvaiḥ rūpaiḥ saha apyeti śrotraṁ sar-vaiḥ śabdaiḥ saha apyeti manaḥ sarvair dhyānaiḥ saha apyeti* | *sa yadā pratibudhyate yathā 'gner jvalataḥ sarvāḥ diśo visphulingāḥ vipratish-ṭherann evam eva etasmād ātmanaḥ sarve prāṇāḥ yathāyatanaṁ vipratish-ṭhante prāṇebhyo devāḥ devebhyo lokāḥ* (Kaush. Br. Utt. A. 3, 3) *iti* | *syād etat* | *svāpe purushāntara-vyavahārāvichhedāt svayaṁ cha sushupta-pra-buddhasya pūrva-prabodha-vyavahārānusandhāna-sambhavād aviruddham* | *mahāpralaye tu sarva-vyavahārochhedāj janmāntara-vyavahāra-vach cha kalpāntara-vyavahārasya anusandhātum aśakyatvād vaishamyam iti* | *na esha doshaḥ* | *saty api sarva-vyavahārochhedini mahāpralaye Parameśva-rānugrahād īśvarāṇāṁ Hiraṇyagarbhādīnāṁ kalpāntara-vyavahārānu-sandhānopapatteḥ* | *yadyapi prākṛitāḥ prāṇino na janmāntara-vyava-hāram anusandhānāḥ driśyante iti na tat prākṛita-vad īśvarāṇām bhavi-tavyam* | *yathā hi prāṇitvāviśeshe 'pi manushyādi-stamba-paryyanteshu jnānaiśvaryyādi-pratibandhaḥ pareṇa pareṇa bhūyān bhavan dṛiśyate tathā manushyādishv eva Hiraṇyagarbha-paryanteshu jnānaiśvaryyādy-abhivyaktir api pareṇa pareṇa bhūyasī bhavati ity etat śruti-smṛiti-vādeshv asakṛid eva anukalpādau prādurbhavatām pāramaiśvaryyam śrū-yamāṇaṁ na śakyaṁ nāsti iti vaditum* | *tataś cha atīta-kalpānushṭhita-prakṛishṭa-jnāna-karmaṇām īśvarāṇāṁ Hiraṇyagarbhādīnāṁ varttamāna-kalpādau prādurbhavatām Parameśvarānugṛihītānāṁ supta-pratibuddha-vat kalpāntara-vyavahārānusandhānopapattiḥ* | *tathā cha śrutir* "*yo Brahmāṇaṁ vidadhāti pūrvaṁ yo vai vedāṁś cha prahiṇoti tasmai* | *taṁ*

ha devam ātma-buddhi-prakāśam mumukshur vai śaraṇam aham prapadye" (S'vetāśvatara Upanishad, vi. 18) *iti* | *smaranti cha S'aunakādayo Madhuchhandaḥ-prabhṛitibhir dāśatathyo dṛishṭāḥ iti* | *prativedaṁ cha evam eva kāṇḍarshy-ādayaḥ smaryyante* | *śrutir apy ṛishi-jnāna-pūrvakam eva mantreṇa anushṭhānaṁ darśayati* "*yo ha vai aviditārsheya-chhando-daivata-brāhmaṇena mantreṇa yājayati vā adhyāpayati vā sthāṇuṁ cha ṛichhati garttaṁ vā prapadyate*" *ity upakramya* "*tasmād etāni mantre vidyād*" *iti* | *prāṇināṁ cha sukha-prāptaye dharmo vidhīyate duḥkha-parihārāya adharmaḥ pratishidhyate* | *dṛishṭānuśravika-duḥkha-sukha-vishayau cha rāga-dveshau bhavato na vilakshaṇa-vishayāv ity ato dharmādharma-phala-bhūtottarottarā sṛishṭir nishpadyamānā pūrva-sṛishṭi-sadṛiśy eva nishpadyate* | *smṛitiś cha bhavati* "*teshāṁ ye yāni karmāṇi prāk-sṛishṭyām pratipedire* | *tāny eva te prapadyante sṛijyamānāḥ punaḥ punaḥ* | *hiṁsrāhiṁsre mṛidu-krūre dharmādharmāv ṛitānṛite* | *tad-bhāvitāḥ prapadyante tasmāt tat tasya rochate*" | *iti* | *pralīyamānam api cha idaṁ jagat śakty-avaśesham eva pralīyate śakti-mūlam eva cha prabhavati itarathā ākasmikatva-prasangāt* | *na cha anekākārāḥ śaktayaḥ śakyāḥ kalpayitum* | *tataś cha vichhidya vichhidya apy udbhavatām bhūr-ādi-loka-pravāhāṇāṁ deva-tiryaṅ-manushya-lakshaṇānāṁ cha prāṇi-nikāya-pravāhāṇāṁ varṇāśrama-dharma-phala-vyavasthānāṁ cha anādau saṁsāre niyatatvam indraya-vishaya-sambandha-niyatatva-vat pratyetavyam* | *na hi indriya-vishaya-sambandhāder vyavahārasya prati sargam anyathātvaṁ shashṭhendriya-vishaya-kalpaṁ śakyam utprekshitum* | *ataś cha sarva-kalpānāṁ tulya-vyavahāratvāt kalpāntara-vyavahārānusandhāna-kshamatvāch cha īśvarāṇāṁ samāna-nāma-rupāḥ eva pratisargaṁ viśeshāḥ prādurbhavanti samāna-nāma-rūpatvāch cha āvṛittāv api mahāsarga-mahāpralaya-lakshaṇāyāṁ jagato 'bhyupagamyamānāyāṁ na kaśchich chhabda-prāmāṇyādi-virodhaḥ* | *samāna-nāma-rūpatāṁ cha-śruti-smṛitī darśayataḥ* "*sūryā-chandramasau dhātā yathā-pūrvam akalpayat* | *divaṁ cha pṛithivīṁ chāntarīksham atho svaḥ*" | *iti* | *yathā pūrvasmin kalpe sūryā-chandramaḥ-prabhṛiti jagat kḷiptaṁ tathā 'sminn api kalpe Parameśvaro 'kalpayad ity arthaḥ* | *tathā* "*Agnir vai akāmayata* '*annādo devānāṁ syām*' *iti sa evam agnaye kṛittikābhyaḥ puroḍāśam ashṭakapālaṁ niravapad*" *iti nakshattreshṭi-vidhau yo 'gnir niravapad yasmai vā 'gnaye niravapat tayoḥ samāna-nāma-rūpatāṁ darśayati ity-evaṁ-jātīyakā śrutir udāharttavyā* | *smṛitir api* "*ṛishīṇāṁ nāmadheyāni yāś cha vedeshu dṛishṭayaḥ* | *śarvaryy-ante prasūtānāṁ tāny evaibhyo dadāty*

ajaḥ | yathartāv ṛitu-lingāni nānā-rūpāṇi paryyaye | driśyante tāni tāny eva tathā bhāvāḥ yugādishu | yathā 'bhimānino 'tītās tulyās te sāmpratair iha | devāḥ devair atītair hi rūpair nāmabhir eva cha" ity evaṁ-jatīyakā drashṭavyā |

"Brahma Sūtra, i. 3, 30. 'And though there be a recurrence of creation, yet as (the new creation) has the same name and form[7] (as the old) there will be no contradiction in regard to the words of the Veda; since this is proved both by the intuition of rishis and by the Smṛiti.' And further, let it be so that if a series of individual gods, as of animals, etc., is born and disappears in unbroken continuity, the alleged contradiction in regard to the words of the Veda (viz. that as they are connected with objects which are not eternal, they cannot themselves be eternal) will be removed by the perpetuity of connection arising from the continuity of practice regarding the designation of things, the things to be designated, and the designator. But when, as texts of the S'ruti and Smṛiti inform us, the entire three worlds, losing name and form,[8] are utterly annihilated and afterwards produced anew, how can the contradiction be avoided? [The meaning of this is: How can there be an eternal connection between the words of the Veda and objects which how long soever they may have existed, must yet have come into being at the new creation following after the total (not merely the partial) destruction of the universe? and if such a connection does not exist, how can the words of the Veda be eternal, when before this new creation they represented nothing existent? see above, p. 102.] A reply to this is given in the words, 'Yet as (the new creation) has the same name and form as the old,' etc. Even then the world must be admitted to have been without a beginning. This eternity of the world will be declared by our teacher in the words (of

[7] Professor Goldstücker is of opinion that here, as elsewhere, these words (*nāma-rūpa*) should be rendered "substance and form." See the note on the subject furnished by him in M. Burnouf's Introduction à l'histoire du Buddhisme Indien, p. 502.

[8] Govinda Ānanda remarks on the Sūtra before us, and S'ankara's comment: *Nanu mahā-pralaye jāter apy asattvāt śabdārtha-sambandhānityatvam ity āśankya āha "samāna" iti | sūtraṁ nirasya āśankām āha "athāpi" iti | vyakti-santatyā jātīnām avāntara-pralaye sattvāt sambandhas tishṭhati vyavahārāvichhedāj jnāyeta cha iti vedasya anapekshatvena pramāṇye na kaśchid virodhaḥ syāt | nirlepa-pralaye tu sambandha-nāśāt punaḥ srishṭau kenachit puṁsā sanketaḥ karttavyaḥ iti purusha-buddhi-sāpekshatvena vedasya aprāmāṇyam adhyāpakasya āśrayasya nāśād āśritasya anityatvaṁ cha prāptam ity arthaḥ | mahāpralaye 'pi nirlepa-layo 'siddhaḥ sat-kāryya-vādāt |*

Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 36), 'It is agreeable to reason, and it is ascertained.' And the world being eternal, although the Veda declares that its dissolution and reproduction take place during the sleep, and at the waking (of the creator), still as the practice continues the same in the later, as in the previous, waking condition, there is no contradiction (of the sort pretended). And it is to be considered that the same must be the case in regard to the dissolutions and creations of another Kalpa (see Vol. I. p. 43 f.). Now dissolutions and creations are said in the Veda to take place during (the creator's) sleep, and at his waking. 'When the sleeper does not see any vision, and when his breath is concentrated in him, then the voice with all names enters into him, the eye with all forms enters into him, the ear with all sounds enters into him, the mind with all thoughts enters into him. When he wakes, just as sparks shoot out in all directions from blazing fire, so do all breaths according to their several seats issue from this Soul; from the breaths spring deities; and from the deities worlds' (Kaushītakī Brāhmaṇa, latter part, 3, 3). But be it so, that [in the circumstances referred to] there is no contradiction of the kind alleged, because during the

tathā cha saṁskārātmanā śabdārtha-tat-sambandhānāṁ satām eva punaḥ sṛishṭāv abhivyakter na anityatvam | abhivyaktānāṁ pūrva-kalpīya-nama-rūpa-samānatvād na sanketaḥ kenachit kāryyaḥ | vishama-sṛishṭau hi sanketāpekshā na tulya-sṛishṭāv iti pariharati "*tattra idam*" *ity-ādinā* | "But since in a great dissolution even species cease to exist, will it not result that the connection of words with the objects they denote is not eternal? In reference to this doubt the aphorist says, 'as the name and form are the same,' etc. Waving the authority of the Sūtra, the Commentator expresses a doubt in the words 'And further,' etc. It is true that the connection subsists in consequence of the continuity of individuals owing to the existence of species during the intermediate dissolutions, and this connection will be known because the previous practice continues uninterrupted. And so from the independence of the Veda, there will be no contradiction in regard to its authority. But since in a total dissolution all such connection is lost, and some intimation (of what had existed before) must be given by some person at the new creation, the Veda will be dependent on the understanding of such person, and consequently its unauthoritativeness, as well as the non-eternity of the dependent object, owing to the extinction of the instructor on whom it depended, will result. But even in a great dissolution an absolute annihilation is unproved, according to the doctrine that effects exist in their causes. And so, as words, the objects which they denote, and the connection between both, (all of which things previously existed), are manifested at the new creation as reminiscences of a previous existence, they are not non-eternal. As the objects thus manifested have the same names and forms as in the previous Kalpa, there is no necessity for any intimation (of what had existed before) being given by any person. For such an intimation would, indeed, be required in a dissimilar creation, but not in one which is similar. It is thus that the commentator removes the objection in the words 'a reply to this is given,' etc."

sleep (of one person) the practice of others continues uninterruptedly, and even the person who has been in a deep sleep can ascertain the action which took place in his former waking state. But this is inapplicable to a great dissolution, because then there is an absolute annihilation of all practice, and because the practice which prevailed in another Kalpa, like that of another birth, cannot be ascertained. This objection, however, does not hold; for although all practice is annihilated by a great dissolution, still it is proved that through the favour of the supreme Lord, the lords Hiraṇyagarbha (Brahmā), etc., can ascertain the practice of the preceding Kalpa. Although ordinary creatures are not observed to evince the power of discovering the practice of a former birth, the limitation which is true of them will not attach to the great lords in question. For just as in the series of beings commencing with men, and ending with posts, although all the creatures included in it without distinction possess the attribute of life, yet, as we descend the scale, the obstructions to knowledge and to power are perceived to go on gradually increasing; so too, in the series beginning with men and culminating in Hiraṇyagarbha, there is an ever greater and greater manifestation of knowledge and of power, etc.; and thus the transcendent faculties which are declared in texts of the S'ruti and Smṛiti to belong to the beings who again and again come into existence at the beginning of the successive Kalpas cannot be denied to be real. And consequently it is established that the lords Hiraṇyagarbha and others who during the past Kalpa had manifested distinguished knowledge and powers of action, and who again came into existence at the beginning of the present Kalpa, and enjoyed the favour of the supreme Lord, were able, like a person who has been asleep and awakes again, to ascertain the practice of the previous Kalpa. And accordingly the S'ruti says: 'Seeking final liberation, I take refuge with that God, shining by the light of his own intellect, who in the beginning creates Brahmā and reveals to him the Vedas' (S'vetāśv. Upan. vi. 18). And S'aunaka and others record in their Smṛitis that the hymns in the ten Maṇḍalas of the Rig-veda were seen by Madhuchhandas and other rishis. In the same way the Kāṇḍarshis, etc., of each of the Vedas are specified in the Smṛitis. The S'ruti, too, in the passage commencing 'Any priest who in sacrificing for another person, or in teaching a pupil, employs a text of which he does not know the rishi, metre, deity,

and proper application, is turned into a post, or falls into a pit,' and ending, 'Wherefore let him ascertain all these points regarding every text;' —declares that a knowledge of the rishi by whom it was seen should precede the ceremonial use of every text.[9] Further, righteousness is prescribed and unrighteousness is forbidden, with a view to promote the happiness and obviate the misery of living beings: and love and dislike have for their objects nothing but the happiness and misery which are perceptible by sense or are scripturally revealed. Consequently each succeeding creation which is effected, forming, as it does, the recompense of righteousness and unrighteousness, is constituted perfectly similar to each of those which preceded it. And the Smṛiti, too, declares: 'These creatures, as they are reproduced time after time, perform, respectively, the very same actions as they had performed in the previous creation.[10] They so act under the influence of (their previous tendencies) whether noxious or innoxious, mild or cruel, righteous or unrighteous, to truth or to falsehood; and it is from this cause that they are disposed to one or another course of conduct.' Besides, even when this world is destroyed, a residuum of its force (*śakti*) continues, and it is reproduced only because it has this force for its basis: for any other supposition would involve the difficulty of the world having no cause. And as we cannot conceive that there are many forms of force (*śakti*), we must believe that, as the relations between the senses and their objects are invariable, so too, in a world which had no commencement, the successions of earths and other worlds, and of different classes of living beings distinguished as gods, animals, and men, (although separated from each other in the period of their production,) as well as the ordinations of castes, orders, duties, and recompences are invariable. For we cannot imagine that such conditions as the re-

[9] The object of these remarks of S'ankara regarding the rishis is thus explained by Govinda Ānanda: *Kincha mantrāṉām ṛishy-ādi-jnānāvaśyakatva-jnāpikā śrutir mantra-dṛig-ṛishīṉām jnānātiśayam darśayati ity āha* | . . . . *tathā cha jnānādhikaiḥ kalpāntaritam vedam smṛitvā vyavahārasya pravarttitatvād vedasya anāditvam anapekshatvam cha aviruddham iti bhāvaḥ* | "In these words S'ankara intimates that the S'ruti which declares the necessity of knowing the rishis, etc., thereby manifests the transcendent knowledge of the rishis who saw the mantras. . . . . And so from the fact that these rishis, distinguished by eminent knowledge, recollected the Veda which had existed in a different Kalpa, and [again] gave currency to the [ancient] practice [of its precepts], it is shewn that the eternity and independence of the Veda is not in contradiction [to any fact]—such is the purport."

[10] See the First Volume of this work, p. 60.

lations between the senses and their objects, etc., should vary in every creation, in such a way, for example, as that there should exist objects for a sixth sense. Hence, as all Kalpas exist under the same conditions, and as the lords (Hiraṇyagarbha, etc.) are able to ascertain the conditions which existed in another Kalpa, varieties (of beings) having the same name and form are produced in every creation; and in consequence of this sameness of name and form, even though a revolution of the world in the form of a great creation and a great dissolution is admitted, no contradiction arises affecting the authority of the words of the Veda, etc. Both S'ruti and Smṛiti shew us this sameness of name and form. Here such texts of the S'ruti as these may be adduced: 'The creator formed as before the sun and moon, the sky and the earth, the air and the heaven.' This means that in this Kalpa the supreme Lord fashioned the sun, the moon, and the rest of the world in the same way as they had been fashioned in the former Kalpa.' Again: Agni desired, 'May I be the food-eater of the gods." He offered to Agni [as the deity presiding over] the Kṛittikās [11] (the Pleiades) a cake in eight platters.' In this passage the S'ruti shews that the two Agnis, he who in the ceremony of sacrifice to the constellation offered the oblation, and he to whom it was offered, had the same name and form. And such Smṛitis, too, as the following should be examined: 'The Unborn Being gives to those born at the end of the night (*i.e.* of the dissolution [12]) the names of the rishis and their intuitions into the Vedas.[13] Just as on the recurrence of each of the seasons of the year its various characteristics are perceived to be the very same (as they had been before), so too are the things produced at the beginning of the yugas;[14] and the past gods presiding over different objects resemble those who exist at present, and the present (resemble the) past in their names and forms.' "

I shall quote a part of S'ankara's remarks on the Brahma Sūtra, ii. 1, 36, referred to in the earlier part of the preceding quotation, in which the eternity of the world is affirmed:

[11] *Kṛittikā-nakshattrābhimānī-devāya Agnaye* — Govinda Ānanda.

[12] *S'arvaryy-ante pralayānte*—Govinda Ānanda.

[13] The sense of the last words, which I translate literally, is not very clear. Govinda Ānanda says that in the word *vedeshu* the locative case denotes the object (*vedeshv iti vishaya-saptamī*). Compare the passages quoted above in p. 16 from the Vishṇu P. and M. Bh. which partially correspond with this verse.

[14] Already quoted from the Vishṇu P. in the First Volume of this work, p. 60.

ii. 1, 36. "*Upapadyate cha upalabhyate cha*" | "*upapadyate cha*" *saṁsarasya anāditvam* | *ādimattve hi saṁsārasya akasmād udbhūter muktānām api punaḥ saṁsārodbhūti-prasangaḥ* | *akṛitābhyāgama-prasangaś cha sukha-duḥkhādi-vaishamyasya nirnimittatvāt* | *na cha īśvaro vaishamya-hetur ity uktam* | *na cha avidyā kevalā vaishamyasya kāraṇam ekarūpatvāt* | *rāgādi-kleśa-vāsanākshipta-karmāpekshā tv avidyā vaishamya-karī syāt* | *na cha karma antareṇa śarīraṁ sambhavati na cha śarīram antareṇa karma sambhavati iti itaretarāśraya-dosha-prasangaḥ* | *anāditve tu vījānkura-nyāyena upapatter na kaśchid dosho bhavati* |

"'It is agreeable to reason, and it is ascertained.' The eternity of the world is agreeable to reason. For on the supposition that it had a beginning, as it came into existence without a cause, the difficulty would arise (1) that those who had obtained liberation from mundane existence might become again involved in it;[15] and (2) that men would enjoy or suffer the recompense of what they had never done, as the inequalities occasioned by happiness and misery, etc., would be causeless. But God is not the cause of this inequality, as we have said (see the comment on Sūtra ii. 1, 34). Nor can ignorance alone be its cause, since ignorance is uniform (whilst conditions are varied). But ignorance, when connected with works induced by the surviving memory of desire and other sources of disquiet, may be the cause of inequality. Further, corporeal existence does not originate without works, nor works without bodily existence: so that (this hypothesis of the world having had a beginning) involves the fallacy of making each of two things depend upon the other. But on the supposition that the world had no beginning, there is no difficulty, as the two things in question may be conceived to have succeeded each other like seed and sprout from all eternity." (See Ballantyne's Aphorisms of the Sānkhya, Book i. pp. 60 and 126.)

Page 111, *line* 2 *from the foot; and Page* 113, *line* 11

In the first edition, p. 78, I had translated the word *samayādhyushite* "in the morning twilight." When revising the translation for the new edition I became uncertain about the sense, and did not advert

[15] *i.e.* as Professor Cowell suggests, if there is no cause for the production of the world, it comes into existence at hap-hazard, and by some chance the liberated may be born again as well as the unliberated.

to the fact that the term is explained in Professor Wilson's Dictionary as denoting "a time at which neither stars nor sun are visible." Professor Cowell has since pointed out that the word occurs in the second of the following verses of Manu, where a rule is given for the interpretation of the Veda in cases such as that referred to by the commentator on the Nyāya Sūtras: ii. 14: *S'ruti-dvaidhaṁ tu yattra syāt tattra dharmāv ubhau smṛitau | ubhāv api hi tau dharmau samyag uktau manīshibhiḥ* | 15. *Udite 'nudite chaiva samayādhyushite tathā | sarvathā varttate yajnaḥ itīyaṁ vaidikī śrutiḥ* | "14. In cases where there is a twofold Vedic prescription, both the rites are declared in the Smṛiti to be binding; since they have been distinctly pronounced by sages to be of equal authority. 15. The Vedic rule is that sacrifice may be performed in all the three ways [indicated in a particular text], viz. when the sun has risen, when it has not risen, and when neither stars nor sun appear, *i.e.* in the morning twilight." Kullūka says: *Sūrya-nakshatra-varjitaḥ kālaḥ samayādhyushita-śabdena uchyate* | "a time devoid of sun and stars is denoted by the word *samayādhyushita*.

Page 142, *lines* 14 *and* 16.

The first of these quotations is from the Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, i. 4, 10; and the second from the Chhandogya Upanishad, viii. 7, 2.

Page 149, *line* 6.

For *śabdādīkshiter* read *śabdād īkshiter*.

Page 154, *note* 140.

Professor Cowell observes on the close of this note that the Sānkhya opponent maintains that the metaphor is in every case a real one.

Page 157, *line* 18.

Professor Cowell remarks that the meaning of the phrase *śabda-pramāṇake 'rthe* is not correctly rendered by the translation here given, viz. "where the (proper sense) is established by the words." The author is laying down the general rule that in cases where there is nothing in the purport of any passage in which a particular word occurs to lead the reader to suppose that it is figuratively used, and where consequently the word itself is the only index to the sense, it must be understood in its primary signification. The proper rendering, therefore, is: "Where the sense can only be determined by the word itself."

Page 160, *line* 18.

For *punar-utpattir* read *punar-anutpattir*.

Page 181, *lines* 7 *and* 11 *from the foot.*

I learn from Professors Cowell and Goldstücker that *vimatā smṛitiḥ* should be rendered not "the variously understood Smṛiti" but "the Smṛiti which is here the subject of dispute."

Page 183, *note* 160, *line* 1.

With R.V. i. 179, 2, compare R.V. vii. 76, 4, quoted in p. 245.

Page 201, *line* 21.

The commentator thus explains this verse of the Vishṇu Purāṇa (I am indebted to Dr. Hall for a collation of the best MSS. in the India Office Library): *Ete cha dveshopaśama-prakārāḥ madhyamādhikāriṇām eva uktāḥ na tu uttamādhikāriṇām ity āha "ete"* | *"bhinna-dṛiśā" bheda-dṛishṭyā* | *"bhinna-dṛiśām" iti vā pāṭhaḥ* | *tattra bhinna-darśane "abhyupagamam" angīkāraṁ kṛitvā dveshopaśamopāya-bhedāḥ kathitāḥ* | *uktānām upāyānām paramārtha-sankshepo mama mattaḥ śrūyatām* | "In the words 'these notions,' etc.' he tells us that the methods of repressing hatred which have been hitherto declared are those which are followed by the persons who have attained only to the secondary, not to the highest, stage of knowledge. *Bhinna-dṛiśā* is the same as *bheda-dṛishṭyā*, 'with a view which distinguishes [the Deity from themselves],' or the reading is *bhinna-dṛiśām*, 'of persons who look [on Him] as distinct.' 'Accepting' (*abhyupagamaṁ kṛitvā*), *i.e.* admitting, this opinion regarding a distinctness, 'I (the speaker in the V.P.) have declared these methods of repressing hatred. Now hear from me a summary' of the highest truth in regard to these methods."

Page 225, *line* 21.

There is a verse in the Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā, xiii. 45, in which also Agni is connected with the creation: *Yo Agnir Agner adhi ajāyata śokāt pṛithivyāḥ uta vā divas pari* | *yena prajāḥ Viśvakarmā jajāna tam Agne heḍaḥ pari te vṛiṇaktu* | "Agni, may thy wrath avoid that Agni who sprang from Agni, from the flame of the earth or from that of the sky, by whom Viśvakarman generated living creatures." This verse is quoted and after its fashion explained in the S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa, vii. 5, 2, 21: *Atha dakshiṇato 'jam* | *"Yo Agnir Agner adhi ajāyata" ity*

Agnir vai esha | *Agner adhyajāyata* | "*śokāt pṛithivyāḥ uta vā divas pari*" *iti yad vai Prajāpateḥ śokād ajāyata tad divaś cha pṛithivyai cha śokād ajāyata* | "*Yena prajāḥ Viśvakarmā jajāna*" *iti vāg vai ajo vācho vai prajāh Viśvakarmā jajāna ityādi* | "Then [he places] a goat (*aja*) on the southern side, (saying): 'That Agni who sprang from Agni:' this goat is Agni and sprang from Agni. 'From the flame of the earth or from that of the sky:' that which sprang from the flame of Prajāpati sprang from the flame of the earth and of the sky. 'By whom Viśvakarman generated living creatures:' The goat, [or the Unborn], is Vāch (Speech): Viśvakarman generated living creatures from Vāch," etc. Compare R.V. i. 67, 5, quoted above in p. 275.

Page 235, *line* 9.

Add after this the following texts, in which the verbs *taksh* and *jan* are applied to the composition of the hymns:

R.V. i. 67, 4. *Vindanti īm attra naro dhiyam-dhāḥ hṛidā yat tashṭān mantrān aśaṁsan* | "Meditative men find him (Agni) here, when they have uttered hymns of praise fashioned by the heart."

i. 109, 1. *Vi hy akhyam manasā vasyaḥ ichhann Indrāgnī jnāsaḥ uta vā sajātān* | *nānyā yuvat pramatir asti mahyaṁ sa vāṁ dhiyaṁ vājayantīm ataksham* | 2. *Aśravaṁ he bhūri-dāvattarā vāṁ vijāmātur uta vā syālāt* | *atha somasya prayatī yuvabhyām Indrāgnī stomaṁ janayāmi navyam* | "1. Seeking that which is desirable, I beheld [in you], o Indra and Agni, relations or kinsmen. I have no other counsellor than you,—I who have *fabricated* for you a hymn supplicating food. 2. For I have heard that you are more bountiful than an ineligible son-in-law (who has to purchase his bride), or than a bride's brother; so now, while presenting a libation of Soma, I *generate* for you a *new* hymn."

Page 253, *line* 15

Insert after this the following verse: R.V. x. 66, 5. *Sarasvān dhībhir Varuṇo dhṛita-vrataḥ Pūshā Vishṇur mahimā Vāyur Aśvinā* | *brahmakṛito amṛitāḥ viśva-vedasaḥ śarma no yaṁsan trivarūtham aṁhasaḥ* | "May Sarasvat with thoughts, may Varuṇa whose laws are fixed, may Pūshan, Vishṇu the mighty, Vāyu, the Aśvins,—may these makers of prayers, immortal, possessing all resources, afford us a triple-cased protection from calamity."

Supplementary Note on Kālātyayāpadishṭa.—See page 84, note 89, and page 290.

I am indebted to Professor Goldstücker for the following additional remarks on this expression:

The Tarkasangraha, quoted by Professor Cowell in his interesting note which you kindly communicated to me, differs materially from the Bhāshāparichchheda in its interpretation of the fallacy called by them *bādha;* and I might add that the Tarkasangraha-dīpikāprakāśa offers even a third explanation of the same Vaiśeshika term. But I do not think that the *bādha* of the Vaiśeshikas is the same as the *kālātīta* of the Naiyāyikas. For when we find that the Bhāshāparichchheda in its enumeration at v. 70 applies to the fifth *hetvābhāsa* the epithet *kālātyayopadishṭa* (probably the same as the *kālātyayāpadishṭa* of the Nyāya-sūtra i. 50) yet in its explanation of v. 77 does not call it *kālātīta,* as the Nyāya does, but *bādha,* such a variation in terms seems pointed; and when we find moreover that its interpretation of *bādha* differs from Vātsyāyana's interpretation of *kālātīta,* there seems to be a still greater probability that the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika disagree on the question of the fifth *hetvābhāsa.*

For that there is *no* real difference between the Nyāyabhāshya and the Nyāyavṛitti is still my opinion. Both commentaries, I hold, agree in stating that the fallacy *kālātīta* arises when a reason assigned exceeds its proper sphere (*sādhanakāla*), and neither, I think, can have taken *kāla* in its literal sense of "time." This might have been the case if, as Professor Cowell seems to suggest, "plausibility" of an argument were the subject of the Sūtra; but as, in my opinion, the *hetu* is always intended to be a valid and good *hetu,* I do not see how such a *hetu* can become a bad one simply by being advanced too late. It would, however, become bad by being applied to a time, *i.e.* to a case to which it properly does not belong.

The circumstance that the Vṛitti and Bhāshāparichchheda are probably works of the same author, does not invalidate my opinion; it would seem on the contrary to confirm it, since the object of both these works is a different one: the former being intended as an exposition of the Nyāya, and the latter as one of the Vaiśeshika.

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THE END.

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